The overlooked, underrated, and forgotten ...

... small wars, of course! My own list is below, but what are yours? What insights and knowledge can we gain from the experiences of insurgents and counterinsurgents in these unjustifiably overlooked wars?

My top ten, in no particular order, restricted to the gunpowder age:

The Rif War (1911-1927)
Egypt in Yemen (1962-1967)
Syria in Lebanon (1976-1990)
Sri Lankan civil war (1983-present)
Haitian Revolution (1791-1804)
Vendee Revolt (1793-1796)
Second Chechen War (1999-present)
Ukrainian/Makhnovist insurgency (1917-1921)
Mozambican war of independence (1964-1975)
Indonesian war of independence (1945-1950)

alot -
Afghanistan I Civil War: Mujahideen, Taliban 1978 2001

Algeria I War of Independence 1954 1962

Algeria II Opposition to Bella 1963 1963

Algeria III Fundamentalists 1992 .

Angola I War of Independence 1961 1974

Angola IIa Angolan Civil War 1975 1994

Angola IIb UNITA Warfare 1998 2002

Argentina Coup 1955 1955

Azerbaijan/USSR Nagorno-Karabakh 1988 1994

Bangladesh Chittagong Hill 1972 1997

Bolivia I Popular Revolt 1946 1946

Bolivia II Bolivian Revolution 1952 1952

Brazzaville Ia Elections 1993 1993

Brazzaville Ib Factional Warfare 1997 1997

Burma I Communist Revolt 1948 1989

Burma II Karens 1948 .

Burma III Shan 1959 .

Burma IV Kachins 1960 1994

Burundi Ia Hutu Coup Attempt 1965 1965

Burundi Ib Hutu Rebellion 1972 1972

Burundi Ic Hutu/Tutsi 1988 1988

Burundi Id Hutu/Tutsi 1991 1991

Burundi Ie Hutu/Tutsi 1993 2003

Cambodia Ia Khmer Rouge 1970 1975

Cambodia Ib Viet Intervention 1978 1991

Cameroon War of Independence 1955 1960

Chad FROLINAT 1965 1997

Chile Army Revolt 1973 1973

China I Com Rev: Final Phase 1945 1949

China III Cultural Revolution 1966 1969

China IIa Tibet 1950 1951

China IIb Tibet 1954 1959

Colombia I La Violencia 1948 1958

Colombia II FARC 1964 .

Costa Rica Civil War 1948 1948

Cuba Cuban Revolution 1956 1959

Cyprus Ia Greek/Turk Clashes 1963 1964

Cyprus Ib Coup/Turk Invasion 1974 1974

Domin Republic Dominican Civil War 1965 1966

Egypt Free Officers' Coup 1952 1952

El Salvador FMLN/FDR 1979 1992

Ethiopia I Eritrea 1961 1993

Ethiopia II Tigray 1975 1991

Ethiopia III Ogaden 1977 1978

Georgia I South Ossetia 1990 1992

Georgia II Abkhazia 1992 1993

Greece Greek Civil War 1944 1949

Guatemala I Coup 1954 1954

Guatemala II Guatemalan Civil War 1960 1996

GuineaBissau I War of Independence 1963 1974

GuineaBissau II Coup 1998 1999

India II Hyderabad 1948 1948

India III Naga Revolt 1956 1997

India IV Sikh Insurrection 1982 1993

India Ia Part/Kash/In-Pak War 1946 1949

India Ib Kashmir 1965 1965

India Ic Kashmir 1988 .

