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I am currently investigating the concept of 'fighting ideas with ideas' as part of multi-dimensional manoevre. I am trying to find a systematic framework to organise such a campaign and this lead me to memtics. Has anybody applied memetics to military operations and is it a valid concept? Alternatively, are there any other deisciplines that may be applicable. Given the importance of countering dangerous beleifs I am surprised by the lack on information in this area.
JD
Hi JD,
I haven't come across anything directly related to the military, but you might find Mutation, Selection, And Vertical Transmission Of Theistic Memes In Religious Canons by John D. Gottsch useful. I've applied memetics in a couple of areas and, on the whole, it can be valid but it is not that predictive. In order to get predictive validity, you need an incredible amount of environmental information. The Journal of Memetics (now defunct) is still the best general site. Their links page is excellent.
If you have anything written, I would be happy to look at it ;).
Marc
Hi JD and welcome to the forum !Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
I found your post extremely interesting and so here I am :)
Sorry for condensing your post, but just wanted a little clarification regarding the last sentence.
I've worked in 3rd world countries for most of my 23-year Army career. I managed to get along with almost everybody by trying to comprehend the other's beliefs and manurisms, then using that understanding while performing my missions. One of my former bosses thought that was a gift I had at my finger tips. Perhaps it was/is.
However, I've never tried to counter said beliefs. Would countering an individual's deep rooted beliefs be beneficial ? If so, in what way ?
Marc, please feel free to step on in :D
Regards, Stan
Hi Stan,
Well, if I'm reading JDs intent correctly, then he's not talking about stompin' other peoples' beliefs so much as, hmm how to phrase this? - ah - "encouraging them to select a memetic complex that, while part of their culture, is more amenable to western concepts" :D.Quote:
Originally Posted by Stan
Seriously, memetics isn't really cultural engineering, although it can be used that way (poorly!). Basically, it's looking at specific memes and meme complexes that create effects and replacing them with others that create other effects. BTW, "meme" a self-replicating piece of information; "meme complex" a collection of memes that is symbiotically related and mutually reinforcing.
JD, part of the reason why using memetics in a military setting would, IMO, be so hard is that it requires a certain amount of "immunization" on the part of the users and the military have heir own, very strong, meme complexes. The process of immunization has a tendency to dislodge many current memes as well as protect against further "infections" (yeah, I'm using he mind virus model here). This can be very counter productive to the military, although I think that if any military environment can accept it, it would be a COIN fight.
Marc
Thanks Marc. Did a quick read on memes before once again introducing my total ignorance :DQuote:
Originally Posted by marct
In my experience, I've tried to stay away from directly selling Western culture or ideologies. Take the Africans for example. Although they basically hated us, they really hated the French. As long as I didn't push too much 'West' and blamed nearly everything on the French, I was gold..Got everything I wanted and as you put it so well, didn't have to stomp on their pride (a slap in the face if you will).
Memetics may have its applications, but seems to me a stone age psycological way of solving problems typically encountered with any other culture.
We can sell the 'West' relatively easy, so long as the recipient is receptive. But, if he/she is a on a camel, hot, PO'd and unstable, you may want to consult RTK and keep the semantics at home :D
Thanks, Stan
Thanks for your replies and I agree with both of you but I am going to keep going with this a little further. Thanks also to Marc for the offer of ready some work and I may just take you up on that. And thanks to Stan for your insights on operations. I wholly agree that trying to force western culture down eastern throats appears to be counter productive and expecting foreign cultures to like the collective ‘us’ is also asking too much. The thing I like about memetics is that it can explain why this is so and, more importantly, predict why this is so. Allow me to explain…
My primary concern is the way we currently plan for and execute campaigns. The Dutch have a great saying that you can only have peace as long as your neighbour wills it, Sun Tzu advocated winning without fighting and Michael Creighton acknowledged that ‘wars are won in the will’. Multidimensional Manoeuvre holds as its central tenet that changing the will of the enemy is paramount yet planning and execution of actions and effects in the physical domain are linked only tenuously through the information domain to the cognitive domain where we seek to generate decisive effects.
As so many luminaries have stated ‘we must fight ideas with ideas’ but at the outset of the campaign do we sit down and say ‘what are the enemy’s most dangerous ideas, are they vulnerable and how do we counter them?’ or, as I suggest is more likely, do we just get into planning troop numbers and logistic support. Recently, we are getting more sophisticated and try nation building but what are the thoughts we are trying to generate? Do we want them to like us or should we simply go for what Dave Kilcullen calls ‘enlightened self interest’. Do we build a school and then undo the good work by demanding half the students are girls or do we accept the local view that girls should not be educated? What are the thoughts we want to generate and how do we achieve them?
Since the early 20th century people have spoken of ‘munitions of the mind’. Any other munition would be systematically dissected and appropriately countered. But what about thoughts and cultural norms? What is a thought, how is it spread and why is one preferred over another? What ideas are we trying to spread and how do we spread them? What is their science? After some investigation, the best answer I have found is memetics.
Memetics, in its essence is very simple (I think). At its core is the concept of ‘universal Darwinism’ where entities are in competition and one is selected over the other for whatever reason. Take two species of motor cars: the Mazda Mediocre is in competition with the Chrysler Chickmagnet. One will be preferred and selected for more sales and will therefore survive and prosper. The other will eventually become extinct. The same goes for elements of culture and thoughts in competition with each other noting that the thoughts and cultural norms already resident in the mind will affect the process or the selective pressures in the environment.
