Are we securing the people?

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10-04-2005
CPT Holzbach

Are we securing the people?

I do not believe we properly secure the people of Iraq against insurgent retribution. In order to win, we must get actionable intelligence. In order to get the intel, we've got to make the people feel safe giving it to us. In order to make them feel safe, we've got to be able to respond quickly if an informant is in danger. We've got to foster a climate of safety in the neighborhoods. I believe that by living on FOBs, detached from the people, we fail to do this. We should be living in the towns and cities in platoon sized elements, with Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police platoons attached to each US platoon. Intelligence is not processed through a lumbering S-2 chain, but passed directly to the platoon leaders on their cell phones, the numbers to which will be common knowledge amongst the people. Flex whatever patrol is out at the time to investigate. This company size element would be like the local police precinct. Comments?
10-04-2005
Steve Blair

Agreed

This was recognized as far back as the USMC Small Wars Manual (which documented experiences from the inter-war years) and even the Army's operations in the Philippeans around the turn of the century. It was later validated by the CAP program launched by the Marines in Vietnam.

Local intel, fed to the people on the ground by locals who have lived around them and grown to trust them, is vital to any operation like this. When Intel has to flow up the chain, and then somehow make its way back down the chain, information is lost. And if troops aren't out among those they're supposed to protect, it creates an impression that the people either can't be protected or aren't worth protecting.
10-06-2005
Hansmeister

This wasn't happening very much in the beginning, but now we are engaging much more in take&hold operations, vs previously using sweep&destroy.

The main reasons we don't follow the USMC SWM principles of putting platoons into villages to secure them are two-fold. First, Iraq is a heavily urbanized country in which such a strategy would be less successfull. Secondly, the risk that an individual unit could be overrun by a determined enemy is much higher, creating a potential PR nightmare. Just imagine if one platoon, operating independently in an Iraqi village, was wiped out by insurgents. The press would have a field day with a report of 50 US soldiers dead in a single battle.
10-06-2005
Steve Blair

Understandable, and that's where the disconnect comes in. Obviously the CAP doctrine/idea needs to be developed and modified to make it work in an urban area. But the choice is still there: do you go for PR or do you try to actually secure the populace? You can't really do both at the same time, since the route for PR is avoiding risk, while securing the populace involves risk. IMO, anyhow.

If past conflicts provide any examples, it is very difficult for an insurgent force in a village setting to wipe out an entire platoon when it's backed by modern fire support. The press is a reality of modern conflict, but if we let them dictate the course of action we're in trouble.
10-06-2005
Hansmeister

Well, we are in trouble because of the nature of our media. In many ways we have to treat our own media as if it were part of the enemy. The adversarial and sensationalistic role of the modern media makes it impossible to act without considering the impact media reporting will have on the greater conflict.

In the information age the media is critical to achieving victory, and sadly we don't have a media that is on our side.

You're are of course right that a platoon backed with modern fire support can't be beaten by insurgents, but if we would spread hundreds of platoon-size element throughout Iraq to work in local districs it would be impossible to provide proper fire support to them all.

Incidentally, we do have a model that would work in Iraq that we're currently practicing in Afghanistan: the Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT. These teams are made up of several hundred soldiers, including infantry, engineers, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, SF, and intel, as well as IGOs and NGOs. We need to establish similar structures in Iraq, but the problem is that we are suffering a severe shortage in those specialized fields, which would only allow a very limited number of PRTs.

Given our constraints our current deployment, as imperfect as it might be, is probably the only feasable approach.
10-06-2005
Martin

Sirs, beware that I am not a Soldier and that my experience is limited.

With that said, a similar scenario has been documented before. The book Stalking the Vietcong (Stuart A. Herrington) talks about Cpt. Herrington's experiences with the Phoenix program in Vietnam.

Among other themes is the social and political interaction at village level, and how that pertains to intelligence gathering. Similarities also go on from both infiltration of the indigenous forces and the violent threat of the insurgents, to show how the enemy motivation could be understood and therefore exploited in defection programs.

