Strategic Directions in Iraq - and the idea of Cultural Identity as a CoG

SWC,
I was working on this essay for another reason, but thought it would make for a good discussion on how difficult it is to incorporate the DIME in a direction that makes sense in COIN. Below is my note to a reviewer, then an excerpt (lead in) and the essay is attached - Regards Rob

From the email traffic...
Tricky working around the 5 pg restriction - I finally decided that even outlining a strategy both required the "why" and the "how" - 5pgs was too little. However, If I stuck to the "why" and follwed up with some themes I might be able to provide "strategic direction". It certainly makes you appreciate how difficult it is to craft strategy in line with the political objective. Funny thing was, many of the things I thought were right were things we are in fact doing - we may not be doing them on purpose, maybe we are doing them by default and our strategy is being constructed by our tactical actions. The other related thing about our Iraq strategy that I noticed was how it seems we are failing to articulate it - this may be because the latter.


From the lead in...

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This essay will describe how to realize the political goal of providing the basis for long term security and stability in Iraq. The Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) capabilities of the United States, Iraq, their coalition partners, regional & global states, and NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) within this essay will be leveraged against the Center of Gravity (CoG) of Iraq’s instability, Cultural Identity, to bring it into proportion with national identity and restore stability. Cultural Identity can be defined as the belief system through which people perceive the world they live in. There are several key sub-systems of Iraqi Cultural Identity: Ethnic Identities (Kurd, Turkmen and Arab), Tribal (Barzani, Al-Jabori, Al-Hussein) and the Religious Belief System (Shia’a, Sunni, Christian and Yizidi). This strategy proposes that the Iraqi Religious Belief System has been perverted by Political Islam (specific visions of Islam being promoted as a form of government to advance a political objective), and that this is the catalyst of polarization used by insurgent-extremists for justification of hatred and moral apathy. It is the chief element of destabilization in Iraq through which others are exaggerated and influenced.

This essay proposes that because Cultural Identity is so important, only by overcoming the perceived benefits by Shia and Sunni, Kurd and Arab of a government which is more exclusive to their single Islamic sect or ethnic group can Iraqis find stability. Only by balancing normal cultural beliefs with the benefits of national identity, can Iraq succeed in providing a base, pluralistic government from which long term stability will grow.

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Rob,
Interesting essay. I, however, am not sure that cultural identity can be a CoG. Joint pubs define CoG as "Agents or sources of moral or physical strength, power and resistance-what Clausewitz called 'the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed.'" Personally, I prefer Dr. Strange's defintion from the USMC War College:

"COG: Physical or moral entities that are the primary component of physical or moral strength, power and resistance. They do not just contribute to strength; they are the strength. They offer resistance. They strike effectively (or heavy) physical or moral blows. At the strategic level they are usually leaders and populations determined to prevail. At the operational level they are almost invariably specific military or insurgent forces. Generally, there is no COG at the tactical level; it has decisive points."

While I completely agree that understanding the cultural identity of the players in Iraq, I'm not sure I can buy that cultural identity is the COG. I'd propose that the Iraqi population is the COG and understanding the culture is more of a critical requirement or even a critical capability supporting the CoG. If you identify cultural identity as the CoG, how do we attack or influence that CoG to achieve our ends? I believe you can understand the culture, become culturally effective working within that culture but can you ever actually change that cultural identity? If not, then I propose it cannot be a CoG.

Just my $.02 before my first cup of coffee. I'll go back and reread after caffine intake reaches normal, sustained levels! Sounds like your 59 classes are awesome! I just kicked off a KSU masters in security studies (in conjunction with SAMS) so we're rereading Walz (Man, the State and War) along with some pretty good essays.

Hey Sully,
Great points

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"COG: Physical or moral entities that are the primary component of physical or moral strength, power and resistance. They do not just contribute to strength; they are the strength. They offer resistance. They strike effectively (or heavy) physical or moral blows.

