Powell-Weinberger & COIN/Stability & Reconstruction Ops

"Essentially, the Doctrine expresses that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target; the force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy; there must be strong support for the campaign by the general public; and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged." -PBS, NEWSHOUR
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"Powell based this strategy for warfare in part on the views held by his former boss in the Reagan administration, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and also on his own experience as a major in Vietnam." -PBS, NEWSHOUR

The time to relook the validity of the P-W Doctrine is now. There is absolutely nothing wrong with "overwhelming and disproportionate force" and "support from the public" or for that matter "a clear exit strategy." The question to ask is what constitutes overwhleming force, support and exit strategy in COIN and Stability and Reconstruction Operations?

If the goal is to establish a Sustainable Peace, which I define as: the decisive turning point where the target state is capable of providing its own security, maintaining the rule of law, and exercising a free and independent democratic government without extensive external military and civilian support (from NPGS Thesis: Progressive Reconstruction, p.7). Then we can claim the establishment of it as the moment to exit. To get to the exit point we (following P-W) should apply all our effort (overwhelming and disproportionate) across the spectrum to achieve that goal.

There is nothing wrong with applying the P-W doctrine to these type operations. It is a valid and proven doctrine and is better than that which we apply today.

-T

Several Powell-Weinberger Doctrine sites for review:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_Doctrine

http://www.afa.org/magazine/Aug1999/0899powell.asp

A lesson Plan :
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/te...ldoctrine.html

Progressive Reconstruction: a Methodology for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. http://theses.nps.navy.mil/06Sep_Rohr.pdf

If Powell based it on his VN time, we can only assume that it involves a good deal of denial and "I never heard of that operation.":wry:

One basic problem with the P-W construct is that it was designed to AVOID any sort of COIN situation. It was geared more toward Desert Storm and similar conventional engagements. There are aspects of it that would be worth adopting or modifying, but on the whole it's more of a "no more Vietnams" catchphrase than any real strategy. IMO, anyhow.:)

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There is absolutely nothing wrong with "overwhelming and disproportionate force" and "support from the public"

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The big problem is "overwhelming and disproportionate force against whom"?

At the one extreme is the notion that a military force is fielded by a group to defend it agaisnt other military forces. Historically a group is "defeated" when its military can no longer provide that protection. If you don't field an adequate military to defend, then what happens to your civilians is "on you" for not defending them.

While much of the western military tradition evolved to stylize warfare and remove the threat of death or enslavement of a defeated group, these "rules of war" suffered setbacks occasionally, that reminded people why it was a good idea to follow them. The acceptance of the "battlefield decision" was easier when the result was tribute or a change in "who got the tax money" - when a groups existance was threatened then adherance to the 'rules' waned. The "rules" applied as long as both sides played by them. This could be complicated by cultural divides, as occured in WWII between US and Japanese. The closer to "Total War" - the more antagonists felt justified in 'bending' the rules in order to prevent worse barbarism. And sometimes just disagreed on what the 'rules' were.

Our (western) concept of "just war" has evolved to the point where it is no longer the responsibilty of a group to field a military force to protect itself, but the responsibility of the groups adversary to avoid casualties to civilians. This 'doctrine' of zero tolerance for 'collateral damage', coupled with the disparity between US military power and anybody else's, in effect has made coventional military forces obsolete. The US has demonstrated on several occasions that it is not healthy to field a mechanized force agasint us. But in utterly defeating those military forces, we bend over backwards to avoid civilian casualties (and in some cases even "excessive" casualties to military forces.

Our overwhleming and disproportionate conventional forces are a victim of their own success. As Mark Steyn writes (about a year ago - I can't find the link, but this text is from another post quoting it):

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We live in an age of inversely proportional deterrence: The more militarily powerful a civilized nation is, the less its enemies have to fear the full force of that power ever being unleashed. They know America and other Western powers fight under the most stringent self-imposed etiquette. Overwhelming force is one thing; overwhelming force behaving underwhelmingly as a matter of policy is quite another.

So even the most powerful military in the world is subject to broader cultural constraints. When Kathryn Lopez’s e-mailer sneers that “your contribution to this war is limited solely to your ability to exercise the skillset provided by your liberal arts education,” he’s accidentally put his finger on the great imponderable: whether the skill set provided by the typical American, British and European education these last 30 years is now one of the biggest obstacles to civilizational self-preservation. A nation that psychologically outsources war to a small career soldiery risks losing its ability even to grasp concepts like “the enemy”: The professionalization of war is also the ghettoization of war. As John Podhoretz wondered in the New York Post the other day: “What if liberal democracies have now evolved to a point where they can no longer wage war effectively because they have achieved a level of humanitarian concern for others that dwarfs any really cold-eyed pursuit of their own national interests?”

That’s a good question. If you watch the grisly U.S. network coverage of any global sporting event, you’ve no doubt who your team’s meant to be: If there are plucky Belgian hurdlers or Fijian shotputters in the Olympics, you never hear a word of them on ABC and NBC; it’s all heartwarming soft-focus profiles of athletes from Indiana and Nebraska. The American media have no problem being ferociously jingoistic when it comes to the two-man luge. Yet, when it’s a war, there is no “our” team, not on American TV. Like snotty French ice-dancing judges, the media watch the U.S. skate across the rink and then hand out a succession of snippy 4.3s — for lack of Miranda rights in Fallujah, insufficient menu options at Gitmo.

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The notion of overwhelming force requires a culturally acceptable target. Currently, in COIN operations by an adversary with an ounce of brains in his skull, such a culturally acceptable target doesn't exist, or at least is so well embedded in 'that which can't be affected' that any sort of application produces collateral damage that is not culturally acceptable back home, making "overwhelming and disproportionate force" and "support from the public" (and perhaps even the notion of a "clear exit strategy" mutually exclusive.

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There is nothing wrong with applying the P-W doctrine to these type operations. It is a valid and proven doctrine and is better than that which we apply today.

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There is "something wrong" fundamentally with applying P-W doctrine to these types of conflicts - any competant adversary can ensure that its application violates the implicit doctrine medicinalizing the use of military force - you can attack the cancer - but "Do no harm" to the rest of the body.
The way insurgent groups are metastasizing, that is not possible leaving us with only a few choices, none of which meet the current cultural expectations that the various military 'revolutions' have oversold to the public.

1) Identify and kill tumors as you find and isolate them from "good cells". Hope that you can kill them quicker than they metastisize. Hope that the small number of 'good cells' killed doesn't become unacceptable.

2) Flood the body with the informational equivalent of chemo - trying to prevent tumors from forming, but making the entire body "sick" with privacy, civil rights, and propaganda influences you hope do not have worse unintended consequenses than the tumors.

3) The P-W anology of radical major surgury, accepting the removal of large chunks of healthy tissue by force, to get rid of the small amount of tumor cells. Hope that this doesn't leave the body permanantly maimed or disfigured to the extent that it suffers a disability.