The other critical element of memetics is the success or resilience of a thought or elements of culture (a meme) can reasonably be predicted on the basis of three things: fidelity (the ability of the meme to be copied accurately), fecundity (to what extent the idea is out there) and longevity (how engrained or how much history the idea has).
Using this information it should be possible to create a framework for uninitiated military planners to asses the process by which they can begin to assess exactly how they will bring about the changes to the enemies mindset in a coordinated manner across multiple dimensions and domains. I am not going for a precise science, only disciplined thought about effects based operations linked from the physical through the information to the cognitive domain rather than simply going straight for kinetics, logistics or policing. Let’s think about thoughts and how to bring them about and what is achievable. After all, ‘they’ are unlikely ever to like us so perhaps we should set meaningful objectives for the cognitive domain from the outset of the campaign rather than eventually being disappointed and dealing with the resultant publicity and morale.
It is a big topic which is exactly why I am after external input.
Thanks.
JD
JD, here is a link to a campaign strategy website that might interest you. A lot of good and free information here. It talks a great about campagin frameworks and gives many real life examples. Hope it helps.
http://www.campaignstrategy.org/index.html
JD,
Sounds like you are interested in this a Logical Line of Operation in a broader campaign. The USAWC has a great Campaign Planning Primer that may be useful. While going to the JPs (at the Joint Electronic Library) is also good, the primer has it all in a nice slim package.
I'm interested in how this turns out for you. IO seems to have many facets, particularly if considered at the different levels (Tactical/Operational/Strategic). Logical LOOs seem to lend themselves better to EBO, and if we're talking Joint campaign planning you need to go with Joint effects based doctrine anyway. If you can, come up with rubrics for your MOPs and MOEs that tie in well with your concepts for using memetics. I'd also suggest you lay out some of the adverse effects with some indicators as part of the MOEs so you can switch course.
You might run some kind of PMESII parallel LLOOs & LOOs that shows how they compliment each other and can be synchronized, etc.
Best Regards, Rob
Thanks to all and particularly Rob.
I am only starting to formulate ideas at the moment but I think I am going to straddle IO and more traditional planning models making sure everything is linked back to bringing 'cognitive effects' for want of a better term. Perhaps the hardest thing is going to be convincing people that IO/psyops may not be the supporting element but the lead element with every other action in support. Wish me luck. I may contact you all directly with a personal message when I have something more concrete if that is OK.
JD
Hey JD,
I'd like to hear your thoughts on the following, using memetics !Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
Scenario: Troop reductions are all over the news, even LTG Odierno reported overall reductions in deaths, violence and IEDs, further justifying a drawdown from surge levels.
The insurgency with its thick mindset (those pesky memes) thus far has only one goal -- Our immediate destruction and withdrawl.
Will they upon hearing and believing the news that we are decreasing forces, increase their attacks or, back off and provide Congress and the military with false impressions to support full troop withdrawls ?
My opinion is they will increase their activities taking advantage of the reductions. Very typical 3rd world mindset - kick 'em while they're down.
So, are their mindsets or memes at a point of no return, and if not, what would we then do to preclude them from thinking they were loosing/lost the war as we depart declaring victory ?
Regards, Stan
Stan,
You've hit on what I think is the biggest problem for EBO. When you are talking about what people will do in an action - reaction sort of thing, its hard to predict when they (really talking about the commited) see life much differently then you (cultural values), when the the thing you'd like them to do is perceived as being worse then death or suffering. This can cost you a great deal of resources if your plan is contingent on a desired effect, and worse if you don't have the ability to go back and fix it the old fashioned way. Some enemy are just "hard headed" and need to be killed.Quote:
The insurgency with its thick mindset (those pesky memes) thus far has only one goal -- Our immediate destruction and withdrawl.
Will they upon hearing and believing the news that we are decreasing forces, increase their attacks or, back off and provide Congress and the military with false impressions to support full troop withdrawls ?
My opinion is they will increase their activities taking advantage of the reductions. Very typical 3rd world mindset - kick 'em while they're down.
So, are their mindsets or memes at a point of no return, and if not, what would we then do to preclude them from thinking they were loosing/lost the war as we depart declaring victory ?
EBO gets its formal roots at least back to WWII where the studies were done on the ball bearings that ruined the Axis. It was not the theory that sold it to Eisenhower though - it was the fact that if bombers went deep then the Luftwaffe would have to come up and try and intercept - when that happened we would continue to destroy planes and pilots faster then Germany could replace them, and exhaust the Luftwaffe's capactity to interdict the landing forces, or to support German units repositioning to destroy our beach heads. However, I think the general feel in the Army is we've been doing EBO since birth, we just never gave it its own spot on the shelf - reading Grant's memoirs - he talks about Winfield Scott conducting what smells like EBO to me as part of his campaign plan against Mexico.
The best example I've heard to consider the limitations of EBO is Hitler's aerial bombardment of the Britons - did Churchill throw in the towel?:D
Having said all that, I do think EBO can be useful in reaching those not totally commited to the fight (for whatever reasons), for shaping the perceptions of those not directly in the fight, but whose support or lack of support could make a difference, and also when the circumstance don't yet, or will not permit more lethal and final ways to be used. There are certainly those who are using it to good effect. It seems to work best when there is some kind of carrot attached.