I'd propose that the Iraqi population is the COG and understanding the culture is more of a critical requirement or even a critical capability supporting the CoG

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Honestly, the essay is kind of an investigation - because for so long I thought of the poulation as a CoG, but am just not sure anymore.

I read the Strange piece - and it works pretty good on most things, but I just find it - well limited in terms of finding a single point to focus on given the diversity of the Iraqi population and their interests. I was thinking in terms of how Non-state organizations convince the select parts of the Iraqi populace (or portions of it) to facillitate their political ends. The only thing I could come up with was by appealing to the "moral entities as a source of moral strength, power and resistance that are a natural part of the cultural identity of the sub groups, and in some cases playing to the more common themes where interests converge (here we might be talking about financial gain, but commerce is also a big part of the Iraqi culture).

I'm just one of those folks who has to hold it to a different angle to really consider it I guess:)

Regards, Rob

I was thinking about this on the way home -

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I was thinking in terms of how Non-state organizations convince the select parts of the Iraqi populace (or portions of it) to facillitate their political ends. The only thing I could come up with was by appealing to the "moral entities as a source of moral strength, power and resistance that are a natural part of the cultural identity of the sub groups, and in some cases playing to the more common themes where interests converge (here we might be talking about financial gain, but commerce is also a big part of the Iraqi culture).

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I think that if this is the case, then the only way to prevent those groups from taking advantage of it is to create within their cultural identity the idea that "pluralism" is not only OK, but beneficial and a strength. The way to start I think is to build upon those foundations already present within the cultural identity and portray pluralism as being useful and good in at least some cases (such as the notion of trade), and to demonstrate that the fears the AIF (and like elements) are using to take advantage of cultural identity are not OK, counter-productive and are a weakness.

I think its a real challenge, but its more useful to me. You have to find a useful wayof defining the moral force that is the population. Maybe its only a metaphor, but then again may "moral force" is too. The problem with Clausewitz and Strange is that for me the definitions don't easily lend themselves to thinking outside a conventional sense - they are appliable and useful, but need to applied.

I often wonder how "On War" would have read if Clausewitz had been an economist, or diplomat. It is a timeless work in my opinion, but its real utility is in application beyond the period Clausewitz's politcal-military construct.

We were reviewing the National Security Strategy and the Defense security strategy and somebody made the remark - "hey where are the documents on National Economic strategy and National Political Strategy?" It says allot. We may need to think about how we balance and apply the instruments of national power in light of the changing world.

Dr. Milan Vego wrote this article about the COG concept and the eternal confusion about it. He says a COG can only be found in the Objective and every Objective has a COG. If you change one you must change the other. It is a very differant view point than what I have read about COG's and I think ties into Rob's paper. In my biased and limited point of view. Link below.
http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_prog...pring_2006.pdf

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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

I read the Strange piece - and it works pretty good on most things, but I just find it - well limited in terms of finding a single point to focus on given the diversity of the Iraqi population and their interests. I was thinking in terms of how Non-state organizations convince the select parts of the Iraqi populace (or portions of it) to facillitate their political ends.

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Part of the problem may be that by definition a COG focuses on a single point, which when disrupted, destroyed, captured, etc, is viewed as a way of achieving success. In most cases, we are not dealing with something like the fire triangle--we need to do more than just eliminate the fuel source, OR the heat source, OR the oxygen in order to put out the flames.

I think COG analyses oversimplify because they tend to turn what ought to be a multi-causal analysis into a focus on a single cause. In the case at hand, it is not just the Iraqi population that is the COG--it is the Iraqi population in various aspects--Iraqis in their diverse economic class structure, Iraqis in their diverse religious belief structure, Iraqis in their diverse tribal/clan familial social structure, etc.--that we must come to understand and confront in multiple ways.