There may be others, but it is not self-eveident to me that 3) is in any fashion "better than what we are doing today" (seemingly 1). Just because 'bad things are happening' pusuing the present course is no guarentee that any different course would not have unitended consequences even worse.

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The questions posed by the Powell Doctrine, which should be answered affirmatively before military action, are:

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

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(4) is a huge problem. The intention is good, but an adversary who knows about this criterion can exploit it by continuing diplomacy and offering the diplomats small advances while achieving his objectives with military force. Hitler did so successfully in 1937-1939.

Furthermore, there's sometimes simply no time for diplomacy. Think of Rwanda.

(1) "vital" is too often used in such contexts in the U.S., so I guess this criterion is much less strict in the U.S. than if read by an European.

(3) and (6) simply never happens. Politicians and even most generals are too dumb for that.

Ok to put it bluntly you are stuck in a box. None of you see the word 'force' as anything but kinetic. Think of Force in other terms. Here is the Websters definition:

1 a (1) : strength or energy exerted or brought to bear : cause of motion or change : active power <the forces of nature> <the motivating force in her life> (2) capitalized -- used with a number to indicate the strength of the wind according to the Beaufort scale <a Force 10 hurricane> b : moral or mental strength c : capacity to persuade or convince <the force of the argument>
2 a : military strength b (1) : a body (as of troops or ships) assigned to a military purpose (2) plural : the whole military strength (as of a nation) c : a body of persons or things available for a particular end <a labor force> <the missile force> d : an individual or group having the power of effective action <join forces to prevent violence> <a force in politics> e often capitalized : POLICE FORCE -- usually used with the
3 : violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted upon or against a person or thing. The quality of conveying impressions intensely in writing or speech <stated the objectives with force

There is nothing in this definition that pidgeon holes us into strategic bombing attacks. Force is not just the ability to bludgeon the enemy to death. It is not just the application of steel on target and masses of troops on the ground.

It is the means to compel, to constrain. Overwhelming force, disproportionate force, means doing what needs to be done and not holding back--if what needs to be done is to coerce tribal leaders, to build schools, to bring agriculture specialists, to rebuild police forces and armies. Then that is what you do. But you do it all out, with a stated goal of establishing a stabile peace.

Why might you ask? I'll tell you becuase the American People NEED a stated functioning doctrine that is simple to cover even the most complex of conflicts as is COIN. The American People know Powell-Weinberger, they like it, it appeals to the senses: it is the American Way of War. It was sold to them and it works. Tell them the reason why we need more money for Iraq, or to surge, or to initiate a plan B is based upon the P-W doctrine to go all out to win this fight and establish the criteria for exit which is a Stabile Peace then they will understand and support.

-T

No, I'm not stuck in a box. I still contend that the whole point of the P-W doctrine is to AVOID engagement in any real way UNLESS a win is somehow guaranteed. Your use of the term "American Way of War" implies overwhelming FIREPOWER, because that is how that term has come to be understood. There is nothing in there about overwhelming construction projects. P-W cannot deal with COIN because it is framed in absolutes. COIN is quite often anything but an absolute.

And how exactly do you define a stable peace? Is it one framed in an American-style democracy? The elimination of a competing tribal group? Stable peace is a very fluid thing that often means different things to different people.

Lastdingo brings up some good points as well. I'd also question Point 7. What percentage in what poll is considered "support of the American people?" And at what point must you reevaluate that support? COIN is typically a "long haul" proposition, and P-W seems to be set up for short-term, quick result operations. I would contend that conditions 7 and 8 can be very difficult to meet, and that is what sets this up for me as a semi-isolationist doctrine.

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But you do it all out,

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What do you mean by "all out"?

Are the people working overseas (far more than just soldiers - and doing far more non-kinetics than kinetics) over there loafing? How many more 100s of billions of dollars spent will take us from where we are now to "all out".

My contention is that our instruments of national power are not organized in such a way as to efficiently emply the vast sums we are spending now - is "all out" spending more, or doing thing differently (ie a more 'combined arms' approach between the military, diplomatic, economic and information agencies). Work smarter, not necessarily harder, and as Steve says, not in an environment of "black and white" and implied "metric centric" mentality that establishes a set of clear "cause and effect" relationships, both to begin involvement and end involvement that exist only in "war between field armies".

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I'll tell you becuase the American People NEED a stated functioning doctrine that is simple to cover even the most complex of conflicts as is COIN.

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Non-sequitor. You are not going to get a "simple" direct cause and effect based mechanist solution to a truely complex conflict - by definition. Complex conflicts (like most COIN sonflicts) are "tipping point" affaris that do not have clear entry and exit criteria, are not amenable to definition of progress and victory through metrics.

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The American People know Powell-Weinberger, they like it, it appeals to the senses: it is the American Way of War.

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To the extent they do know it, they know it only by a single outlier datapoint, and it appeals because that happened to be one of the most lopsided military successes in history. Something that had little to with the P-W doctrine (we would have won in similar fashion with considerably less force), and ultimately it was a victory that ended up not achieving all of its goals because of poor communication and situational awareness - not to mention bad assumptions about metrics...

The American Way of War is to fight and defeat armies. We have become so good at it that nobody will play that game. COIN tends to be cultural warfare - convincing a population that your way of living is better than the other guys and so you should through in with them. That requires not mobilizing a military to defeat a military, but mobilizing your culture to win over another culture. Far from being in a box of military only - I would argue that it is the P-W doctrine that is inherently military (Weinbergers original speach (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...einberger.html)

Was "The uses of Military Power" - and was very much about when to use kinetics - not about when to go in and build schools and hand out food.

We HAVE established the exit criteria for leaving Iraq - when their security forces can take care of themselves.

The problem in Iraq is not an exit strategy, or not "going all out" - it is about the fact that people expect to be able to get the morning paper and read about the "Iraq success index" going up and approaching the "magic number" that means we won. People don't want the P-W doctirne - they want what it assumes - a mechanistic "victory meter" that we can point to and say how we are doing against the list of "vital interested no longer threatened; clear objectives obtained; how prescient we were predicting risks and costs; uses violence only as a 'last resort'; clear exit critera and avoided 'endless entanglements'; lack of unintened consequences; and how every one at home and abroad is so enamored with how wonderful we for doing so well.

That is not a doctrine, its a FANTASY.

We disagree on what constitutes a threat to our vital national interests let alone what they even are. Our adversarys 'get a vote' in whether out objectives are achieved, and do their best to cover them in 'noise' and objectives of their own. No one as yet has proven their ESP poweres of acurately predicting risks and cost (hell we can't even do it BUILDING weapons, why would there be an expectation to accurately predict the effects of using them?). We have to deal with the double standard of acceptable use of violence, which means other can use force as they see fit (ie the current situation in Lebanon vs the Pal camps) while we must worry about equitable use force in defending ourselves. Using overwhleming force (in the eyes of the beholder) in and of itself causes unitended consequences, alienates us abroad and within certain groups here at home, where we are not fighting an organized military force.