Indonesia I War of Independence 1945 1949

Indonesia III Acheh Revolt 1953 1959

Indonesia IV PRRI Revolt 1958 1961

Indonesia V PKI Coup Attempt 1965 1966

Indonesia VI East Timor 1975 1999

Iran I Kurds/Mahabad 1946 1946

Iran IIa Iranian Revolution 1978 1979

Iran IIb NCR/Mojahedin 1981 1982

Iraq I Army Revolt 1958 1958

Iraq II Mosul Revolt 1959 1959

Iraq IIIa Kurds 1961 1970

Iraq IIIb Kurds 1974 1975

Iraq IIIc Kurds 1980 1991

Iraq IV Shi'ite Insurrection 1991 1993

Israel/Palest Unrest/War of Indep 1945 1949

Jordan Palestinians 1970 1971

Kenya I Mau Mau 1952 1956

Korea Korean War 1950 1953

Laos Pathet Lao 1959 1973

Lebanon Ia First Civil War 1958 1958

Lebanon Ib Second Leb Civ War 1975 1990

Liberia NPFL 1989 1997

Madagascar MDRM/Independence 1947 1948

Malaysia Malayan Emergency 1948 1960

Moldova Trans-Dniester Slavs 1991 1997

Morocco I War of Independence 1952 1956

Morocco II Western Sahara 1975 1991

Mozambique I War of Independence 1964 1975

Mozambique II RENAMO 1976 1992

Namibia War of Independence 1966 1990

Nicaragua Rev/Contra Insurgen 1978 1990

Nigeria I Biafra 1967 1970

Nigeria II Maitatsine 1980 1984

Pakistan I Bangladesh 1971 1971

Pakistan II Baluchi Rebellion 1973 1977

Paraguay Coup Attempt 1947 1947

Peru Shining Path 1980 1999

Philippines I Huks 1946 1954

Philippines II NPA Insurgency 1969 .

Philippines IIIa Moro Rebellion 1972 1996

Philippines IIIb Moro Rebellion 2000 .

Romania Romanian Revolution 1989 1989

Russia Ia First Chechen War 1994 1996

Russia Ib Second Chechen War 1999 .

Rwanda Ia First Tutsi Invasion 1963 1964

Rwanda Ib Tutsi Invasion/Genoc 1990 1994

Sierra Leone RUF 1991 2002

Somalia Clan Warfare 1988 .

South Africa Bl/Whit, Bl/Bl 1983 1994

South Korea Yosu Sunch'on Revolt 1948 1948

Sri Lanka II Tamil Insurgency 1983 .

Sri Lanka Ia JVP I 1971 1971

Sri Lanka Ib JVP II 1987 1989

Sudan Ia Anya Nya 1955 1972

Sudan Ib SPLM 1983 2005

Syria Sunni v. Alawites 1979 1982

Tajikistan Tajik Civil War 1992 1997

Tunisia War of Independence 1952 1956

Turkey Kurds 1984 .

USSR I Ukraine 1942 1950

USSR II Lithuania 1944 1952

Uganda I Buganda 1966 1966

Uganda II War in the Bush 1980 1986

Vietnam I French-Indochina War 1946 1954

Vietnam II Vietnam War 1957 1975

Yemen Southern Revolt 1994 1994

Yemen North I Coup 1948 1948

Yemen North II N. Yemeni Civil War 1962 1970

Yemen South S. Yemeni Civil War 1986 1986

Yugoslavia I Croatian Secession 1991 1995

Yugoslavia II Bosnian Civil War 1992 1995

Yugoslavia III Kosovo 1998 1999

Zaire/Congo I Katanga/Stanleyville 1960 1965

Zaire/Congo II Post-Mobutu 1996 .

Zimbabwe Front for Lib of Zim 1972 1979

The Hukbalahap war in the Philippines is a huge one. It should be one of the great examples of how to do COIN properly, but it's relegated to the margins because Malaya was roughly contemporaneous and made a bigger splash.

Not in priority:

Indonesian Confrontation - campaign in Borneo (1960's)

Dhofar Province, Oman (1965-1975 note Oman, helped by Iran and UK)

Imperial campaigning along North West Frontier (till 1947)

Rhodesia / Zimbabwe War (1966-1979)

Post-1947 campaigns in India (little known and still current)

davidbfpo

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Originally Posted by tequila

... small wars, of course! My own list is below, but what are yours? What insights and knowledge can we gain from the experiences of insurgents and counterinsurgents in these unjustifiably overlooked wars?