Marc, and regional/national/tribal/ethnic/religious specialists like Marc who have spent their lives thinking about people and why people do what people do (or don't do) are probably bested sutied to look across the targeted PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure) environment and give us a few posible reactions to consider before we marry ourselves to an effect.
Hey Rob !
EBO IMO only rarely works when the opposition has more to loose. If our enemy is content with death as a final result, there’s little ‘effect’ going on. You’re right, old fashioned it is. Hopefully, we have but one or possibly two generations to deal with before the third gets fanatically unstable and we have yet another million to deal with. I would hope that the munitions would run out prior to the third fanatical generation gearing up against the Yankees.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
Damn ! I thought it was that famous Chinese dude Sun Tzu :DQuote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
One of my favorite books to date is WWII America at War, 1941-1945 by Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen. “General Eisenhower grew to be the indispensable coalition General, a peerless coordinator and command of the Allied operations”. Eisenhower back then was correct in his line of thinking, as we had nearly destroyed Hitler’s war machine. The overall morale of his troops vanished with lack of ammo and food. Pretty basic Bravo Sierra aye ? However, we knew where all his stuff was, so destroying it and his machine was no real strategy. We just had to get there, dump ordnance and head home for fuel.
I think Winston got a raw deal. After all, he was only 35 or 36 when he reached ‘cabinet rank’. I know folks to this day in their 50s who can’t put the M4 back together without their eyes. Churchill didn’t throw in the towel, but he did realize that Britain would never win without US involvement. Hence the deal ‘destroyers for bases’.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
I like that approach, but just how many of the estimated 5 million are unwilling to fight ? What sort of carrots are we talking about :rolleyes:Quote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
I also like asking Marc questions…It’s his answers that worry me most :eek:
Regards, Stan
Stan,
Thanks again for your reply.
I really believe that the analysis of memes or thoughts / beliefs should be the starting point for anything. First one needs to analyze what each party believes its final objectives are in the physical realm the decide what beliefs and thoughts will bring about that reality e.g. we want peace therefore the enemy must believe it is in their best interests to stop fighting. The next step is how to decide which ideas are beneficial, which are harmful and get to fighting ideas with ideas through a campaign linked between the physical and cognitive domains through the information domain.
The first problem: do the violence does believe the withdrawal of troops is going to be hastened by peace or increased violence (firstly identify what they believe). Second problem: is troop withdrawal in their interests? Thirdly: what is their ultimate objective? Once you know the answer to these problems for each group you can start to be predictive. This is also where the fundamentals of memetics can be used to tailor a campaign to shape the battle space across the domains in an advantageous way.
The question you have asked is what I think will happen not how I would use memetics so I will try to answer your question. The problem with Iraq is there are so many different groups and what advantages one will disadvantage another. A decrease in violence from one may show an increase in violence from another. My personal belief is that there will be increased peace until the troops withdrawal has gone to the point of no return and then everybody will come out of the woodwork trying to out-do each other trying to show that they were the ones to kick out the superpower and use this as a way of gaining support or influence. This is where the battle of ideas will really hot up and the allied IO will need to be on the job if there are not be global repercussions in terms of what extremists or potential radical recruits believe the truth to be.
I make the point here that I don’t think the real battleground is the irredeemably radicalized – rather I think it is the uncommitted. The truly extreme may need to be killed or captured but that is less preferred than a change of heart. A useful illustration of this is the Firqats of Oman.
I will however close with what may best be described as the 'battle of the bulge' analogy. The battle of the bulge in ww2 appeared to show a resurgent Nazi Germany. It was not and was in fact the last desperate throw of a dwindling enemy. I think that a decrease in violence may not always be an indicator of success if the enemy is beginning to control territory and become a viable alternate government. Similarly, an increase in violence may show that the enemy has given up all pretexts of being a viable government and can only act as a destructive and destabilizing influence. Again, fighting ideas with ideas is important, not only in the immediate theatre of conflict but on the home front where audience is either given too much or too little credit for understanding complex issues.
Fighting ideas with ideas has to be the way to go and again, I think memetics will not have the answer but can certainly provide the framework for disciplined thought.
Thanks for your input and I hope this made sense.
JD
JD,
I like the idea as a starting point – sort of get to know your enemy or neighbor. But we do have quite a bit more than just say one or two tribes to analyze. It also sounds like one is dealing with rational folks, and many of them are not. Would an interdisciplinary study such as cognitive science pay dividends when your subjects are say irrational (read centuries of brainwashing or just plum crazy)?Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
I think that this line of thinking will gain about 50% of the population, but the other 50% have not only objectives but also objections. I doubt that even the slightest smell of failure is an option. That’s why I feel troop reductions will result in an increase in attacks. The sad truth there is yet another surge. Is there a means of figuring that scenario out and subsequently countering it?Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
I’m no stranger to such problems working in Sub-Sahara with 400 tribes. Getting one or two to the table was hard, but the others seem to fall in line accordingly. However, that country still has no peace and factions are constantly battling each other. It’s been nearly two decades. I’m afraid we’ll see the same with Iraq, but the only difference being that they are not content to stay home and destroy things, rather travel around.Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
I believe that Oman enjoyed several positive factors we don’t currently have in Iraq. That is, an effective local government with sufficient external support and more importantly - local support. Even still, something to consider in the overall equation.Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
Thanks for the interesting posts !