The P-W doctrine arose during the Cold War in a context of when to engage directly in proxy wars and with surrogates. It assumes military action against military forces where you can easily track the relative combat power of the forces involved and track your progress to victory.

It has been rendered obsolete by the perception of success that is argued to make it desireable to go back to.

We DO need to look beyond "kinetic solutions" but to do so we need to "operationalize" the agency's that control the non-military elements of national power, make them expeditionary and provide doctrine and infrastructure to allow them to be full partners with DoD in setting the conditions required for secure, stable, government institutions that foster liberty and equality in the countries of the ME.

If we can't figure out how to do that in Iraq we have serious long term problems...Attempting to "overwhelm" them in any way in so doing is counterproductive...despite how much may want the fantasy to be a reality.

"And how exactly do you define a stable peace? Is it one framed in an American-style democracy? The elimination of a competing tribal group? Stable peace is a very fluid thing that often means different things to different people."-Steve Blair

From my first post in this thread: a Sustainable Peace, which I define as: the decisive turning point where the target state is capable of providing its own security, maintaining the rule of law, and exercising a free and independent democratic government without extensive external military and civilian support (from NPGS Thesis: Progressive Reconstruction, p.7).

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Originally Posted by Lastdingo

Furthermore, there's sometimes simply no time for diplomacy. Think of Rwanda.

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What of Rwanda? It was terrible, true. But what did/do you expect the US to do? Regardless of how terrible (look at today's classification of Darfur as a Genocide by President Bush--Genocide by the UN Charter requires action immediate and direct, no other nation has or is going to join the US) there is little that can be done. (I'll defer to the Rwanda experts on the SWC). But in general actions by the US are mostly deliberate and slow, as in a true democracy, the deployment of troops is not to be taken lightly. Anyone remember the indignation over Madeline Albrights comment to Colin Powell over the Balkans regarding using Military force: paraphrased-what good is this great army if we dont use it?

I still don't think you'll find many (if any) situations that meet the P-W doctrine, especially if the goal is an extended stable peace. American-style democratic government (which is what I assume you mean when you mention a democratic government...correct me if I'm wrong) has a very poor track record when it comes to transplanting. To do so requires a commitment of years and a level of overwhelming effort on many levels.

There are no simple answers in the world, as your response to Lastdingo regarding Rwanda points out. The P-W doctrine is by its nature and the number of unattainable conditions in its framework a platform for either isolation or total war. It isn't suited for COIN in any real way. COIN involves too many gray areas, too long a commitment, and too broad of an effort. I would argue that in short the P-W doctrine is a codification of the "no more Vietnams" mentality, ignoring the fact that in this world Vietnams are everywhere. And as pvebber points out we can't even agree on what constitutes Point 1 on the list most days. And I'm sure there's someone somewhere who would argue that, based on the information they had at the time, the Bush administration thought they had all 8 points covered when they decided to go into Iraq.

THE SUSTAINABLE PEACE
"A sustainable peace requires a strong and liberal law code implemented through legislation, reflecting basic human rights. Human rights monitoring, training and capacity building agencies sponsored by the government and indigenous non-governmental agencies. Corrections and detention facilities and staffs funded, trained and monitored in compliance with national and international laws. Reconciliation projects including courts and tribunals, reparations commissions, investigative and apprehension apparatus, and outreach programs fully supported and operational. Community rebuilding, confidence building, religious tolerance, and women’s rights are also important elements of the reconstruction. Refugees and internally displaced persons must be protected and reintroduced to the community. In other words it is a huge project, and potentially extremely costly in time, dollars and personnel.
Because of its great attendant cost, nation-state building has been avoided. However, with the global threat of terrorism, avoidance is no longer possible....

If the target state has been determined to be a failed or rogue state by the international community and the mandate for the intervention is clear then the intervention is legitimate. With the proper planning and allocation of manpower and material resources it will work.

It is important because it will reduce the threat of terrorist supporting rogue states. It will bring another nation into the productive world body. It will assist the noncombatant majorities within these states to achieve self-determination and democracy. It works best when instituted from the beginning [of an operation]. It can be used after but it will be harder...

The overall goal of the intervention is to change the political situation through military means, but once combat is over there needs to be a visible change in newly pacified or liberated areas. The overt demonstration of the benefits of the intervention and of the future benefits of democracy must become the focus of operations."

You all posted so many questions it takes a bit to counter:cool:

The American Way of war is unique. Therefore, the US cannot enter into a military intervention without falling back to its root culture. The US has the capacity to and should exploit its penchant towards overwhelming organization and overwhelming force, the Powell-Weinberger doctrine. Failure to utilize the capacity to overwhelm, to play towards the US strength, to plan for all aspects of the inevitable conflict to include stabilization reconstruction and transition leading to withdraw of forces is foolhardy. (Note: planning for something is not wishing it away, nor making false assumptions it is just being prepared).

From the General Order #20 issued by General Winfield Scott in the Mexican war to the Lieber Code of the US Civil War and on to the USMC Small Wars Manual and the Army and Navy Manual for Military Government and Civil Affairs in WWII the progression of US military stabilization and reconstruction efforts has [in parallel to US warfighting doctrine] been guided by certain principles. The primary principle is the belief in liberal democratic government and that war is waged against the government of a state and its military not against the people of the state. There is also inherent in these doctrines the concept of the application of force, the appropriate amount of force necessary to achieve the desired end state [including unconditional surrender and overwhelming force], the defeat of that regime and the army that supports it. This has required the destruction of the infrastructure that supports the warfighting capability of the regime and the army. These doctrines were set aside with the advent of the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions which prevented interstate wars but allowed for internal conflicts. New doctrines arose, doctrines that called on US forces to support regimes or to act in a neutral and impartial manner separating warring factions. With today’s pre-emptive strike strategy, with the resurgence of state building as a legitimate use of military forces [and the addition of transnational threats] there is a need to restructure the doctrine.

BUT there is no need to deny the US culture of warfighting in the process so long as the COIN version of Powell Weinberger focuses on developing techniques and tactics that fit. When preparing for this type of intervention the US must recognize certain facts. The first being that the conflict will be asymmetric: a conflict between insurgents and counter-insurgents (or freedom fighters vs. foreign occupation). Secondly, in this conflict the US is the foreign occupying force and will inevitably play the role of counter-insurgent. Therefore, the US must plan to seek the end state in the role of the government forces.