My top ten, in no particular order, restricted to the gunpowder age:

Syria in Lebanon (1976-1990)

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In summary, the lessons:

1. Stay there a long time (at least a quarter century).
   
2. Switch (local) sides often. Arm everyone at one time or another.
   
3. Shell population centers to signal displeasure. Enforce curfews with summary executions.
   
4. Stultify domestic political discourse with heavy secret police presence.
   
5. Assassinate recalcitrant political leaders (Junblat), but not too many (Hariri) or it all backfires.
   
6. Allow your officer corps to enrich themselves by facilitating drug and trade smuggling--it keeps them happy, offsets low military wages, pleases local farmers too, and really keeps electronics prices low in Damascus.
   
7. Risk/threaten to restart civil war if policy goes wrong.

As successful as Syrian stabilization operations were in their day, I vote we don't copy this one!

Katangese Secession in early post-independence Congo? Great mercenary stories from that one, and it definitely has had long-term impact on that part of the world.

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Originally Posted by charter6

Katangese Secession in early post-independence Congo? Great mercenary stories from that one, and it definitely has had long-term impact on that part of the world.

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Yep. Good friend of mine, now deceased, helped plan and execute it with Tshombe. And then repeated the act in 1964. that would be Fred Vandewalle, Tam Tam #1. le Tam Tam was the newsletter he used to send out to all of those old Congo hands. His book, L'Ommengang on the Simba rebellion is excellent if you can read French and find a copy.

Egads, I had this as a question on a midterm this semester. I would have given a tooth for this list about a week ago.

Tom, the big secret I'd give an arm and a leg to find out more about is the Tshombe 1968 rescue rumor -- that a bunch of mercenaries rescued him somehow and brought him to Rhodesia, although he died shortly thereafter.

I think it became the basis for the movie "The Wild Geese", which is one of those classic late '70s action flicks.

I remember the flick. It was big in the skydiving community at Ft Bragg. As for a rescue, I just don't know. Certainly is possible although I always found the actual mercs were of much lesser quality than protrayed by film or Mike Hoare. Makes great myth and film. But for the guys like Fred VdW or DV Rattan who were with these guys up close; they were very much a mixed bag.

Best

Tom

Just a couple to add to it;

The Lower Canada Rebellion 1837
The Red River Rebellion 1869-70
The Metis or North-West Rebellion 1885

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Originally Posted by charter6

The Hukbalahap war in the Philippines is a huge one. It should be one of the great examples of how to do COIN properly, but it's relegated to the margins because Malaya was roughly contemporaneous and made a bigger splash.

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That's were Edward Lansdale earned his status COIN expert and propelled him to Vietnam.

I just read Edward Lansdale's Cold War:Culture, Politics, and the Cold War by Jonathan Nashel. It's interesting becuase it talks a bit about all the ways Lansdale is remembered and all the ways his legacy is used by different communities.

Also what about King Philip's War? I believe that was the bloodiest conflict per capita ever fought on North America.

Also the so-called "Indian Wars" of US history

Pequot War (1635-1637)
King William's War (1689–1697)
Queen Anne's War (1702–1713)
Chickamauga Wars (1776–1794)
NW Ordinance War (1787-1795)
Sullivan's Expedition (1779)
"Tecumseh's Wars"
a. First Creek War (1813-1814),
b.First Seminole War (1818-1819)
Black Hawk War of (1832
Second Creek War (1836)
Second Seminole War (1835–1842)
The Cherokee War (1838-1839)
Great Raid of 1840
Antelope Hills Expedition (1858)
Red River War (1874–1875)
Puget Sound War (1855–1856)
Dakota War of 1862 (1862)
Colorado War (1863–1865)
Red Cloud's War (1866–1868)
Comanche Campaign (1868–1874)
Black Hills War (1876–1877)
Nez Perce War (1877)
Pine Ridge Campaign (1890)

I think these wars are especially important for Americans to consider today. If the begining of the UK and France's COIN experience was in their colonial, then the American equivalent for Americans in, frankly, the conquest of the Native of American tribes. 26 of 30 US Generals who served in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902 served in the final "Indian Wars."

