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I believe that this is LtCol John Nagl, who was the Operations Officer of 1st of the 34th Armor - 1st INF DIV in Iraq. I personally enjoy the shameless plug for his own book.
Hmmmm I am guilty of that on here :)
But I did not start a "list" on Amazon
Tom
I too did a list a while back for Amazon - it does not contain a shameless plug for my book but it also does not have the name recognition of Col Nagl. :)
Shameless Plug to My List
Tonight, 23 August - The Daily Show with John Stewart (11p - 10c)
Boy, did LTC Nagl ever steal that show.
I saw it. He was very impressive. He made good sense, was understandable and likeable and made a good case for the new strategy.
Youtube link:
Interview | The Daily Show - Lt. Col. John Nagl | 08/23/07
Excellent!
I caught it, and thought it went well. His "be prepared to kill" remark wasn't well received (or I think properly interpreted) by the audience. Otherwise good interview, especially the 7.3% remark.
The phrase, "Pilgrim in an unholy land comes to mind."
SFC W
I thought LTC Nagl showed a lot of class!
From a trigger puller perspective I thought this was his best remark.
"Be polite, be professional, be prepared to kill."
Great interview and with this venue John may have reached a whole segment of the U.S. population with little understanding of COIN and what it takes to prevail.
I understand that the new COIN doctrine is a major tactical change but if civilians in New York don't see much difference between, "Kill the bad guys," and "Be polite, be professional, be prepared to kill." I wonder if civilians in Baghdad will notice much difference.
10 characters...
What I enjoyed most was how LTC Nagl maintained control over the show, never letting his guard down.
John Stewart is almost never that nice to anybody he doesn't personally respect. I thought it was pretty apparent that John Stewart had also actually read the book and that is pretty darn rare.
Needless to say, the situation was tenuous at best. Stewart invited Nagl to discuss an extremely unfunny book on a comedy show. There is nothing inherently funny about COIN, killing, etc. John did a superb job of walking that fine line of keeping Stewart and the audience focused and interested without seeming either glib or boring. Then -- the 7.3% comment nailed it.
Be prepared to kill didn't need to resonate, it just needed to inject reality into the discussion of this very serious business of ours.
At his Global Guerrillas web log:
Quote:
... He does a great job. It was also effective in that it drove sales of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual to the top 100 on Amazon.
NOTE: Wow, the Petraeus information operations media machine is amazing (and this is a great example). Nod of respect, without the attachment of a value judgement, to the masterful way in which Petraeus has been able to influence the public's perception of this war.
SWJ Blog entry with additional links to others who blogged the interview. Also embeds the Comedy Central video vice the YouTube version.
Wow that ws a great interview and John did the Army proud ... he even has a sense of humor! :D
I swear I heard him say al Qa'ida is only 7% of the insurgency. Hmm, isn't that what you've been saying, Abu? Or does this just mean LTC Nagl is "part of the antiwar crowd" too? :rolleyes:
I'm glad SWC exists. I know where to come to find the truth.
10 characters
Yes, the IO machine is in high gear, but what's the message? An earlier phase of the plan, getting 3-24 into the NYT Review of Books was another brilliant step. That said, sooner or later someone needs to deliver the punch line. You can't lead the nation through a tortuous buildup, then tell them to connect the dots.
The enemy has no similar problem. When the president of Afghanistan complains more loudly about coalition-caused civilian casualties than he does about AQ/Taliban ruthlessness, we've lost the IO thread. When every Arab on the street (and most of liberal America) can recite the Abu Graib/Guantanamo mantra (see Tom Friedman editorial today), we've lost the IO thread.
Somebody help me with this.
How many of you guys participate on other political discussion boards? If you want to take advice from a rookie, that advice would be to get out there and get the message out there. I do a little bit, posting things I see here (with citation) on other boards I participate. The problem, however, with me doing this is no experience = no credibility.
