US policy with an ally like the Saudis till 2016

20 Face Lash for Dancing in Saudi Arabia - AP.

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Saudi Arabia - A Saudi Arabian judge sentenced 20 foreigners to receive lashes and spend several months in prison after convicting them of attending a party where alcohol was served and men and women danced, a newspaper reported Sunday.

The defendants were among 433 foreigners, including some 240 women, arrested by the kingdom's religious police for attending the party in Jiddah, the state-guided newspaper Okaz said. It did not identify the foreigners, give their nationalities or say when the party took place. Judge Saud al-Boushi sentenced the 20 to prison terms of three to four months and ordered them to receive an unspecified number of lashes, the newspaper said. They have the right to appeal, it added.

Saudi Arabia follows a strict interpretation of Islam under which it bans alcohol and meetings between unrelated men and women.

The religious police, a force resented by many Saudis for interfering in personal lives, enjoys wide powers. Its officers roam malls, markets, universities and other public places looking for such infractions as unrelated men and women mingling, men skipping Islam's five daily prayers and women with strands of hair showing from under their veil...

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I love the title to this post....:D With allies like Pakistan and them how can we go wrong? :confused:

Some of our Rock and Rap groups would be beheaded for performing, huh? It's enough to make a man want to use biodiesel and electricity as the main means of powering vehicles.

Another LBR essay, this one looking at the Saudi monarchy and oil.

Best

Tom

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In Princes’ Pockets
Tariq Ali
America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier by Robert Vitalis · Stanford, 353 pp, £19.50

Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation by Madawi Al-Rasheed · Cambridge, 308 pp, £19.99

The day after the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, a Saudi woman resident in London, a member of a wealthy family, rang her sister in Riyadh to discuss the crisis affecting the kingdom. Her niece answered the phone.

‘Where’s your mother?’

‘She’s here, dearest aunt, and I’ll get her in a minute, but is that all you have to say to me? No congratulations for yesterday?’

The dearest aunt, out of the country for far too long, was taken aback. She should not have been. The fervour that didn’t dare show itself in public was strong even at the upper levels of Saudi society. US intelligence agencies engaged in routine surveillance were, to their immense surprise, picking up unguarded cellphone talk in which excited Saudi princelings were heard revelling in bin Laden’s latest caper. Like the CIA, they had not thought it possible for him to reach such heights.

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This issue has come up on a number of threads where it was peripheral; I though it deserved its own discussion.

One view that’s been proposed is that Saudi Arabia is a central front in the GWOT. According to this view, decades of bad governance in Saudi Arabia combined with the perception of Western support for the Saudi government has generated an insurgent situation which expresses itself primarily externally, in the form of terrorist attacks and support for insurgents and anti-Western forces in other countries. This view holds as well that popular resentment toward the Saudi government fuels and enables insurgencies in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and others.

According to this view, the US badly needs to revise its policy toward Saudi Arabia, acting as a mediator between the Saudi Government and its own populace and visibly pressing for reforms, thereby appropriating the al Qaeda agenda.

I could describe this argument in more detail and quote from previous posts, but those who support it are more than able to speak for themselves.

My own view is somewhat different. First, I would question the assumption that the Saudi populace is in a state of insurgency or near-insurgency. There’s no doubt that radical Islamic political beliefs have some quite fanatical adherents in Saudi Arabia, but I see no evidence that the populace at large is on the verge of insurgency.

It seems to me that much of our thinking on Saudi Arabia remains mired in the 1990s, when the oil glut was driving severe economic stress and the US military presence, which continued long after it was necessary, provided a convenient scapegoat. This was the environment that drove the preaching of the “three sheiks”, the radical preachers that provided much of the AQ narrative.

Today’s situation in Saudi Arabia is very different. The massive influx of cash from 5 years of high oil prices has been largely invested domestically, with very visible results. The substance of what one might call the “three sheiks narrative” has collapsed. The sheiks, and AQ, claimed that the US would never leave Saudi Arabia, that Americans would convert Saudis to Christianity, corrupt the women, violate the holy places. They claimed that the US would never allow a fair price for oil, would end up taking control of the oil, would never allow Arabs to prosper, would never treat Arabs with respect. All of these claims are now obviously false and completely useless.

This change is reflected in the content of AQ communications. The 1990s communiqués, most notably Osama’s declaration of jihad, revolve almost entirely around Saudi Arabia; issues such as Palestine are barely mentioned. In the recent releases Palestine takes center stage; the most recent tape does not even mention Saudi Arabia. The implication is that AQ has already lost Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and they know it.

The great irony here is that the rise of China and the surge in oil prices have severely trimmed US power, but they have also given AQ a groin chop from which they may not recover. The surge in oil prices does not seem likely to abate any time soon; prosperity is not conducive to rebellion and the AQ narrative is not very appealing while Gulf Arabs are rolling in cash and receiving deferential (sometimes groveling) treatment from Western leaders.

I do not believe that AQ enables the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies; I would suggest that AQ is enabled by these insurgencies. Very few Iraqis or Afghans fight because of what’s happening in Saudi Arabia, they fight because of what’s happening in their own countries. The Saudi situation may motivate some foreign fighters, but foreign fighters are hardly the core problem. AQ thrives on the “resistance to foreign intervention” narrative, which provides it credibility that it’s anti-Saudi narrative never gained.

Even if it were desirable for us to promote reform in Saudi Arabia, our ability to do so is quite limited. The Saudis do not depend on us, and we have neither carrots nor sticks to guide their behaviour. On the contrary, they have quite a significant capacity to guide ours: they have oil, and their investments in our economy provide a badly needed support. They certainly don’t need our money, and they face no immediate military threat. If they were threatened – say by Iran – we would come to their aid in any event, simply because it would be in our interest to do so.

I also doubt that our intervention is sought or desired by the Saudi populace, which would probably see any attempt to intervene as further evidence of inappropriate influence, and would likely assume that we were pursuing our own interests rather than theirs.

A good deal more could be said, and probably will be. All other views welcome...

Dayuhan,

I suppose what General Petraeus says is indicative, in a speech in London on the 18th September 2009:

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Meanwhile, in the Arabian Peninsula, we have seen important signs of progress against Al-Qaida and extremist organisations, with the exception of Yemen that is. The progress in this arena is especially significant to the United States and Europe because of the extensive political and commercial connections we have with the Gulf states and because of the concerns we’ve had over the years about the growth of extremism on the Peninsula and its transnational nature. It is hugely significant, therefore, that Saudi Arabia has virtually eliminated Al-Qaida from its territories, though the attack on Deputy Minister of Interior Mohammed Bin-Naif was unsettling, to be sure. That notwithstanding, the kingdom has implemented an impressive and effective comprehensive counter-extremist programme.

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From: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/news/news.cgi?id=749

The other issue that few seem to raise publically is the external role of Saudi agencies in promoting their version of Islam and the number of scholars studying there. Other threads may have touched upon this and IIRC reference was made to Saudi funding appearing in parts of Nigeria.

davidbfpo

This, I think, will be of concern in the next few years.

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In July, Richard C. Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the Taliban was reaping the bulk of its revenue from donors abroad, especially from the Persian Gulf.

Other U.S. officials have noted that the Taliban received substantial financial help from Gulf countries during the 1990s, when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- along with Pakistan -- were the only nations that gave diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government ...

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Tequila,

It is worthy of note that the UAE contributes to ISAF. IIRC Special Forces at one point. ISAF's webpage shows 25 troops: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf

As always there are different aspects to their role: a 2007 report of a defector: http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2...138362757.html and a 2008 BBC report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7318731.stm

There are no Saudi troops in ISAF.

davidbfpo

It has long been my contention here on SWJ that the nature of the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America is the Center of Gravity of the decade long War on Terrorism.

Today on a thread regarding Iran and a possible AQ link.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...-alqa/#c022781

Dayuhan posed a fair observation and question:

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I understand your concern with Saudi Arabia, but I think, as always, that you vastly overestimate AQ's reliance on Saudi resentment toward their own government, and even more vastly overestimate the ability of the US to do anything about the way Saudi Arabia is governed. We can rethink that relationship all we want; how we think isn't likely to change anything. They are not a vassal or a client state, and they are not going to change their way of governing because we want them to. I really don't know what, in any specific sense, you want the US to do about the Saudi situation.

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What indeed does one do with an Ally such as Saudi Arabia? The home of bin Laden. The home of the vast majority of the 9/11 attackers. The home of the vast majority of foreign fighters in Iraq. The home of one of the most oppressive regimes on the planet. The home of the largest proven oil reserves on the planet. What in deed does one do.

I will explore that question, and invite others to join in that exploration as well.

Bob

Alliance isn't only a function of common values. Common interests come into it as well, and those with whom we have interests in common aren't necessarily progressive. Those alliances - like all alliances - are not absolute, and we obviously have to consider the extent of our commitment at any given point... but common interests do exist.

I've often heard it said that the US "supported the Saudis" when they were threatened by Saddam. This is to some extent true, but it's a highly distorted view. We did not act to protect the Saudis, we acted to protect ourselves. The US can't allow the Gulf oil supplies to be controlled or dominated by a hostile power that would use oil as a weapon. We would fight again if Iran threatened to control those oil supplies. Again, that has absolutely nothing to do with how we feel about the way the Saudis govern, or how progressive they are, or whether we like them. It's purely a matter of common interest.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

What indeed does one do with an Ally such as Saudi Arabia? The home of bin Laden. The home of the vast majority of the 9/11 attackers. The home of the vast majority of foreign fighters in Iraq. The home of one of the most oppressive regimes on the planet. The home of the largest proven oil reserves on the planet. What in deed does one do.