John Nagl, in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, talks about how the US fought some many for these wars but American generals, wanting to feel like equals to European Generals, still emphasized standard main force tactics and didn't really codify much in the way of any foundational and uniquely American COIN doctrines. Still the histories of these wars are interesting and overlooked.

Yes, I should have mentioned Louis Riel, every bit the equal of Sitting Bull in his oratory skills and ability to cross cultural barriers with a message - he remains a hero to the Metis, at least up in N Dak that I'm aware of anyway and no doubt many First Nation folks up there hold him in high esteem as well

One of the things that's been troubling me in many of the analyses of various COIN ops is "desired endstate".

Many of the TTP proffered by various COIN experts of the past are applicable when the endstate is permanent (or relative permanent) administration, but not when you're trying to establish an independent entity capable of governing itself and not bothering its neighbors.

Indian Wars TTP quite often worked because the future of the various tribes was irrelanent to the endstate. Eventually, "real 'merkins" were going to dominate all of the natives and totally subjugate them permanently. For colonial powers, the endstate was similar, even if not so extreme -- UK, France, NL intended to administer colonial areas indefinitely, so their relationship to the indigenous populations and their development of enduring institutions was different than it was in, say, Malaya, where the intent to grant independence was declared relatively early on.

This is also one of the critiques I have for LTC Campbell's excellent paper on Making Riflemen from Mud. What works in situations where you want to leave may be different from those situations where you want to stay.

Sorry for the ramble.

Hope this makes sense.

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Originally Posted by relative autonomy

I think these wars are especially important for Americans to consider today. If the begining of the UK and France's COIN experience was in their colonial, then the American equivalent for Americans in, frankly, the conquest of the Native of American tribes. 26 of 30 US Generals who served in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902 served in the final "Indian Wars."

John Nagl, in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, talks about how the US fought some many for these wars but American generals, wanting to feel like equals to European Generals, still emphasized standard main force tactics and didn't really codify much in the way of any foundational and uniquely American COIN doctrines. Still the histories of these wars are interesting and overlooked.

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I quite agree, in particular with respect to the postwar Indian campaigns. It's interesting to look at the differences between campaigns before and after the Civil War...especially in terms of how much needed to be relearned.

Hi Old Eagle,

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Originally Posted by Old Eagle

One of the things that's been troubling me in many of the analyses of various COIN ops is "desired endstate".

Many of the TTP proffered by various COIN experts of the past are applicable when the endstate is permanent (or relative permanent) administration, but not when you're trying to establish an independent entity capable of governing itself and not bothering its neighbors.

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I think you have hit upon a really cogent point, and one that has been bothering me for some time. The only analogs I have been able to come up with either failed (e.g. the Spanish Civil War, the Russian Civil War) or were cases of propping up or creating "puppet states" (e.g. various Roman campaigns, various British East India company campaigns). About the only other examples I can think of that might be analogs involved the replacement of a current regime with a legitimate, but displaced, local regime (e.g. Spain during the Napoleonic Wars).

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Originally Posted by marct

Hi Old Eagle,



I think you have hit upon a really cogent point, and one that has been bothering me for some time.

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Me too, but when I hear "Officers who wish to remain anonymous are suggesting that democracy may not work in Iraq," I suspect that the COIN experts have figured out there's a reason why it hasn't been done before.

Hi RA,

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Originally Posted by Rank amateur

Me too, but when I hear "Officers who wish to remain anonymous are suggesting that democracy may not work in Iraq," I suspect that the COIN experts have figured out there's a reason why it hasn't been done before.

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"Democracy is a wonderful thing or will be once we have someone in power who will tell us how to make it work" (paraphrase - anonymous Russian taxi driver to Robert Heinlein).

I really think it is important to separate out the process from the form since the deal with related, but different, cultural factors. Insisting on a "democracy", and a particular form of it at that, was, IMO, one of the greatest blunders in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In my mind, a lot of it comes down to concepts of "legitimacy", which is a slippery cultural perception.