That's because we still haven't mastered IO in relation to some of the specific mediums causing us the most damage. I don't think we've mastered dealing with al-Jazeera's version of "fair and balanced," we haven't mastered, or even really begun to deal with the 24/7 rampant rumor mill that is the Arab world, and we sometimes forget that it will always, at least in the near future, be politically expedient to blame the Americans for a problem, rather than themselves or local insurgents. Just like how in the US it will remain politically expedient to blame things on a misinterpretation, a miscommunication, or a Miss Lewinsky rather than actually take responsibility.
I know a lot of very smart people in the armed forces are working on this stuff, but I just don't see how anything we accomplish can change the strategic equation until we deal with these issues.
Sorry for getting waaaaaaaay off topic - I love the Daily Show, probably because I'm a little more to the left than most of you, and I loved this interview, especially LTC Nagl's great deadpan sense of humor.
Stewart was respectful and seemed impressed with Nagl, but his comments at the end, generic "looking out for the guys" stuff, betrayed his feelings about Iraq; namely, it sucks, we've screwed up, I don't want to hear anything more except a departure date."
Also, did anyone else sense that Stewart was making a major distinction between officers like Nagl (or any other officer) and "the guys," as though officers wall themselves in compounds and send the dead-ender young boys out to do the job?
I'm a pretty liberal kid and this is far and away the most infuriating attitude that many on the left have.
Along with the whole "why are you throwing away a Cornell education" question when I mention I'm applying for Marine PLC, of course. . .
Matt
Agreed on both counts.
A great loss for the army, there are too few officers who really understand the COIN fight.
It's time to move on (I convinced myself the very same 11 years ago). Do I look back ? Yep, nearly every day.
Colonel, time to relax, reflect and start lookin' for work...as your retirement was based on 1960s cost of living guesstimates with generous upgrades every decade or so :mad:
Best of luck in your future endeavors.
Respectfully, Stan
PS. Drag Racing is like free adrenaline and fun :p
I doubt we've seen the back of LTC Nagl - I have no doubt that whatever Administration takes power in 2009 that there will be an undersecretary or assistant secdef position waiting somewhere if he wants it.
I retired as just an old NCO, not a field grade O, but I certainly don't feel like I've been shortchanged financially by my retirement benefits. Hell, with most of us retiring in our 40's, to expect the government to pay us enough just to sit at home is just plain cussed greed that would end up bankrupting the country. (There's a lot of us old bastards) Anyone "retiring" at that age should expect to work - either a completely new career, or continue to drive along the same path in another sector.Quote:
Originally Posted by Stan
The exception to my POV on this, as I've stated before, is the lifetime support that this nation must provide to those who have truly sacrificed, and been wounded/injured in service to their country to a degree where they cannot work any longer. For those men and women we have to ensure that they are not scrabbling to make it from day to day.
For everyone else, its Darwin's law. A man can either use his 20+ years in the military wisely to lead up to a successful post-military life, or piss away opportunities and end up hard-scrabbling as a middle-aged civilian. Those individuals have noone to blame but themselves.
Yep, as did I retire as an NCO !
Concur, my GI Bill benefits are adequate (my comments were NOT completely a joke however).
Now, as for greed...sorry. We did not draft our contracts (bankrupting the USG), but I did agreed to it, and signed it...benefits or not.
Been on this 'new' career for 11 years, and perhaps not directly helping the common USA Joe, but I'm doin' my part so others can pass it along when I am too friggin old to compete.
Military Service directly translates into service with a team. Everything the US Military does is a team effort, start to finish, we take care of our own.
Yes you have some points there that I can agree with
support to veterans: absolutely
planning for retirement: absolutely if you get the opportunity
No in that retirement packages that reflect age 40 or so are not "greed driven" but reflect the wear and tear of military service. Using language that infers such plays into the hands of folks like Mr. Chu, who likes to dismiss disabilities as normal aging.
No in that when you cite Darwin's law for military retirees, just pause a minute and look at other agency retirement packages, especially those packages given to political appointees who make a limited time gate and draw benefiits.
Too many who make the cuts are too inclined to cut benefits (or fail to keep benefits competitive) while preserving their own. We have enough "friends" like that not to offer them free targets.
