Mechanization hurts COIN forces
Study co-written by Princeton and West Point scholars:
Quote:
Empirical evidence suggests that Great Powers and weak states alike are increasingly unable to wage successful counterinsurgency campaigns. We argue that this decline can be explained by rising levels of mechanization within state militaries. Unlike their earlier counterparts, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit the creation of information-gathering networks among local populations. Mechanized militaries therefore struggle to wield their power discriminately, pushing fence-sitters into the insurgency. We test this claim using a new dataset of 238 insurgencies (1800-2000) and a microlevel comparison of two U.S. Army Divisions in Iraq (2003-04). We find that mechanization is associated with a decreasing probability of incumbent victory; that regime- and power-based explanations only account for nineteenth century outcomes; and that oft-cited factors such as terrain or ethnolinguistic divisions are largely unconnected to outcomes in counterinsurgency warfare.
http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/Rage2.3.pdf
Competing factors at play.
Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...
Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:
Quote:
" 'Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail.' - General George C. Marshall."
Combined arms still needed
Most people recognized that sufficient mounted armor forces could have made a significant difference in the Blackhawk Down battle in Mogadishu.
We also know that dismounted forces are more effective at going into a neighborhood and protecting the people and also gathering intelligence on enemy activity.
It is also inarguable that we have a real advantage against the enemy when we can call in an air strike on on a sniper trying to pin down the dismounted troops.
I am not sure why there is an argument against the combined arms approach, Historically, it has been been pretty effective. We shouldn't be arguing about driving a vehicle with one of its wheels removed.
Light Infantry is willing to fight in squad sized elements
Mech, to include Strykers doesn't do that. Mech has to protect their vehicles and Rob misunderstood my earlier comment; yes, Mech can put out a substantial force (particularly the SBCTS) but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles. There is also a comfort factor, the Mech guys I've know were reluctant to get too far from their vehicles. That may not be the case with SBCTs but I suspect it is with the Bradley guys... :confused:
Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot... ;)
That's not to take anything away from the re-roled guys who are doing better than expected or anyone who's over there busting their hump.
I agree that the mounted mentality adversely impacted our efforts in Iraq early on; that and I'll also restate my earlier point that the right Commander will do his METT-T thing and do well regardless of background or type of unit involved and the wrong one will err regardless of what type units available.
Correlation is not causality
This reminds me of a study that concluded that homes with more books in them tend to have children who are better readers. One should not conclude from that study that if you drop your entire paycheck at Barnes & Noble that your 6-year-old will be reading at the 12th grade level. It was not the presence of the books that made the kids better readers. The parents thought that reading was worthwhile and that good reading skills were important, so they owned lots of books. The children inherited the values of their parents. They thought that reading was enjoyable and important and put forth more effort to become better readers.
Likewise, there is a root cause to mechanization that correlates with a reluctance to do necessary dismounted work, but this does not imply a causal relationship. I would assert that militaries become more mechanized only after their country has modernized. An increase in modernization correlates with less tolerance for casualties in the so-called “middle wars” that include COIN. Less tolerance for casualties leads a military to reduce exposure to enemy actions by placing more armor between the Soldier and the enemy, as in Iraq, or to neglect the armor protection and then retreat in short order after fatalities hit double-digits, as in Mogadishu.
It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.
It's a good thing they're not yet extinct.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
In all the aspects you cited.
...That from the resident dinosaur... :cool:
Schmedlap is completely, utterly correct. Just as modernization drives mechanization, modernization drives imbecilization. Excellent post.:D
And I know this to be certified true because the wise old dinosaur sayeth it is so.;)
Maybe it will only make the tactics we choose to employ
more safe to do so. The amount of battlespace assigned dictates that even the smallest patrol will have to transit large areas – they may be going somewhere to link up with ISF to do dismounted patrols, they may be responding to an incident, they may be delivering aid or logistics, they may doing anyone of the myriad of things they do everyday that require vehicular movement.
This means the enemy will employ IEDs (of all flavors) against our folks while they move to do those things. IEDs are a feature of the modern battlefield, but all IED are not EFPs – the technology required to produce and employ EFPs to good effect is more technical then those of regular IEDs – this is why every IED is not an EFP, and one of the reasons why Iran’s technical assistance is such an issue. However, big IEDs – big enough to kill from the shock effect of killing and wounding those inside an 1114/1151 is more common and real – think of a marble inside a beer can. Now imagine if that marble is hollow and has soft, spongy brain matter inside it. That is where we have so many MTBI (mild traumatic brain injuries) from. However, mild is a misnomer – some things will not manifest themselves for years, some are up front and center. MRAP’s design deflects some of that blast and lessons the chance of MTBI. I’ve had several friends killed from such big IEDs while riding in 1114s/1151s and others seriously injured by big IEDs – their trucks where picked up – their bodies pushed up inside the truck and slammed against the ceiling with incredible force – their necks broken, their bodies hurled from a turret, their skulls smashed inside their ACH (advanced combat helmets). Think of torpedo detonating under a ship.