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I really think it is important to separate out the process from the form since the deal with related, but different, cultural factors. Insisting on a "democracy", and a particular form of it at that, was, IMO, one of the greatest blunders in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In my mind, a lot of it comes down to concepts of "legitimacy", which is a slippery cultural perception.

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Could one really call the "democracies" in question a genuine "blunder" when the Afghan government still retains legitimacy throughout the country and the current Iraqi government in its present form was never the intended result of U.S. policy, but rather one they were forced into by the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and which came about through a series of negotiations between Sistani, the U.N., as well as the U.S.?

Hi Tequila,

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Originally Posted by tequila

Could one really call the "democracies" in question a genuine "blunder" when the Afghan government still retains legitimacy throughout the country and the current Iraqi government in its present form was never the intended result of U.S. policy, but rather one they were forced into by the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and which came about through a series of negotiations between Sistani, the U.N., as well as the U.S.?

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I suppose it depends on how you define "blunder". I tend to use it in a way that is similar to "prat fall" - an embarrassing, and stupid, but not fatal action / event. US policy demanded a "democracy" of the republican form, something that caused a lot of problems in the 2003 Loya Jirga in Kabul when there was a legitimate government in exile. By forcing the royal family out of the equation (to a large degree), this served to reduce the overall legitimacy of the Karzai government, although that seems to be correcting itself over time. A parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy could have been easily established with quite a large reservoir of legitimacy since it was already part of the cultural matrix.

In Iraq, things were quite different, including the sources of legitimacy. The current form may not have been the intent of US policy, but that is, really, an "I didn't know it was loaded!" type of argument. We've had a lot of discussions on what went wrong, so I'm not going to rehash them, but I will point out that in order to make any democracy, regardless of its form, work, it really does require both cultural and structural legitimacy and, if you are going to try and build that de novo, it takes quite a while.

Marc

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Originally Posted by tequila

Could one really call the "democracies" in question a genuine "blunder" when the Afghan government still retains legitimacy throughout the country and the current Iraqi government in its present form was never the intended result of U.S. policy, but rather one they were forced into by the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and which came about through a series of negotiations between Sistani, the U.N., as well as the U.S.?

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Good point, tequila. It might be added that in both cases some effort at democratic politics was inevitable as soon as intervention took place, given both international and local expectations (especially in Iraq).

It also has to be said that we really don't yet have a good idea (despite all the political science energy that we put into this) as to when democracy will function, and when it won't .

Why didn't India--with its lack of democratic experience, extreme poverty, many ethnic, religious, and caste tensions (arguably the most of any country), and the extreme violence of partition--collapse into chaos and authoritarianism after 1947, the way most post-colonial countries did?

How has Mozambique sustained democracy since 1992, despite having experienced bitter anti-colonial (1962-75) and civil (1975-92) war that left left almost a million people dead through its direct and indirect consequences?

I think it's arguable that India was in fact a "real" democracy, as opposed to just having democratic form, at least until the end of Indira's emergency. Congress party exercised so much patronage power and had such an iron hold on politics at so many levels. A non-Congress Prime Minister doesn't get elected until 1977 after Indira had declared emergency and engaged in, amongst other gross offenses, a forced sterilization campaign.

I know I'm going to get jumped on here, but I think that basically India's form of government in the first three decades of its independence was essentially that of a one-party authoritarian state, not a real democracy.

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Originally Posted by charter6

I think it's arguable that India was in fact a "real" democracy, as opposed to just having democratic form, at least until the end of Indira's emergency. Congress party exercised so much patronage power and had such an iron hold on politics at so many levels. A non-Congress Prime Minister doesn't get elected until 1977[]

I know I'm going to get jumped on here, but I think that basically India's form of government in the first three decades of its independence was essentially that of a one-party authoritarian state, not a real democracy.