Issues such as being overrun are present, too.

Other than that, I'd like to express a concern about surveillance of cell phones (and phones in general). More I will not say, minding my lack of knowledge.

Martin
10-07-2005
77Marine98

Phoenix Program

Quote:

Originally Posted by Martin

Sirs, beware that I am not a Soldier and that my experience is limited.

With that said, a similar scenario has been documented before. The book Stalking the Vietcong (Stuart A. Herrington) talks about Cpt. Herrington's experiences with the Phoenix program in Vietnam.

Among other themes is the social and political interaction at village level, and how that pertains to intelligence gathering. Similarities also go on from both infiltration of the indigenous forces and the violent threat of the insurgents, to show how the enemy motivation could be understood and therefore exploited in defection programs.

Issues such as being overrun are present, too.

Other than that, I'd like to express a concern about surveillance of cell phones (and phones in general). More I will not say, minding my lack of knowledge.

Martin

Martin, regardless of your background or experience you surfaced a Vietnam era program that worked well, but was vilified in the press and has since become an urban legend. We should study what Phoenix and CORDS did in Vietnam as a harbinger for future operations in that we may most certainly find particular aspects that may be useful, and go figure, successful. Vietnam was not the “total” failure some would like us to believe it was. Of particular note are the lessons we might learn if only we studied them.
10-07-2005
77Marine98

Forgot to mention

I am a fan of the USMC CAP program but at the same time acknowledge what I read on another thread here that you cannot simply take the Vietnam model; lock, stock and barrel; and plop it down into Iraq. Situational adjustments need to be made. That said, had we utilized a CAP-like program early-on and had sufficient resources to guarantee security going into Phase IV the current sit in Iraq may have looked a bit better. Of course, Monday morning quarterbacking is always a breeze.
10-07-2005
Steve Blair

Program Ideas

CAP, Phoenix, and CORDS were all reasonably successful programs in their day (some more than others...I'm a big fan of CAP/CAC), and have lessons that we certainly should study. Note that the key word here is "lesson." All situations are different, but that does not mean that we should ignore what has gone before just because it happened "in the past."

That said, it's also possible to discern successful operational patterns from studying the past. Isolating yourself from the target population has never proven succesful as far as I know. You have to know the terrain and the people, and let them know you within the constraints of prudent security. If you fail in this aspect, you allow your opponent to label you however he likes.
10-07-2005
Ironhorse

Oilspot

See Krepinevich's recent How to Win in Iraq article in Foreign Affairs, advocating an "oilspot" approach.

The CAP approach has some economy of force benefits in some respects. But it can also be a sink hole for forces. Ironic that we couldn't afford to invest the forces into an economy of force operation to preserve and expand our presence.

Has anyone mentioned Shinseki lately?
10-08-2005
CPT Holzbach

Good discussion. Naturally, adjustments need to be made from the original CAP program to fit modern day situations. My experience in Iraq is in Baghdad (Hardly an isolated village. The war here is quite different compared to out west.) I believe the biggest threat to a CAP in a city like this is the VBIEDs, the car bombs. Park one of those outside the platoon's safehouse, and it's a replay of the Marines in Beirut in 1983. As far as the media having a ball with casualties, they do that anyway. Unfortunatly, adopting a CAP program now would ensure a spike in casualties IN THE SHORT TERM. But there's more to security in counterinsurgency than fire power. Information is the best security. The CAP program in Vietnam often forbade the use of supporting artillery entirely. Marines survived through small unit infantry skills, and the protection provided them by the people. They knew when the enemy was coming. In Bing West's The Village, the Marine SQUAD (with the help of the PFs) fought off company and battalion sized elements on more than one occasion, thanks entirely to tip offs from the people, and the threat of rapid reinforcement from nearby Army units. A modern US platoon, supported by an Iraqi Police platoon and an Iraqi Army platoon, in urban terrain (strongly favors the defender), would make very short work of an insurgent force of almost any size. The insurgents here are a far cry from the level of training and skill the Viet Cong and NVA had in infantry combat. Just mustering a sufficiently sized force would be nearly impossible to hide. They would loose any surprise. I dont believe a complete wipe out of a CAP in Baghdad would be a real threat. Stopping car bombs would be the real challenge.
10-08-2005
Strickland

