BASRAH--some perspective (Iran, etc)
To the readers of this Forum:
Thought you'd find these observations of interest since they are from a secular Shia university professor living in Basrah. I've been in regular contact with him by mail (since 1992) and email (2002-EARLY 2003; fall 2003 on) and met him 2 yrs ago in Canada at a conference. He was mentioned by name & quoted in a spr 05 NYT article of the restoration of marshes in southern iraq)
He was concerned about the LACK of action by our British allies VERY EARLY ON (late 2003) and warned me in early 2004 about Iran.
Here are some email excerpts:
(I have corrected some spelling, grammar—and cut out text not relevant to Iran).
12-12-05:
“I think the balance is changing against clerics and religious parties. They will have a share but not like January. They are putting tremendous effort to win. People don’t like them in the south. THEY WILL WIN BECAUSE OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE (my emphasis in caps). We need a change. It will be a disaster if they win”.
12-13-2005:
Two days ago a prof of soil sciences have been kidnapped and yesterday they found his body killed. These gangs came to him at midnight and take him to his death. I know the fellow... I believe his crime was to be a Dean of the College of Agriculture seven years ago. It is a chaotic country! MAYBE I AM ON THE LIST PREPARED BY PRO-IRAN GROUPS FOR KILLING. I am going to buy a gun to defend myself and my family. I feel really bad and sad. We need somebody to rescue us from this horrible situation."
2-22-06:
“We are safe till now. We live day by day. The British troops at last wake up. I wonder if they have a chance to achieve things. They left Basrah so long to be very dangerous even to them. BASRAH IT WILL BE THE BATTLEPLACE WITH IRAN. God bless and save us. After the British caught several police men the wave of killing stopped—hope forever. BUT EVERY PERSON KNOWS EVERY MONTH NEW LIST OF NAMES TO BE KILLED COME FROM IRAN. They used certain cars, sometimes police cars,and police men perform the assassination”
1/14/07 “We are living under constant bombardment of Al Mahdi army shelling to the British and American consulates. By the way we are under the regime of Shiite Taleban. It is the same as that of Afghanistan with no big difference.”
7/18/07: “i did not told you about what we face during June in Basrah. Previously I you told we have the intention to leave our house to another one more safer but it is very difficult. In first week of June mortar shell fell in front of garage ,thanks god the shrapnel hit the iron door, I depot of fuels for the generator and barrel of kerosene beside the car full with gas., The worse turn up during the third week of June when mortar shell hit the second floor roof. thank god only the rim and water storage, That happened at night . The house was full of smoke,water and dust coinciding with power cut ie in darkness. Imagine the situation. Now no bombs we are feel safe for a while [note: in Syria].
Another "penpal" just got out of Basrah to Kuwait, but is having trouble getting his family out.
From 2/3/05--Much more hope and optimism----now lost
DEAR STEVE THE FEAR IS AWAY ANDI TOOK ALL FAMILY FOR ELECTION EVEN THEIR IS A THREAT OF BOMBS AND TERRORIST BUT NEVER THE LESS WE WENT AND VOTE AT THE END IT IS BEUATIFUL TO FEEL FREE TO CHOOSE WHAT ONE THINK IT IS RIGHT, WE THANKS U.S. FOR THAT AND HOPE TO KEEP HELPING IRAQI PEOPLE IN PROCCESS OF DEMOCRACY WITH OUT U.S. WE WILL RETUR BACK TO DANGER AND DARK AGES .WE ARE SAFE FOR TIME BEING HOPING THE SITUATION WILL BE IMPROVED .
Such a depressing change .
Basra is astride our supply line.
When the Brits pull out, I don't see any choice but for us to go down there and secure it.
Cordesman's assessment was right. The response of the British Army and the commentariat surrounding the Brown Government was to call Anthony Cordesman a right-wing neocon.
Anything but.....
Question: will we have enough Mojo in Anbar to pull forces from there to go down south? It will definitely have to be an overwatch kind of thing, as I think the Iranians have decided that they want to get a stranglehold on our supply lines.
The Brits are great and all, but the Brown Government wants out, ASAP.
Failure of the British approach?
Here's a question: is the British retreat from Basra, which is certainly what it looks like, a serious blow to the British counter-insurgency approach, supposedly perfected over decades in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Aden, Malaysia, and many other theaters? Softly softly, berets instead of helmets, and rapid enlistment and cession of control to local elements seems to have worked no better than much heavier U.S. tactics in Anbar, and indeed, probably worse.
The Financial Times covered this to some extent:
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage...9599778&page=1
Quote:
"A soft approach to the population when you are talking about counterinsurgency is one thing, but it doesn't work when you [are up against] a large and dedicated military force," he says. The model that worked in Northern Ireland would not work in southern Iraq because of the thousands of militiamen who were challenging UK forces: "There were several hundred activists in Northern Ireland – that was not what you had in southern Iraq."
Seems to me, and maybe this is stating the obvious, that it's further proof that almost all of what we talk about here, like "population-centric" vs. "enemy-centric operations," levels of firepower, role of indigenous security forces, etc., depends almost entirely on the situation. Maybe there are some broad counter-insurgency principles, from the likes of Thompson, Galula, Kitson and others, but even these seem to make a lot more sense in the classical Communist insurgency case.