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I find myself rather inclined to agree with you with here, charter6. The Congress Party did have "extra-parliamentary" means available to it that were not necessarily as available to other parties, even the BJP. However, I would add the vital qualifier here that what was perhaps at least as important was a "dynastic" element to the appeal of the Congress Party.

In many countries, "royalty" has a sort of natural appeal to many people, combining as may an image of a strong, established leadership that will look after the people through a parent-child relationship of sorts. "Royalty" has an organic, rather than an abstract, appeal, as it mirrors in a manner the natural family order; the "Royal" holds the role of Father/Mother of his/her people, and they are his/her children after a fashion. Many people may not understand other forms of government, but practically everyone readily grasps Monarchy. And just as inheritance is the most common formal system of succession in monarchy, reflecting as it does the passage of generations within the family, people may be inclined to cling to the hereditary successors of someone whom they admire - thus the "dynastic" appeal of the Congress Party so long as a Gandhi was at or near the helm.

Even in the U.S., the Kennedy family is still very much considered to be its natural "royal dynasty" so to speak, and many Kennedys have entered politics aided in no small part by virtue of their belonging to that family. Even in the American Republic, "Royalism" has a strong, natural appeal. It is certainly no different in India, amongst many other countries.

At the very least, the role of the "Gandhi Dynasty" may have gone a long way to preventing India from utterly disintegrating or falling into outright dictatorship. The Hashemites do not enjoy such a position in Iraq. It is difficult to even conceive of any Iraqi analogue that even begins to approach a sort of "Royal Dynasty" in modern times.

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Originally Posted by Old Eagle

One of the things that's been troubling me in many of the analyses of various COIN ops is "desired endstate".

Many of the TTP proffered by various COIN experts of the past are applicable when the endstate is permanent (or relative permanent) administration, but not when you're trying to establish an independent entity capable of governing itself and not bothering its neighbors.

Indian Wars TTP quite often worked because the future of the various tribes was irrelanent to the endstate. Eventually, "real 'merkins" were going to dominate all of the natives and totally subjugate them permanently. For colonial powers, the endstate was similar, even if not so extreme -- UK, France, NL intended to administer colonial areas indefinitely, so their relationship to the indigenous populations and their development of enduring institutions was different than it was in, say, Malaya, where the intent to grant independence was declared relatively early on.

This is also one of the critiques I have for LTC Campbell's excellent paper on Making Riflemen from Mud. What works in situations where you want to leave may be different from those situations where you want to stay.

Sorry for the ramble.

Hope this makes sense.

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U.S. Scales Back Political Goals for Iraqi Unity

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Originally Posted by New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 — With American military successes outpacing political gains in Iraq, the Bush administration has lowered its expectation of quickly achieving major steps toward unifying the country, including passage of a long-stymied plan to share oil revenues and holding regional elections.

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Like I said, I believe that the end goals are being changed to something that is achievable according to COIN doctrine.

Thank you realtive autonomy! I have long argued that the so-called "Indian Wars" offer excellent case studies to better understand what the US and her allies face today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

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Originally Posted by Griz882

Thank you realtive autonomy! I have long argued that the so-called "Indian Wars" offer excellent case studies to better understand what the US and her allies face today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

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...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I don't doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model ;)

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I doubt doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model ;)

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http://www.nps.gov/archive/foda/Fort...ret%20Peak.jpg

Anybody remember this guy?

Steve Blair should be along in a few moments to deconstruct the Crook myth. :D

I'll tell you a major difference between the Pashtun and the Apache - there are millions of Pashtun and they are not just marginalized, uneducated tribal warriors in the FATA and the tribal areas.

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Originally Posted by tequila

I'll tell you a major difference between the Pashtun and the Apache - there are millions of Pashtun and they are not just marginalized, uneducated tribal warriors in the FATA and the tribal areas.

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Add in their strategic position and the fact that everyone with an interest in the area has tossed technology at them, which hey have integrated and made their own, a 2500+ year history, and a feuding tradition that makes the Scots of old look like a bunch of pacifists....

