Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy
I found this an interesting read, The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy (by Johan M.G. van der Dennen; 1995) (over 850 pp. with a huge bib).
Good short review by George Modelski (BLUF):
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What this particular IR scholar appreciates in particular in this analysis is its facultative aspect. It is good to be shown convincingly that humans are neither inherently bellicose nor innately peaceable. Though it might at time have been opportune, war was not preordained in the long distant past, and it is not preordained in the future. On the other hand, it ought to be pointed out that the male-coalitional strategy has been key not only in war but in all the myriad other cooperative enterprises: business, political, religious, associational and sports, that have marked the evolution of the human race and of the world system. Nor does "reproductive strategy" appear sufficiently convincing as the ultimate cause of modern warfare. Territory remains an important bone of contention but hardly an all-encompassing imperative.
What appears to be missing from this account is sensitivity to evolutionary changes in such a basic political institution as war. Are we to understand that in its basic makeup warfare has remained unchanged for several million years? Or that its basic structure was laid down in the dawn of prehistory, and that all that followed, in the past five thousand years of civilization and of "history", has been nothing but "a nightmare" (p.593)? Has nothing changed in world politics even in the past one thousand years? Arguably, the biological (reproductive) component of the war syndrome is less powerful to-day, and the social (coalitional) more important, and working through social evolutionary mechanisms such as e.g. elections, or innovations, that are analogous to natural selection and genetic variation. That much might indeed be implicit in this account but it could be spelled out more fully if the author looked carefully at modern history as the record of world political evolution.
Regards
Mike
"cosmopolitan individualism"
Link; not an endorsement.
See page 5 et seq:
Quote:
B. The Shift toward Cosmopolitan Individualism
A combination of ideological, strategic, and political forces have driven the shift from communalism to individualism in the regulation of wartime behavior. It would be impossible to show which of these forces was most influential, either independently or in connection with a particular issue. Sometimes, military regulations that began as strategic self-interest were later incorporated into the law; at other times, legal norms shaped moral sensibilities, which were then translated into strategic and tactical conduct. These driving forces have been most influential over liberal democracies, and much of the analysis below thus focuses inevitably on the norms that govern — or purport to govern — liberal democracies. ....
Regards
Mike
Cosmopolitan Individualism
Many thanks. Its from Harvard, but I can live with it...:D
Wars of Third Party Revenge
Here is my section on WoTPR. It is still very crude.
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Wars of Third Party Revenge are conflicts whose motivation is predicated on a perceived injustice against an individual or group with whom the warring group has some affiliation. When these wars are conducted by a political state and there is no mutual defense treaty they tend to be classified as humanitarian interventions. Not all humanitarian interventions are motivated by revenge. There has to be a perceived injustice. An early example of a WoTPR was the attacks by the British against the Duke of Savoy in response to the massacre of the Vaudois in the mid 1650’s. In this case the massacre was the injustice and the affiliation was religious; the Vaudois were Protestant.
The impulse for Third Party Revenge acts on the individual and can cause people to take action independent of an actual political interest. This can be observed today in calls for jihad against infidel invaders. The perceived injustice is a territorial infraction and the common affiliation is religion. Individuals join the fight without leadership from within their group. In Syria it is not uncommon for foreign fighters to enter the country in order to protect members of their religion.
Much like the perceived injustice the nature of the affiliation required to activate Third Party Revenge is culturally specific and can change over time. For example, in the West “[t]he concept of people deserving protection evolved: from confessional co-religionists, to all fellow Christians, to all human beings.” It is not unconceivable that this list will continue to expand to “all living beings” as environmental activists and animal rights groups feel compelled to act to protect any living organism.
Not all conflict can be associated with a group need. Wars are often initiated by political leaders for strictly political or personal reasons. If war is a natural activity for humans where a group’s needs is threatened, then wars for reasons other than group needs can be termed artificial. These are wars where the leader initiates the conflict for a personal motivation. There is sufficient information available on when and why leaders take their countries to war so no further examination of this topic is made here.
Rings within rings (or is that wheels within wheels?)
The Hegelian in me wants to see thesis-antithesis pairs in the ring of values in your chart. Just as a case can be made that the middle ring sets anxiety reducing and anxiety free in opposition, in some cases values in the inner ring seem to be opposed to each other, but this does not carry through in any complete way. Can you explain the asymmetry of the values in the inner ring; as a minimum, why the numbers of values that are apprently subordinated to the two middle ring categories are not equal to each other? Or am I just attributing more to the visualization than it is meant to convey?
Schwartz' Universal Values
WM,
The circular design of the inner "ring" or pie comes from Shalom Schwartz Universal Human Values Theory (Are there Universal in the Structure and Content of Human Values). The values are set up opposing based on his surveys. He laid out responses to his surveys in a two dimensional form and the result was that value pie.
