The concept of "adaptation"
As an outsider looking in, I wonder if anyone would be able to point me to any papers, books, or other publications that analyze the concept of adaptation from a military perspective. I'm an evolutionary biologist, and my people have been talking, thinking, and getting confused about adaptation for nigh on 200 years. But have there been specific, detailed analyses of this concept in the military sphere? It's popular now to say that forces must be adaptable, that quick adaptation is needed in small wars, that insurgents adapt to counterinsurgents, etc.
Since I'm coming from the academic side of the house, there may well be a three volume work by some nineteenth-century German on Theorie der militarisch Adaptation that everybody studies at the War College but that I don't know about; if so, I'd be glad to be educated.
If there isn't such an analysis, I might be interested in writing one. (Not in three volumes, though.)
Many thanks.
Bob
Evolutionary Biology and Military Change
Bob,
Ah, I see said the visually impaired person as they looked through the knot hole in the barbed wire fence….
No, seriously, I do comprehend your thinking. Certainly there are at least some broad correlations between ‘evolution’ and what is in the literature on military change. To abuse your metaphor somewhat, you might find a rough sketch of the skyline of that mountain range you refer to useful, in as much it may help you to navigate your way through the literature. I emailed a brief ‘sketch’ to you, though, as my ramblings are somewhat long and boring.
The devil will be, as always, in the detail.
PS I find that sometime my messages sometimes get bounced back (possibly because I have degenerated from a computer geek to a computer klutz). So let me know if do you not receive it shortly.
Pt 2 This is getting too long.....
Q3 'How long is does this continue to occur after the war ends and we become more resistant to change (where an organization becomes stable and change resistant?)'
Part of ‘an’ answer to this I addressed above. The process will continue after the war, but most likely only in terms of making the many adjustments needed to fully integrate what was learned and successfully applied during the war (and deemed of continuing benefit). Equally, the historical record is replete with militaries undertaking major change after a having a lost a war to an opponent using different forms of warfare, or better tech, as they seek to redress their weaknesses and failures. I am not aware, however, of any studies that look at how long the period of such post war adaptation continues, for most studies examine why militaries change or why they do not (particularly when circumstances strongly suggest they should change). So the issue of how long this process may continue is just not something that is really examined for; this is reflected in the fact most studies do not really examine the detailed implementation of changes, rather focus on the circumstances and factors that influence the introduction and acceptance of a particular change.
Q4 'How does this impact our ability to inculcate the required changes to remain successful, while not abandoning the ability to recognize new requirements?'
This is an excellent question but I one I do not have a good answer to. My strong sense is that, at the end of the day, the willingness and capability to adapt in wartime has little real impact on whether a military will remain very innovative in preparing for some uncertain future. The is more than a grain of truth in the old saw that generals prepare to last war, or the last battle of the last war. Militaries are innately conservative, or, rather, cautious. If they undertake a ‘jump into the future’ there is risk that the change undertaken could be maladapted to the actual conditions they confront there, there may well be potentially disastrous consequences for them and the nation they serve. Being cautious, they revert to instrumentalism as a less risky approach (there are other reasons, such as military culture, political culture, and so on, that can strongly impact on this propensity as well). This tendency, it seems to me, is likely to be more pronounced when a military has been successful in the war just concluded.
This said, now to turn to the first part of your question. I am going to be bold and presume that you are thinking about how we inculcate the lessons and adaptations with respect to COIN and even irregular warfare. In very broad terms, I have argued elsewhere that what is required is a new ‘narrative’, ‘behaviour’ and demonstrated ‘benefit’, particularly if military organizational culture needs to be adjusted to ensure change takes place. And it usually does. You change behaviour through by altering education and training, you alter promotional pathways, and so on and so forth. The US military is changing education, training, etc. The hard question is whether these changes in the US military are merely a function of the expedience of needing to prepare personnel before deployment, due to the wars they are engaged in, or whether the change in behaviour is aimed to change the US military more permanently, or will have that consequence. My suspicion from I what have read, seen and been told is that the lean is toward ‘expediency’, as the changes are not as far ranging and as deep as I would think they would need to be to effect more permanent change.