Cap

I disagree with the assessments of CAP needing revision to apply to modern times. Yes, VBIEDs, such as the one used against the Marines in Beirut, are a problem; however, the Beirut example is a poor one due to the ROE the Marines were forced to observe in that situation. The VBIED threat can be mitigated by creating stand-off zones, picking suitable locations to reinforce, and by further creating and enforcing traffic laws and regulations. While others are trying to discover the Mr. Wizard way to defeat VBIEDs; how about installing traffic control devices, no parking zones, mass transit, and simple things like one-way streets. I know that this wouldnt cost $5 billion dollars, but it would employ hundreds of Iraqis to make the signs, post them, and then enforce the appropriate laws.

CAP most certainly works in an urban area. Anyone who has conducted urban combat knows how difficult it is to clear a building of a handful of determined foe, thus the idea of wiping out an entire USMC Platoon iby cutting it off is unrealisitc. Does community policing in the US work? Then why would CAP not work in Iraq? Everyone agrees that securing the population is the first priority. How does one do this without freedom of action and freedom of movement? How does one do this if Army organizations such as Movement Control restrict movement in a predictable manner to the same MSRs?

I also agree that the French colonial warfare method of pacification should be employed. Using widely dispersed units to pacify outward towards each other is a good idea.

I would argue that it maybe time to shift areas of operations between the Army and USMC. The Army can take Al Anbar, and the USMC can take Baghdad. I am not implying that there is a performance difference; however, I am suggesting that by shaking things up and giving the enemy something new to thing about might not be a bad thing. In addition, we need to adjust our expectations of the National Guard. Should we expect these folks to perform on the same level as the active duty peers? If they can perform as equals, then why have an expensive large standing army, why not just one we call up when we need it. It is obvious that too much is being expected of these folks. CAPs run by the USMC throughout the city could work.

In the end, whether we call it Small War, Irregular War, Peoples War, etc., it is all Maneuver Warfare. It is all about generating and controlling tempo in order to create advantages to be exploited by spatial and temporal maneuver. It is about being able to maneuver throught the OODA loop faster than your opponent. We need to get everyone on the same sheet of music.

The question remains - how do we attack the enemy COG - the ability to operate in the open without fear of detection or identification?
10-09-2005
Steve Blair

My point was not that CAP needs to be "modernized," but rather that the basic concept be examined and used where and when appropriate and modified IF that is needed. The community policing example is one that I had intended to draw as well. It has been demonstrated time and again that radio cars alone do NOT provide a good picture for law enforcement. Since a fair percentage of SW activity can be seen as law enforcement (or something similar to that), it stands to reason that we should look to the LE community as well for lessons and tactics that might prove useful.

The biggest issue with maneuver warfare is that the USMC sees that it is the way to go, while the Army has not yet reached this point, IMO at least. The beauty of maneuver warfare is that its basics can be applied to almost any sort of conflict you encounter. I would argue that maneuver warfare is a system for approaching any sort of warfare you encounter. It may require adjustments in some particulars, but the profecient user of MW will come out on top in most situations.
10-29-2005
Strickland

back to where we started

Quote:

Originally Posted by CPT Holzbach

I do not believe we properly secure the people of Iraq against insurgent retribution. In order to win, we must get actionable intelligence. In order to get the intel, we've got to make the people feel safe giving it to us. In order to make them feel safe, we've got to be able to respond quickly if an informant is in danger. We've got to foster a climate of safety in the neighborhoods. I believe that by living on FOBs, detached from the people, we fail to do this. We should be living in the towns and cities in platoon sized elements, with Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police platoons attached to each US platoon. Intelligence is not processed through a lumbering S-2 chain, but passed directly to the platoon leaders on their cell phones, the numbers to which will be common knowledge amongst the people. Flex whatever patrol is out at the time to investigate. This company size element would be like the local police precinct. Comments?