Again there is nothing in the P-W doctrine, other than its previous application, that cannot be adopted wisely into COIN. The previous use of P-W did focus on force on force/state vs state. That doesn't make its tenents incorrect. This is the box I was talking about. View P-W in regard to a multi-dimensional DIME effort. The premise still holds and is a good guide for the use of America's entire arsenal of democracy.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

I still don't think you'll find many (if any) situations that meet the P-W doctrine, especially if the goal is an extended stable peace. American-style democratic government (which is what I assume you mean when you mention a democratic government...correct me if I'm wrong) has a very poor track record when it comes to transplanting. To do so requires a commitment of years and a level of overwhelming effort on many levels.

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No, American style democracy is rare indeed. It doesn't translate well. The model was unique. And democracy should be unique to each state. It should be a localized version of government by the people, a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections.

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Originally Posted by TROUFION

Again there is nothing in the P-W doctrine, other than its previous application, that cannot be adopted wisely into COIN. The previous use of P-W did focus on force on force/state vs state. That doesn't make its tenents incorrect. This is the box I was talking about. View P-W in regard to a multi-dimensional DIME effort. The premise still holds and is a good guide for the use of America's entire arsenal of democracy.

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I still think you'll have difficulty answering yes to most of the 8 points that form the basis of the P-W doctrinal checklist. In this day and age (given the impact of instant media outlets and the like) you'll have a fair amount of difficulty mustering the popular support for a longterm COIN operation (and most of them are long term, even with overwhelming assets...look at your average disaster relief operation including the reconstruction process; and those are small when compared to a larger COIN effort).

P-W may make a good starting point, but we really need to look beyond that model.

"If the target state has been determined to be a failed or rogue state by the international community and the mandate for the intervention is clear then the intervention is legitimate."

Actually, the situation of the state has no saying in the question whether an invasion is legal or justified.

It is legal when the UN allows or when it invaded your nation/alliance in the first place. All other invasions are illegal for every signatory state of the UN. If you don't want to obey the UN charter, then leave the charter and become the outlaw state that you wanna have.

Is is justified to invade a country if it's legal and a measure to improve the world for mankind, or at least for your country. An invasion that costs more ressources and blood than not to invade (Lebanon, Iraq examples) is not justifiable under any conditions.


"I still don't think you'll find many (if any) situations that meet the P-W doctrine, especially if the goal is an extended stable peace."

Actually, you see the light here. Really, there's little reason to start military action on an annual basis. A lesson that many countries in the world have learnt and others so far not is: Being trigger happy as a nation is silly. You're much better off by simply trading than trying to influence things by sending troops.
Look at the U.S.' costs for Persian Gulf activities - it's multiple times as expensive as all net oil imports of the U.S. together. Even if we assume that oil price would skyrocket withtout U.S. intervention, the U.S. would still better off economically not to meddle in the Near East. That's not the least because oil prices cannot go higher than synthetic oil (coal basis) prices in the long term. And that's where they are right now.

There's really very little reason to go to war if it ain't about stopping genocide, defending your alliance, fighting at home to regain sovereignty and expel an occupier or helping nations whose sovereignty you guaranteed.

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Originally Posted by Lastdingo

"If the target state has been determined to be a failed or rogue state by the international community and the mandate for the intervention is clear then the intervention is legitimate."-Troufion

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Actually, the situation of the state has no saying in the question whether an invasion is legal or justified.

It is legal when the UN allows or when it invaded your nation/alliance in the first place. All other invasions are illegal for every signatory state of the UN. If you don't want to obey the UN charter, then leave the charter and become the outlaw state that you wanna have. -Lastdingo

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When I stated 'determined to be a failed or rogue state' I made the assumption that the determination came from the world body, or was presented to the world body and in acordance with P-W.-Troufion

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"I still don't think you'll find many (if any) situations that meet the P-W doctrine, especially if the goal is an extended stable peace."

Actually, you see the light here.

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Actually I think Steve Blair 'sees the light'. I however do not, this was Steve's statement not mine. :D

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There's really very little reason to go to war if it ain't about stopping genocide, defending your alliance, fighting at home to regain sovereignty and expel an occupier or helping nations whose sovereignty you guaranteed.--Lastdingo

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Lastdingo, thank you for agreeing with my point, The Powell-Weinberger doctrine works. As your statement here agrees with almost all 8 of the requirements. Particularly 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 7 & 8.

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

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A Look at the U.S.' costs for Persian Gulf activities - it's multiple times as expensive as all net oil imports of the U.S. together. Even if we assume that oil price would skyrocket withtout U.S. intervention, the U.S. would still better off economically not to meddle in the Near East. That's not the least because oil prices cannot go higher than synthetic oil (coal basis) prices in the long term. And that's where they are right now.-Lastdingo

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Here my friend I would love to agree with you, in fact I do, BUT we have no choice. The US is tied to the Middle East by so many issues it is impossible to disengage. ALSO, the terrorists that attack and would continue to attack America are there, so we fight them there. This is a vital national interest. And GWOT and Afghanistan are still very well supported, even Iraq has support just not as much, It could better. Perhaps if our doctrine that we followed expressed gaining and maintaining public support:wry:

To Steve Blair, I say just this, take a look at the 8 criteria, and apply them with cold logic (disregard the incilnation to view with pre 911 eyes) to the situation in Darfur, or to Iraq if you choose, as it stands today not as it stood in the past. I think exactly what has been stated here-think overwhelming reconstruction, disproportionate stabilization not in a negative light but in the positive. I think you could see the potential. (maybe:))

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Originally Posted by TROUFION

What of Rwanda? It was terrible, true. But what did/do you expect the US to do? Regardless of how terrible (look at today's classification of Darfur as a Genocide by President Bush--Genocide by the UN Charter requires action immediate and direct, no other nation has or is going to join the US) there is little that can be done. (I'll defer to the Rwanda experts on the SWC). But in general actions by the US are mostly deliberate and slow, as in a true democracy, the deployment of troops is not to be taken lightly. Anyone remember the indignation over Madeline Albrights comment to Colin Powell over the Balkans regarding using Military force: paraphrased-what good is this great army if we dont use it?

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I am very much the classic reluctant warrior mentality; I am very cautious when it comes to calling for US involvement and I still believe that in the vast majority of cases coalition warfare for all its friction is ultimately the best way to go. The P-W doctrine had its strengths and it had its weaknesses. Its strength was it in many ways made us think--we handled Central America the way we did because of the PW doctrine, And in the case of Desert Shield, it stood that test. But in some ways it was its own worst enemy. When you best an enemy in a war like Desert Storm, it tends to make you think the next one will go the same way--or worse it makes politicians think that way when the circumstances are entirely different. Somalia is what I am alluding to; we collectively never really got the reality of Somalia.

And when it blew in our faces, we misread the results, applying them to Rwanda and the genocide. We strapped the hands of the UN because of fears of mission creep and we strapped the hands of the UNAMIR commander, MG Dallaire. When the war restarted and genocide began we could have supported an immediate strengthening of UNAMIR. Instead we pushed to get most of Dallaiire's forces removed. When it was all over we reacted to the dying in Goma by helping the killers and we allowed them to rebuild and fester like a boil threatening to spew war all over central Africa. The Rwandans finally took matters into their own hands and war did come, claiming some 4 million or so folks since 1997. The same folks who allowed the genocide to go down allowed the conditions for the next war to fall into place.