Regards, Stan
Stan,
I am interested in your comments on the rationality of individuals and groups. I personally have a tendency to assume that anyone whose motives I can't understand is irrational but I am increasingly getting the uncomfortable feeling that the problem is my inability to grasp a foreign thought process not the irrationality of the other perspective. I think it is possible to simultaneously be sane, rational and incomprehensible to others, just as I feel the west is to the East at times. A rational view can still be logically flawed or based on faith, culture or emotion. Any faith system can be challenged by logic without assuming the beiever is irrational or insane. It then gets down to a matter of degrees and subjective judgement to the point at which irrationality sets in.
My further concern is that if we dismiss too many ideas as irrational we lose the IO campaign / battle of ideas by failing to contest it in the most vital areas. Again, I go back to finding a disciplined apporach to analysing thoughts and cultural norms to ensure we don't impose our own emotions, norms or ethnocentricities on our chosen courses of action.
Your thoughts?
JD
JD, at the website I posted under resources there are some interesting articles on semiotics (the use of symbols to influence) close to the idea of memetics. Although it is based on how to run a political campaign it largely deals with information operations and how to handle them. Especially the 12 step program they recommend. Couple of points from the 12 step program, don't teach or educate people but learn how to motivate them to take the action you want. Also recommends using pictures instead of words where possible over all it has a lot of good simple steps to take to make the campaign a success. If you get time to read any of it let me know what you think about it.
JD,Quote:
I am interested in your comments on the rationality of individuals and groups. I personally have a tendency to assume that anyone whose motives I can't understand is irrational but I am increasingly getting the uncomfortable feeling that the problem is my inability to grasp a foreign thought process not the irrationality of the other perspective. I think it is possible to simultaneously be sane, rational and incomprehensible to others, just as I feel the west is to the East at times. A rational view can still be logically flawed or based on faith, culture or emotion. Any faith system can be challenged by logic without assuming the beiever is irrational or insane. It then gets down to a matter of degrees and subjective judgement to the point at which irrationality sets in.
What is sane is much influenced by culture, language, and social pressures. This is in my experience the number one culture gap in understanding and it is one that never goes away. The moment you fully understand that alien view, you have probably shape-shifted and become one with them, leaving you divorced from your own cultural roots.
Many folks used to say Saddam was crazy. He was not; he was perfectly sane in the peculiar world that he built around himself. The JFCOM Iraqi Perspectives report is most valuable in seeing how the US leadership and Saddam's regime miscommunicated over decades. This is not a new phenomenon; cultural miscommunications play a role in every conflict.
best
Tom
that a huge part of that miscommunication is as a result of who talks to whom. An academic, writer, business man or woman or a media person -- A soldier, for that matter -- traveling in the ME (or elsewhere) is most likely to spend the majority of their time talking to similar people in the nation(s) visited. Many of those will have western education to one degree or another. They are comfortable talking western values.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
In much of the world, the polite thing is to tell your guests what one thinks the guest wants to hear and thus, the perception among the movers and shakers grows that "we're all alike." We aren't. Not by a long shot.
The media and the academy are not helpful in this regard; while some do get it right, most do not. They are captive of what they are told, all to frequently in English (when entirely different things are said by many in their own language) by, again western educated peers, who probably have if not an agenda, certainly a defense mechanism to protect the tribe, clan, region or nation of their birth.
Unless one truly speaks the language and is willing to sit in the bars (amazing number of them in Islamic nations...), bazaars and ghave or chaikhane for hours on end and truly listen, it is easy to be lulled into the belief that the cultural differences are 'minor.' They aren't. They never are.
Our last three largest wars are proof of that. :(
Ken,Quote:
Unless one truly speaks the language and is willing to sit in the bars (amazing number of them in Islamic nations...), bazaars and ghave or chaikhane for hours on end and truly listen, it is easy to be lulled into the belief that the cultural differences are 'minor.' They aren't. They never are.
One of my earlier formative experiences as a FAO was in a bar over the course of several evenings talking to Egyptians, at least one of whom was their security services because he pitched me before we were all said and done. Notable among the discussions was the legitimate need for female circumcision to control those insatiable Egyptian women....:eek:
Best
Tom
PS
A follow up thought: in the aftermath of Goma, I went to Rwanda and Stan was still in Kinshasa when a senior diplomat insisted on coming out to do a site visit which included a gorilla walk in the middle of a war zone. Yours truly got to arrange that one; but the diplomat came with his spouse. He was a political appointee and she was his self-appointed advisor. Anyway we took them to Goma as part of the visit and another friend of Stan and I met them to give an orientation of the camps. Our friend was explaining the reality of Goma (with 70K dead) when the spouse said some to the effect, "it's all soooooo exciting. it's like an election." Point being, even when language and nationality are not cross-wise, cultural differences still rear their homely heads.
To Slapout9,
thanks for the link - it's excellent and good food for thought.
To Tom,
My understanding of what you say is that it is not possible to feel comfortable in a culture unless you hold its values and it is not possible to simultaneously adhere to contradictory values. This may well be true but the next question is: is it possible to understand a society without adhering to its values in the same way that it is possible to predict a criminal mind without being a criminal?
For everyone,
A general question: do we now need cultural advisors in Joint HQ with the same level of recogniton as politcal and other advisors? Would it be possible to find one without an agenda of his/her own? And if so, would they not be there merely to provide an insight into the mind of those to be influenced - in other words should there not be another element interpreting the cultural advice to turn it into psyops?