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Is our problem the way Saudi Arabia is governed, or is our problem our own addiction to oil? Both, obviously, but we might want to consider which of those is within our ability to control.

It's easy to make assumptions, and altogether too easy to act on them, but there are a few here that we need to avoid.

We're conditioned by our cold war history to see our dictatorial allies as dependents, over whom we have significant influence. We should not overestimate our influence over the Saudis and the other Gulf states.

We easily fall into the trap of oversimplifying the political dynamics of other countries. We see an autocratic government, we assume a populace uniformly seeking freedom and a "government vs populace" dynamic. It's often a great deal more complicated than that. Trying to intervene in situations we don't fully understand, or that we misinterpret by assuming that our values apply universally, can quickly bounce back and bite us no the backside.

It's also all too easy to assume that because many people in Saudi Arabia (or any number of other places) dislike their governments and resent our perceived (accurately or not) support for those governments, we can counter that resentment by openly pushing those governments to change, or by trying to somehow intervene as champion of the populace. That I think is a very dangerous delusion. Even people who detest their own governments often don't want the US trying to lecture those governments or dictate to them, or to act as the instigator of change. Our actions are typically seen as conspiratorial attempts to advance our own interests, and our active support can actually discredit a reform agenda. We do not want reformers to be seen as tools of the US.

If we're asking the old "what can we do" question, we have to ask whether we have to do anything. Supporting those who seek change is often a good thing, if we can do it subtly and without seeming to direct or take over the reform agenda (subtlety, alas, has never been one of our strong suits). Trying to initiate, direct, or control political change in other countries... for me that's kind of a reverse Nike slogan: just don't do it.

We should remember that what fuels support for AQ is not simply US support for repressive regimes, it's western interference in the Muslim world in general. We may say that we're interfering on behalf of the people, but who will believe us? Very even for even well intentioned interference to backfire on us.

Not saying we should abandon all thought of intervention... but we need to think very, very carefully before trying to initiate political change in any other country, most especially those in the Middle East.

Our default position in managing the internal affairs of other countries, IMO, should be to stay out of it. If that default seems unsustainable, three quick questions before taking any action:

Must we?
Can we?
Should we?

All three have to be very carefully reviewed before we go sticking ourselves into other people's business.

R.C. Jones, you bet I'll join in. You want believe what has just recently come to light, well on second thought you probably want be surprised at all.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

What indeed does one do with an Ally such as Saudi Arabia?

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Are they a real ally -- or just a nation with whom we do business, have some common interests and many disconnects? I'd say the latter.

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The home of bin Laden.

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Well, yeah. Though I'm totally unsure what that has to do with your topic.

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The home of the vast majority of the 9/11 attackers.

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Yep. Others from various places. Other attackers at other times in total outnumber the Saudis. Though, again, I'm not sure what that has to do with anything...

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The home of the vast majority of foreign fighters in Iraq.

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Way wrong, I suspect. No way to get really accurate numbers but generally, the Egyptians, Syrians and Sudanese were captured and killed in greater quantities than Saudis -- the foreign fighters in Iraq literally came from all over. As do those in Afghanistan, where Pakistanis and North African Arabs seem to be the most numerous. I think the problem is one of Islamic distaste for the US versus Saudi implacable hatred for us.

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The home of one of the most oppressive regimes on the planet.

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Yep, oppressive, one of the most so. Shame. Not our concern. We can express distaste but really have no right to do more. None.

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The home of the largest proven oil reserves on the planet.

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Proven (conservatively). Go to 2 P or 3 P and they drop well down in the tables IIRC. Canada and Russia (plus the US...) might hop out there... :D.

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What in deed does one do.

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Depends. Some say:

- Subject them to intense pressures to change their ways, to include military action.

- Buy no oil from them.

- Work with them to achieve change using carrots and sticks.

- Do nothing, they are a business associate, no more.

- Support the Kingdom totally, get more involved with and supportive of Islam.

And ten or so variations between each of those. IOW, there are numerous 'positions' on what should be done. Your problem is that those varied positions are held by and within the Congress of the United States and the current Administration (as well as almost any likely future Administration). i.e. No consensus, ergo, nothing will be done other than incremental nudges. As Martha Stewart, Federal felon says, "this is a good thing..."

It is not our job to interfere with sovereign States and we darn sure do not do it very well. See Korea, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq.

I was reading a new book yesterday, ran across this line: "He (Lyndon Johnson, POTUS) was unable to make hard decisions -- to mobilize the reserves, to force the South Vietnamese government to reform, to commit fully to the war, or to explain his policy clearly to the American people."

I agree the first, third and fourth were in the President's scope for decisions -- but I cackled at that second item. No US President has ever had the power to make such a decision and if he made it he couldn't enforce it. Yet that attitude -- we want if 'fixed' so it must be fixed is pervasive in US strategic and policy circles. It's foolish hubris. Thinking it's ones job to fix others is as dangerous and wrong as any Cold War missteps.

Dayuhan has it right:

""Our actions are typically seen as conspiratorial attempts to advance our own interests, and our active support can actually discredit a reform agenda. We do not want reformers to be seen as tools of the US.

If we're asking the old "what can we do" question, we have to ask whether we have to do anything. Supporting those who seek change is often a good thing, if we can do it subtly and without seeming to direct or take over the reform agenda (subtlety, alas, has never been one of our strong suits). Trying to initiate, direct, or control political change in other countries... for me that's kind of a reverse Nike slogan: just don't do it.""

Experts don't consider the Saudi oil reserves claims reliable. The figures are pretty much made-up - no foreigner really knows how much oil they have.

About "ally"; I remarked years ago that Americans tend to use that word inflationary. That is dangerous, for at times people really believe that a nation with which you had some agreements and which was called an "ally" is really allied - with obligations and all. See Georgia and the nutty idea that they were an ally and the U.S. should somehow intervene...
The inflationary use of the word "ally" also leads to delusions in the "allied" country (again; Georgia!).


Btw; the German government proved its lack of taste, judgement and class in regard to Saudi Arabia just a few weeks ago.

Good comments so far.

First, when I suggest we need to "do something" I always direct that finger primarily in the direction of what do we change about ourselves, about our end of the equation, first. We need to evolve from defining our problems as being something we solve in foreign lands while we seek to go about business as usual at home.

Second, the energy driving transnational terrorism is, IMO, primarily coming from a large number of long suppressed nationalist insurgencies that AQ and others tap into to leverage in support of their own agendas of power and control. This is important, because a global effort to leverage many distinct insurgencies does not make a "global insurgency" when done today by NSAs any more than it did in the Cold War when done by the Soviets and the US. Each is unique and must be addressed individually. Also the grievances and issues that create the conditions of insurgency among a populace are much more about perception than fact. More on that last one

Dayuhan relies heavily on "fact;" and Ken raises some challenges to some of the "facts" I quickly laid out to help frame the discussion (I can provide cites), but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is. Historically governments challenged by insurgency have tended to grossly discount the grievances of the populace as the conditions of insurgency were growing to noticeable levels, but still very manageable through simple civil adjustments on key points. Even when the insurgency explodes into violent, illegal action the governments tend to cling to their "rightness" on the issues, and to write off the insurgency as the actions of a few misguided malcontents, or on some radicalizing ideology, or some foreign actor, or any combination of the three. Rarely do they recognize that a long series of governmental disconnects have produced a widespread condition of insurgency among the populace from which such movements spring and are sustained.

What are the perceptions of the Saudi people about their government?

what are the perceptions of the Saudi people about the US?

What are the perceptions of the Saudi people about the nature of the relationship between the Saudi Royals and the US?

What aspect of these perceptions are in turn targeted and exploited by NSAs such as AQ?

What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

...Ken raises some challenges to some of the "facts" I quickly laid out to help frame the discussion (I can provide cites)...

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Nope. Incorrect. I didn't challenge your facts, I agree with all except the oil and the Saudis being the largest supplier of Furrin Fighters -- I too can provide cites on that -- what I did 'challenge' was the relevancy of any of those facts to your premise.

That's the subject FYI. Then, on other aspects of your comment...

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...but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is.

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Ah, the silver tongued attorney person himself subtly points out that, as I said, those 'facts' don't count for much... :D

He then asks questions about Saudis perceptions which neither he nor we can answer though we could speculate until the cows RON at the barn.:wry:

This OTOH:

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What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

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Seems perfectly reasonable. Except that it asks us to define a policy based on the above speculation. :eek:

While this:

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what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

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is really none of our business.

It is good to advocate dismissal and recasting of Cold War values and practices. It is IMO however rather unwise, perhaps even a bit conflicted, to advocate continued interference in and with other nations just done a bit differently. To me, that seems to be a continuation of the cold war by other means... :rolleyes:

Actually I believe that such perceptions are easily derived if one simply listens for them. Too often we are so focused on ourselves and what we think is either important or legal, that we do not hear, or rather listen, to the perspectives that are most important to the matter at hand.

As to the internal stability of Saudi Arabia, if it is "none of our business" (IE, we have no vital national interests there), then great, let it burn, because left unchecked, it will indeed burn sooner than later.

The problem is that we do have a vital interest in the stability of that region. For the past 60+ years our approach to that stability has been in the the form of supporting the government while turning a blind eye to growing problems between that government and their populace. Historically such approaches have worked well. "Friendly Dictators" are a proven tool of securing interests in foreign lands.

My contention is that in the current information environment such relationships are obsolete, in that the Cost now exceeds the Benefit. Markets change, and business models must change as well or grow obsolete. We are working to force an obsolete "business model" to work; and the populaces affected by our actions are more than willing to attack us for our troubles.

We need a new "business model."

