Thoughts from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. I)

Part I from your fellow Council members on the SWJ Blog - Thoughts from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles, compiled by LTC Thomas P. Odom (US Army, Ret.).

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Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council...

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I'll be posting the remainder of the series over the next several days. As always, posting comments on the actual blog site are 'more than welcomed'...

And to think this all started because I got pissed at Fabius Maximus one night. :D

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Originally Posted by RTK

And to think this all started because I got pissed at Fabius Maximus one night. :D

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...happens.;)

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Originally Posted by RTK

And to think this all started because I got pissed at Fabius Maximus one night. :D

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ONE night? :wry:

SFC W

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Originally Posted by Uboat509

ONE night? :wry:

SFC W

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OK, one particular night.....

:cool:

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Originally Posted by RTK

OK, one particular night.....

:cool:

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Keep going...:rolleyes:

This blog is absolutely superb... must reading for those about to go into theater, especially those going to MiTT teams. Thanks for posting!

Tom, as always a first rate job !
I look forward to subsequent issues.

RTK, Great contributions !
BTW, it was 3 nights and it's been 3 weeks (addresses your previous question) :D

Regards, Stan

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Originally Posted by Stan

Tom, as always a first rate job !
I look forward to subsequent issues.

RTK, Great contributions !
BTW, it was 3 nights and it's been 3 weeks (addresses your previous question) :D

Regards, Stan

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My therapist seems to remember it was much more than that. :o

Elaborate some then on point #6. How's it going? How do you recruit? How much 'pull and influence' do they really have? Is this small community of resources within units/AOs collaberating and collating and buiding data bases and communicating amongst themselves? If two men step forth with savvy and time in-country, what subjective and objective criteria determine the selection of your cultural point man? Who makes the decision - the company CO? Bn? I would think in smaller units this 'point man' would want to be able to readily have the ear of the Commander - is this the case? What mechanisms are there for procuring such talent from outside the military structure? If you knew a civilian in-country who had good language skills and moved easily amongst the people, how could you get him? You couldn't nab him or bribe him with MREs and field chow to come work for you. How much cross-over is there in the current applications of COIN?

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Originally Posted by goesh

Elaborate some then on point #6.

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Goesh - This will be covered in the next blog entry, but here's the Cliff's Notes version:

This is arguably more important during predeployment training than any other time. Setting the tone in training for how to interact with local populaces will determine the automated responses you're looking for once you get to theater.

Think of it this way: Before you play the in Stanley Cup Finals you had better have a good game plan going in. Whatever you do or fail to do in the practices leading up to Game 1 will have implications within the Series. Certain areas you must assume risk in and others you must emphasize as important. Am I going to focus on power plays, penalty killing, backchecking, or forechecking? How do I adjust my lines to best neutralize or defeat the strengths of my opponent?

Training for a deployment is much the same. What areas will I focus on and which will I assume more risk? One could argue that if we're viewing the people (both locally, domestically, and internationally) as the center of gravity then it so follows that learning how to deal with unfamiliar customs, courtesies, and language would be a hot commodity area.

Finding those with experience in country is a good start, but ideally you're looking for someone smart who's actually from the area you're going to before you leave. This takes some searching and a good network system. If they don't deploy with you, you need to find someone in theater for mroe local specific matters. If you're patrolling correctly and developing the relationships you need to in order to be successful, in no time you'll find someone you trust enough (and, in turn, trusts you) to act as your local cultural advisor.

Hopefully this helps explain some.

"If you're patrolling correctly and developing the relationships you need to in order to be successful, in no time you'll find someone you trust enough (and, in turn, trusts you) to act as your local cultural advisor."

Then interpretation/interpretors can be a vulnerability. How do you adequately vet someone who has sufficient English skills and just happens to be in your AO? I would stick and move via counter-COIN strategies other than intimidation if I were say an interested Iranian, especially in hotly contested turf. We aren't the only ones on a major learning curve here.