Of course, the article also says this:
Quote:
The actions of UK troops also had on occasions inflamed local sentiment, the two men said in a report on the British experience in southern Iraq. In Maysan province, one of the four for which the UK had responsibility, UK forces upset locals by their efforts to collect heavy weapons. Elsewhere, house searches for explosives using dogs caused considerable anger.
"Despite their reputation for 'community soldiering', British soldiers had crossed local red lines without knowing it," the two authors concluded. They "did not know enough about the cultural environment [they] were operating in".
British Troops Pull Out of Their Last Base in Basra City
3 September London Times - British Troops Pull Out of Their Last Base in Basra City by Michael Evans.
Quote:
The final 500 British troops in Basra city last night withdrew under the cover of darkness from their base, a former palace of Saddam Hussein.
The highly symbolic pullout from Basra Palace began at about 10pm local time. Residents then reported seeing helicopters overhead and a convoy of eight tanks, six Land Rovers and five other large vehicles, possibly armoured personnel carriers, approaching the main British airport base from the palace shortly before midnight.
The streets of the city were largely deserted, and the convoy of troops from the 4th Battalion The Rifles was not attacked. Troops at the palace suffered daily attacks over the summer, with nine members of The Rifles being killed since May 21.
Basra airport will now be the only base for the 5,500 soldiers still serving in southern Iraq. With the palace base handed to the Iraqis, the Government is expected to announce that the British presence in Iraq will be reduced by 500 within the next few weeks...
The pullout came as two of Britain’s most influential generals during the Iraq war delivered scathing attacks on the Americans for their handling of the campaign after Saddam’s defeat. Major-General Tim Cross, who supervised reconstruction projects alongside his American counterparts in 2003, joined General Sir Mike Jackson, former head of the Army, in criticising the US for ignoring British advice. General Cross, a Royal Engineer, is retired but he was a hugely respected figure in the Army and had unrivalled experience in dealing with postwar nation-building. He revealed that he gave advice to Don-ald Rumsfeld, the former US Defence Secretary, about the size of the force needed to tackle the challenges after Saddam’s downfall, but was ignored.
The attacks by General Jackson, the former Chief of the General Staff, in his autobiography, and General Cross, in an interview with the Sunday Mirror, have laid bare the anger felt by the British military over the way that Mr Rumsfeld dismissed all the warning signs of a potential disaster in Iraq.
Although much has been said about the failures of the American strategy in Iraq, not least by Sir Jeremy Green-stock, the former British Ambassador at the United Nations and later Tony Blair’s special envoy to Baghdad, the strong criticism from the two generals has added to the growing sense of a rift between Washington and London...
Only in the sense that people are
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MattC86
I'm wondering if in anyway the current Basrah fighting can be compared to ARVN operations in Laos in 1971-72...
shooting at each other.
maybe I'm just a cynic, but...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
the Mahdi Army in the Baghdad area was no longer under Sadr's control but Iran's.
I'm not sure the word "control" ever applies to contemporary Iraq, especially as it pertains to the role of external actors.
Influence? Sure. Allies? Yes, although always temporarily. Control? Underestimates the local dynamics, and the extent to which the locals and supposed "clients" are able to use (and even abandon) the externals and supposed "patrons" as vice-versa.
Reference: see "al-Anbar Awakening, US control over..."
Your political characterization is correct but those are among
the few corollaries. Urban vs. jungle; Two moderately trained and competent Armed forces vs. one less well trained against a group of semi-trained irregulars; Armor and air mobile ops vs. mostly dismounted urban combat; massive US air and artillery support vs. a little; two (sort of nations) in a fight in a third nation vs. a civil disagreement in one; we probably didn't push this on the HN vs. one that the HN didn't really want to do; and so on...
More difference than similarities.
Quote:
In that sense, I see a comparison to Basra. Not only is the operation providing a major test of the indigenous security forces, but if they are shown to be extremely wanting (as the ARVN was) it will have further impact on US domestic support, as well as the legitimacy of the Maliki government.
If is a big word; "extremely" wanting is likely to be in the eye of the beholder; impact on US domestic support will have little real effect on much of anything; and the legitimacy of the Maliki government is determined by how it got in power, not by events that occur after it is in power -- though such events can affect its durability and / or survivability, different things.
With respect to the Laos incursion, the real object lesson was not the progress or lack of it of "Vietnamization," it was the failure of the US Army to properly train the Viet Namese or to assist them with detailed planning that was far beyond their capability. In fairness to MACV, XXIV Corps and ARVN, undue and quite wrong pressure by the Bobsey twins of Kissinger and his idiot Mini-Me, Alexander Haig caused a major rush and arguably contributed significantly to the failure just as much as the fact that the south VN fought in Battalions and had NO experience in even Brigade ops, much less multi Division. Dumb political battle and essentially a US fomented effort as opposed to a real local desire...
The fact that the high vis units, Ranger Bns, Airborne Bns and Marine Bns were used was a political failing by both US and VN cdrs.