I am going to talk about the three domains of the physical, informational and cognitive. We have Sea / Air / Land / Space because because each part of the physical domain has its own challenges and requires a certain skillset and culture to deal with these challenges. Increasingly, there ae communications / IO specialists to deal with the information domain either with information as media or message. There are, however, few, if any, experts on the cognitive domain where the ultimate effects will be wrought. Do we need to create cognitive experts in line with Sea / Air / Land experts? And should a cognitive effects based approach be the lead of operations with physical effects in support?
Big questions I know - maybe I should start a new thread?
JD
JD,
I'd say keep it to this thread since you/we are already developing the thought/thread. Its alright if the subject evolves some. Regards, Rob
JD,
On the issue of ‘rationality’, a book I would highly recommend is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1978?), which is still in print or you likely can find in your local university or other library. Jervis addresses the question of why opposing leaders may do things that appear to us as irrational.
As the book title suggests, it is about the interaction of state leaders, and is very much addressed to the fundamental assumption that underpinned the theorizing up to that time on deterrence and crisis behaviour – which is that the decision makers are rational and will act rationally. So what he explores are a multitude of reasons why an opponent may well act in a manner which we consider irrational but which is an action that is perfectly rational to them. He covers many of the reasons that several of the others have raised earlier on this question Though dated, the general arguments he makes, which he takes largely from the cognitive sciences of the time, still hold up well. After reading Perceptions and Misperceptions it is much easier to see why we should never assume that someone else will act in the manner we expect them to do so based on our ‘rational’ assessment (such as Tom Odom’s example of Saddam).
Some aspects Jervis discusses may a bit broad, given what you are seeking to explore, such as one reason why a state leadership may not act in the way we think is rational is because their world view is not the same as ours – this speaks to, but does not directly address, questions of culture, etc. But his arguments are still very useful. I would highly recommend Perceptions and Misperception to any one – indeed, I require all my PhD students to read it regardless of whether it is of direct relevance to their research or not, and the same for any of my Postgraduate students who are ‘upgrading’ their education to get ahead in whatever government department they are in.
Best
TT
JD,
Who is the target audience for your work? The reason I ask is I think it might be helpful to place the article/proposal in the right context. We've spent a little time here talking about it as a logical line of operation for campaign design. Some thoughts:
- Discuss where you see this doing the most good. Is this something limited to a COCOM, or is it applicable to a JTF stood up by a COCOM? Or is it both?
-You've identified the need for the capability, but you might also want to outline where the capacity is most needed and why. You might also look at how the HQs could tap into an already existing capacity - maybe from a country team in the region. There is also the possibility of having the inter-agency connectivity and the ability to work with International Organizations and NGOs. I've known some very culturally integrated NGO members - their level of cultural literacy exceeds most due to their level of immersion - but.... they have their own perspectives.
- This gets to the problems of our own military culture. We talk about culture awareness & sometimes you'll here sensitivity. I think the choice of words also speaks to our level of commitment in some ways. I don't mean to say this is bad or good, its just who we are right now. The reason I bring it up is the biggest challenge with this type of LLOO is the time it takes to work, and the ways you measure its effects - level of returns so to speak. So, this may do the most good as a shaping LLOO, part of a strategy for conflict prevention (you might include Theater Security Cooperation type activities here as well), or a part of the conflict termination/winning the peace and SSTRO. Certainly it has a place at the table during major combat operations, but just realize where the emphasis during that part of the plan is likely to be given our own strategic culture.
-Generating the capability on a large scale as a standing billet, while relevant is going to be expensive - so its always good to outline the requirements - a good way to do this might be to discuss the value added in terms of the cost of doing without.
- Is this capability more applicable to the implementation of an OPLAN, or is it applicable to a contingency plan? What I mean is - having a regional COCOM capability that can pushed down to a subordinate JTF (three star HQs) stood up to deal with a regional crisis could be very helpful for that JTF.
\Quote:
I am going to talk about the three domains of the physical, informational and cognitive. We have Sea / Air / Land / Space because because each part of the physical domain has its own challenges and requires a certain skill set and culture to deal with these challenges. Increasingly, there are communications / IO specialists to deal with the information domain either with information as media or message. There are, however, few, if any, experts on the cognitive domain where the ultimate effects will be wrought. Do we need to create cognitive experts in line with Sea / Air / Land experts? And should a cognitive effects based approach be the lead of operations with physical effects in support?
We still talk in terms of LOOs and Centers of Gravity. So here you might talk about how you would target the CoG through the identification of Critical Requirements, Critical Capabilities and Critical Vulnerabilities (Google "Strange & Centers of Gravity", or see it in the Campaign primer). Consider it at the strategic CoG and the Operational CoG.
You might also do an assessment of our CoG (strategic) and talk about how an enemy might use the same capabilities to attack our CoG - think public will, domestic resolve/commitment, international/regional will, coalition the media etc. A factor planners must consider in a democracy is the access we have to all forms of media - anyone can post a video, or appeal to our citizens on both an individual and mass basis - our enemy understands this and uses the info-sphere to good effect. Can we develop a LOO that anticipates and counters their message (or at least one flexible enough so we can react quickly), while getting across our own both domestically and internationally. How might that look?
Finally, you might consider how (and if we should) better to tie together IO at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Also consider Operational Art in your argument - how does this provide the CDR an advantage, retain the initiative and translate toward strategic success.