And this points to changing the narrative, by which I mean that the military needs to change how it 'sees itself' and 'what it does'. Put another way, it needs to redefine its ‘self-identity’. To use the example of the US Army, its narrative is (or was) that it is, to keep it very simple, an armoured force (who we are) that fought wars against other like militaries (what we do). This 'narrative' is not so simple by any means, for it is composed of the entire history of the US Army, and more particularly about how the US Army has and does perceive, interpret and articulate this history (and here is where myths and legends creep in). To return to the US Army, this idea of what its narrative will be is bound up in the debates about whether COIN/IW is the future or whether it is conventional, classical state-vs-state warfare (ie the threat posed by China).
Demonstrating benefit is fairly straightforward – benefit on the battlefield through to benefit, at a more personal level, of, say, gaining promotion because of excellence in the practice of these new methods (as a very narrow example, it has been discussed elsewhere on these board, I believe, the problem of MiTT personnel and whether they are rewarded for this duty).
My view is that all three need to be achieved. Easy to say, much, much,much harder to do.
To come to one of the more specific points of your question, inculcating the new while retaining the capacity to ‘recognize new requirements’, my view would be that as part of the above process you need to inculcate or foster a mindset of innovation and adaptation, as well as a broad mindset that is forward leaning in outlook. I am of course leaving aside the capacity to analyze for new requirements, though I would think that this would be linked. Again, easy to say……
I apologize, Rob, for having twisted one or two of your questions abit. I also apologize, profusely, to one and all for going on and on, and then on some more.
Sad to say but one of the things they do not tell you when you start your doctoral studies is that when they hand you that particular sheepskin (all I got was a piece of paper - :() several big, burly guys grab you, hold you down and inject you with several serums that seem to make you genetically long winded and pedantic……
Best
TT
Very good points above by several
I'd suggest that the critical point in the development of practices in generals is service as a Battalion commander. Puller was and is indeed an icon but his later career based itself upon his service as Cdr 2/4 and 1/7.
Westmoreland correctly wasn't on any list of greats but his experience as a Battalion Commander at the tail end of WW II pointed him in that direction. I worked for several Generals who had commanded Battalions in Viet Nam. Those who commanded early in the war with full, non-infused and generally well trained first string Army units were pretty laid back and willing to give subordinates a littler slack -- they were also willing to accept and try innovative ideas.
Those who had commanded later when they had to accept infusion from other units, when it was nominally illegal to move a unit outside artillery coverage, there were too few Captains and senior NCOs but a slew of 2LTs and SGTs who would do anything you asked them (but didn't know much and required considerable watching) were invariably over cautious and micro-management inclined.
I had earlier noted a similar phenomenon with WWII Army veterans, those who had commanded Battalions in the Pacific were generally far more flexible and less excitable than were their counterparts who had served in Europe. In the Corps, all were Pacific veterans and I don't recall meeting any that were excitable except Puller who was a minor force of nature... :)
Thus I think that a combination of the 35 year (± 5) old temperment and first command of a multi-unit echelon where the subordinates have to be granted considerable independence and are more frequently out of sight merge to produce the military and command techniques and methods of the Generals.
Perhaps we should look at that.
To amplify on one thing Marc mentioned, Ullman when III Corps commander IIRC had one of the Diviisions at hood on the way back in from the field. he ordered them to halt and bring all the Officers into the Garrison area for an Officers call and to let the NCOs continue the move to billets and insure accountability and get the cleanup started. I have been informed by a reliable source that a couple of LTCs had absolute panic attacks and I know that on hearing this anecdote, one former Battalion Commander in my presence said, very seriously and angrily, that had he been there, he would not have complied with the order and that Ullman was dead wrong to have issued such an order...
Perhaps we should also look at role changes and playing "Fallout One."
I routinely did it with NCOs at Platoon through Battalion level for many years and it works. Strangely, I could only convince one Battalion commander to do it with the Officers -- but that worked well also and he went on to get two stars...
We should be breeding trust, flexibility and innovative thought. My perception is that we're doing that better than we did in the mid-60s until recently period but perhaps not as well as we did it pre-MacNamara. I believe that all three attributes are going to be needed over the next few years and we should be developing rather than inhibiting them.