This in not unlike what Great Britain encountered with their empire. As populaces connected and empowered by the very network of telegraphs, steam ships and railroads built by the British to manage and exploit their empire, employed those same tools to stand up and resist that foreign presence and the illegitimate governments they formed and protected. The Cost of empire came to exceed the Benefit of empire, so the Brits were forced to adopt a new business model (the Commonwealth) and contract the degree of control they sought to exercise over others.

So too the US today with our Containment strategy that is also rooted in exercising controlling influence over others (not to the degree of colonialism, but control-based all the same). We too need a new business model.

Like the Brits we are currently attacking the points of friction in an attempt to force the failing model to work. Like the Brits we are learning the hard way that such efforts are futile.

Instead of nicking away at the edges with efforts to sustain an unsustainable status quo, I recommend that we focus on the heart of the matter with an effort to design and implement a new, more sustainable business model.

Preaching "universal values" won't get us there.

Blindly supporting despots who oversee vital interests for us won't get us there.

Sending the Military from hot spot to hot spot to help suppress those who dare to act out against the current system will not get us there.

We must get in front of the situation and focus on this new system. One that is less controlling. One in which the affected populaces have a greater say. One that by definition must be different than the one that exists today.

Or we can just keep expanding the lists of organizations we deem to be "terrorist" and just keep sending the military out to conduct CT against those organizations, while we continue to spend an ever increasing amount to prop up failing allied governments with development, security force capacity designed for internal threats, etc. If we do this, we will fall and fall hard. This is not inevitable, it is in fact very avoidable. But first we must get to step one, and that is to admit we have a problem internal to ourselves. Currently we dwell in denial. This is like any other form of addiction to self-destructive behavior.

Gleaning from that information which is publicly available (well, that portion of it which is written in English, at least!) my take is that the U.S. Government seems to have unrealistic expectations of the House of Saud. They—and I use the pronoun with the recognition that it encompasses within its scope plenty of factions at cross-purposes—seem to be either unwilling or unable to aid our (ever “evolving”) counter-terrorism strategy.

As to whether the House of Saud is a good bet to provide stability, my reading of the publicly available stuff is that they are not. The social welfare carrot they have so lavishly funded does not appear to be sustainable and one would suspect that that is going to lead to eventual tensions emanating from the non-Royal Saudi citizenry. But just as serious a threat would seem to be internal to the House, as the members of the family are often portrayed as conniving, petty, back-stabbing simpletons. Not the first time such a charge has been leveled at a ruling family of aristocrats, of course. :p Nor does a political system even need to be non-democratic to evidence those qualities, as demonstrated by the last few weeks in DC. :rolleyes:

A question and two follow-up questions to it for those with a good knowledge of such things—am I correct in assuming that stability in Riyadh is an absolute prerequisite for the continued operation of NSA Bahrain? Are there any plausible alternative locations for a comparable base? And is such a base an unquestionable necessity for U.S. military and political strategy as it now stands?

"It is just like man's vanity and impertinence to call an animal dumb because it is dumb to his dull perceptions."

Perceptions abound -- and they are often wrong, sometimes dangerously so.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Actually I believe that such perceptions are easily derived if one simply listens for them...

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So it is your perception that is so? Perhaps true, they do in fact seem to be easily so derived -- perhaps too easily -- and those derivations are historically often terribly wrong.

Hopefully you will recall that we Americans historically do quite poorly on assessments of the perceptions held by those in other lands -- and the more different the language and / or culture, the more likelihood of terribly flawed ideas being adopted.

Perceptions are important; they are not reality. People in general are indeed prone to act on their perceptions but it seems to me to be incumbent upon planners and strategists to not fall into that trap themselves...;)

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The problem is that we do have a vital interest in the stability of that region. For the past 60+ years our approach to that stability has been in the the form of supporting the government while turning a blind eye to growing problems between that government and their populace. Historically such approaches have worked well. "Friendly Dictators" are a proven tool of securing interests in foreign lands.

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No, they have not worked well, not at all. They merely succeeded in forestalling the inevitable (see Spring, Arab...), generally for the benefit of the supporters of that terribly flawed policy. Your belief and that of many in the policy establishments that they have worked is a very significant contributor to our current and recent past imbroglios -- and even as modified by you, does not bode well for the future which appears to be doing the same thing (define insanity...) with minor tweaks and being (slightly) less controlling in the process...

Controlling is controlling, no matter how sweetly it's couched.

It is interesting to speculate how things might be different if there was not almost a need in our political system as currently modified for the benefit of the political parties and incumbents, the shakers and movers in the policy establishments (plural -- and that's another issue...) to move from crisis to crisis -- or at least event to event... :rolleyes:

Might I suggest that we do not really have vital interests there but that we have simply assumed we must have some since we elected to foster oil dependency worldwide? We did that for short term gain and because it was seemingly easy. As many are fond of saying, it's all about choices -- and the US polity is very fond of seemingly easy choices that punt problems a yard or two at a time. We do not have a US foreign policy nor do we have many national interests outside our shores, we have US domestic politics that drive foreign efforts -- and adventures (most of which do not work out that well in this era of 'Super Size Me').

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My contention is that in the current information environment such relationships are obsolete, in that the Cost now exceeds the Benefit. Markets change, and business models must change as well or grow obsolete. We are working to force an obsolete "business model" to work; and the populaces affected by our actions are more than willing to attack us for our troubles.

We need a new "business model."

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We agree on that and this:

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So too the US today with our Containment strategy that is also rooted in exercising controlling influence over others (not to the degree of colonialism, but control-based all the same). We too need a new business model.
...
...while we continue to spend an ever increasing amount to prop up failing allied governments with development, security force capacity designed for internal threats, etc. If we do this, we will fall and fall hard. This is not inevitable, it is in fact very avoidable. But first we must get to step one, and that is to admit we have a problem internal to ourselves. Currently we dwell in denial. This is like any other form of addiction to self-destructive behavior.

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Absolutely agree.

We disagree on two points, one you elide and one in which IMO you are a victim of misperception...

You never mention the fact that US domestic politics drive the train of our foreign activities and you never offer solutions or recommendations to fix that major problem. It may be that you believe that is not a correct assessment or that you think that may be correct but is unimportant. I think history proves that it is both correct and quite important (I can provide cites).

You believe we should intrude on other nations when we perceive (there's that word again...) our interests require it. IOW you want to do the same thing but with more finesse (something of which, as I have to keep reminding you, the US government is totally incapable :rolleyes:). A belief or policy based on perceptions can be and likely will be just as flawed as one based on invalid assumptions -- or is that redundant??? :D

Link to former Senator Bob Graham's new novel. I am trying to find the TV interview he did. It goes all the way back to the end of WW2.


http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...ob-graham.html

This is not aimed primarily at Bob, but at the loose usage of language (unfortunately a too-common usage) in his message:

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from BW
... but the important thing to remember is that if the aggrieved populace believes something to be true or significant, then it is.

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....then it (the perception) is exactly what - true or significant ?

What is "true", for most of us mortals, is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, or a neat package (a Holy Grail) that we can find if we only search enough. As Pilate asked (with question not answered): "What is Truth ?"

I will take "an important thing to remember" as this: if a substantial population group believes something to be "true", that perception is "significant" to that group; and that perception may or may not be "significant" to third parties. That it is or may be "significant" does not make it "true".

For example, we can find a number of historical examples where a population group believed its magico-religious rite were sufficient to prevent death in war (e.g., the Sudanese Mahdists and Plains Indian Ghost Dancers). Those perceptions were obviously not "true" (certainly not to the lead bullets that were not impressed by magico-religion).

BLAE: I agree with Ken: "Perceptions abound -- and they are often wrong, sometimes dangerously so."

Regards

Mike

As to lawyers, legal strategy and what is "true", see this post and the article "A Theory of Legal Strategy".

No, I believe we should fix ourselves first. How we operate internally and how we interact in locations where we have convinced ourselves we have "vital" national interests at stake.

In recent days we have all watched the debate between the Democrats and Republicans. Both profess to be fighting for the American people, yet in reality the Democrats fight to preserve their President in office and the Republicans fight to take him out in the coming elections. All hard decisions are (in their minds) something to deal with "after the election." The problem is that "after the election" like tomorrow, never comes.

Some times I wonder if American politicians appreciate that even our amazing constitution can only protect them for so long. Sad bit of business to watch. Yet for how amazingly F'd up and embarrassing our elected officials are; we still are citizens of a political system that is the envy of much of the world. Little wonder so many Saudis get scarfed up in the middle of the night without warrant or charge; or scoot off to places like Yemen or the FATA to bide their time and plot their return.

But still, if we allow the percept to persist that the Saudi Royals are protected against internal and external challengers by a US insurance policy there will be those who will seek to get us to break that commitment of support. I think much of what we need to do can be done by simply going on record that it is a new era:

1. That we do not care who presides over Saudi Arabia and that we are willing to continue to work with whomever that might be, regardless of how they came to rise to power. But we won't protect that new group either, so they better be snapped in with the people or they will likely soon suffer the same fate at their hands.

2. That we do not care what form of government the Saudi people self-determine.

3. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we will act to prevent external challenge.

4. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we reserve the right to act decisively to preserve infrastructure deemed vital to our own national survival and to hold the same in trust until such time as such threatening disputes are resolved (So figure out a way to work this out without forcing our hand to step in).

Meanwhile I think some backroom discussions with the Royals are long overdue. They can listen or not, its their heads. Simple changes, such as putting a little more "justice" into the justice system; or either getting the Royals closer to Islam or acting to bifurcate the "keeper of Islam" role from the Royal job description, would both go a long way toward greater stability.