This was the original question/quote from this thread. Upon review, I have the following comments: 1. There were 872 American KIA in Iraq in 2004. (iraq has a total population of 26 million) 2. There were 1360 homicides in Texas in 2004. (Texas has a population of 21 million) 3. Most of the Iraqi provinces are relatively safe; however, just as with Harlem, SE DC, South-Central LA, East St Louis, and others, there are certainly places in the US that ARE NOT SAFE. While we have too few troops in Iraq to provide the appropriate level of security, we should not forget that to most outsiders, US crime figures generate a perception of "civil war."
11-09-2005
sabers8th

AL Anbar

I was in Al Anbar in 03-04 with the Army which was subsequently relieved by the Marines. Since leavign have followed the area of and on since leaving. I hae read articles about the employment of the CAP platoons there but they seem to be overshadoewd by reoccurent Operations to pacify the area that the MArines have seem to lost complete control of... I am not saying we did a outstanding job but if you compare the casualty figures from our entire stay in Iraq to the Marines first month look something like this. Army 3 KIA with @ 100 WIA for one unit compared to Marines 10 KIA first month and 60 serious WIA first month. When we were relieved by the Marines the overall impression from myself is that they really did not have ahandle with what was going on there...... And unfortunately they paid for it. My 2 cents being a former 0311 it was very dissapointing to see them like that.
11-18-2005
DDilegge

LAT Article on Iraq CAP-like Program

18 Nov. Los Angeles Times - The Nation.

Quote:

About 350 Marines here and at Camp Pendleton are being trained as advisors to the Iraqi army, in the hopes that a strategy honed during the Vietnam War can be used to improve Iraq's military and hasten the withdrawal of U.S. personnel....

Split into teams of 11 to 15 men, the Marines will provide monthly evaluations of the Iraqi troops they are embedded with. In many cases, that will mean living outside the security of U.S. bases...

"We have taken a page from Vietnam," Sattler said. In Vietnam, the "combined action platoon" concept brought U.S. and Vietnamese troops together in a counterinsurgency strategy...

Bing West, former assistant Defense secretary in the Reagan administration and author of two books on the Marines in Iraq, said the advisor idea involved a trade-off of "risk of casualties versus [the] reward of better-trained Iraqi soldiers..."

Thomas X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel and author of "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century," said he would like the advisor course at Camp Pendleton to be expanded to six or 12 months, including language training...
11-18-2005
GorTex6

A little late in the game aren't we? :confused:
11-18-2005
DDilegge

Are "We" Confused?

Quote:

Originally Posted by GorTex6

A little late in the game aren't we? :confused:

1st MARDIV trained up CAP units prior to re-deploying to OIF "II". Much training and educaton went into that effort.

Then "#### happened."

Reader's Digest version here:

- Division arrives in country (Al Anbar - Fallujah, Ramadi)
- Division just settling in and ready to impledment CAP
- Contractors killed and hung from bridge
- Mucho press coverage - outrage - attention from 'above'
- Division conducts MOUT to take Fallujah, Iraqi Bn does not perform well
- Division close to taking Fallujah after hard fought battle
- Division ordered to cease and withdraw by 'higher HQ'.
- Division ham-strung by uncertainty from above
- Maybe Iraqi's need more training before being put in 'harm's way'...

Give the Marines a break - I can attest that the CAP program was intended from day one.
11-19-2005
CPT Holzbach

Better late then never.

I think this is a fantatic development. And if these units are intended and organized primarily to fight as CAPs, rather than a whole division with the intention to operate as CAPs, maybe they'll be able to continue mission without too much grief from higher if things get crazy again. And hopefully higher levels will have the confidence in them to take care of themselves if things do go askew. I eagerly await what those guys will have to say about their experiences. Im especially keen to hear how they deal with the IED/VBIED threat when they dont have a fortress FOB to live on. Any word about how long they are supposed to stay?
11-19-2005
SWJED

Good question...