Bottom line for me on Rwanda is that we could and should have shut the genocide down. But we (the collective again) allowed the dictum "no mission creep. no more Somalias" to guide our inaction.

Darfur has been festering for the past half decade with some assistance and a lot of talk. I see our part in that as just a lot of talk and a little support. I fear that "TIA" applies in this case--this is Africa.

Best
Tom

Thanks Tom for the insight on Rwanda and 'TIA'. I think you hit a great point, as did Lastdingo. genocide. Or the obligation to prevent or stop it. As well as the reluctant warrior comment. I truly appriciate both.

What I'd like to ask, because I think now we can see that the P-W doctrine had its moment AND that it is still valuable. I ask this question:

How could we (members of the SWC) modify the P-W Doctrine for the post 911, Post Iraq world? To deal with trans-national threats and genocide?

-Troufion

As I pointed out before, P-W makes a good point of departure for discussion. Tom makes very good points regarding the weaknesses of P-W.

To modify P-W for our current environment, you'd have to accept the fact that some operations will be undertaken without wide popular support (both domestic and international). You'd also have to be prepared to let some situations remain as they are if it's not safe to send in humanitarian aid and you're not willing to back it with military force. I'm also not at all sure that our political system is strong enough to deal with long-term humanitarian operations.:wry:

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What I'd like to ask, because I think now we can see that the P-W doctrine had its moment AND that it is still valuable.

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So far the discussion seems to indicate:

that the "overwhelming use of violent force" is problematic, (the fundamental foundation of P-W doctrine);

that 'vital national interests' are debatable (such as the ME really isn't an economic one);

that we can clearly state objectives far more easily than we can measure attainment of them;

that we are not good at predicting risks and costs;

that "other non-violent means not only are not exhausted, but are an out of the box part of 'overwhelming force';

that 'exit strategies that avoid endless entanglement' may not be identifiable and result in No-GO right from the start (ie Rwanda discussion - the TIA obviously plays to that "who cares"...);

that unintended consequences can't be wished away;

AND that we may well have to operate without consensus support of either our own citizens or the international community.

So given that the fundamental foundation of overwhelming force is a problem, and each of the "go/no-go" criterea is problematic, how is this "still valuable"?

Well, other than a place to say "what do we replace all these things that used to apply with, now that people have learned to play the victim to overwhelming force, market terrorism as "freedom fighting", hold us to our overstated claims of "bloodless warfare", assume complexity away so we can apply simple metrics (and then blame the military and political leaders when the metrics don't provide 'correct' answers) and our military and civilian cultures have diverged?

How are these shortcomings in every aspect of P-W doctrines framework to be fixed without changing it into something that bears no resemblence to P-W (and hence has no real connection to it)?

"that we can clearly state objectives far more easily than we can measure attainment of them;"
Is the small wars council comfortable with this statement? If this is true, I’d question the utility (or even existence) of an objective so vague that its attainment could not be measured. How do you even know if you have the proper strategy, if you can’t measure whether you are getting anywhere near accomplishing it? I’d wager that most wars people have ever thought worth fighting in history have objectives clear enough that the people can identify progress or the lack thereof: wars of independence, punitive expeditions, repelling invasion, seizing territory for annexation. I’d also bet that such vague objectives lead to unfocused activity in the war, itself.

“AND that we may well have to operate without consensus support of either our own citizens or the international community.”
Is the small wars council comfortable with this one, too? In a political system where the voters are ultimately sovereign and politicians must answer to them at regularly scheduled elections, how does a government realistically expect to conduct an extended war without maintaining substantial public support? Has any representative republic ever been able to pull that one off?

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

As I pointed out before, P-W makes a good point of departure for discussion. Tom makes very good points regarding the weaknesses of P-W.

To modify P-W for our current environment, you'd have to accept the fact that some operations will be undertaken without wide popular support (both domestic and international). You'd also have to be prepared to let some situations remain as they are if it's not safe to send in humanitarian aid and you're not willing to back it with military force. I'm also not at all sure that our political system is strong enough to deal with long-term humanitarian operations.:wry:

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COIN missions without strong popular support are determined to fail, that's the experience of western forces since WW2 (since Indochina, to be exact).

Small raids can easily be done without popular support and missions of 1993

Somalia-scale can easily be done if the president is in a firm position (not known as dumb, not failing everywhere, decent popularity...).

Lack of international support is a hint that youu're wrong with your intention. You collide with others' strategies, alienate others and spend political capital instead of accumulating or at least preserving it.
Come on, didn't the americans learn something of Iraq?
I mean, after all we told your people it was a dumb idea. All Europeans believed that the idea was dumb - only a couple of governments followed against the preference of their people.
Well, it probably requires a nuclear war or something until the Americans learn the same bitter lessons the Europeans learned - war is bad and should be avoided if that's anyhow acceptable. Going to unnecessary wars is plain stupid and a waste. The collective memory over here contains this information, but this probably requires that the nation was at least once on the receiving end of warfare.

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Originally Posted by Lastdingo

COIN missions without strong popular support are determined to fail, that's the experience of western forces since WW2 (since Indochina, to be exact).

Small raids can easily be done without popular support and missions of 1993

Somalia-scale can easily be done if the president is in a firm position (not known as dumb, not failing everywhere, decent popularity...).

Lack of international support is a hint that youu're wrong with your intention. You collide with others' strategies, alienate others and spend political capital instead of accumulating or at least preserving it.
Come on, didn't the americans learn something of Iraq?
I mean, after all we told your people it was a dumb idea. All Europeans believed that the idea was dumb - only a couple of governments followed against the preference of their people.
Well, it probably requires a nuclear war or something until the Americans learn the same bitter lessons the Europeans learned - war is bad and should be avoided if that's anyhow acceptable. Going to unnecessary wars is plain stupid and a waste. The collective memory over here contains this information, but this probably requires that the nation was at least once on the receiving end of warfare.

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I wouldn't say that all European nations are war-adverse...they just tend to pick their spots differently (look at France's record in Africa). And given the flow of international events, they can also wait behind America and clap if it works and boo if it doesn't.;) They haven't had to act on their own for some time now. I'd say that's more an accident of political events than collective memory. In the case of Germany (and Japan) it's a matter of legalities due to their respective constitutions in addition to international events.

And I'd be careful about generalizing about ALL Americans. But that gets to the heart of my opinion about the political system not being strong enough to sustain a prolonged operation (military or otherwise) of any sort these days. There are too many politicians (and others) who are all too willing to exploit any situation for short-term gains (be they political or monetary) and not consider long-term effects. It's that reality that hampers US policy planning more often than not.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

I wouldn't say that all European nations are war-adverse...they just tend to pick their spots differently (look at France's record in Africa). And given the flow of international events, they can also wait behind America and clap if it works and boo if it doesn't.;) They haven't had to act on their own for some time now.