Some concepts that have worked well elsewhere that might be worth considering are:

1. A parliamentary system similar to Britain's, with the Royals stepping into a similar role.

2. A creation of a "Vatican City" approach to Mecca/Medina to free the KSA to evolve without the friction of having those sites holy to all Muslims within their borders.

The only truly bad idea is to just keep doing what we've been doing and hope it somehow starts to work. Every other idea has some redeeming value, though some are better than others; and any selected by the Saudi people being better than any imposed upon them.

Insurgency is illegal politics. In a land where no legal politics exist, can there be anything but insurgency? The Royals might want to install a legal offramp or two while they are at it.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Second, the energy driving transnational terrorism is, IMO, primarily coming from a large number of long suppressed nationalist insurgencies that AQ and others tap into to leverage in support of their own agendas of power and control.

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I'm aware of that opinion, but I'm not convinced that it's fully supportable. AQ has tried to tap into internal resentment. They've also tried, much more successfully, to tap into a widespread and rather generic Muslim resentment toward the west - Bernard Lewis calls it "aggressive self-pity" - and specific anger toward foreign intervention in Muslim lands. Of these, the latter two have been the successful narratives. AQ and its precursor organizations have always drawn their greatest support when they were rallying support against foreign intrusion in the land of the faithful. By contrast, AQ efforts to rally revolution against leaders they dislike have generally gone nowhere: they've achieved strong support from small minorities but never won the populaces and never won anything remotely resembling a critical mass of support. When AQ rallies the faithful to attack the infidel, the cheers ring out, the money flows, and the recruits come running. When they bring the fight home, they don't get much. That doesn't mean people in these countries love their governments, but it suggests that they don't see AQ as a viable domestic alternative, and they certainly don't see AQ as their champion against their own governments.

The belief that foreign fighters travel to combat zones in an effort to free their own countries remains unsupported. Foreign fighters flowed from all the same places to fight the Soviets, and foreign fighters come from many places where governments get no support from the US. "Expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" was a powerful narrative during the crusades, and it remains so today.

On the subject of perceptions, I'd have to agree with Ken: we don't know what they are. I'd add that when we try to assess perceptions we have a powerful tendency to impose our own ideas about what perceptions ought to be, and when we listen we tend to assign the highest priority to the voices we agree with. As in most countries, there's a wide range of variance in perceptions in Saudi Arabia, and many of them are conflicted, contradictory, and vary according to circumstances. Trying to reduce to "oppressed populace struggling for democracy" is simply an imposition of our own values. It ain't that simple by a long shot, and as with most things we don't understand, we're best off staying out of it.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

What small, reasonable changes could the US make on our end to help mitigate these perceptions?

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Realistically, not much. No matter what our intentions, anything we do will be perceived as an attempt to advance our own interests and gain control of the oil.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

what small, reasonable changes could the Saudis make (beyond the enhanced bribes and security efforts being employed now in response to fears driven by Arab Spring)?

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Probably a lot, but that's completely outside our control. We have little or no influence there: for an example, how much attention was paid to our prescriptions re Bahrain?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

But still, if we allow the percept to persist that the Saudi Royals are protected against internal and external challengers by a US insurance policy there will be those who will seek to get us to break that commitment of support.

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We will not break our commitment to protect the Saudis against external aggression... and breaking it wouldn't gain us any points with the Saudi populace anyway. No matter what they think of the royals, they don't want to be ruled by Iraqis or Iranians.

We can't break a commitment to protect the Saudis from internal challengers, because no such commitment exists. It isn't needed, and it's never been asked for. The Saudis don't need or ask for our help or permission to oppress their populace. If there is a perception that we are giving help or permission - and whether or not that perception exists remains an open question - we have to accept that it's an inaccurate perception, and we can't change it by changing the policy. We can't stop doing something we aren't doing in the first place.

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I think much of what we need to do can be done by simply going on record that it is a new era:

1. That we do not care who presides over Saudi Arabia and that we are willing to continue to work with whomever that might be, regardless of how they came to rise to power. But we won't protect that new group either, so they better be snapped in with the people or they will likely soon suffer the same fate at their hands.

2. That we do not care what form of government the Saudi people self-determine.

3. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we will act to prevent external challenge.

4. That while we will not act to protect the current or future regime from internal change, we reserve the right to act decisively to preserve infrastructure deemed vital to our own national survival and to hold the same in trust until such time as such threatening disputes are resolved (So figure out a way to work this out without forcing our hand to step in).

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How is that a new era? Doesn't seem all that different... and I suspect that the prevailing reaction from the Saudi populace would be along the lines of "piss off and mind your own business".

Silly to claim that we don't care who runs Saudi Arabia, though. We do care, and everybody knows it. We have to lie on occasion but we should avoid the really obvious ones.

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Meanwhile I think some backroom discussions with the Royals are long overdue. They can listen or not, its their heads. Simple changes, such as putting a little more "justice" into the justice system; or either getting the Royals closer to Islam or acting to bifurcate the "keeper of Islam" role from the Royal job description, would both go a long way toward greater stability.

Some concepts that have worked well elsewhere that might be worth considering are:

1. A parliamentary system similar to Britain's, with the Royals stepping into a similar role.

2. A creation of a "Vatican City" approach to Mecca/Medina to free the KSA to evolve without the friction of having those sites holy to all Muslims within their borders.

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Ouch. To repeat a point previously made: Ttying to initiate, direct, or control political change in other countries... for me that's kind of a reverse Nike slogan: just don't do it.

What you suggest is, no matter how we sugar coat it, an effort to initiate, direct, and control political change in another country.

You might also want to consider that just because we take something up in the back room doesn't mean it stays there. How long do you think that would stay secret? Do you really want Al Jazeera, Wikileaks, and the rest of the world press trumpeting a "secret" US attempt to tell the Saudis to change their system of government and give them instructions on their relations with Islam and the holy sites?

Granted that past interventions have caused a lot of problems, but we aren't going to change that with more blundering well-intentioned intervention. The answer to bad intervention isn't good intervention, it's less intervention. The perceptions left from the past exist; we can't counter or change them overnight. If we mind our own business, though, those perceptions will gradually change.

PS [edit}. Americans often forget (if they ever knew) that in much of the world, even people who loathe their own governments deeply resent criticism of those governments by foreigners, especially Americans. Even when the Americans are repeating the same points as local critics, it's not perceived as support, it's perceived as self-serving intrusion and as disrespect for the nation and the culture. Again, subtlety is required, and that's not something we do well.

Oh the times are indeed a changing...

Some good points made in this article. Perhaps most importantly that the US not be made a tool in the never ending Sunni-Shiite divide.
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/...erous-reaction

Some good points here as well:
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/...-for-dictators

This last line from the second article is important, and with Sen Kerry as a likely replacement to Clinton as Sec State, this may also be a window into future focus:

"Influence in the region must come through new means, and actions matter. It is time for the US to create allies amongst citizens who increasingly pressure governments, and enhance authority by being the global power that consistently supports the rights of local citizens. Being on the wrong side of values that our country was built upon is not only hypocritical policy, but makes us less secure."

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

"Influence in the region must come through new means, and actions matter. It is time for the US to create allies amongst citizens who increasingly pressure governments, and enhance authority by being the global power that consistently supports the rights of local citizens. Being on the wrong side of values that our country was built upon is not only hypocritical policy, but makes us less secure."

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More senseless meddling in store? How nice. Not. The "bear any burden" legacy lives...:eek::rolleyes::mad:

Is it less "senseless meddling" when we manipulate governments of others to become what we thing will best support our own interests; regardless of the concerns, and certainly without the consent of the governed?

I won't speak for the author as to what he thinks he means by this statement; but it is consistent with my belief that in the modern information age we must learn to better account for the will of the people affected by our decisions regarding their governments and homelands. This does not mean meddle more, in fact, if done properly, should lead our own political leaders to realize they are better served by meddling less.

The Cold War was the peak of US meddling in the affairs of others.

The GWOT is merely our follow-up meddling in efforts to stem the negative effects of our Cold War meddling.

Being more cognizent of the impacts of our actions, not just on the target country, but also back at us as occurred on 9/11 and a dozen other times over the post-Cold War era, can only be a good thing. (Unless of course we use it to validate why we need to go in and change some regime...)

Getting our policy back in line with our professed principles as a nation (as defined pre-Cold War, not as morphed during and after) can only be a good thing as well.

No one likes a hypocrite, and no one likes to be judged. We've grown too used to doing far too much of both.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Is it less "senseless meddling" when we manipulate governments of others to become what we thing will best support our own interests; regardless of the concerns, and certainly without the consent of the governed?

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Meddling is meddling, no matter how you qualify it and you know that.

The issue is how much meddling in the version he and you espouse would be welcomed or tolerated -- consented to -- by those governed. I believe that is very difficult calculation and also believe that the US proclivity for overkill, intemperate action and confusion would almost guarantee we will mess it up... :eek:

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I won't speak for the author as to what he thinks he means by this statement; but it is consistent with my belief that in the modern information age we must learn to better account for the will of the people affected by our decisions regarding their governments and homelands. This does not mean meddle more, in fact, if done properly, should lead our own political leaders to realize they are better served by meddling less.

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What an optimist. Politicians meddle, that's what they do. It's a lifestyle choice, a vocation and an avocation -- and it is rarely beneficial to any with whom they meddle. :rolleyes:

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The Cold War was the peak of US meddling in the affairs of others.

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Not really, we've long had a pre-disposition to meddle (see Jefferson, T; Adams, J.Q.; Monroe, J. et.al. up to and incuding Taft W.H.; Roosevelt, F.D and to Carter, J.E, Reagan, R.; Bush G.H.W.; Clinton, W.J and Bush G.W. plus Obama, B.H.). You just remember the Cold War and so does our inept media and the acedemic community. That communication explosion you cite had a part in that.