You can do this a number of ways. Two are to take a historical campaign and explore it. The other is to take a fictional campaign that has not happened yet, but is set close enough in the future to where the reader can extrapolate the lessons we are now learning and integrate them to make your point.
p.s - take a look at some of the work Marc has done - like the DR. Johnny piece and related thread. I think it has some great insights!
Hey JD,
It looks like you've received a ton of good info from the smart folks herein !Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
I would echo what Tom covered in his response and add that logical thinking won't get you very far when dealing with cultural misconceptions. Logically derived conclusions in say, an abnormal place like Zaire will only serve to make you crazy.
Back in Sub-Sahara Tom and I were thought of as Jungle Medicine Men. Trying to assist the JTF, carefully watch the French and answer DC's barrage of questions by second-guessing the Zairian forces (in the middle of a civil war with political and social upheaval) and the Rwandan refugee crisis and fleeing ex FAR.
I credit our successes to our language abilities, keen awareness of cultural differences and social taboos. Tom brought along his immense background and sneaky demeanor :cool:
Even with the odds in our favor, there were still plenty of irrational folks around to keep us on our toes.
Do we need cultural advisers? Indeed, but we’re only going to end up with a real smart individual without basic soldiering skills, or be dependent on a local national strapped to your side (who all too often fails you the very second you need him/her most).
I would rather have a skilled can-do soldier with the ability to operate in a cross-cultural environment.
No not what I said (or at least meant). You can feel comfortable in a foreign culture depending on the depth of immersion. But if you expect to become one with the culture, that is transformational--the worst cases I have seen are those who become more African than the Africans or more French than the French.Quote:
My understanding of what you say is that it is not possible to feel comfortable in a culture unless you hold its values and it is not possible to simultaneously adhere to contradictory values. This may well be true but the next question is: is it possible to understand a society without adhering to its values in the same way that it is possible to predict a criminal mind without being a criminal?
It is possible to understand the tendencies of a culture and use those tendencies as a predictive framework--as long as you understand it is a framework and never absolute in its accuracy. Interesting parallel with the criminal mind but again you are talking a criminal mind and a cultural assessment is by its very nature a group target.
Best
Tom
Rob,
Thanks again for your reply. Just to introduce my background, I am currently on Command and Staff Course. My background is in aviation particularly Joint Terminal Attack Control / FAC so my grounding is psyops is not strong. It is, however, an area I am increasingly coming to view as critical.
I think a structured approach to examining effects in the cognitive domain will benefit any campaign planning process. The reason I am drawn to memtics is it may allow the portrayal of intangibles in a similar manner to more traditional physical targets and allow the same level of analysis. I think CofG analysis could work for example: the endstate may be the cessation of hostilities, the CofG may be the bleif that the conflict is a Jihad and the CC / CV may be the reputation of certain religious leaders. These can then be linked to actions in and through both the physical and informational domains.
The problem is understaning the problem and I think a cultural expert without an agenda is going to be very hard to find. The best option I could think of is a member of the diplomatic corps who has undergone campaign training at a war college / staff college. This may give them a skillset that makes them useful to both the military and the diplomatic corps.
In terms of describing the concepts, I don't think it is wise to use a real conflict as so many people are so emotionally invested in the current operations and it can appear disrepsctful and arrogant to deconstruct an event with 20/20 hindsight.
I apologise for not having more to offer at this stage but I am increasingly convinced of the need to stress the importance of activities other than kinetics and coordinate these with the overall campaign. 'Wars are won in the will' and I am starting to believe any CofG will be resident in the cognitive domain so all lines of operation should be geared toward that effort.
Controversial for a pilot I know!
JD
IMHO, memes are like string theory and 5th dimensions in quantum physics - easy to talk about and even easier to hypothesize about but impossible to objectify with isolation and analysis via Western Science. It's sort of like the blood-brain barrier in which only certain substances can easily cross over and do their thing - we aren't getting through and nobody likes voo-doo science in trying to understand and predict human behavior, least of all the Military.
Take the phenomenon of young Muslims easily memorizing the entire Quran for instance, and thousands of them do. What if it wasn't the message or the teacher or the setting or the genetics and brain of the kid or his family and culture all pushing and motivating the kids to memorize it but rather the actual Quran itself that had been repeatedly used for the same purpose? An imprinted, cultural accouterment? Or take the Chippewa medicine man I knew years ago who had a couple of round, smooth, well handled black rocks that he called his telephone, saying he used them to communicate with other medicine men. Or take the Indian who once told me it was easier to turn into a bird and fly over a mountain than to walk over it. We have psychogenic pain and seizures for instance that are acknowldged realities carrying scientific validity yet the diagnosis of illness via a shaman ingesting a psychoactive substance such as peyote or using an ancient, imprinted turtle shell rattle is bogus.
I think the trick to accepting another culture's norms lies in the realization that our logic is ofen bogus in and of itself.
Ok either turn in your scarf and flight rompers or report for reprogramming :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
Seriously keep asking questions. We will try and answer.
Tom
Goesh,
Good post. I was listening to NPR on the way down and there was a psychologist who'd written a book about writing some stream of consciousness lines every morning upon waking up because that was when the hold of daily perceptions was weakest. Cultural perceptions do influence our reality - how much is probably dependent on circumstance and environment - its like when we say there are somethings that only make sense in the context of the environment you are in.