Anybody done some thinking on the use of "war of ideas", or someting else besides the label "War on Terror" which sounds allot like we are making war on a tactic? For me "war of ideas" or "war of ideaology" allows me to understand what we are up against. I'm not a fan of "Islamic Extremism" either because although AQ is based on political Islam, it also seems limited - and could produce the the belief among moderate Islam that we are an existential threat to core beliefs, not just those who would pervert it.

Earlier I'd mentioned the NSS and the lack of a document ref. Political and Economic Strategies on par with our Nat'l Military Strategy, but what about an Informational Strategy? Then I began to wonder why. I guess DOS might have the structure to create, articulate and produce a Diplomatic/Political strategy, but who would produce an Economic one? DOS controls the foreign aid, but as pointed out to me by a friend - nobody votes for the US Congress who lives in Nigeria - so DOS does not have as much Congressional support as say the military. How about Informational? USIS has been gone awhile right - who picked up the ball?

Hey Slapout, intersting about DR. Vego - by chance I got to meet DR. Vego recently - we (the small group class) did not talk about that per se - but spent allot of time discussing his thoughts on EBO, and also naval strategy - an incredible thinker. P.S. picked up the T-Shirt and need to send it to you.

Hi Rob, You are not going to believe this but if you have read some of the more detailed things by Col. Warden he is very close to Dr. Vego even though Vego has criticized him from time to time. Warden's whole theory is a great deal different than what the Air Force is putting out now. I have a lot of his stuff from privately published manuals that I cannot post for copyright reasons but he may turn loose of some of it shortly and if he does I will post what I can. It has nothing to do with Air power even if he uses Air power examples (he was a pilot) it is a thinking process used to develop a strategy much like Vego describes but a great deal simpler. What the Air Forces passes for EBO he calls Parallel Warfare and explains the "Time Theory of Action" ala Strategic Compression. Later.

PS-send the bill too:wry:

Slapout,
I'd like to see it. One of the places where I think Sytems type theory is useful is SSTR & COIN type operations. The T-Shirt is on me - you can send me on of those Slapout, ALA CSI T-shirts :D

WM - I like the idea of avoiding mono-causal relationships - anything dealing with people gets complicated, and the more diverse the group, the more things which interest and influence them. However, without the means in which to affect them, it becomes difficult.

I know this starts to get off the CoG issue, but its still in line with resourcing the means to pursue a strategy where D,I & E are at least as big as the M if not bigger in some areas.

That I think is at the heart of some of the things SSI is trying to get after (see the blog) and I think some respected former GOs, diplomats, and leaders are advocating. In order to bring the correct tools of national power to bear we need to rethink the way we are organized on a large scale. Excercising military power might get you security, but without the right size efforts applied within the context of the cultural conditions in Diplomacy, Economics and Information you are in a holding pattern where your credibility is being attrited and you start to lose the status of "guest".

One - creating and sustaining stability in the world is in our security interests - we have a hard time communicating that one, but I think its a great place to start.

Two - we may need to culturally rethink what security is. I know its laid out in the NSS, but that may not mean everybody has a common understanding of it; is resourced to fulfill their role in it; or is still not asking if that function is really their lane. Allot of folks think security is a wall on the border and that is it - outside of this site (and some of those like it) not much discussion is given to security threats such as the effects of global warming on populations and resources, pandemics, Disaster preparedness, etc. I agree with what I heard earlier this week from a visiting speaker (the reamarks the guest made were on a non-attributional clause so he'll remain un-named) that we need something on the scale of the Goldwaters-Nichols Act that goes beyond Inter-Agency coordination, but adresses the structure required to face the challenges of the 21st Century.

I think the COG shifts/morphs over time, and that an argument could be made that the U.S. military presence in Iraq (and to a lesser extent Afghanistan) is the current COG for our enemies. It serves as the source of their moral strength (their justification) to resist us, not just in Iraq, but in many locations far beyond Iraq. I have seen estimates on how many Iraqi fighters we have captured and killed, and yet they keep regenerating because we are still there, thus the cause still exists.