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The GWOT is merely our follow-up meddling in efforts to stem the negative effects of our Cold War meddling.

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Mmm. One way to look at it. Not sure I agree totally though I acknowledge it's correct in part. That 'GWOT' (a term even Bush said should no longer be used...) was as much a reaction to correct the sins of omission of G.W.Bush's four predecessors who responded very poorly and inadequately to a series of probes from Islam. Bush did the right thing, pity his executive agents, the Armed forces, were not properly prepared or trained to do what was needed...:rolleyes:

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Being more cognizent of the impacts of our actions... can only be a good thing as well.

No one likes a hypocrite, and no one likes to be judged. We've grown too used to doing far too much of both.

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Agree on that -- We need to quit doing those things. It would be even more beneficial if we stopped 'helping' others who neither want or need our help.

Now, all you have to do is figure out how to keep a dysfunctional foreign policy crew from screwing up the drill -- an insure the force is prepared to execute whatever drill pops up. As I sad, best of luck to ye... ;)

Oh, and in strategizing do recall that capabilities and potential probabilities must be considered. That should include such facts as that the possible courses of action and likely reactions to events by our political masters are almost certain to be rather inchoate. We too often tend to forget that. Not believing the enemy thinks like you do is a well known and generally observed fact. We often seem to forget that our bosses don't think like we do...

http://www.andhranews.net/Intl/2011/...ails-12695.htm

Poor Governance at work. This is the type of governmental action designed to counter/prevent insurgents from getting up a head of effective steam (though with twitter, etc can now organize on the fly, so the Cost/Benefit/Effectiveness of such measures has changed dramatically in the past few years). This is also the type of gross injustice under the rule of law, a key component of the type of poor governance that makes the conditions of insurgency grow within an affected populace.

A populace denied legal venues to speak out or affect government WILL ultimately seek illegal venues when pushed hard enough. That is the essence of insurgency.

From the article dated 23 July:


"Human rights activists have said that a counter-terrorism law proposed by the Saudi Arabian government, that mandates jail sentences for criticizing the king, would effectively quash political dissent.

The proposed law would give the Interior Ministry broad powers and mandate jail terms for speaking against the king.

Additionally, the law would allow prisoners to be held with no bail and trials and appeals would be handled secretly, both Saudi and international rights advocates have said.

The new law gives Interior Ministry the ability to tap telephones or search houses without permission from the judiciary, The New York Times reports."

A critical Metric here for those who understand the drivers of insurgency:


"Saudi activists have long accused the judicial system and the Interior Ministry of a lack of respect for human rights, even when such rights exist legally."


Also important:

"Critics said the law's definitions of terrorist crimes are vague enough to encompass all manner of activity.

According to a translation provided by Amnesty International, it uses broad terms like "harming the reputation of the state."

It mandates a 10-year prison term for calling the king or a crown prince an infidel.

Some activists view the law as an attempt by Prince Nayef, the longtime interior minister, to consolidate his power and that of his son, Prince Mohammed, who runs counterterrorism operations."


What is the penalty for calling the King foolish? A piece of unsolicited advice: If you want to stay in power, if you want to retain the wealth, dignity and respect that your family has held for so long, and not always be remembered as the guy who lost it all, this is the absolute wrong direction to go. In the past, yes, this was viable. Now? No more. You cannot control the flow of information to your populace so you cannot control your populace. Now you must actually lead. Now you must actually govern. Now you must actually treat your people with dignity, respect and justice. A few small changes in approach that cost you virtually nothing to implement will make you the greatest king in the history of Saudi Arabia. Laws like this? This could cost you your throne or worse.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Are they a real ally -- or just a nation with whom we do business, have some common interests and many disconnects? I'd say the latter.

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I think I'd say that they are not our ally, but that we are theirs.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

What is the penalty for calling the King foolish? A piece of unsolicited advice: If you want to stay in power, if you want to retain the wealth, dignity and respect that your family has held for so long, and not always be remembered as the guy who lost it all, this is the absolute wrong direction to go.

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Of an Iranian acquaintance who owned a Pizza Parlor in Tehran (you haven't lived 'til you've had Pizza with shredded Lamb as the meat topping...).

He'd previously owned one in New York and had moved back home. He once told me that in NY, they told him when he could open and had to close, how many people he could hire and what he had to pay them, where he had to buy his ingredients, how high his fire extinguishers had to be off the floor.

In Tehran, he opened and closed when he felt like it, hired and paid who he wanted, bought whatever he wanted, didn't even have to possess a fire extinguisher.

Another difference was that in NY, he could stand in the middle of the sidewalk and scream "The President is a stupid SOB" while in Tehran, he could not stand on the sidewalk and scream "The Shah is a stupid SOB."
He then asked "Now you tell me where there is more freedom?"

It does not have to be our way to be right. Freedom -- and oppression -- are in the minds of the residents and outsiders may not view things the same way. :wry:

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Originally Posted by motorfirebox

I think I'd say that they are not our ally, but that we are theirs.

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We are or will be if we feel like it at a given time but will drop or ignore them totally if it suits us. In the meantime, they are simply a habit, foolishly foisted on us by FDR -- and as any American knows, if Franklin did it, it must be honored and retained -- even if what we have done to it since wildly exceeds any ideas of FDR. :rolleyes:

In discussing relationships with nations, people are prone to equate a nation's actions and reactions with those of humans. Bad mistake. Nations don't have morals or a conscience (nor do many humans but that's another thread... :wry:).

The whole Middle East involvement thing is a habit -- and not a good one. We should've moved on forty plus years ago. :(

That statement also applies, broadly, to oil...

The US national polity is a bundle of conflicts. There is little political continuity but due to inertia and lack of imagination plus an arcane budgeting system, entirely too much policy continuity. Things get started for good reason and usually fairly sensibly -- but they then take on a life of their own and morph in strange and wondrous ways -- and they become habitual -- no matter how stupid they have become.

However with respect to 'friends' and 'allies' there really are none other than temporarily when convenient. We, like Palmerston's Britain, only have interests. That's as it should be... :cool:

Concur on the interests focus.

(Eric Wendt recently published a piece called the "Green Beret Volckmann Program." The one fault I have with it is that he rationalized the need in terms of dealing more effectively with AQ. I would (do, and will) argue that such a program has great merit, but must be focused and prioritized by where we assess our greatest interests to lie. Friends and enemies come and go, or just switch hats, but interests are indeed much more durable.)

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

A piece of unsolicited advice: If you want to stay in power, if you want to retain the wealth, dignity and respect that your family has held for so long, and not always be remembered as the guy who lost it all, this is the absolute wrong direction to go. In the past, yes, this was viable. Now? No more. You cannot control the flow of information to your populace so you cannot control your populace. Now you must actually lead. Now you must actually govern. Now you must actually treat your people with dignity, respect and justice. A few small changes in approach that cost you virtually nothing to implement will make you the greatest king in the history of Saudi Arabia. Laws like this? This could cost you your throne or worse.

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All very well said, but the truth is that they don't care what you think, they don't care what I think, and they don't care what the US Government thinks. We saw that in Bahrain, and we'll see it again. The President, the DoS, and both houses of Congress could jump up and sing the above in 3 part harmony and it would change exactly nothing. At this point they have more leverage on us than we do on them. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have signed up for some $120 billion in arms purchases from the US, enough to keep the US defense industry afloat for another decade or two. Everything they are buying could be had from other sources as well... and if the US-Saudi relationship got fussy, how many seconds do you think it would be before the Chinese, Russians, French, British, Germans, and a bunch of others had offers on the table?

How many well-paid American manufacturing jobs are involved? Exact counts vary, but Congress ain't gonna mess with that with the economy where it sits now. We may indulge in a bit of talk here and there, but both sides know we won't rock that boat.

I actually think you overestimate the unrest in the Kingdom. It's dropped off quite a bit since the bad days in the 90s, when the oil glut and the US military presence nearly brought things to a head. Like the Chinese, I suspect that the Saudis are likely to hold it together until there's a real economic crunch, which in Saudi Arabia may not happen until the oil runs out.

People seek liberty, but they also seek security and prosperity. When I'm in the Gulf I read a real desire for change, but it's tempered by an overwhelming fear that change could bring chaos and disorder and eventual foreign control. A substantial part of the populaces of these countries has something to lose, and they're very much aware that they could lose it.

I can't count how many times I've been told, in that part of the world, that American efforts at democracy promotion are a conspiracy to weaken and divide them and exploit those divisions to gain control of the oil. We will (the refrain goes) support parties that support our interests, undercut those that don't, foster internal division and cultivate chaos, manipulate elections, and take over. That may not be true (though given history they can be pardoned for believing it), but as you say, it is perceived as truth.

The whole assumption of "enraged populace struggling against despotic regime" is a construct imposed by outsiders because it's consistent with their views. There's some truth to it, but it's by no means the whole picture... and if we build policy around the assumption that it is the whole picture - or the assumption that we have to mount our white horse and ride to the rescue of these aggrieved populaces - we're likely to step on our equipment in a major way.

They will do what they want, and they will reap whatever consequences come. The consequences may land on us as well, even though we have little or no influence on what happens... but that's fair enough, our actions and our mistakes often have major influence on people who have zero influence on our policies. Our fault for getting addicted to a commodity we haven't got...

I worked with a fellow who had spent several years working in the oil business in Saudi Arabia. He said one day his Saudi colleagues were bitching about something the State Department had done in a none too subtle way and he said, “Look, how much do you have to do with your government’s foreign policy? Probably about as much as I do.” Not to say that there aren’t stark contrasts between living your life as a citizen of and in Saudi Arabia and doing the same in the U.S., of course.

http://news.yahoo.com/ny-judge-al-qa...002608127.html

I recommend we send this bill to the King.