A while back we had a thread on magical realism where I was telling Marc & Slapout about the conversations I was having with my Iraqi peers about genies/ djiin. It was a pretty fantastic idea for me, but for them it was day to day.
I'll reread your post a couple of times I think. I always do when I think ideas/things are related but can't define how:wry: - it just kind of rumbles around in my head like Tetris until it finds the right spot. Thanks for providing food for thought.
JD, to echo Tom, you are raising some good questions and facilitating a discussion - you are contributing:D & we're glad to have you aboard.
Rob,
I was just reading your post regarding viral extremism. Memetics often uses similar terms and you may be interested in the book - Virus of the Mind:: The New Science of the Meme by Richard Brodie.
Memetics is pesented in different ways but a basic tenet is that a meme / thought / cultural unit is a replicator copied by the human ability to imitate. Those ideas that are spread follow a basic evolutionary algorithm where those most able to replicate do so in fairly dispassionate way and that process is influenced by the fidelity, fecundity and longevity of the meme. Its very much like a virus so I find your parallel with extremism quite interesting. Sept 11 gave extremism fecundity through publicity, longevity through the imagery and the internet and media gave it fidelity allowing it to tranfer its ideas without modifation or moderation. The model and analogy appear to hold up. I was reading a recent study which showed a link between horrific events, the degree of media coverage and the incidents of follow on copy cat events. The viral analogy seems apt.
JD
Cultural Advisers as an entity at the geographic command level may have some merit but it will take some time before they're accepted and a long time before they're accorded equivlency to the Political adviser, I expect. Plus, I suspect State would consider that a turf intrusion... :)Quote:
Originally Posted by JD
Since the geographic commands react, mostly, to directives from the NCA, better locations for your cultural advisers might be at State, DoD and the WH / NSC -- those are the places where that cultural knowledge would be beneficial before any rash decisions are made...
Unfortunately, I also think you need to find a way to work on our memes. There was plenty of cultural advice available at all levels prior to commitment to Viet Nam (all five Administrations involved in such commitments) and the bulk of it was diligently ignored. The same comment applies to this commitment to Iraq; advice in trainload lots, mostly ignored. If I recall correctly, there were a couple of people with extensive local and cultural knowledge who tried to talk to Jonathan Howe on the ground in Somalia -- they were also ignored.
Maybe the issue isn't our meme -- it's the egos of those in high places...:mad:
I think the determination of lead effort, cognitive effects versus physical effects, is situation dependent but I also think that at least a teaming would have been nice going into Iraq. Come to think of it any consideration at all of cognitive effects would have helped...:wry:
We could certainly sure benefit today; those guys are stomping us in the info war...
We spend millions of dollars training Foreign Area Specialists, most of whom don't get promoted above LTC and who do great work but are rarely, in my observation, called upon by those on high for advice and counsel before they maks decisions. That's just dumb.
No intent to rain on your idea, it's a good one; much needed. Just some thoughts for you to consider in your formulation. Egos, I think will be your greatest obstacle. You're on to a need, keep plugging. :)
JD. I've heard of Brodie - so I had to look him up. Looks like a good one to read. I'll pick it up. Thanks for the tip.Quote:
Rob,
I was just reading your post regarding viral extremism. Memetics often uses similar terms and you may be interested in the book - Virus of the Mind:: The New Science of the Meme by Richard Brodie.
Best Regards, Rob
The points about resistence to change and egos are well taken. In my relatively short experience the major problem in moving forward has been different cultures and engrained beleif patterns. I'm not talking here about the societal differences but the differences between organisations such as army / air force / navy / civilian and the way narrowly defined loyalties create an assumption of incompetence in others.
Knowing, however, that so many people enjoy a scientific approach I went digging for some behavioural modelling. It basically models peoples behaviour on their beliefs / perceptions and indirectly compares them to a contagion much like a virus. Its interesting but the result is obviously dependent on the input. The ability to persuade will depend very much on the audience.
I have also included two short and highly digestible articles that harken back to the mind virus discussion.
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/5/3/1.html
http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/2001/vol5/marsden_p_let.html
http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/2005/vol9/gatherer_d.html
JD
Quote:
Maybe the issue isn't our meme -- it's the egos of those in high places...:mad:
Quote:
We spend millions of dollars training Foreign Area Specialists, most of whom don't get promoted above LTC and who do great work but are rarely, in my observation, called upon by those on high for advice and counsel before they maks decisions. That's just dumb.
Too right on those comments, Ken
Tom
Greetings all,
First time post - long time lurker, (as with many, I am in awe to be associated with like-minded professionals).
I must admit, I am not fully up to speed with memetics, but I am going to do some more research. I am an Active Duty PSYOP Commander, currently in the fight, and I have some interesting observations regarding lethal and non-lethal operations.
Interesting post earlier, about having PSYOP/IO in the lead, with everything else as a shaping operation. I have seen too often in my limited time here, that Information Operations, and the "perception" index of the local nationals not taken into account, and the tertiary effects of our operations.
Perhaps PSYOP or IO Consideration should be the decisive effort, where tactical commanders mass all of their combat power to achieve the desired in conjunction with the all elements of combat power. I am just spitballing...
The biggest challenge that I see is that our tactical commanders are not properly schooled on the principles of EBO (hell, it is not even Army Doctrine). I surmise that although are doctrine explicitly discusses "effects on the enemy" in tactical tasks, the power of shaping the informationr realm and the cognitive perceptions is often counterproductive to overarching campaign.