Tom
Get the opportunity? With a minimum of 20 years active service required to meet eligibility for retirement, the only thing stopping opportunity is the individual himself. "I didn't have a chance to plan" translates to personal fiscal irresponsibility. Especially these days, since the military now throws so many plans in the troops' faces on a continual basis. I came from nowhere and started with nothing, and have worked full-time since I was 14 just to survive - I don't have much sympathy for people who claim lack of opportunity.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Tom, I did not state that retirement packages were "greed driven". What I was trying to say was that I viewed a demand for the government to pay a 40-something (non-disabled) military retiree enough to permit him to sit on his ass all day long in front of the TV or in a fishing boat without a need to work for the next 40+ years of his life was greedy and parasitic. I think the basic retirement package is a pretty good deal, that just needs better tweaking to adjust for cost-of-living and inflation.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
And normal retirement and retiring with a disability are two very different things. Sure, I've lost some hearing, and have a bit of pain once in a while from an incident in service, but essentially I am much more healthy and fit than my civilian peers in the same age group. This despite, or because of, having spent much of my career in units that forced us to fall out of aircraft and hump loads over truly lovely terrain. Ultimately, having had a couple of my close friends and many people I've worked with over the years end up truly disabled, I would feel like an ugrateful parasite if I uttered a word about asking for additional "disability" for any minor complaint. Perhaps it is unfair of me to state my personal perception in a comprehensive manner that way.
Tom, the largesse drawn by certain types of political appointees is something that is a point of contention with a lot of people. Definitely unjustified - almost without exception. In a slightly smaller scale it equates to the almost obscene departure packages received by some execs from struggling companies - even when they are let go for incompetent leadership. In those cases corporate shareholders tend to make more noise than does the American public for those similar political packages that you are referring to. But when you compare (non-disability/medical) military retirement, and the age of that retirement with damn near any plan in the private sector, we are very lucky indeed. This isn't to say that we don't earn it, but I'm just not one to feel entitled to anything.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Anyway, in the end, I don't see where I said anything that should be construed as "offering a target" for cuts in benefits. I believe that I did state that military retirement is not something you can survive on with no other source of income. But I hold to the other half of that view in that I strongly believe that anyone with half a brain should be well enough set-up after 20 or more years in the military to do well in civilian life. The vast majority do. We damn sure should not have our benefits cut, and, as Stan implied, there should be a better system for keeping them in line with real inflation. But as a taxpayer I don't think I should fund someone to sit at home for the entire latter of half of their life in what would be essentially welfare. This would only increase the prevalence of those who squeeze through 20 years or more of personal fiscal irresponsibility by having the military look after him (like the CSM living above his means whose BC covers for bouncing checks), and then retire with a feeling of entitlement to everything the state will give him to continue a life of parasitic bliss.
My wife worked for Tricare for a couple of years and saw a lot of retirees. Her experience was that a lot of guys retired not realizing that SFC/MSG/SGM really doesn't mean a whole lot to employers in industries not dominated by the military. She saw a lot of guys who retired with some rank who found themselves doing menial jobs for a lot less money because they had no degree and a job that did not translate well to the civilian world. We do get some preparation for the civilian world but I still don't think a lot of guys realize how different it is.
SFC W
I had a retired airforce G1 and two retired 0-6's working for little ol' me at one time. We had fun. Both of my bosses were retired Army 0-6's. No issues and would hire or work for them in a second. My secretary was a retired Airforce E-9 and other than his proclivity to chase skirts (he had a child born from different women in every decade since the 60's) he was the best back up an executive in the telecom industry could have. I guess some military members have a hard time moving to the civillian world (my team was 8 military 135 civillians) but I haven't seen it. Now in the military contracting world... Let me tell you those retired officers can't figure out they are RETIRED...
I have a retired Army O-6 "working" with me right now, that I'd like to shoot in the head.
He still thinks he's an Army O-6 and does nothing but bitch, despite pulling down a decent paycheck, provided he does absolutely nothing.
I finally got around to reading "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife," (took me attending a foreign university to get a library that carried it) and after reading it, I wondered a lot about organizational culture and the inherent proclivity an institution may have for specific tasks, as opposed to institutional difficulties with others.