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That's the common myth.

In fact, the USA did not really have to act at all for a long time either.
It's just the propaganda that tells people that wars are needed to keep the world together.

Most U.S. interventions with force had very little relevance (Grenada, Panama, Bosnia, Sudan). Others had much overstated impact (1991 Gulf War for example - without it, we would have had the present capacity shortfall oil price crisis in 199-1994 and not today).
Even Afghanistan is an intervention of doubtful value.
- As long as they're the only nation-wide force that opposes the foreigners, the continuing occupation does only strengthen the Taleban
- The AQ mercenaries/holy warriors in Afghanistan weren't the kind of troops that can be used for terror acts in the western world
- AQ obviously just moved to other countries; they were not completely dependent on that safe heaven
- Without religious zealot Taleban that forbid drugs, opium production did expand greatly.
- More christian troops in muslim countries as occupiers just provoke even more holy warriors... (same in Iraq)

It's also worth to note that without billions of USD each year for Israel and political backing against every UN security council resolution concerning Israel as well as US troops in the Gulf area (on land), there would most likely be no such perpetual conflict as we all (also the allies) are in today.

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Originally Posted by Lastdingo

Well, it probably requires a nuclear war or something until the Americans learn the same bitter lessons the Europeans learned - war is bad and should be avoided if that's anyhow acceptable. Going to unnecessary wars is plain stupid and a waste. The collective memory over here contains this information, but this probably requires that the nation was at least once on the receiving end of warfare.

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Hello Lastdingo,

No Americans ever on the receiving end of warfare? I can't tell from your profile where you reside, and I don't know how familiar you are with American history.

But not two miles from my front porch is a statue dedicated to the local dead soldiers of the Confederacy. This is not a rare thing. You'll find one in just about every town and hamlet that was around at that time. There's a trilogy written by Shelby Foote on the American Civil War, which will give you a good history of the conflict. Short version: The South was very much on the receiving end of an invasion and destruction of the economy and its armies. I'm not saying their cause was just, but I feel the need to correct any popular impression where you are that no Americans have ever suffered catastrophes in their own towns from war.

Regards,
Tacitus

I don't have the time or inclination to engage in the rhetoric of capitulation. irhabi-mufsiduun....

I fail to see the “short comings in every aspect.” Let’s review and break it down:

Military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security by the intended target;
--(why would we choose military action as the first resort? Why would we engender the risk to ourselves if there was no national security issue at stake? One could argue in cases like Rwanda and Darfur that the stability of the region is a vital national interest, as well as the argument that supporting the UN Charter on Genocide could also be viewed as a national interest)

The force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy;
--(again we review what is meant by ‘force’. True the force in Weinberger’s terms was military, but then we have SOF (not the DA stuff but FID type), Civil Affairs and Medical units in the military why not consider leveraging these as a use of ‘force’. I again state that force is not all kinetic, it is whatever we need to use to achieve the intended goal of coercion that is military action. As far as disproportionate goes, the counter-insurgent, the government forces, will always need some level of disproportionate effort to overcome the asymmetric adversary: closing bank accounts, massing satellites, buying informants, building schools. These are all things we need to do better than the adversary. It doesn’t matter if P-W was not originally focused on this, what does matter is that it does work for it. Look at the B-52 bomber, originally designed to nuke Russia and today it flys in support of SOF units riding horses in Afghanistan.)

There must be strong support for the campaign by the general public;
--(Strong support, why is this not a solid example of a goal. I totally disagree with Pvebber here, it can be gained, it will almost certainly be gained at the outset of conflict. Steve Blair hits hard on the sustainability side, it will be hard to sustain in the long run, BUT why is it a bad doctrinal goal just because it is hard?)

There must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.
--(Alright why would you commit to military action without an idea of why you are going in, branches and sequels included? To get in a fight with no idea why or how to get out of it is a bad policy. I ask again why would this be poor doctrine or ‘fantasy’.)

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
--(again this is a solid criteria for military action, we need to have a reason that is valid. Support of the UN, Genocide prevention, Strategic Lines of Commerce and Communications etc)

2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
--(When planning to initiate a military action why would you not establish an objective? This is no fantasy, if you cannot articulate why you are doing something, why do it.)

3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
--(Risk vs Gain, why would any person let alone a nation, engage in risky activity without estimating the risk vs gain. Your analysis may be wrong and as with any plan, it may change upon contact BUT to not at least try would be foolish)

4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
--(Military action is a BIG DEAL, it is not used lightly, it should be a last resort, and if you can solve the problem without resort to military action why wouldn’t you?)

5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
--(The key word here is PLAUSIBLE, meaning fair or reasonable, why would any nation engage in a military action without a reasonable end state in mind, a viable solution, that the coercive application of military force is not going to be wasted. You have to have an idea of what you want to achieve.)

6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
--(In particular when you enter a military action by choice having weighed out the potential consequences cannot be viewed negatively. Does this mean you will be right in your assumptions, NO. But to not even consider the ramifications would be negligent.)

7. Is the action supported by the American people?
--(This is a democracy and the people have a say in when and where their military and tax money goes. If when you plan a military action you do not take steps to gain and maintain public support you are already lost. If your doctrine ignores the public the public will drop support fast. A concerted effort to achieve support and maintain it has to be a part of the plan. It will be hard, but in the most media savy country in the world there has to be a way for the Military to achieve ‘overwhelming force’ in the media. But you’d not know if you did not try or put it into doctrine.)

8. Do we have genuine broad international support?
--(Similar to popular support, if you don’t try to get it you won’t get it. If you plan for and try you have a shot, a long shot, but you have to try.)

In summary, The Powell_Weinberger doctrine IS a valuable tool for strategic planning. It has not lost its relevance. It can apply to the full spectrum of operations from raids to humanitarian missions to COIN. I see strength in every aspect. I see a flexible doctrine that will achieve the Nation's goals and interests while also placing us in better stead around the world. It is clear, decisive and coherent. It is not fantasy or naive. It addresses War that a Democracy can wage, it addresses the depth and breadth of conflict AND reconstruction operations.

-T

@Tacitus

Oh come on. I know very well about that Civil War. My history and military history knowledge is good enough for that, but that war is - let's calculate - 142 years in the past.

I'm citizen of Germany, close to Cologne.

When I drive into the city, only about 1% of all buildings look like 50+ years old. That's because it was destroyed by more than 90% in 1945, inhabitants reduced from about 800,000 to 100,000. Comparable cities in neutral European countries look very different, for a reason.
Here are still bunkers sitting around, often with graffitti on their walls but nevertheless easily recognized.
The effect of the fallen heroes monuments in each village about the huge loss of lives in the Great War is pale in comparison to that of the monuments next to them - listing the dead of WW2, a list several times longer in every village.
When I went to horse racing circuit as boy, I always saw a monument that told about how 29 boys of my age were killed when a Flak battery was hit there.
My parents annoyed me with stories about how bad it was in the late 40's and even in the 50's when much of Germany was still destroyed since I was about five.