Just my two cents, would love to hear back from you all.
Godspeed!
Take a look at CALL products such as the Special Study on Brigade Planning, the Special study on Battalon Planning, the Company-Level SOSO series of newsletters, especially Vols 2 and 3. Vol 2 covers EBO at the company level and is an extract of the CALL Handbook, EBO from Brigade to company. Vol 3Int, IO, and Patrolling at the company level. Wheher you call it EBO, effects based process, or full spectrum planning, we have been working this hard for the past 5 years at JRTC with the stated, simple to say but hard to do, goal of synchronizing lethal and non-lethal operations and their derivative effects.Quote:
Originally Posted by Hardrockxo
Best
Tom
I am not so sure that egos will be the biggest obstacle. Rather, bucking the accepted wisdom is more likely to be so. (I submit we have a case here similar to that discussed in another thread on anthropology's antipathy to the military.)Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Memetics seems to have passed out of vogue in academia. The Journal of Memetics had an 8 year run with its last issue being in 2005. Much of what I read in the literature smacks of another idea that has long since fallen out of vogue, namely Social Darwinism. It could be that this is what has caused memetics' demise.
The following extracts come from Daniel Dennett's lecture, "Memes and the Exploitation of Imagination," The David and Miriam Mandel Lecture, American Society for Aesthetics, October 27, 1989 found here. I suggest a reading of the whole thing.
AndQuote:
I don't know about you, but I am not initially attracted by the idea of my brain as a sort of dungheap in which the larvae of other people's ideas renew themselves, before sending out copies of themselves in an informational Diaspora. It does seem to rob my mind of its importance as both author and critic. Who is in charge, according to this vision--we or our memes?
And finallyQuote:
The important point is that there is no necessary connection between a meme's replicative power, its "fitness" from its point of view, and its contribution to our fitness (by whatever standard we judge that). The situation is not totally desperate. While some memes definitely manipulate us into collaborating on their replication in spite of our judging them useless or ugly or even dangerous to our health and welfare, many--most, if we are lucky--of the memes that replicate themselves do so not just with our blessings, but because of our esteem for them.
All leading toQuote:
[C]oncepts from population genetics . . . transfer smoothly: here is a case of what a geneticist would call linked loci: two memes that happen to be physically tied together so that they tend always to replicate together, a fact that affects their chances. There is a magnificent ceremonial march, familiar to us all, and one that would be much used for commencements, weddings, and other festive occasions, perhaps driving "Pomp and Circumstance" and the Wedding March from "Lohengrin" to near extinction, were it not for the fact that its musical meme is too tightly linked to its title meme, which we all tend to think of as soon as we hear the music: Sir Arthur Sullivan's unusable masterpiece, "Behold the Lord High Executioner."
This is actually just a vivid case of one of the most important phenomena in the infosphere: the mis-filtering of memes due to such linkages. We all have filters of the following sort:
ignore everything that appears in X
For some people, X is The National Inquirer or Pravda; for others it is The New York Review of Books; we all take our chances, counting on the "good" ideas to make it eventually through the stacks of filters of others into the limelight of our attention.
Quote:
I submit that the meme's-eye view of what happened to the meme meme is quite obvious: "humanist" minds have set up a particularly aggressive set of filters against memes coming from "sociobiology," and once Dawkins was identified as a sociobiologist, this almost guaranteed rejection of whatever this interloper had to say about culture--not for good reasons, but just in a sort of immunological rejection.
Tom,
Thanks for the info - I have indeed referenced those publications, and I am very much an advocate of EBO. During my tenure with my supported unit, I have had some successes in intergration of non-lethal and lethal assets.
Although I conduct Psychological Operations, I like think of myself as an "agent of influence"; exploiting the tactical plans and successes, and amplifying the beliefs and perceptions of the locals...
I think that with my supported unit, I have achieved success with regards to advising them, and at least having them consider the ramifications/benefits/options associated with the effects of a kinetic operation.
Again, thanks for the response, looking forward to being a proactive member of the team.
Are we prosecuting 21st Century conflict with 16th Century structures? Originally there were the army and the navy and environmental separation seemed logical as each required unique skills and a certain distinct culture (although the contribution of marines and sailors operating on land was significant). Enablers such as intelligence and logistics could be handled in house particularly when information moved at the speed of a horse and army's often lived off the land. Then came the air force and the environmental separation still seemed to make sense. But the change in the manner of conflict and the proliferation in information technology have changed the function of the combat enablers that necessarily straddle all the services. The addition of the air force came from a change in technology and the manner of warfighting. On the basis of advancing technology, skillset and culture, is it not time to generate separate services to represent the changing nature of warfare.
My best guess is to divide responsibilities into sea, air, land, space, logistics, intelligence and communications. The skillets, culture and required attributes of personnel would be different and distinct e.g. a communications expert launching a computer virus may be a very different person from an infantryman with a bayonet but both are doing vital work.
My particular interest is the communications area where information may be both the media and the message. WRT media, it would be nice to have a single service providing a coherent and interoperable combat enabler to all other branches rather than the current issues faced with interoperability. The second part is information as a message where there is a real need for expertise in turning intelligence into the vital information campaign. Without such experts or recognition of the importance of this campaign, the chance is we will be whipped in information operations.
Any thoughts?
JD