First, a quick aside - I know a lot of changing for the better is going on in the services, but when the guys who clearly articulate the changes (some radical, some not so much) that need to occur, like Hammes and Nagl, have joined the Cranes and Krepineviches of recent years in adding "(ret.)" to their surnames, it makes you wonder just how much effective change is going on. Anyway, back to my point.
The first post I made on SWC concerned the Army's reverting to the big war focus after Vietnam in all phases, from procurement (Abrams, Apache, Blackhawk, Bradley, MLRS) to doctrine (AirLand Battle) and scoffed at the idea that the services would do it again when commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan reduced - whenever that is. I was alarmed when Tom and others said they're worried by some of what they've seen and heard. I didn't really understand how this could be. After all, the Soviet threat doesn't exist, and a land war with the Chinese is unthinkable in the near future.
In "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife," Lt. Col. Nagl effectively described why the Army was not a proper learning institution and how it failed to conceptualize and execute an effective COIN strategy. Hammes in The Sling and the Stone recommended several ways in which the services need to change to be better suited to the pressures of adaptability and innovativeness that COIN and IW entail. Both touched on the point that the services, the Army in particular (given the Marine Corps' 19th and pre-WWII 20th century history) have an organizational self-image as the citizen army that fights wars of survival. Such wars, then, have typically been monstrous clashes of attrition won by "liberal use of firepower, even more liberally applied." Obviously we all understand that and how it applies to military thinking in the Civil War, the World Wars, Korea, etc.
But the more subtle result of that self-image is that the services expect the full weight of the nation behind them. Economic, political, social commitment. And while we talk about how political COIN is, or the need to use the oft-repeated "all aspects of national power," repeatedly clamoring for more commitment from the home front on numerous levels I believe to be an excellent indicator of why, as an institution, the services remain in ways ill-suited to COIN.
Nagl emphasized that a large part of the British success in Malaya was because the British Army and political apparatus recognized both the political nature of the struggle (and thus the associated requirements of limited and discriminate force, employment of troops in policing roles, etc.) which I think we have understood properly, at least now, in Iraq; and also the tradition of imperial soldiering and policing - that the troops on the ground would have to make do with limited resources and support from the home country. This "forced privation," I think it could be argued, help spur creative solutions and innovation that enabled success.
I understand that comparing Malaya to Iraq (or making the oft-repeated analogy to Vietnam) is fraught with discrepancies - controlling a country the size of California with its infrastructure and government destroyed is different from the work required in Malaya - but the point is this: How much time to we spend observing the failures of the American citizenry to be committed to the effort, or even know a thing about it? I am completely and totally guilty in this respect, often bemoaning my generation's failures to contribute to, or even be aware of, the conflicts today. Captain Hsia's articles on the SWJ blog are only the most recent examples of this attitude.
But I wonder, do we (again including myself as a hopeful future stakeholder) need to get this malady of "why isn't the rest of the country involved in this?" behind us to truly be institutionally prepared for what successful COIN entails? Does anyone else see how this cherished self-image of being the nation's savior during the darkest times, of American foreign policy being so messianic, can hurt our COIN abilities?
Or am I just way off base? Thoughts?
Regards,
Matt
This is why Nagl is pretty much ignored in the UK. The campaign in Malaya was founded on torture, assassination and mass punishment techniques, that were not acceptable at the time and would not be now. The whole "hearts and minds" gimmick was the cover story. Same in Kenya. We won using well disguised brutality.
When used in isolation, all the techniques applied in Malaya failed miserably in Vietnam, and all thanks to a self styled expert, called Robert Thompson.
Matt
Took me a while to come to grips with what you were really asking. :confused: Your title of Org Culture and National power threw me a bit, as I kept re-reading your post to figure out how you got from Org culture to National Power, and indeed where National Power had got to. So, as an aside, re at least military power (close to national power) see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton Uni Press, 2004; and Risa A Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds. Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, Staford University Press, 2007. These will not directly answer your actual question but will provide you with some food for fruitful thought.