That was not because of a civil war, but because my nation had invaded others - the link between invading other nations and suffering is clearly visible for everyone growing up here at the age of six.

Our history lessons in school are to a large part about how the bastards got the power, why nobody stopped them and that the big asshole decided to go to war to take away what wasn't ours.
Our history lessons about war are not about generals doing this or that in set-piece battles with fancy colours, half of our nation fighting for freedom and earning glory and such.
It's about drawing lessons from history.

(And I'm a history/military history freak, so I know even more than set books content by orders of magnitude).

The Italians learned as much. Russians, British, French all had their special lessons in the suffering caused by war.

Can you tell me what exactly your family suffered in the Civil war? How often did they rebuild their house? Did one half of your family have to flee and looks at old photos that show their old homes and property ... things that are now part of another country?

The U.S. Civil War didn't teach a strong lesson. Many U.S. families cannot even trace their american tradition back to 1865 because their grandparents came later to that country. Others lived far away from the fighting.
As early as 1898 the lesson about war and suffering were obviously gone in the USA as a completely needless war was begun at that time, marking the end of isolationism.

You make some good points, but it still (IMO) ignores the thrust of the P-W doctrine, which was to AVOID any sort of intervention unless it was a slam-dunk. P-W was pretty much a "yes-no" checklist, and some of those points (like public support) are very hard to get a firm "yes" in. As I recall, if you had more than a couple of "nos" (or questionable "maybes"), P-W called for an automatic "no go" on any sort of intervention.

I think what needs to be done is take some of the basics of P-W and move BEYOND it to something new. Overwhelming force of any sort (including economic or aid) can be easily "spun" by an enemy IO message into "American Imperialism." How do we deal with that concept within a P-W framework? And any sort of COIN is a lengthy operation. Given the political climate as it exists in the US, how does one sustain momentum AND popular support over more than one two-year election cycle? Is it possible to do so?

I'm doing a bit of devil's advocating here, T, because I feel that you're looking for the good in P-W and ignoring or marginalizing its shortcomings. I don't dismiss it out of hand, but I really see it as a basis for something new...taking the parts that do work or can be adapted and chucking those that don't work. P-W was very much a reaction against Vietnam and how that involvement grew over time. It's calculated for small, quick operations.

In reference to your comments in Point 7, given the way the military has bungled a number of media operations (Tillman for one) I'm not sure that they're especially media savvy. Their idea of overwhelming force in the media might do more harm than good.

With reference to genocide, we have to consider national interests beyond physical for a moment. If the US claims to be the defender of human and civil rights (which was a major part of our rhetoric during the Cold War and after...which is what many remember), then defending those rights becomes in a way a part of the moral or metaphysical national interest. This is more Marc's area than mine, but with all the talkin' we do, people will expect us at some point to either do the walkin' or shut the hell up. The UN isn't really equipped to do much about genocide, and one could possibly argue that they aren't interested in doing much aside from passing resolutions.

It's complex...much more so that P-W allows for. That's why I again view it as a starting point or line of departure.

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Is the small wars council comfortable with this statement? If this is true, I’d question the utility (or even existence) of an objective so vague that its attainment could not be measured. How do you even know if you have the proper strategy, if you can’t measure whether you are getting anywhere near accomplishing it? I’d wager that most wars people have ever thought worth fighting in history have objectives clear enough that the people can identify progress or the lack thereof: wars of independence, punitive expeditions, repelling invasion, seizing territory for annexation. I’d also bet that such vague objectives lead to unfocused activity in the war, itself.

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With reference to the vague objectives statement that generated this reply from Tacitus, I'd say that Americans are obsessed with metrics (as in Vietnam-style body counts, villages fitted with flush toilets, and so on). This can make it difficult to measure the attainment if it's looked at in only numeric terms. There's always that temptation to declare victory when X number of people are housed or Y number of children have been vaccinated. Is that a true measure of success? Possibly, depending on the situation, but not always. This may in fact cloud our strategic thinking...especially when the search for "measurable objectives" becomes an objective in itself.

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Originally Posted by Lastdingo

@Tacitus

Oh come on. I know very well about that Civil War. My history and military history knowledge is good enough for that, but that war is - let's calculate - 142 years in the past.
<snip>
The Italians learned as much. Russians, British, French all had their special lessons in the suffering caused by war.

Can you tell me what exactly your family suffered in the Civil war? How often did they rebuild their house? Did one half of your family have to flee and looks at old photos that show their old homes and property ... things that are now part of another country?

The U.S. Civil War didn't teach a strong lesson. Many U.S. families cannot even trace their american tradition back to 1865 because their grandparents came later to that country. Others lived far away from the fighting.
As early as 1898 the lesson about war and suffering were obviously gone in the USA as a completely needless war was begun at that time, marking the end of isolationism.

---

I don't intend to continue this past this one response, but I really don't think you have a good grasp of what impact the Civil War had on parts of the US, Lastdingo. Or continues to have to this day. And the suffering of two world wars certainly didn't stop the Russians from going into Afghanistan. Or the Vietnamese from invading Cambodia just a few years after their own decades-long bloodletting. Immediate experience with war doesn't necessarily lead to some sort of greater knowledge, or an inclination to avoid conflict. Look at Africa.

If you wish to blame the US for every problem in the world, that's fine. But don't support it with platitudes about nations experiencing war. If you want to talk about your ideas regarding the European experience of war and how it might have changed the foreign policies of some countries, we can do so in the History forum. But if you want to understand history, you need to look past the slogans and nationalistic generalities and get to the deeper meanings.

Now let's get back to P-W.:)

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Originally Posted by Lastdingo

@Tacitus
Can you tell me what exactly your family suffered in the Civil war? How often did they rebuild their house? Did one half of your family have to flee and looks at old photos that show their old homes and property ... things that are now part of another country?

The U.S. Civil War didn't teach a strong lesson. Many U.S. families cannot even trace their american tradition back to 1865 because their grandparents came later to that country. Others lived far away from the fighting.
As early as 1898 the lesson about war and suffering were obviously gone in the USA as a completely needless war was begun at that time, marking the end of isolationism.

---

Greetings Lastdingo,

I hesitate to hijack a thread dedicated to an unrelated topic. I can't be sure if you are asking me rhetorical questions about my family history in the Civil War, or you really want to know what kind of impact this war had and continues to have, on this region.