However, I don't think we can use linear logic and assume that if we pull out the insurgency will then collapse because we removed their COG, rather the COG will morph again, and the nature of the fight will change.

That leads to the next question. What came first the COG or the nature of the fight?

Rob,I can just about do that, it is not quite a Slapout CSI shirt but it is pretty darn close!!

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Two - we may need to culturally rethink what security is. I know its laid out in the NSS, but that may not mean everybody has a common understanding of it; is resourced to fulfill their role in it; or is still not asking if that function is really their lane. Allot of folks think security is a wall on the border and that is it - outside of this site (and some of those like it) not much discussion is given to security threats such as the effects of global warming on populations and resources, pandemics, Disaster preparedness, etc. I agree with what I heard earlier this week from a visiting speaker (the reamarks the guest made were on a non-attributional clause so he'll remain un-named) that we need something on the scale of the Goldwaters-Nichols Act that goes beyond Inter-Agency coordination, but adresses the structure required to face the challenges of the 21st Century

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Rob,

Long over due and Goldwater-Nichols is only part of it; we really need refereed version of the Key West process from the late 40s but one that pulls in the other agencies and departments. Unfortunately I see no prospect for this adminstration to muster the "juice" necessary to undertake such a review. We had an opportunity with 9-11 and the Dept of Homeland Security consolidation as well as the creation of the DNI. In all of that, there was too much turf protection going on and too much focus on other agendas.

Best

Tom

PS

You are correct; All people crave security--how they define their security is culturally influenced and in some cases driven.

Great discussions on Rob's paper and Center of Gravity. What I like about Clausewitz and what I think makes him eternal is his holy trinity: The relationship between passion, chance and reason. As we struggle to develop coherent strategies, I think we'd all be better served if we kept the trinity in mind and tried to bring balance among the three.

Rob-I completely understand what you are looking at in terms of a CoG that's cultural focuses versus just throwing out the population. I know in COIN we try and influence the fence-sitters, those who could support either side. Perhaps that's more of an accurate CoG than just the population. The ones that hate us will mostly likely always hate us and the onese that love us...well they are ours to lose. Its the middle strip of the population that we are trying to win over, and hopefully tip the balance in our favor. I'm going to noodle the cultural identity concept...its starting to grow on me. I want to try and figure out how to integrate it into a operational design model.

I wrote a paper last year for school stating we needed a National Strategy for Oil to address the growing energy problem. I totally agree with you Rob that our NSS is not integrated at all with the other elements of our government. The failure in our strategic plan lies not in our political-military bridge, but in harnessing the other players in government. We definately need to look at a Nichols-Goldwater type of legislation to get the JIIM process moving. What if a DoS guy could NOT make it to the SES level unless he did joint time with a military staff for a year...kind of like DoS branch qualification? Same thing with serving at a "hardship" embassy. Right now there is no way to make a DoS guy do something...as we see in the Baghdad Embassy and the flood of government folks leaving when the rockets start to fall in the green zone. If we tie jobs to promotions and clearing certain gates, I think we can start making progress towards a true JIIM operating environment. Don't forget, there are more Army band members than there are Field Service Officers in the DoS!

Systems and chaos theory are big here at Leavenworth right now. When you get here Rob, I've got some huge briefs which are just awesome and really delve into chaos theory.

Slapout-Warden's rings, in my opinion is a useful model for conducting simultaneous targeting moving closer to the COG. In today's COE, this is more how the terrorists operate and where we need to shift. Since they can operate nearly independently, with minimal logistics and C2, they are difficult to target. I think we need to move our military more to that type of model for COIN fights and away from the napeolanic structures we still cling to for task organization.

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Its the middle strip of the population that we are trying to win over, and hopefully tip the balance in our favor. I'm going to noodle the cultural identity concept...its starting to grow on me. I want to try and figure out how to integrate it into a operational design model.

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These are the folks that need the most attention.

Here are my random thoughts on how to get these folks on our side...