Your reponse is helpful. Is General P. having to kick alot of butt with the implimentation of COIN or is it a relatively smooth transition in operational theory and application?

Is there any logistical adjustment required for COIN implimentation? Does COIN impose any unique logistical challenges? I guess I should apologize for jumping out of order here and jumping ahead and rushing and acting pushy, but I keep in mind there are significant forces on the home front who want to pull the plug on the whole thing.

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Originally Posted by goesh

Then interpretation/interpretors can be a vulnerability. How do you adequately vet someone who has sufficient English skills and just happens to be in your AO?

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You get very selective in what you allow them to know or tell them. I can't really go into what is entailed in the vetting process.

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Originally Posted by goesh

Is General P. having to kick alot of butt with the implimentation of COIN or is it a relatively smooth transition in operational theory and application?

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A lot of what FM 3-24 was implimented by 3ACR in OIF III before FM3-24 even came out in draft. COL McMaster ensured we were trained to conduct operations the way they were supposed to be conducted. Between COL McMaster and some very squared away Squadron Commanders, the leadership led by example. All we had to do was follow.

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Originally Posted by goesh

Is there any logistical adjustment required for COIN implimentation? Does COIN impose any unique logistical challenges?

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There's always adjustment, especially when you're talking about an Army that thinks in linear dimensions traditionally. There are outside considerations, but I think we've gotten a pretty good handle on them at this stage of the game.

... articles 6 through 12.

Given 300+ years of linear theory and application, is COIN theory and practice in full implimentation or is it essentially still all on paper and limited in real application to some AOs? Are some in the Officer Corps regarding COIN as a pet project that is going to fade away? I sense a bit of a struggle in the two camps. How serious are the differences? How much of a turf war is going on in-house?These are questions some who hold the purse strings are asking in their own way.

Point 8. It would seem as in previous wars and engagements that necessity facilitates this principle. In Nam, the good officers kept their mouthes shut for a while and followed NCOs around like pups until they developed their bush craft. I would presume in 'hotter' and more hostile AOs this principle manifests rather easily and quickly out of necessity. One could argue however that point 8. and other points, are simply linear history repeating itself. This could provide a justification for some to think COIN is more of a situational and environmental necessity and not a national, strategic necessity. Can COIN survive if relegated to Mission Only status to be put on the table when and where needed? How open and friendly is the General Officer Corps to COIN? This is the type of interfacing the military should expect from civilians and what civilians should demand of their armed forces. I will say this in closing: I think COIN can pull civilians with their flags off the sidewalks to at least approach the rank and file of our armed forces much more so than the traditional, linear camp does. From my perspective, you've got some cavalry soldiers dressed and acting like Indians.

... articles 13 - 20 and articles 21 - 28.

A very enjoyable read. Wished we had this a few years ago !

Great work guys !

Point #19. Except in direct educational services, the Peace Corps Volunteers who spent the most time with children were the least respected and usually accomplished the least in W. African muslim bush villages. Very smart to beware the children. There is nothing more insulting than for powerful, grown men from a poweful, unknown, foreign culture to be interacting with children while their fathers and uncles look on. As mentioned, family roles and parental authority is changed when a child through lots of interacation and contact becomes the authority on the Americans in the home and the center of attention because of it. No good can come of it. I don't see how the rigid paternalism of traditonal 3rd world Islam, the arranged marriages, the lack of full economic participation and power sharing by the women and their complete lack of religious authority is very conducive to planned enpowerment of them in any kind of COIN implementatioin. The responses given suggest utilizing and positively exploiting presented opportunities more so than focusing time and resources to cultivate said opportunities. If energy/resources can be devoted to empowering women, there should be equitable energy/resources for income generating projects for men.

Hey Goesh,
I could be wrong here, but I think the article is in general broad stroke and a tad vague, but the subsequent inputs clear things for me. I read it as being careful and also being influential, but not straight interaction.