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

Now, granted, that is an arrangement that US officials entered into and sustained of their own free will; but the only thing we seem less willing to do than recognize the role of Saudi governance in the birth and growth of AQ, is to recognize the role of US-Saudi foreign policy in the same.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

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Have we ever preserved the Saud family in the face of a domestic threat? The hypothesis that American support has allowed the Saudis to avoid evolutionary changes that would have been necessary without that support seems to me historically insupportable.

Both the description of the 9/11 terrorists as "insurgents" and the causative link you suggest remain largely speculative... part of the picture doubtless, but only one part. Exaggerating that part and focusing on it to the exclusion of the many other parts does not improve our understanding of the entire picture.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

It was due to our policy of preserving his family in power that created the causal linkage between his oppressive regime at home and the decision of a handful of Saudi insurgents working with AQ to attack the US to advance their ultimate goal of bringing the Saudi reign down.

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You may have seen something that purports to be proof of that. I have not and I therefor question the validity of the "causal linkage" portion that statement. It smacks of a standing broad jump at a convenient conclusion... ;)

Had you said contributed in part, I would likely have just kept driving but "causal linkage" smacks of more positivism than seems warranted. I don't think this -- or the whole 'governance is the cause of it all' thing -- is nearly as simple as you'd like... :wry:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

You may have seen something that purports to be proof of that. I have not and I therefor question the validity of the "causal linkage" portion that statement. It smacks of a standing broad jump at a convenient conclusion... ;)

Had you said contributed in part, I would likely have just kept driving but "causal linkage" smacks of more positivism than seems warranted. I don't think this -- or the whole 'governance is the cause of it all' thing -- is nearly as simple as you'd like... :wry:

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Actually, much of this is very simple, it is just inconvenient. Complexity if vastly over-rated and over-sold of late.

As to Dayuhan, the Saudi's are a major purchaser of US military hardware, yet while certainly their Wahabist doctrine makes them a sworn enemy of Shia Iran, that is their problem and not ours. They employ the majority of what they buy for internal purposes, as they know (as do the Iranians) we will come running if any true external threat should emerge. So, yes, protecting the Saudi regime has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy since at least 1944.

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

We've invested Billions, perhaps Trillions in "complex." Would it kill us, given the failure of that to do much more than kill a bunch of individuals while at the same time stimulating the overall organization to grow and become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism. I stand by that. I have yet to see anything that would prove that wrong, but I am open to informed arguments on the topic.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

We've invested Billions, perhaps Trillions in "complex." ...become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism.

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Aside from the fact I suspect the reasons for things are not as clear cut as you wish to assume -- ask any kid why he joined the US Army... :D

Trillions are not necessary; cheap, simple and smart are desirable, no question. Dogmatism is cheap but it isn't smart. ;)

I thought you disliked the term "war on terrorism?" :wry:

We're not going to agree on this aspect, we never have. While I agree that Saudis have taken advantage of us and agree that our relationship with them needs change, they are far from the only opponent out there. It is possible to over-simplify things...

Poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency.

My perception, right or wrong, is that you've got some bad cases of tunnel vision and while we agree on many things, we still do not agree on those two things. That's okay, we can disagree. The good news I'm not going to influence anyone in a position of power. You may. I suggest one thing only...

Be careful.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

the Saudi's are a major purchaser of US military hardware, yet while certainly their Wahabist doctrine makes them a sworn enemy of Shia Iran, that is their problem and not ours.

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The issue between the Saudis and the Iranians is not just about Wahhabi vs Shi'a, it's about two regional powers glaring at each other across a whole lot of a very valuable resource. It is our problem, like it or not, because if a fight breaks out the price of oil will go to the stratosphere and stay there. The US desire to keep Gulf oil out of the hands of Iran (or in prior days Saddam) has nothing to do with support for the Saudis. It's self defense.

Saudi arms purchases are not US aid to Saudi Arabia. If anything it's Saudi aid to the US: those purchases do a great deal to keep our defense industries viable, and the Saudis could easily buy the stuff elsewhere.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

They employ the majority of what they buy for internal purposes...

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When was the last time you saw Saudi F15s or M1s used against domestic opponents. They probably would if they thought they had to, but they haven't had to: they've never faced an internal threat that required more than a police response... a very ugly police response, yes, but not one that requires any help from the US. The Saudis don't need our help to manage their populace, and they sure as hell aren't going to ask our permission or pay attention to our objections.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

as they know (as do the Iranians) we will come running if any true external threat should emerge. So, yes, protecting the Saudi regime has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy since at least 1944.

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Protecting the Saudi regime against external aggression has been a central component of our Middle Eastern foreign policy. We haven't had to protect them from domestic dissent.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

bin Laden and most of the 9/11 attackers, and the core of AQ are Saudi for a reason. They hate the Saudi regime and the US for a reason. We can ignore it or address it. So far ignoring it is not working.

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They hate the US for a wide variety of reasons, and they're pursuing a variety of goals, many of which are proactive, not responsive. You focus on one small portion of that picture, because it fits the model you're trying to present.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Would it kill us, given the failure of that to do much more than kill a bunch of individuals while at the same time stimulating the overall organization to grow and become more wide-spread and durable, to switch to cheap, simple, and smart for a change??

The nature of US - Saudi relationship; and the nature of Saudi governance, is the core of the war on terrorism. I stand by that. I have yet to see anything that would prove that wrong, but I am open to informed arguments on the topic.

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You've seen a number of informed arguments, but you've already made up your mind.

Would you care to elaborate on "cheap, simple, and smart"? The suggestions you've made in the past have typically been based on the premise that the US has far more influence on Saudi domestic policy than the US actually has, and that's a very risky premise. Any plan based on urging or encouraging the Saudis to change the way they govern is really pointless from the start. It might feel good, but it will have no more effect on the Saudis than the periodic European criticisms of US policy have on us. Neither will it be appreciated by th Saudi populace: no matter how they feel about their own government, they hate it when we lecture them. It doesn't come off as support for the populace, it comes off as arrogant, patronizing, contempt for their nation and culture.

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Dayuhan,

I suppose what General Petraeus says is indicative, in a speech in London on the 18th September 2009:



From: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/news/news.cgi?id=749

The other issue that few seem to raise publically is the external role of Saudi agencies in promoting their version of Islam and the number of scholars studying there. Other threads may have touched upon this and IIRC reference was made to Saudi funding appearing in parts of Nigeria.

davidbfpo

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What the governments of the Arabian Peninsula have been doing under the guise of "counter-extremist" programs are in fact ramped up efforts to suppress those members of their populaces who dare to challenge what are widely recognized as some of the most oppressive regimes on the planet.

We have spun this problem in terms favorable to the US and these dodgy allies by branding these revolutionaries as "extremists" or "terrorists" or "radical islamists" or any of a wide range of disparaging terms. This is what governments do. The fact that Yemen is the best physical terrain to hide in from one's government leads various insurgent members from a number of states to flee to their for physical santuary. The fact that the rural tribes of Yemen are equally oppressed and dissatisfied with their own government provides a populace base for this sanctuary as well. Of course AQ goes to Yemen as well to conduct their UW campaign to support these nationalist insurgent movements.

We need to set our Kool-Aid down and step back and put all of the intel products we are using to drive our thinking under a strategic microscope and as free from the bias of our relationships with the governments of the region and our concern over interests related to oil and access to critical sea lanes that oil and other commodities travel through as well. These things are important, vitally so. But we must evolve in our approaches to securing them.

Propping up friendly despots is obsolete. Just because we have done it for generations does not mean it cannot be obsolete now.

The US applied an offical policy of ethnic cleansing to the Native Americans; we now recognize that as obsolete in the current environment.

The US applied an offical policy of slavery to develop the agriculture of the South; we now recognize that as obsolete in the current environment.

Similarly the US applied an offical policy of adopting and sustaining a collection of despots in power throughout our colonial and cold war eras to help secure our interests; we need to now recognize this apporach as obsolete as well.

Also worth considering here are the strong parallels between the US relationship today with the Saudi family and that we had with the Shah of Iran in the early 70s.

There too we balanced the extreme amount of capital we were shipping to the Shah in exchange for Iranian oil with massive sales of military hardware.

There too the Shah (with no help from us, not needed, just as the Saudis do not need our help in this mission so long as the people remain cowed) acted ruthlessly to keep an extremely oppressed and insurgent populace in check with one hand, while he entertained US dignitaries in opulent excess with the other.

There too, as late as 1977 the DIA predicted that the Shah would remain strongly in power for at least another 10 years; as I suspect estimates for the Saudi family are at least as bold.

But in such a powder keg of oppression it only takes a spark, and with Arab spring burning brightly all around the Kingdom, such sparks are easily found.

These were and are complex and important relationships. We bite off our nose today to spite our faces over our anger and embarrassment at being rebuked by the Iranians over 30 years ago; can we afford risking a similar 30 plus years of national sour grapes when (and it is when, not if) the Saudis meet their come uppence from their populace as well?? We need to work to get straight with the governments AND the populace of both of these important nations sooner than later.

All I have ever advocated is that we need to focus less on attacking and defeating symptoms, and spend more energy focusing on repairing the flawed dysfunctional relationships that I see as the causal roots of those same symptoms. So what if I am wrong, what do we lose by getting straight with our own professed principles? Nothing. We can begin to repair our reputation in the region, and an honorable reputation is a hard commodity to put a price on.