It may be that you need to be targetting them all the time. I recall a reference to the wells dug in Chad (I think) by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that had these little plaques on them, identifying who had built them (SA) and why (for the people of Chad). Just a little daily reminder that they cared. Consider it akin to preparing the battlefield, except now we're doing it all the time.

It may be that some of what needs to be done is in the realm of rehabilitating how the US and its policies come across. I firmly believe that if we could do something that demonstrated humility we'd get a lot of the middle strip thinking more favorably towards us.

Tactically, at the operational level, force protection cannot be job one. It sends the message that American lives are more valuable than those of others. In reality, we pay for it with the lives and livelihoods of the locals around which we operate. Who wants to root for the guy who's willing to throw you (or someone else) in front of a bus to save his own life?

Strategically, American national security cannot be more important than the security of others. Same message as above, writ larger.

Again, I think a lot of this needs to be an ongoing effort.

Sully, yep...that is what Warden calls Parallel warfare. It is best to act on all 5 rings at once! in order to produce the system wide effect. Very close to what Troufion says in his paper. One point about ring 1 leadership that he is often misunderstood about. He has consistently said that ring 1 leadership must include the entire leadership structure!! not just one or two people. I have a five rings diagram he made where it is applied to a terrorist organization and if I can I will post it. Also some of the D3A Targeting procedures used by Artillery (both kinetic and non kinetic) are extremely close to Warden's overall concept. Later

How abou this - going back to which elements can compel and which ones can only coerce

Doc Strange says that only certain things can be a CoG, but he breaks that down into two other categories - CC - Critical Capabilities and CVs Critical Vulnerabilities.

I know what I wrote, but how about if we say the CoG of these type groups are in fact the the groups themselves - in not from a larger organization perspective, then from the foot soldier size groups

Then the critical capability might be Public Support - they need Public Support in order to operate (the ability to blend in the neighborhoods in white opals really only gets you so far - you need public support or at least public apathy/lack of ISF/CF support to get you the rest of the way)

Then the critical vulnerability might be the element of Public Support to which they appeal - Cultural Identity through Political Islam - they are trying to send a better message, or at least one that counters any benefits the Iraqi Govt/CF might offer while trying to demonstrate the pros of siding with the AIF (or the perils of siding against it).

Strange says the way to attack the CoG is to peel back the layers and find a vulnerability.

Allot of the problem is how we interpret the significance of the CoG and apply resources to it. We may have trouble attacking the groups since they are regenerative, but maybe we can attack the message through a counter message. To do that though requires....

A friend of mine just pointed out an interesting parralel to the CG>CC>CV analysis between our own CCs and CVs. In order to affect the CV of the model I put in above, you'd need to acknowledge that the CC for us is also Public Support. To provide a credible counter message which contests the AIF message it must include both perceived & demonstratable benefits that appeals to immediate and long term needs. It must also be structured to have cultural appeal to the many groups and sup groups. It does not have to promise everything, but must accomodate enough if not all enough so they accept it.

If we're using Clausewitz's Iron Calculas equation of Results = Means x Will, are we using the right types of means (D-I-M-E), in the right proportions and quantities, and in the right ways to result in the triumph (lasting political peace) we are after?

How does our W (will) figure into the application of the required means in the equation?

Are we willing, or capable of applying the means towards the result/political objective?

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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

If we're using Clausewitz's Iron Calculas equation of Results = Means x Will, are we using the right types of means (D-I-M-E), in the right proportions and quantities, and in the right ways to result in the triumph (lasting political peace) we are after?

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Rob, I think this is critical we have to start thinking of Force as something that may not be destructive, but something that is constructive.

Great Point - I agree, but I also think yu have to start with a means of considering it like Edaward Luttwak does in his work on Grand Strategy on the Romans - In his work (based on economic expression in my mind) Force is kinetic, Power is the means of generateing force and Deterrance is from the benefit of havng excercised force, and maybe it also provides influence - but that is about where I'd end as a means of describing how we might think about it.