I can say that while in Afghanistan, we tried to make sure the children saw us as friendly and respectful, but that didn't mean we let our guard down (We also didn't try to teach them bad language such as in the recent video herein). Weeks later in the city flea markets, some remembered us and came up to greet us in front of the general population. They displayed no fear, were open and walked with us for 15 minutes or so, exchanging a few words in English and Estonian. The USAF CPT with us said he had never seen such friendly relations with foreign troops and asked if we had been 'dumping' candy and food 'excessively'. The Estonian NCO responded with an immediate "No, just good will !"

Going back to 90 - 94 in Zaire, the women ran "wall street" (directly across the street from the US Embassy), their presence, their rate of exchange, and in some cases their interaction with me and my drivers was key to such things as events of the day and in one case, civil uprisings.

That's my take on Article 19 :)

Why I decided to press on this project:

First of all sometimes a certain article "resonates" with an audience because it touches that audience as a group and as individuals.

Clearly Kilcullen's 28 touched a very large audience because he offered insights that could be understood and applied at the small unit level. Much of what was previously published on COIN fell in 2 camps: the war story/history that can be very enlightening but requires the reader to dig a bit or b., the pollitical science, sociology, anthropology brain twisting theory ridden writing that just does not prompt a sergeant, a captain, or any other soldier to say, "I really enjoyed reading that because I understood it as the author was speaking to me, not at me, or worse, down to me."

Kilcullen touched RTK enough that he worked through each point and offered his own thoughts, followed by JC on the blog. When I took the two and combined them, the sum became greater than the total of the two. Others who contributed seemed to sense the same thing.

Secondly how you react to any of the discussed points, hopefully will be in the same vein. That what you take away is based on what we put before you and how you interpreted it. Kilcullen's stated goal was COIN principles at the company-level. In using his 28 articles as a framework, I deliberately dropped the "company-level" limitation. My goal--and I believe the goal of everyone who offered a thought including Dave Kilcullen--was to get you to think on how these principles might affect you at whatever level you apply them.

Best,

Tom

Fighting the War on Terrorism: A Counterinsurgency Strategy

- so while the wife is shopping, I'm in the bookstore and spend an hour with Corum. I see good stuff that makes sense to a non-professional civilian, some I understand, some I don't but I can relate to alot of it, what I see in an hour of browsing. Then towards the end he says in affect that there are significant forces that essentially oppose the concepts and precepts of counterinsurgency. There's basically one small blurb on something with immense ramifications and implications coming from a man of some insight and experience. It's sort like getting a nice blueprint of a fort that tells all about the bulwarks and fortification and its many intracacies and all the tactical advantages it offers, then a note attached to the last page says in affect: "hostile Indians will be descending on the fort from all sides."

To quote Mr. Odom: "That what you take away is based on what we put before you and how you interpreted it" and that applies to my browsing of Mr. Corum's book. Who are these oppositional forces? What are their mechanisms of action? who are their supporters and who has the vested interest in the counter-counterinsurgency mindset? How strong are these vested interests? How much of a threat are they to the counterinsurgency crews (policy makers)? How high up and deep does this antagonism run? Is it really antagonism or general professional difference in strategic orientation? I realize the intent of this forum is specific, rightfully so, and excellant it is, but when you align yourselves directly with civilian quasi counterparts in non-traditional civilian roles, these are the questions you will get. There is a general tendency amongst civilians to think the military is all on one page, all nicely lined up like in some parade, in step and all that, but clearly that is not the case. The element of trust of our military is based on part because of this perception and in-house fighting IMO is not going to hurt that trust. I don't expect the airing of any in-house dirty laundry and certainly not any specific finger pointing but it seems to me you have a 2 front war on your hands - one over there and one at home. Our own civilian bias of simply wanting to crush enemies is not helped when experts like Corum don't deal a full hand to us. That's my gripe for the day.