We Americans can be generous and honorable and self-less to a fault; we can also be self-serving, callus, arrogant and petulant. The problem is that sometimes we act like the latter while seeing ourselves as the former. We can be better than this. We are better than this. But the first step to getting better is to recognize we have a problem and to take responsibility for our actions that contributed to bringing us here.

The comparison with the Shah of Iran is I think a bit strained. To an American it seems absurd and incomprehensible, but throughout the Gulf, even when there's criticism of a monarch, there's enormous respect for the monarchy, which is widely perceived as having inherent traditional legitimacy. That respect isn't universal - nothing in a populace ever is - but it's very widespread and is a real factor. A ruler who claims traditional power without actual blood right (the Shah) or rulers such as a Mubarak or a Saddam, who simply seized power, are seen as fundamentally different from a true traditional ruler. To us they're all just despots, but the distinction is meaningful in these places.

I've never noted any great enthusiasm for the idea of democracy in the Gulf, except among a few western-educated individuals, most of whom tend to keep it quiet. There's a very widespread perception that democracy would bring chaos and open the door for foreign domination. In much of the Gulf it's simply taken as a given that the American enthusiasm for promoting democracy is a vehicle for gaining power: the CIA would manipulate the elections (the ability to do so is presumed) and reduce them to US puppets.

It's easy to say this, and it sounds good:

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We need to work to get straight with the governments AND the populace of both of these important nations sooner than later.

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but when you get down to specifics, it always seems to presume influence that we haven't got, and to involve a level of interference in domestic affairs that's likely to be seen as unacceptable by both government and populace.

The cold war paradigm of dictators that are dependent on the US is not applicable here: these despots do not depend on us, and our influence over them is very limited. They are not client states and we cannot dictate policy changes or exert substantial influence over domestic policy. Neither governments nor populaces want us meddling in their domestic policies, no matter how high-minded our declared objectives are. These are peer-peer relationships, and if we treat them as patron-client relationships we will achieve nothing and antagonize everyone in the picture.

Meddling in the past hasn't given good results, but the answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, the answer to bad meddling is less meddling. That won't change perceptions overnight, but neither will anything else. Attempts at good meddling will just reinforce the perception of self-interested interference: no matter what we say we're trying to accomplish, our actions will be interpreted as a self-interested attempt to gain control.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

There (Iran) too we balanced the extreme amount of capital we were shipping to the Shah in exchange for Iranian oil with massive sales of military hardware.

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We bought very little oil from Iran -- our relationship involved the extraction of oil and the concomitant money from the soil of Iran. Those massive sales of military equipment did not start until the US and the Saudis sabotaged oil prices and inadvertently (on our part, almost certainly deliberately on the part of that Saudis) Iran and the Shah at the Doha Conference in 1976, mostly at the behest of William Simon -- the Shah then began to realize that the US was perfidious and decided to embark on his own program, telling us he preferred to buy here but was going to buy what he wanted from somewhere. Speak to Zbig and Jimmy -- they sold him everything and then pulled the rug out from under him.

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There too the Shah (with no help from us, not needed, just as the Saudis do not need our help in this mission so long as the people remain cowed) acted ruthlessly to keep an extremely oppressed and insurgent populace in check with one hand, while he entertained US dignitaries in opulent excess with the other.

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Where do you get this stuff? The Shah played rough, no question -- but Khomeini killed more people in his first two years than the Shah had in the previous 25. Opulent excess. Poetic -- and wrong. the Shah didn't like American and didn't entertain much, the minions did and not all that opulently. :rolleyes:

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There too, as late as 1977 the DIA predicted that the Shah would remain strongly in power for at least another 10 years...

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Accurate at the time but that was before Carter told the CIA to get him dumped in late '78. I wish people who decide to use Iran as an example for much of anything would get their facts together before they write...

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But in such a powder keg of oppression it only takes a spark, and with Arab spring burning brightly all around the Kingdom, such sparks are easily found.

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Sounds good. Idealistic but good. We'll see.

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These were and are complex and important relationships...

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But Bob, you just told me we over complicated things and that this was simple. Which is it? :D

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But the first step to getting better is to recognize we have a problem and to take responsibility for our actions that contributed to bringing us here.

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I'm not at all sure that will be enough, taking responsibility is just saying things -- actions completed are hard to undo. Particularly in an area that throws words around willy nilly and operates on Ta'arif -- tell people what they want to hear. They're subject to think that we're doing just that. Rather than trying to re-do the past, better to just move on.

Ken,

I know you have history with Iran, so I trust your insights. I am currently working through "Reset" by Stephen Kinzer; and while I am sure it has its own bias and inaccuracies, I believe it to be an important and generally fair position.

Note, in my condemnation of the Shah I never praise the Mullahs. As I often state, insurgency is natural, and when certain conditions come to exist within a populace due to the nature and actions of their government as assessed by the populace, insurgency becomes inevitable. WHO shows up to lead the people is another matter. Iran began moving toward more modern and democratic governance with the Revolution of 1906, and yes it is and will be a bumpy ride. Our action to take out Muhammad Mossadeq at Britain's request and elevate the Shah back into power ultimately pushed the people into the hands of the Mullahs. Who else was going to help them??

Similarly our blind support of the Saudi family is helping to push elements of the Saudi popualce into the hands of AQ. Again, who else is going to help them??

The Ayatollah and the Mullahs are a curse on the people of Iran; as is AQ on the Sunni Arab populaces of the Middle East today. The truth of that in no way excuses the actions of the respective governments whose actions and policies have pushed their populaces into the arms of these shady "saviors." Similarly, it does not excuse US foreign policy that has in many cases empowered and enabled these same governments to act with the impunity that sped them on their collision course with their own populaces. We love to blame ideology, or point out the truely evil aspects of these men and organizations that step up to exploit conditions of insurgency for their own gains, particularly where it challenges positions that we seek to nurture and advance for our own interests. We need to be less petty in our analysis, more intuned to the true grievances of the popualces involved; less risk adverse in terms of letting others self-determine their own governance; and less blindly supporting of "allies" in the form of protecting specific dictators or regimes.

Desprate situations call for desperate measures.

So, yes, these relationships are complex; but the fundamental principles of human nature and insurgency that provide the foundation they are built upon are indeed simple. I generally pick my words carefully, though rarely edit them to avoid taking positions that are unpopular or contrary to what people want or need to hear.

As to Dayuhan, the comparison of Iran in the 70s vs Saudi Arabia today is not a strain at all. In fact, it is shockingly on point. The more you research the topic the more you will see that to be true. Or you can just wait a few years and read it in the newspaper if we continue on our current track.

Cheers!

Bob

(Oh, and my research shows that in 1974 the US purchased 463 thousand barrels from Iran to 438 thousand from the Saudis; by 1978 we were indeed buying twice as much from the Saudis (1142 to 554); but to minimize the importance of Iran to our energy economy in that era is not accurate; nor would it be fair to minimize how the Iranian people felt about the Shah and our role in squelching their quest for democratic reforms by bringing him back as part of Ike and the Dulles brothers program of covert regime change and manipulation to wage the Cold War.)

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

I am currently working through "Reset" by Stephen Kinzer; and while I am sure it has its own bias and inaccuracies, I believe it to be an important and generally fair position.

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Read it. Agree with your first statement, not so much with the second -- though I suspect you will like the book.

The WaPo says sorta correctly that Kinzer is "among the best in popular foreign policy storytelling." I'm quite sure that Kinzer's suggested tripartite effort wouldn't be nearly as smooth as he envisions -- I am reminded of Hillary Clinton's 'Reset' button.

I suggest the issue is not how and with whom we should 'partner' in the middle east but whether we should at all...

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Our action to take out Muhammad Mossadeq at Britain's request and elevate the Shah back into power ultimately pushed the people into the hands of the Mullahs. Who else was going to help them?

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There you go, over simplifying again. Way over... :rolleyes:

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Similarly our blind support of the Saudi family is helping to push elements of the Saudi popualce into the hands of AQ. Again, who else is going to help them?

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You assume they need or must have help. Careful with assumptions; you know what they say... :D

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Desprate situations call for desperate measures.

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Avoid the Kool Aid. What desperate situation?

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I generally pick my words carefully, though rarely edit them to avoid taking positions that are unpopular or contrary to what people want or need to hear.

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Of course you pick your words carefully, you're a Lawyer and a Colonel -- that's not an insult, merely an observation that both categories are noted for relatively careful choosing of words. Thus one can be sure you're doubly careful...

Unpopular is in the eye of the beholder. So is the selection of things people "need to hear." Been my observation that users of such phrasing are on 'missions.' Self assigned, usually.

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(Oh, and my research shows that in 1974 the US purchased 463 thousand barrels from Iran to 438 thousand from the Saudis; by 1978 we were indeed buying twice as much from the Saudis (1142 to 554); but to minimize the importance of Iran to our energy economy in that era is not accurate; nor would it be fair to minimize how the Iranian people felt about the Shah and our role in squelching their quest for democratic reforms by bringing him back as part of Ike and the Dulles brothers program of covert regime change and manipulation to wage the Cold War.)

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Your research should also show that the 1974 oil purchase figures were influenced by the Saudi driven OPEC cut in exports to raise the price and 'punish the US for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War.' Fortunately our then friend the Shah willingly upped Iran's production just to support the US and cock a snook at the Saudis by temporarily making up for the Saudi cut. We never imported much oil from Iran other than that spike.

You seem to not only choose your words carefully but also your research quotes... ;)

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Similarly our blind support of the Saudi family is helping to push elements of the Saudi popualce into the hands of AQ. Again, who else is going to help them??