You may be right that this is a ‘subtle’ result of the self image of the Army’s view of itself as fighting the nations wars. But its stems, I would argue, most immediately from Vietnam, as certainly having the support of the American populace was a something the Army (and the other services) believed was required as a lesson of Vietnam - to the point that there was an strong effort to institutionalize into the American political discourse about the use of force, by way to the Weinberger/Powell doctrine, the idea of such ‘ public support’ as being a core pre-requirement of fighting a war (any war) overseas (on this see: C.E. Dauber, ‘Implications Of the Weinberger Doctrine For American Military Intervention in a Post-Desert Storm Age’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3, Dec 2001, pp. 66-90; and Craig S. Cameron, ‘Two Front War: 1963-1988’, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, Lynn Rienner, 2002, pp. 119-138).Quote:
MattC86 posted:
But the more subtle result of that self-image is that the services expect the full weight of the nation behind them. Economic, political, social commitment.
I am not convinced that it may be an ‘excellent’ indicator of why the ‘services remain in ways ill-suited to COIN’. Certainly the Army (and USMC) have learned and are applying what they have learned in the field in Afghanistan and Iraq (I leave aside here any and all debate on whether they have learned all the right lessons and/or about are succeeding through the application of the lessons learned). And this in spite of the putative lack of public support (or so opinion polls indicate – though I have not seen the sort of antipathy manifest within the American public to the degree that was prevalent in the Vietnam era).Quote:
MattC86 posted:
And while we talk about how political COIN is, or the need to use the oft-repeated "all aspects of national power," repeatedly clamoring for more commitment from the home front on numerous levels I believe to be an excellent indicator of why, as an institution, the services remain in ways ill-suited to COIN.
Remember, service personnel returning from Vietnam were not only not hailed but actively shunned and worse, whereas after WWII (the ‘Good War’) and Gulf War I in 1991 returning personnel were hailed as heroes. So one way to view the lack of public support is that this means that the American public do not believe that Iraq (and Afghanistan?) is a ‘Good War’ (ie a war that the American people, whom the services serve, do not think is a war worth fighting for whatever reasons), and this can only raise questions about the value of the sacrifices being made in the name of the American people (to me, Cpt Hsia is pointing to a somewhat different, though related, issue). And if the American people do not think the sacrifices being made are worth the effort, then in the long term of COIN campaigns the services are likely to be forced to withdraw without achieving the desired ends, even though undefeated on the battlefield. I think what I am suggesting is that it may be an indicator of ‘why’ the services are reticent about COIN campaigns, rather than an indicator of why they are ‘ill-suited’ for COIN campaigns.
You also note that the Army’s ‘organizational self-image as ‘the citizen army that fights wars of survival.’, but the hard question is whether the Army is truly a ‘citizen’ army now that that is an all volunteer force?
I would also note that learning lessons through operational experience is not the same as institutionalizing the lessons. The Brits may be very good (or maybe it should be ‘may have been’) at learning from operational experience (ie Malaysia), that they are good at adapting, but to over generalize a bit, they had to constantly relearn those lessons from one campaign to the next as they did not institutionalize the lessons (so they made mistakes in the early phases of each subsequent campaign). Learinng lessons, or adpting, is very important in the context of ongoing operations, but the longer range issue is whether these lessons are subsequently institutionalized or, for a variety of reasons, including org culture reasons, just jettisoned as the service in question reverts to what it prefers or is most comfortable with. This, I think, is why many on this board (‘Tom and others’, as you say, and I would include myself in that group) question whether the Army, et al, will institutionalize the lessons learned or simply do a ‘system reboot’ once out of Iraq.
Maybe, but as even you only suggest that this is a ‘subtle’ implication, the changes really required are with respect to the core, fundamental characteristics of the Army’s (or AF, USMC, Navy) organizational culture, or self identity. With such major, hard to make changes, the subtle implications, which are likely third, fourth or farther out ramifications, may well shift to bring them in line with the major cultural changes successfully undertaken. So if the Army were to accept and internalize that fighting the nations wars included COIN as a core mission (and not as lesser included cases), then the rest likely would follow.Quote:
MattC86 posted:
I wonder, do we (again including myself as a hopeful future stakeholder) need to get this malady of "why isn't the rest of the country involved in this?" behind us to truly be institutionally prepared for what successful COIN entails?