Now - if Force is the kinetic expression of power - then it seems to me it neutral until the user decides how they are going to use it. Or as Obi-Wan would say.....

Absolutely, the use of force for positive and constructive ends on a large scale is something the U.S. can do well. Look at the use of force in Disaster relief, engineering, etc. We must be able to determine how those resources are applied.

In FM 23-4 it states some of the functions can be done by the Military that would normally be done by OGAs and NGOs for a limited time. I think that statement says allot - and could be used to open a dialogue about the structure we need in the military and the structure we need in OGAs to have to provide the military the capacity to do those other things for a limitied time, but then hand them off to a more suitable agency/organization for the long term - so that both ends can better focus on their core compentencies.

Rob,
If you can, try and get a copy of the small book, "Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade" by Dr. Jack Kem. It was published by the CGSC DJMO (Department of Joint and Multinational Operations) here at Leavenworth. There is a great breakdown of CoG>Critical Capabilities (CC)>Critical Requirements (CR)>Critical weaknesses (CW)> and critical vulnerabilities (CV). Its a small book just full of great operational design tools. We spent a pretty good deal of time at CGSC working through the process and more in the strategist track.

Here we go guys. A PDF book on Warden's complete system. It is a mixture of how to use it in the military and business. Special parts definitions of COG's, system concepts, and especially Parallel warfare. It does have a short section on the 5 rings applied to a terrorist organization. This is not the full deal but it is free and no copyright problems. Enjoy:)

http://www.venturist.com/Prometheus%...s%20wCover.pdf

The more I think about this whole tread on finding centers of gravity, critical competencies, critical vulnerabilities, and the associated verbiage, the more I come to the conclusion that we are fumbling around with a bunch of terminology to try get a grip on a process that has been in place for a long time. That process happens to be providing customer service.

The hard part for we folks currently or previously in uniforms is that this happens to a business that is usually foreign to us. We do not think of what we do as a customer service business. I mean how many ordinary people out there tend to ask for someone to come over and drop large explosive devices on their heads or take pot shots at them with 5.56, 7.62, and 9 mm rounds from covered and concealed positions. We tend to view our “customers” as the citizens back home whose way of life we are defending.

In a counterinsurgency fight, we have a different set of customers. Now we need to look to the folks who are threatened by the insurgents as our customers. And, we need to find out from them what it is they want us to do in the way of serving them. A really important piece of this that we cannot sit back and wait for them to come to us with their “druthers.” We need to go out there and ask them directly what they want and need. Then we need to push it to them a fast as we can.

The good thing about the Petraeus approach seems to be that we have taken that mindset to heart by getting out in the population instead of holing up in the “legionary fortresses” of Balad, Camp Victory, etc. However, we need to continue to keep the customer focus of what we do squarely on the population.

We need to conduct a market analysis, segment the population, and then serve up the products that cater to the needs and wishes of those various segments. I suspect that the tripartite division made by others in this thread (pro-Coalition, anti-Coalition and fence-sitting Mugwumps”) may be a good start, but the market segmenting is much more complex than that. Just identifying the segments is not enough. We also need to figure out what they want from us. Moreover, you can bet that this will not be the same in each segment. However, we can probably identify some common desires that cross over multiple segments. Not every MacDonalds customer wants a cheeseburger and fries. That’s why their menu includes chicken nuggets, fish sandwiches, and salads too. But, all MacDonalds customers do want their food fast, fresh, and at low cost.

The real trick will be to figure out how to satisfy the common desires without also creating dissatisfaction in the disparate segment’s by failing to satisfy their unique sets of desires.
For example:
All the population probably wants security. However, the Shi’a may not want to have their security provided by some Sunni police officer.

We need to get some folks out in the field who know how to identify customer values and how to deliver products that cater to those values with the least amount of waste (in this context AKA collateral damage, among other things). And remember, waste is largely in the eye of the customer.