CMO or Military Governance type doctrine?
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Another aspect of this that occurred to me is whether the leadership skills and attributes of past generals (or officers) are the same as are needed today when our militaries are faced with increasingly complex ways of warfare, as used both by us and our opponents? Certainly many of the skills and attributes of part 'hero-warriors' are applicable today, but I wonder whether some may not be, and whether there are skills and attributes needed today for which there was no requirement for a leader to have. I am not competent to judge whether this an issue worth considering, but you and a great many of the SWB certainly are. If there is difference, this would suggest an emphasis on more modern leaders that better exemplify the traits you are seeking to instill.
We've got some doctrine out there on the subject - but the idea of using these type vignettes (in any but the most rudimentary sense) is new to me (if anybody has some examples with doctrinal references please help me out).
Surely there are probably a myriad of recent (within the last 20 years) U.S. and multi-national examples where innovation by a soldier or civilian serving in one capacity but faced with challenges outside that capacity has innovated a solution. I think at the GO level you can start with a Chiarelli type example, but we could quickly find a set of link examples that ends with a National Guardsman who deployed as an 11B, but whose civilian job might have been running a dairy or poultry farm, or power plant engineer and quickly found themselves in the spot light. Highlighting the importance (through a true vignette) of an individual as a mission critical enabler would be good I think toward fostering both an understanding of how such things are linked, and in flattening things out a bit.
Also of use might be using some examples:
- of indigenous partnerships to innovate and solve problems ranging from military to building capacity in other areas
- Inter-Agency/IO/NGO cooperation where the civilian is highlighted
- Tactical/Operational/Strategic problem vignettes that highlight the type of innovation required solve other then military problems - (they might also reflect some possible solutions sets)
I need to go back and look at some doctrinal pubs - I think the FM 3-0 is going to hit the streets in conjunction with the AUSA - I wonder how it will be different?
Best Regards, Rob
The Marines could -- can, do -- use the tradition
aspect to good effect; the Army less so. Our theoretical traditions are abstract and while units pay them lip service, few have anywhere near the depth of meaning that they do in other armies, particularly those who adapted from the British Army.
Thus, I'm a little dubious that would work for us sans a major culture change in the US Army. Add to that todays attention spans and the fact that history in US Schools seems to be an almost proscribed subject...
Let's see what Marc comes up with. As he he says there are more esoteric rituals that might have merit. There are also some very practical efforts that could be pursued.
Some thoughts on ritualization
Hi Rob, TT, Ken...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
The Marines could -- can, do -- use the tradition aspect to good effect; the Army less so. Our theoretical traditions are abstract and while units pay them lip service, few have anywhere near the depth of meaning that they do in other armies, particularly those who adapted from the British Army.
You're absolutely right, it is much easier in a regimental system where there is a specific focal point (the Regiment) and a specific history. The USMC is, in some ways, a Regiment writ large and, as you note Ken, it is easy to craft rituals for it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Thus, I'm a little dubious that would work for us sans a major culture change in the US Army. Add to that todays attention spans and the fact that history in US Schools seems to be an almost proscribed subject...
Let's see what Marc comes up with. As he he says there are more esoteric rituals that might have merit. There are also some very practical efforts that could be pursued.
Thanks for the vote of confidence :wry:. Okay, before I start a couple of caveats. First, as you know, I'm a Canadian and have never been in the US military (I know the Canadian military from family tradition) so I just don't know the specifics that would work for the US Army. Second, I can come up with a suggested model for how t build them and how they would work, but I would be relying on others to get the specifics.
Okay, here goes...
I'm going to make an argument from analogy at the level of social structure, so bear with me ;). In many ways, military organizations parallel kinship structures. The regimental system is surprisingly similar to tribal societies: roughly BTN=Sept (or Lineage), REG=Tribe, Army=Clan, Service=Confederation, "military"="nation". Within this system, it is simple to produce "meaningful" rituals since the segmentation (sept, tribe, etc) matches he organizational structure and their are obvious connections between structure, history and structural conflict.