And yes, a possible implication of this is that it 'may' be the case, in some cases at least, that insistence on needing the support of the American public may well simply be an argument used to justify not having to fight a form of war that it does not want to engage in for other reasons. :eek:
Hey Terry (Good to see your thoughts!)
(bold added by me)Quote:
You also note that the Army’s ‘organizational self-image as ‘the citizen army that fights wars of survival.’, but the hard question is whether the Army is truly a ‘citizen’ army now that that is an all volunteer force?
I'll have to chew on that one today - it has allot of potential implications. It might be worth developing what a change in self image could actually mean. "Historically", I don't guess we're that far removed from our former self (being "not" and all volunteer Army). We still have people with great influence (both positive & negative) whose experiences incorporate both. Some are mentors, some are educators, some are politicians, some are civilian leaders working in the departments. I point that out because it gets to the nature of change over time, the bureaucratic process (the super-tanker analogy), and the golden mean.
We're comparably comfortable about talking about where we want to be with regards to capabilities (maybe what we project outwards?), but I don't know that we've had a serious internal discussion about rationale for inward change of the type or scale you posit - or more importantly, what are the potential implications for charting that course. There is risk for inaction, and risk for action - identifying specific risks at a level of depth that uncovers risk in areas we were not intending to jeopardize is tough work, and I think takes time (I don't know how much time).
(bold and underlined added by me)Quote:
Maybe, but as even you only suggest that this is a ‘subtle’ implication, the changes really required are with respect to the core, fundamental characteristics of the Army’s (or AF, USMC, Navy) organizational culture, or self identity. With such major, hard to make changes, the subtle implications, which are likely third, fourth or farther out ramifications, may well shift to bring them in line with the major cultural changes successfully undertaken. So if the Army were to accept and internalize that fighting the nations wars included COIN as a core mission (and not as lesser included cases), then the rest likely would follow.
We should not see this in a vacuum from civilian policy, and how that policy enables risk in terms of pursuing change. We should also not be afraid to push back some, and identify for civilian leaders the risks - consider the road to "smaller, lighter, more efficient" land forces as an example of what happens when we focus on the way we'd like the operational environment to be without accounting for the way the operational environment is, and how its interactive nature produces friction and chance.
Some pieces of our "inner" self image are things like - "be relevant and ready", ""expeditionary capabilities with campaign qualities", "dominate land power", "agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders". This is a tall order of characteristics to live up to, but reflects the range of conditions in which the Army may be employed, and illustrates the challenges with meeting both mass based and technical based (I mean the broad meaning of technical such as skill sets and education) requirements.
I'm not sure that until (or if) the United States Government brings existing, (or new) capabilities up to a level that they can in practice fill those roles the military has been asked to, or has by default taken on as a policy instrument, that we can (or should?) shed the necessary dichotomy of having somewhat dual personalities. It may be that the nature of "warfare" (the means available and the ways in which they are used) has changed to such a degree it is now a condition, and as such, those forces generated, trained, equipped and maintained must reflect those conditions in order to achieve the political objective. For the immediate future, we must be full spectrum in body, spirit and mind. A tall order for sure.
Best, Rob
The relationship of organizational culture to the effectiveness of the military is a fascinating subject, and one that people who care about our military love to fret about.
The common complaint is that the Army (my own background, so I'll stick to that) is not structured as a 'learning organization' and it has strong bureaucratic checks on change. These are both true, but not necessarily bad.
I think we can safely say that the Army is structured as a 'training' (vice learning) organization. In other words, it is built to impart a certain set of skills to its members. Unlike a 'learning' organization, however, the chosen set of skills is selected in a top-down, bureaucratic manner. The danger is that a certain amount of inertia is built into this process and innovation from below is stifled. The benefit, however, is that if our leaders get it right, they can more easily wrench the organization onto the correct path. This is what happened after Vietnam, when an enlightened set of generals and a new set of institutions - the combat training centers and their unfriendly evaluation regime - shook us out of the doldrums and focused the Army on major conventional combat operations. Which was the right thing to do!