In regard to what it means
Matt,
Although some of the characterizations of the situation are understandable and maybe even likely; who's helping who and why etc. I think there is one thing we can all bet on.
The militias will not win this one. It seems pretty obvious considering the various elements reviewed even in this thread that the main players all have a somewhat win/win option available and along those lines it would seem unlikely that the militias would be the overall victors.
I think the answer to your question depends
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
How much money and blood should we invest in supporting something that is inherently unstable?
on what you're investing the blood and money for. Is it a stable democracy? That would seem to merit X amount of both. If the prospect of achieving that is less than good; then X-p or perhaps even 0 would seem appropriate. If OTOH, you're investing those two things in something else and a democracy of some sort is simply a desired but not imperative by product; that sort of changes the equation, doesn't it?
I'm not sure their one in the same
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
True enough, but I think that most of the guys here are fighting for freedom and democracy. It really makes me angry that they're being lied to: even if it doesn't make them angry.
Of course, if most of the people here agree with Ken about the reasons why you're fighting I guess I should have a beer, chill and thank you all for being so nice to me, helping me learn and for all the intelligent conversation.
There has more often than not been cost of blood and treasure in fighting wars somewhere other than our backyards. The fact that the battle is there instead of here and may not result in good ol American style democracy so to speak does not really have anything to do with whether they are defending our democracy. They are doing what they do in order to assure we get to continue to enjoy what we have without suffering at the hands of those they are fighting.
Thats the crux of what Ken is pointing to. It's not always a zero-sum math problem being addressed but more often than not has to do with so may variables in the ether that although one may not be privy to, really do matter a lot to the end result of it all.
I don't think anyone is being lied to and I think most
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
True enough, but I think that most of the guys here are fighting for freedom and democracy. It really makes me angry that they're being lied to: even if it doesn't make them angry.
Of course, if most of the people here agree with Ken about the reasons why you're fighting I guess I should have a beer, chill and thank you all for being so nice to me, helping me learn and for all the intelligent conversation.
of them accept the reality that Ron cites above. A lot of that 'fighting for freedom and democracy' stuff is political hype but it's mostly true if you put it in context. There's also the fact that what may be freedom for some doesn't seem like it to you but to them it's a major change and improvement. Lots of relativity out there.
I'll also suggest one more time that you continue to ascribe thoughts to me that are grossly incorrect, or in this case, placed out of context in a pejorative mode. If you need to do that, fine. :cool:
If you're angry, perhaps you should figure out why you are and work on that. I'm pretty sure most of the guys don't think they're being lied to so if that's all you're angry about, I suspect you can relax a bit.
True. Stability is a myth. Well, not a myth exactly
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Presley Cannady
Democracy's western approximations range from the streets of Sao Paolo and Cali to Germany, Greece and Italy in the 1970s and 80s to the quiet hills of Vermont. At some point, the literature really needs to stop abusing the word "stability."
but it sure is a lot more elusive than most would like -- and even the quiet hills of Ben and Jerry can be disrupted on occasion. Instability is, I think, a pretty normal human condition and we're just sort of spoiled in the greater west, have been for a while -- but there's no guarantee at all that will continue indefinitely...
Other Issues At Play Here? Looks like there are...
...other issues which exist, which are being ignored (or not understood) by the media. For example:
Quote:
Iraq takes licensing step, but E&P fiscal policy murky
Ferruh Demirmen
The invitation extended early this month by Iraq’s Ministry of Oil to international oil companies (IOCs) to preregister by Jan. 31 for exploration and production licensing rounds has no doubt attracted much interest in the industry (OGJ Online, Jan. 3, 2008).
In its announcement, the ministry requested the applicant companies to provide a comprehensive list of information, from company bylaws to tax compliance record to HSE policy. The ministry will use the information to select those companies that will be allowed to compete for upstream projects in the country. The scope of information requested for qualification may set a new standard in the industry.
But IOCs are still mainly in the dark as to Iraq’s fiscal policy. Timing of the first licensing round is also unclear.
Link to Article
Iraq made the first set of awards on 03.27.2008:
1. Royal Dutch Shell - Kirkuk (10 Bil Bbl. reserves)
2. Shell / BHP Billiton - MIssan (3 Bil Bbl. reserves)
3. Chevron/Total - W Qurna 1 (15-20 Bil Bbl. reserves)
4. Exxon Mobil - Zubair (5 Bil Bbl. reserves)
5. BP - Rumaila N and Rumaila S - (16 Bil Bbl. reserves)
Note that (1) is up North, the other four are all in the South. To get the process started, you have to have stability. Basra is the gateway for commerce - if it's substantially under militia control, the whole effort is going to be stillborn.
This could easily explain the Maliki government's abrupt effort to take control from the militia elements in and around Basra.
Then throw in one other factor. The Interior Ministry has been heavily influenced, if not controlled by employees who are allegedly supporters of JAM and Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Could the crackdown possibly be a way for the Maliki government to identify al-Sadr supporters within the different Ministries, and have them fired from their jobs?
Talk about a conundrum - Politics vrs. Religion vrs. Big money economics.
Thoughts?