Because you have a continuity of membership that flows with the structure, it is easy to see how rituals develop - they are often segment specific relating to historical events and using a segment specific hagiography (i.e. specific stories about the members of the segment). This is reinforced by segment specific symbology, e.g. things like battle honours on a flag, a unit patch or some other piece of unique clothing. In this type of system, segment specific rituals ("traditions") are often spontaneously generated and, if you really want to build new ones, it's not that hard to do at all - any halfway competent symbolic Anthropologist could do it after spending three months with the group.
Now to the US Army which, alas, does not follow a regimental system but, instead, mirrors kinship and social practices in the US circa the 1920's (i.e. the Fordist model of organization which is, today, totally obsolete). This is a much trickier situation since you just don't have either the historical or the structural continuity inherent in the regimental system. It's made even trickier because the career path within the system is based on an organizational model that is designed to destroy individual connections with most structural segments (except the "branch" which is roughly equivalent to a "professional designation" within Fordist organization). In effect, the system is designed to destroy loyalty to a segment while reinforcing loyalty to the overarching organization.
That type of organizational structure can, and has, worked, but it is currently on the wane in civil society and that is where the military recruits its members from. It also, in part, explains why civil society is so anti-military on the whole (but that is another thread), and why retention bonus' in money just aren't working too well (it's not s symbol that is all that attractive in the newer civil organization - again, another thread). All of this is compounded by the fact that the current conflicts, along with many projected future ones, are not "traditional" state vs. state conflicts. In effect, the US Army is an Industrial Age organization, recruiting from an Information Age civil population fighting Information Age wars.
The structural effects of this disjunction are appalling. None of the rituals or ritual systems that serve an Industrial Age organization will work because they do not match either the civil sociey or the battlespace experience. This disjuncture started showing up in Vietnam, and has really gotten much worse during current operations.
In civil society, we have evolved new structural relationships built around personal networks and virtual, contingent communities, and we are certainly starting to see these flow over into the military (SWC is a great example of this). Again in civil society, some of these communities mimic the segmentation system of the regimental system but, unlike that system, they cut across the formal structures. Just using the SWC as an example, we are starting to see the development of "rituals" - the "beer and burger" fest in DC is an example. Another, more germaine to the general topic, is the increasing use of the SWC as a place to get expert advice. Whether or not most people realize it, this is a return to the Socratic example of "ask the man who knows", and it is totally contrary to the Fordist model.
So, back to ritualization...
At the structural level, we are seeing a lot of "ritual spaces" starting to appear - again, SWC is a good example. In order to create more ritual spaces and appropriate rituals, we need to look at the current structural realities and encourage those spaces that will allow us to reinforce the "traditions" that will be important for the future. So, what are these traditions? I leave it up to the folks in service to complete the list, but there are a couple that we've talked about ad nauseum: adaptability and innovation.
Both of these share a common set of characteristics, i.e. operating outside of the book by getting external (to the Book) ideas and ways of thinking / perceiving (Regiments as Tribes?!?). This type of trait can best be introduced and reinforced (and "ritualized") very early in a military career, i.e. in the military education system. The simplest way to do this is to create assignments in courses that require students to go out to virtual communities and non-military sources for their data. Personally, if I was developing a curriculum stream, I would start this in 2nd year and run it through until graduation. I would certainly require it for any advanced education opportunities.
I would also require a course that teaches history at a structural level - i.e. patterns of action and interaction. Ideally, this course should be team taught by people who have totally different backgrounds. Think about Heilein's idea of History and Moral Philosophy as the exemplar for this.
Rob is absolutely correct that this would have to be institutionalized - the question is where such institutionalization should take place. I would suggest that many of the MOS' be used as the basis for institutionalization, possibly by arranging for "exchanges" between the private sector and the military (probably work best in the policy, analysis, engineering, law enforcement, etc. areas - definitely not the combat ones :D). In this case, we are attempting to "ritualize" personal networks by creating situations where people create non-military networks they can draw on.