I’ve also watched EOD survive massive IEDs because their MRAP type vehicles deflected most of the blast – you can only covertly employ so much explosive. Now which one combined with good tactics will mitigate the enemies weapons while allowing us the flexibility to go after the networks? I don’t like reliance on technology – but I do like having good tech to be there when I need it. It is one of our strong points that allows us to conduct our “away games”.
The Traditional Infantry Division
I really can't help but wonder if COIN wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been a little easier to wage if the bulk of the (combat) force structures in both countries were not made up mainly (not entirely) of good old-fashioned Infantry Divisions, the type that the Army got rid of several years ago favour of Light Infantry Divisions and now Stryker Brigades.
The old Infantry Divisions of course had the standard three brigades, nine battalions, da-da-da of Infantry, Div Arty, an Engineer Bn, et al, and a ready-made heavy-armour mechanized force for dealing with the more intense situations based upon a Tank Battalion and a unit of APCs sufficient to mechanize an entire Infantry Battalion. Not to mention, the regular infantry battalions had their own full scales of organic wheeled transport to get them where they needed to go (useful in areas where MBTs and APCs might provoke the locals or the terrain isn't really right for heavy stuff) and they can get around fairly fast. Moreover, the old Infantry Divisions only required about half of the logistical base of an Armoured or Mech Div.
It just seems that, looking back over the arguments on this thread, that the best Formation for most of the needs in Iraq could best be handled by regular Infantry Divisions. The old standard Infantry Divisions gave you a full complement of infantry, organic wheeled transport, and equipment, plus a modest but organic heavy armour and mech infantry capability that didn't have to be begged, borrowed, or stolen from another Brigade or Division and whose guys might not be familiar with your way of fighting (like when Armor units are attached to Airborne or Light Infantry formations), but already know how you operate.
It's probably too late now to re-organize Light Infantry Divisions and Stryker Brigades into regular Infantry Formations for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. But given that Light units as far back as Mogadishu (15 years ago now) needed what a regular Infantry Brigade (with organic tank company and mech infantry company) could provide that a Light Infantry Brigade couldn't, and that much the same sort of thing is needed right now in Afghanistan and Iraq, maybe the Army would be rather better served in the future by regular Infantry Divisions in anything that didn't require mainly either Armoured Divisions or Airborne/Air Assault Divisions. Infantry Brigades and Divisions are a lot easier to switch back-and-forth between low-intensity and medium- or even high-intensity (purely defensive/holding ground role in the latter case) roles. Just a thought or two.
It Doesn't Matter Now....
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Norfolk
I really can't help but wonder if COIN wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been a little easier to wage if the bulk of the (combat) force structures in both countries were not made up mainly (not entirely) of good old-fashioned Infantry Divisions, the type that the Army got rid of several years ago favour of Light Infantry Divisions and now Stryker Brigades.
The old Infantry Divisions of course had the standard three brigades, nine battalions, da-da-da of Infantry, Div Arty, an Engineer Bn, et al, and a ready-made heavy-armour mechanized force for dealing with the more intense situations based upon a Tank Battalion and a unit of APCs sufficient to mechanize an entire Infantry Battalion. Not to mention, the regular infantry battalions had their own full scales of organic wheeled transport to get them where they needed to go (useful in areas where MBTs and APCs might provoke the locals or the terrain isn't really right for heavy stuff) and they can get around fairly fast. Moreover, the old Infantry Divisions only required about half of the logistical base of an Armoured or Mech Div.
It just seems that, looking back over the arguments on this thread, that the best Formation for most of the needs in Iraq could best be handled by regular Infantry Divisions. The old standard Infantry Divisions gave you a full complement of infantry, organic wheeled transport, and equipment, plus a modest but organic heavy armour and mech infantry capability that didn't have to be begged, borrowed, or stolen from another Brigade or Division and whose guys might not be familiar with your way of fighting (like when Armor units are attached to Airborne or Light Infantry formations), but already know how you operate.
It's probably too late now to re-organize Light Infantry Divisions and Stryker Brigades into regular Infantry Formations for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. But given that Light units as far back as Mogadishu (15 years ago now) needed what a regular Infantry Brigade (with organic tank company and mech infantry company) could provide that a Light Infantry Brigade couldn't, and that much the same sort of thing is needed right now in Afghanistan and Iraq, maybe the Army would be rather better served in the future by regular Infantry Divisions in anything that didn't require mainly either Armoured Divisions or Airborne/Air Assault Divisions. Infantry Brigades and Divisions are a lot easier to switch back-and-forth between low-intensity and medium- or even high-intensity (purely defensive/holding ground role in the latter case) roles. Just a thought or two.
Since the Army decided a few years back that the cornerstone entity is the BCT, the title of the Division means very little. You're either and HBCT, SBCT, or IBCT. Whether you're in an Armored Division or a Mech Infantry Division, you look the same now. Strykers all look the same in terms of task org.
You could accomplish the same thing by returning all three cavalry regiments to corps control, making them all look like 3 ACR, giving the cav back their Kiowas, and bolstering their dismount capablility with either additional scouts within the scout platoons or 1x additional light infantry company in each squadron.