The date was April 6, 1862, before dawn. The place was Shiloh Church, on the banks of the Tennessee River. The man was Private William A. Avery of the 21st Alabama Volunteer Infantry Regiment. My name is Brock Avery. It was not a good place to be for Private Avery and his pals, that day.
http://www.rootsweb.com/~alcwroot/in...st_ala_inf.htm
Later in the morning they were given orders to move the Yankees out of the Hornet's Nest. The 21st Alabama lost 6 color bearers in succession. Needless to say the losses were pretty severe in the ranks. I've walked the battlefield, from one end of the Hornet's Nest to the other. I've stood in front of the Confederate burial trench in that area. Those boys are laid 7 layers high in a mass grave. Somehow, Private Avery lived to tell about this battle, those that made it, those that didn't.

I have more stories like this of other ancestors on my mom's side of the family, and on my wife's, too. One on my mom's side began the Vicksburg campaign weighing 180 pounds. He came out of the siege there weighing 130 pounds.

After the War my dad's people left Alabama altogether. I've never seen any photographs. I don't think there was much of value left to leave. They moved westward into Texas and settled there. They felt the area would be depressed for a long time, and wanted a new start in a place with more wide open opportunities. My mom's people left Mississippi for Texas. The rest is history. That is where I was born and raised.

Often when I drive back from Tennessee to Texas to visit family, I will stop and vist the Shiloh battlefield or the fortifications in Vicksburg. I think alot about my ancestors at such times, and how this war changed their whole world

I will concede your point that Americans in California, for example, and probably most even in the North do not know much about how this war affected their family histories. Down South, though, it is a different story. The past casts a longer shadow. I've spent more than a few evenings on a neighbor's front porch with a drink and a cigar discussing aspects of this war (political, why they fought, military, diplomatic, slavery, social), if you can believe it!

Cologne. I have been there. I only spent a couple of hours there waiting for the train to Koblenz, where I spent a few days of vacation. I was stationed for a while in your country and really enjoyed it. Of course I visited the awe inspring Cathedral. I walked across that bridge over the Rhine to get a good look, to put it in perspective. It is amazing how it survived the kind of destruction rained down on the rest of the city. That's quite a Mardi Gras celebration they have in Cologne.

Regards,
Tacitus

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

You make some good points, but it still (IMO) ignores the thrust of the P-W doctrine, which was to AVOID any sort of intervention unless it was a slam-dunk. P-W was pretty much a "yes-no" checklist, and some of those points (like public support) are very hard to get a firm "yes" in. As I recall, if you had more than a couple of "nos" (or questionable "maybes"), P-W called for an automatic "no go" on any sort of intervention.

its shortcomings. I don't dismiss it out of hand, but I really see it as a basis for something new...taking the parts that do work or can be adapted and chucking those that don't work. P-W was very much a reaction against Vietnam and how that involvement grew over time. It's calculated for small, quick operations.

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I do have a question here, you say the P-W is designed to avoid any intervention except the slam -dunk, earlier you said it was designed to avoid conflict. But basically you see it as a doctrine designed to avoid foriegn entanglements. I see that too, to an extent. But I'd like to here a little more as to why or how much more interventionist the US should be.

IMO I see the P-W as a good limiter of intervention (and I am an 'interventionist') it is a good sanity check prior to intervention.

Further, I refer to the B-52 analogy, built for the Cold War and adapted due to the airframe versatility to the GWOT. I see P-W in a similiar vein. In the realm of popular support I see it this way. The general public, and the legislators, like to see military activity in neat bundles. Unrealistic in 99% ofthe cases true. But here with P-W we have an opportunity to influence the people in a positive manner. With it you have a doctrinal jump off point, an avenue to say to them we have a strategic doctrine and we have a strategic plan what we need is your backing. This is easy (generally) at the outset. It is harder to maintain over a long period, but with a solid doctrine as its genesis we are on much more solid footing. P-W was not used prior to the invasion of Iraq, it was expressly set aside as old and antiquated & probably becuase the 8 wickets would not have been achieved.

Another point, the P-W is a strategic doctrine, meaning a very high level, President, JCS, COCOM levels. It should not be translated or devolved down to operational and tactical levels.

-T

You seem quite wedded to P-W, T, as opposed to using it for a point of departure for future doctrine. That's fine...not slamming you for it. Just an observation...:)

That said, the question of HOW interventionist the US SHOULD be is really a matter of higher policy. I don't think that P-W should be the checklist in the corner that determines that point. And I understand that P-W is strategic. That's the main reason I consider it an isolationist doctrine. In a strategic sense many of its points cannot be reached with 100% certainty unless you're in a total conflict.

Personally I'm not a huge fan of intervention. We don't do it well even when it's necessary to prevent genocides, because our political system isn't stable enough to support it for more than one of the slam-dunks I mentioned earlier. If you think about it, the US goes through some sort of mini-revolution every two years or so. We can't even get some larger disaster aid projects done within our own country in that time (no matter who's president or whatever).

Let me turn that question back at you. How often do you think the US should intervene and in what situations? I'm in favor of intervention in the case of humanitarian disasters provided that the US isn't the one carrying the main load. Political interventions I'm not as crazy about, as our system doesn't translate well many other places and our record here is really bad (due more to the time involved and the above-mentioned political issues within the US). And if we become less intervention-minded, our rhetoric needs to change. "In a time and place and with the means of our choosing" seems a better guiding point to me.

Just rough thoughts at this point, I'm afraid.

Not wedded to it necessarily or entirely. I just see utility in it (that and I enjoy a good debate). Ive heard a lot of criticism of the P-W and I believe it tends to be unwarranted, it was a successful doctrine for its time. What I'm looking at is how we take the principles and move them on, I don't see a need to scrap it to create something entirely new. Evolutionary vice revolutionary.

As far as interventions are concerned, I see several types. The best kind is what we are playing with in Africa now, (needs much refining) low level, civ-mil support to governments and peoples on the fence, a mature FID, that approaches internal defense on a mutli-lateral level, meaning it addresses social/medical issues as well as military issues (here I see the plan a s comprehensive or 'overwhelming'). These we should initiate, in a preventive maintence manner. I see P-W as a utility tool here, for instance the POTUS has determined that Africa is a Vital National Interest. From that point we then review the doctrine. Overwhelming 'force'--1 Billion Dollars for AIDS prevention and medication. Show me a terrorist organization that can top that one.

BUT I also see the type of intervention that is thrust upon us by the rogues of the world, when we have no real option but to repsond-911 is the prime example. I prefer the old days when parking a CVBG off the coast would pucker the bad guys into restraint. Unfortunately the new 'enemy' doesn't care about CVBG's threat or deterent effect. We need to be prepared to respond to these vigorously and immediately, in general we are.

It is the interventions in between these two spectrums that are problematic. These are interventions by choice. Making this decsion to intervene (or not to) in cases like iraq, Rwanda, Darfur, Somalia, these are the difficult and tricky decsions. Here is where P-W doctrine works, if it causes the US to AVOID involvement militarily so be it. But at least what can be said is that all options have been weighed.

-T