With the type of structure we are seeing now, the best way to "create" traditions and rituals is to help create ritual spaces that allow for them to come into existence. If we go back to the kinship analog that started this post, we actually have seen this happen in a number of different cultures with the development of occupation based "secret societies", and this is the type of model that I can see working in the US Army.
Marc
TT, I believe you and Rob see the problem...
Some stream of consciousness thoughts.
From Rob:
Quote:
"Can you really do this without an outside catalyst? What are the different stimuli for change? Seems there is the outside - which for us means civilian something, and an inside which might be a grass roots from the lower ranks."
Good question and there are several ramifications to any answer. "Civilian something" implies the Executive or Congress. Given previous efforts, I am not optimistic about either; there is a ferocious tendency to put quick fixes in place and these are rarely effective. I can cite my favorite whipping boy, DOPMA and there are other examples of well intentioned but ill informed and unproductive tampering. I suggest that given out governmental milieu, a better approach is to present a logical plan and expect them to tweak it (and they will...), hopefully not too badly.
I think Rob's comment implies that many of us would not expect a cutting edge solution from the current senior leadership and thus it will be a bottoms up -- or mid level up -- effort. Probably true. TT mentions the tribes and they are ever with us -- they dominate any talk or concept of reform. Simply put, it is illogical to expect a person who's spent 30 years or so in a tribe not to be colored by that and to expect him or her to oversee the diminishment of that tribe -- much less its dissolution.
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"How are the two different?"
My suspicion is that the difference is the civilian solution will opt to the domestically politically attractive while the military solution will debase into a tribal squabble. In my view, it would be great if we could elect a broad consensus on a future strategy for the use of force (an extremely difficult proposition, I know) and the course of our Foreign Affairs ove the next decade or two (even more difficult). While that's in the 'hard' box, I do not believe it's in the 'too hard' box.
Then a design of a force to support that strategy could be undertaken. Blank sheet of paper type. That may well be in the too hard box...
However, I'm a firm devotee of "ask for 20, expect ten and get five..." :D
Which leads to:
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"Which one is more effective? In terms of it being reinforced or accepted?"
My guess would be the military solution would be better accepted and reinforced. If a civilian solution is imposed, it if unloved will not be reinforced by the armed forces; deviously perhaps -- but there it is. Conversely, if the military solution is sensible and achievable, it will be supported by the civilians to include the Nation at large (as or more important than Congressional acceptance) and will be reinforced by the system that designed it.
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"Can there be a blend?"
Obviously there must be but the key is who initiates.
TT says:
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"I would add here that most innovation studies do not focus on changing culture (or the ‘organizational society’) which is a key part of any serious rethinking of our militaries but the change management literature also generally agrees that the right leadership is a requirement (the details on how to effect change are differing in this literature, however, and our military organizations are not quite the same as business organizations)"
Totally correct in my observation and yet, a MAJOR cultural change is what's needed. Ergo... :eek:
He also says:
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"...And yes, even under these favourable conditions large scale change such as seems to be being argued for will take a lot of time (and so can be seen as evolutionary)."
Which is important and correct -- it will take a generation to get such a sweeping change implemented and embedded -- and our penchant for quick fixes will inevitably be at cross purposes to that. The interesting thing will be the tiffs between the "I want this done on my watch" types versus "This will not happen on my watch " types. The greater good of the Nation and the forces in totality should be the driving parameters but we're still dealing with humans.
TT again:
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"...The second is to effect a change in ‘behaviour’ (which encompasses the junior to field command ranks) which includes revamping training, which teaches the tangibles of ‘what to think’ and what the answers ought to be, and revamping the education system to impart to these more junior officers the intangibles of ‘how to think’ and what the questions ought to be (Marc’s suggestions above re the education system fit very well here)..."
Raise them right and teach them well and they will do well. We have to start with the Basic Courses -- Officer and NCO, you cannot change one without changing the other -- and they will change the system and processes as they grow.
I'm also a firm devotee of "It is better to ask forgiveness than to seek permission" and the old Staff Officers watch words -- "Answer the question that was asked, answer the questions your answer will generate and answer the question that should have been asked." I alway liked the SAS Motto, too -- but I like the SBS Motto better, the original, not the new one... ;)