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Is AQ helping "elements of the Saudi populace", or is it the other way around? AQ has traditionally drawn support from the Saudi populace when it has taken the role of resistance to foreign occupation of Muslim lands. AQ's efforts against the Saudi government have drawn much less support: they've developed a very small core of vigorous opposition, but failed to gain traction with the broader populace or to gain anything close to the critical mass needed to drive a credible insurgency. AQ's efforts to generate a Saudi insurgency in the 90s fell flat, despite highly conducive conditions (economic crisis and a prolonged US military presence). That doesn't mean the Saudis love their government, but it strongly suggests that very few Saudis see AQ as a desirable alternative.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Similarly, it does not excuse US foreign policy that has in many cases empowered and enabled these same governments to act with the impunity that sped them on their collision course with their own populaces.

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You have yet to demonstrate that anything the US has done has "enabled or empowered" the Saudis to act as they do toward their populace. The Saudis don't need our help or approval to oppress, and they would do it no matter what we said or did. The comment above suggests that without US help the Saudis would be forced to take a more accommodating stance toward portions of their own populaces, which seems an unsupportable contention that presumes a dependence that is not in fact there. The danger in assuming that we enable or empower is that it implies that we can force policy changes by ceasing to enable or empower. That's not the case in Saudi Arabia, and basing policy on the assumption of influence or dependency that does not in fact exist is a good way to devise ineffective policy.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

the comparison of Iran in the 70s vs Saudi Arabia today is not a strain at all. In fact, it is shockingly on point. The more you research the topic the more you will see that to be true. Or you can just wait a few years and read it in the newspaper if we continue on our current track.

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I've looked into the topic. Been looking at it for well over a decade, since I started spending time there. Oddly, I started out from a frame that is not too different from yours. Had to change my mind. Embarrassing, but it happens.

I think political disruption and forced change is ultimately likely in Saudi Arabia. I do not think it's going to involve AQ. I doubt that it will happen in the next few years. I don't think anything the US says or does is going to have any bearing on it. We do not have the capacity to change - or even significantly influence - Saudi domestic policy.

Well I will agree with Dayuhan that AQ is largely moot. They do not create insurgency with either their actions or their ideology. They are opportunists who seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that already exist. Those conditions are shaped by the perceptions of distinct and significant populace groups within a wide range of countries that are primarily Sunni Muslim in religion, and Arab in ethnicity. That is their core target audience. Obviously others who buy in to their message and mission get on board as well. Those popular perceptions are based on how those populace groups feel about certain key aspects of their governance situation and their perceived lack of effective legal options for addressing the same.

The Saudi people, like people across the Middle East, will either pressure their government to evolve or will openly revolt (violently or non violently, that is a tactical choice) because of how they feel about their government, not because of how they feel about AQ.

For the US, the critical question is not how we perceive our role, it is how these same populaces perceive our role. This is where the material questions lie for the US; and there are shocking similarities between Iran-US in the 1970s to Saudi Arabia-US today. Just something for Americans to consider. As Ken points out, we were not all that reliant on Iranian Oil, so when we got PNG'd from that country by the revolutionary government we could simply buy more oil from our remaining "friends" in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and our new friend (a guy named Don Rumsfeld was sent by Reagan to make nice with a guy named Saddam and offer any help we could provide in Saddam's new war with Iran) in Iraq, etc. If we are PNG'd by a revolutionary government in Saudi Arabia we will not have the same options. In fact, we will be much like the Brits were when they were PNG'd by Iran in the early 50s.

In the evolving conflict-competition ecosystem the nature of conflict remains fairly stable, but the characteristics are evolving on the back of evolving technologies (primarily of the Information variety), and what worked for centuries in many cases is becoming obsolete today. It is my opinion that "friendly despots" are obsolete. (and like "friendly fire," are not all that "friendly" either).


Yes, there are millions of differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Noted. It is the critical similarities that cause me to raise the red flag.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

If we are PNG'd by a revolutionary government in Saudi Arabia we will not have the same options. In fact, we will be much like the Brits were when they were PNG'd by Iran in the early 50s.

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We could shrug our shoulders, recall that we buy Saudi Oil not because we must but because it was cheap at one time -- and then and now it enables us to keep a nominal economic interest for blundering about in the region. We could easily get by with no middle eastern oil.

The real question is whether we need to keep blundering there. We could also easily get by with no middle eastern turmoil... ;)

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It is my opinion that "friendly despots" are obsolete. (and like "friendly fire," are not all that "friendly" either).

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Agree they are obsolete and that they aren't really friendly -- but then, neither are we...:D

All true. It comes down to our risk tollerence and degree to which we are willing to relinquish control.

Historically, when the US was a small, developing country, and the Middle East was dominated by the Ottomans primarily, and major European powers secondarily, we were able to build tremendous influence by working within the frameworks established by the Ottomans (Trade, Schools and hospitals ok, even the odd raid to mitigate KFR operations, but don't come in preaching or looking to establish any type of colonial presence). We were always going to be an outsider, but as outsiders went we were far away and less inclined to attempt to estabish colonial controls, and all worked fairly well.

As WWII worked to disrupt European Colonial Controls, FDR's message of "end of colonialism" and free trade was well received by the populaces and governments of the region as well.

It was only as we got into the Cold War, and began creating states, manipulating, changing, and backing governments that the tide began to turn...tolerated to a degree while the Soviet threat existed, but less so ever since that faded.

I don't know if we can take our hand completely off the reins in all cases, but certainly a much lighter hand is necessary in all. But we see the Cold War as the normal we measure by. So much of our national and international systems were designed by the West to promote the West, with the US in the lead, all in the name of winning a Cold War that is long over. Thus the "good Cold Warrior" syndrome. We need to break this, but that is about changing ourselves, and we are still hard set on changing others...

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Well I will agree with Dayuhan that AQ is largely moot. They do not create insurgency with either their actions or their ideology. They are opportunists who seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that already exist.

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AQ leverages a good deal more than conditions of insurgency. AQ plays on a huge and widespread generic resentment of "the West" that runs back to the colonial period and beyond; what Bernard Lewis calls "aggressive self-pity". They play on anger at Israel and western support for Israel, and most effectively at all they play on anger at foreign military forces occupying Muslim land. The rallying cry and recruiting pitch for foreign fighters is "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful", not "break American support for your own government".

I feel at times as though you dismiss driving factors behind AQ that don't involve insurgency because you're determined to fit AQ into an insurgency-based model, rather than adapting the model to circumstances where it does not entirely fit.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

The Saudi people, like people across the Middle East, will either pressure their government to evolve or will openly revolt (violently or non violently, that is a tactical choice) because of how they feel about their government, not because of how they feel about AQ.

For the US, the critical question is not how we perceive our role, it is how these same populaces perceive our role.

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The feelings of the Saudi populace about their own government and their perceptions of the Saudi-US relationship are not nearly as monolithic as you make them out to be. They run across a wide range, as perceptions within a populace typically do. I think you may be imposing your own perceptions and assuming that they are shared by the populace.

As I said, I think in the long term a popular eruption is possible in Saudi Arabia, but I don't see it on the near horizon. As long as the oil and the money keep flowing, I suspect they'll carry on a good deal longer than you think, not because the government is loved, but because fear of instability, disunity, and foreign intervention is for many people greater than the fear of tyranny. The devil you know, and all that.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

This is where the material questions lie for the US; and there are shocking similarities between Iran-US in the 1970s to Saudi Arabia-US today.

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On a superficial level, yes. When you get to details the differences are so numerous that a comparison is pointless: they are unique cases and must be managed as such.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

As Ken points out, we were not all that reliant on Iranian Oil, so when we got PNG'd from that country by the revolutionary government we could simply buy more oil from our remaining "friends" in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and our new friend (a guy named Don Rumsfeld was sent by Reagan to make nice with a guy named Saddam and offer any help we could provide in Saddam's new war with Iran) in Iraq, etc. If we are PNG'd by a revolutionary government in Saudi Arabia we will not have the same options. In fact, we will be much like the Brits were when they were PNG'd by Iran in the early 50s.

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The danger is not that the Saudis will stop selling us oil. As long as the Saudis are selling oil into the world market there will be oil for the US to buy. The danger is that instability will significantly impair production capacity and reduce output, a risk that's shared equally by all consumers.

Ken says this:

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We could shrug our shoulders, recall that we buy Saudi Oil not because we must but because it was cheap at one time -- and then and now it enables us to keep a nominal economic interest for blundering about in the region. We could easily get by with no middle eastern oil.

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But we have to recall that our interest with Middle East oil, often misinterpreted, is less in keeping that oil flowing to us than it is in keeping it flowing. As long as it flows, there will be oil to buy. If the flow is cut, there will be a lot less oil to buy, and the price - for everyone on the buy side - will be a lot higher. As long as the Gulf remains a key producer and the home of the world's only surplus production capacity, the US will have an interest, even if we don't buy a single drop from the Gulf.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

It is my opinion that "friendly despots" are obsolete. (and like "friendly fire," are not all that "friendly" either).

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Very likely so... but again, our cold war reflex tends to assume that "friendly despots" refers to despots installed and/or maintained by us, indebted to us and to some degree controllable by us. In SDaudi Arabia we deal with a rather different situation. These despots are outside our control and we have no influence at all over their domestic policy. If we urge reform (as we do regularly) they ignore us. Call them friends or something else, we have to deal with them. We will defend them from foreign aggression, not because we're friends but because it is in our interest. We will sell them arms, not because we're friends but because their money keeps much of our defense industry afloat.

Any policy suggestions built on the assumption that the Saudis are a dependency or a client state that will hop when we say hop and reform when we tell them to are flawed from the start, because they don't have to, and they won't.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

It comes down to our risk tollerence and degree to which we are willing to relinquish control.

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If we're speaking of Saudi Arabia, we have no control to relinquish.