The threat from 1972 to 1991 - a generation - was existential and arose in the form of Soviet conventional armies and their clones. Thank God we forgot about unconventional warfare.
Unfortunately, the latest generation of leaders weren't wise enough to refocus us on what would turn out to be our future threats. They neither recognized the nature of our new set of wars, nor staked their professional reputations on recasting the training bureaucracy. Therefore we stumbled badly in Afghanistan and Iraq once they passed from their firepower intensive phases to their insurgent phases. But...the penalty here was relatively minor; certainly it doesn't compare with the penalty we will pay if we are not ready for the next contest against a peer or near-peer.
And, it illustrates a strength of our otherwise dysfunctional personnel systyem: the ability of our forces, by osmosis, to adapt and 'learn'. Years ahead of our training institutions, small units were learning how to fight small wars again. I think this is partly because we 'trickle-post' people, moving them individually between units. Over the course of a couple of years, these individuals spread the word and pass on lessons learned. This process can now be seen seeping into the senior ranks, and the institution is also beginning to respond. FM 3-24 is flawed, but that's almost beside the point. Graybeards may remember that the first cut at Air-Land Battle was crap, but it sparked and focused the debate - it officially signalled that the great oil tanker of the Army had finally settled onto a new course.
Finally, I agree that the Army is losing its moorings as an all-volunteer force. This is a bad thing in the long run - but in the short run it allows the US people to regard warfare as a reality show: engaging, sometimes tragic, but judged more for its entertainment value than for its effects on the lives of the participants. It allows people to be patriotic without the bother of actual sacrifice. This gives the institution greater freedom of maneuver so long as they can show results. American people don't mind casualties - they add spice to the news - but they can't stand stasis.
So, my point is that while the armed forces have structural flaws, the uniquely American nature of those institutions do have certain strengths that we abandon at our peril.
Thanks to all for clarifying the processes of my muddled mind . . .:eek:
Anyway, I think that while the Army of course is now an all-volunteer, "professional" force, it still operates with a bit of the citizen-army mentality. That's where things like Capt. Hsia's pieces (not an uncommon feeling from what I've heard in the services) come into play; by constantly asking where is the support from home - either in engagement of the citizenry, recruits, or commitment of non-military resources to the fight (what I meant by the national power remark) we are reinforcing an institutional bias, I think, towards the war of survival, and not the limited, "imperial policing" type of conflict.
Clearly my question was ill-phrased, and upon looking back, a bias against COIN in favor of the "big war" wasn't quite what I meant. More just a handicap in COIN, rather than anything to do with conventional conflict. Let me try again with a shorter, simpler version\:
Essentially, Nagl says (WFO's comments notwithstanding for the time being) that the British Army was successful because it proved to be an adaptable, innovative, and learning institution reinforced in part by a tradition of limited conflict where personnel in theater knew they were not the highest resource priority and would have to "make do."
This imperial policing tradition really does not exist in the US armed services, and as a result, do you think commanders and personnel are uncomfortable being in situations where they have very modest resources of manpower and materiel; limited domestic support for the mission, and equally modest goals for the operation - More like peacekeeping/stability ops than full fledged COIN e.g. Iraq, to link to Rob's excellent thread - and thus naturally less effective in these roles, even with the proper preparation and training?
The idea, I guess, is that if we're in the "long war" and will have a lot of limited commitments (far smaller than Iraq) in many different locations, the US will be doing a lot of imperial policing (I don't like the empire term, but that kind of sums up the operations) with limited resources. I think the services' background and self-image as the guarantor of the nation in wars of survival (even if we have accepted that COIN is a more likely operation at this point than conventional war) is an impediment to effectively operating with the aforementioned limited resources, support, etc, in that commanders will be more likely to require more and more resources rather than adjust their objectives and do what they can with what they have.
I really hope that doesn't sound like "stop whining for more support, suck it up," but I fear it does . . .
Regards,
Matt