It is not as much philosophical theory as it is psychological fact (or at least as much fact as you can have with psychology). He has been working on this theory since 1989 and it is pretty robust.
Whatever Is Material To Defining The War
Quote:
The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor turning it into something that is alien to its nature.[2]
[2] Quoted in John T. Fishel & Max G. Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, Norman: (2006) Univerity of Oklahoma Press, p. 9 from Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: (1976) Princeton University Press, pp. 88-89.
From brother Fishel's book review, Thinking and Writing About COIN.
In any given instance, the materiality (weight to be given) re: the enemy's policy and strategy has to be determined. IMO: e.g., we blew it in Vietnam by not recognizing the kind of war Ho-Giap et al were fighting, compounding by supporting a series of failed SVGs - all determined by trying to force the war into the mold desired by the USG.
In a much simpler (and non-lethal) context, your last section's questions apply to any lawsuit - decide what is material and what is not. IMO: that's largely a matter of experience and intuition.
Regards
Mike
The more things change ...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
A thought or two on this. I sat in several joint planning groups where the group leader would identify the adversary's will to fight as the center of gravity. I didn't find this very useful, but it seems to parallel your proposal that perhaps we should consider targeting the adversary's motivation. I think this should always be considered, and of course most militaries have employed various forms of psychological operations in an attempt to achieve this, but usually based on my observations and in my studies these efforts largely fail. Identity politics seem to be more powerful than any carrots and sticks we can offer. Furthermore one person may have multiple reasons for fighting, and when examine the motivations of an Army, an insurgency, a counterinsurgent force, a gang, etc. I suspect you'll find multiple factors that interact to provide the motivation to fight.
Bill,
Somewhere in the final version I mention that, while what psychologically motivates us to go to war may be a prime mover or first cause, I don’t advocate it as being the center of gravity in a war. It presents an opportunity to reduce the enemy’s success by helping to break their will or by dividing them against themselves, but these are nothing new.
What I did find interesting was that, by examining war in a pre-state society you find that identity is a necessary antecedent for war, not a cause. In modern times we look at war as the province of states so we don’t need to examine the question of how the population divides itself into side: how we determine who is “us” and who are “them”. If you take away the “us versus them” war becomes crime. If I murder a fellow American to take their land I am a criminal. If I kill a (fill in the blank with any indignant population that we colonized) to take their land (or “conquer” it), society accepts that. So while identity politics looks like it is the motivator, it is not. It in simply the way we determine who are the in-group and who is the out-group. Something else has to be added to the mix. Some other motivational trigger like revenge (honor) or greed (power).
This brought out another interesting observation that as Westerners adopt the idea of human rights and begin to see all people as being the same, the people who we decide we can go to war for, the "us", has expanded exponentially. Suddenly ideas like R2P make sense because one of the “us”, defined as all humans, is being attacked by one of the “them”, humans who act unjustly against another human. “Them” is now defined as the members of an unjust government. It is defined in terms of action, not in terms of ethnicity, nationality, or religion. See Dayuhan's comment in post 46 as an illistration of this idea.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I have almost completely dismissed the idea that good governance (after an insurgency starts) will be sufficient in itself to bring an insurgency to an end. I also see absolutely no correlation with our nation building efforts to effectively "counter" an insurgency, yet we blindly assume if we provide jobs the insurgents will quit fighting despite the wealth of empirical evidence to indicate this assumption is not valid.
I agree. Good governance does not really go to any of the motivations that I found. There are certain aspects of a good government, without which you can sustain the motivation to fight (or create new ones), but those are separate from the idea of good governance.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I'm not sure what COIN strategy you're referring to, because frankly I am not aware of one in Afghanistan. I definitely don't see any focused on individual identity, but rather trying to create a largely non-existent identity of an Afghan national. To offer an answer to your question, once we realized the power of the "various" collective identities in Afghanistan should we have adjusted our strategy? If our goal remains to build a national identity, then I our strategy definitely requires us to be aware of the various collective identities, but then we would need a way (I'm not proposing one exists) to convince them that first and foremost they should value their value as an Afghan national.
Funny, we kinda did that by putting infidels amongst them.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
In my opinion we tend to treat most of these insurgencies as a bilateral event between the government and its disaffected people, yet in reality it is normally a multilateral event with different views within the government (not unlike ours), and definitely multiple groups of combatants fighting for different reasons, so the ideal state of a "legitimate government" accepted by all seems to be unreachable in many cases. When we realize that, then we need to adjust our strategy to pursue an achievable end that is better than when we first intervened, but far from perfect. We don't do that, we simply get tired of trying to achieve the impossible and go home.
Social engineering by force is a bad idea to start with. Not to say you can’t do it. I don’t have an answer for this one.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Like you said not much has really changed over the past few centuries when it comes to human nature.
I don’t think human nature has changed for the last 40,000 years. I think that the conditions humans find themselves in have changed, and that has caused humans to behave differently.