Quote:

Originally Posted by CPT Holzbach

Any word about how long they are supposed to stay?

...because it addresses a hot issue - will the CAP units be in country long enough to create cohesion and continuity between the Marines and Iraqis. Other issues are involved, especially when it comes down to length of tour vs. effectiveness. I am sure there has been some discussion about the current 7-month tour vs. a 1-year stint.
11-20-2005
GorTex6

Quote:

Originally Posted by DDilegge

Give the Marines a break

My reply never meant to blame anyone. Sorry for the misunderstanding.
11-20-2005
CPT Holzbach

Tour should be open ended.

Quote:

I am sure there has been some discussion about the current 7-month tour vs. a 1-year stint.

I think the standard Marine tour of 7 months is definatly too short. A year would be better, but as a minimum. I think they should leave the ultimate completion date up to the experts on the ground: the Marine squad involved. If they become as invested in the people as Bing West describes in his book The Village, they may volunteer to stay longer, a request that should not be denied. They will also need to look into properly training individual replacements. A squad size element can be depleted fast if the situation is rough, especially in a city. There may not be enough time to train up a full squad replacement should the exisiting one become combat inefective. Such a switch would also destroy continuity between the teams and the local people.
11-21-2005
DDilegge

Quote:

Originally Posted by GorTex6

My reply never meant to blame anyone. Sorry for the misunderstanding.

No harm done, I thought the post was directed at USMC prepardness early on in OIF II, I probably misread your statement.
11-27-2005
Hansmeister

Related to this we've started establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq:

Quote:

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice made a surprise appearance at the inauguration of the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).
Rice established Iraq’s first Provincial Reconstruction Team on Veterans’ Day 2005, along with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad; Deputy Regional Coordinator, Clarence Hudson; and Director of the National Coordination Team, Greg Bates.

The ceremony took place on Forward Operating Base Courage located in Mosul, Iraq, one day after the Ninewa PRT completed its initial training. This effort was lead by Bates and certified by Maj. Gen. Robert Heine, Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office Deputy Director for Operations.

This ceremony inaugurated the first of fifteen PRTs that will deploy across Iraq by next summer; two more PRTs are being fielded in Nov. to demonstrate a “proof of principle” and provide lessons for further implementation. The remaining 12 PRTs and one Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) are scheduled for implementation by July 2006.

The PRT is designed to lead the effort to build capability and sustainability within Iraq’s provincial governments, eventually allowing them to function independent of Coalition assistance. This transition to Iraqi leadership will be achieved by developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, increasing security and assuring rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and by providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

Accomplishing these efforts is essential a stable democracy evolving in Iraq and increased stability spreading throughout the Middle East.

“The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is fundamental to the success of the PRT in building capable and sustainable institutions for Iraq’s local and provincial governments,” said Col. Richard Jenkins, USACE Gulf Region North commander.

Major Mike Farrell is the USACE engineer officer assigned to the Ninewa PRT. When asked what was most significant to him personally, he said, “As a U.S. Army officer, I swore to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. Now, I have the opportunity to help implement a constitution and mentor fellow engineers on providing for their citizens’ basic needs.

Secretary of State Rice addresses the first Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team on Nov. 11, 2005. (GRD Photos by Polli Keller)

“The USACE has been fundamental in executing the Iraqi reconstruction program,” said Farrell. “Now, through PRT, we will be instrumental in helping the Iraqis learn to do it for themselves.”

Jenkins also stated the Iraqis are first in the planning and implementation of reconstruction efforts because it is their future and they have both the responsibility and the capability to make it work.

The reconstruction program has become the frontline in Iraq. Although insurgents have caused delays and damage -- both in lives and increased costs for the reconstruction effort -- the U.S. and Iraqi governments remain steadfast in their joint efforts to help rebuild Iraq. The formation of the PRT will help develop effective solutions to some of the challenges facing Iraq -- an important step as Iraq takes the lead in addressing their problems with the U.S. serving as a true partner, assisting in their efforts.