I suspect that there are really only two Indian wars that come even close: the ongoing alliances fights with the Iroquois Confederacy, and the fights with the Cherokee (and allies). Even then, you have to consider the relative demographic pressures.

Understanding Bleeding Kansas and the underlying conditions that brought it about in the mid 1850s can be instructive for a clear understanding of Iraq today.

American political leaders in the Compromise of 1850 believed that they had staved off a complete sectional breakdown, and thought that that compromise might produce existential cooperation between the north and south. A few years later when Stephen Douglas crafted the Kansas/Nebraska Act he was hoping to do the same. The idea that if you can just get the western lands organized into territories and then into states that economic and social development that would come about would further the "hard-wiring" between the north and south and bring the two close together.

Yet both of these compromises did not solve the underlying political and social problem of the day: slavery and more specifically in the 1850s what to do with slavery in the territories, or white freedom versus black freedom. Douglas's Kansas/Nebraska Act of 1854, although designed to compromise, brought about a small civil war between southern proponents of slavery in the territories and northern proponents of the territories being completely free of slave labor. The end result was a violent confrontation in Kansas from about 1855 to 1858 over whether or not slaves should be allowed into Kansas. The underlying political problem of the day, as a prelude to the American Civil War, was fought through violence and death on the rolling hills of east Kansas. Ultimately the issue of slavery in America would be decided not by compromise but by the American Civil War.

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

Hi Gian,

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

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Good example, and there certainly does seem to be an analog. I'm hesitant about how to extend it to Iraq, however. In the period you are talking about, there are significant demographic and economic differences between the North and the South. Slavery, qua slavery, was more of a hot button, rhetorical and emotional issue than a causus belli, and the real root was in the differences in productive and distributive economic systems (and their products)l a difference between two modes of production to use the Marxist term.

How does this play out in Iraq? Well, there is a rough analog between oil production and the Southern Agrarian economy (the analog shows up in the Lorenz curve but not in the technical production skills of the workers or in the numbers required). This type of economy, a resource export economy, is a tricky one to diversify even when you have quite a few resources that are in demand (look at the Canadian economy as an example). With Iraq mainly operating on oil revenues, what are they going to produce especially given the infrastructural decline over the past 20 odd years?

Then we've got the hot button issues; not slavery but "religion" / ethnicity / tribalism. These issues will tend to be exacerbated as long as you are dealing with a resource export economy, at least in the sense of there will be a continuing fight over access to and division of the economic pie. Without an alternate economic structure that can produce and distribute goods and services, and generate significant revenue, you don't have much backing for alternate social structures. Again, this is a significant difference with the case you are pointing to.

This very difference might point to one, potential, way out of the "hardening the sides" model. Since you don't really have a major conflict between economic systems, a revenue sharing model that was generally agreed to even if it is not generally agreeable may be enough to create a breathing space for multiple new economic systems to develop. If this is tied in with either a centralized development plan, such as Dubai or Brunei have used (as, BTW, did Canada and Japan), then that could reinforce the central government, at least in the short term (speaking as an Anthropologist, so 15-30 years :wry:).

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Understanding Bleeding Kansas and the underlying conditions that brought it about in the mid 1850s can be instructive for a clear understanding of Iraq today.

American political leaders in the Compromise of 1850 believed that they had staved off a complete sectional breakdown, and thought that that compromise might produce existential cooperation between the north and south. A few years later when Stephen Douglas crafted the Kansas/Nebraska Act he was hoping to do the same. The idea that if you can just get the western lands organized into territories and then into states that economic and social development that would come about would further the "hard-wiring" between the north and south and bring the two close together.

Yet both of these compromises did not solve the underlying political and social problem of the day: slavery and more specifically in the 1850s what to do with slavery in the territories, or white freedom versus black freedom. Douglas's Kansas/Nebraska Act of 1854, although designed to compromise, brought about a small civil war between southern proponents of slavery in the territories and northern proponents of the territories being completely free of slave labor. The end result was a violent confrontation in Kansas from about 1855 to 1858 over whether or not slaves should be allowed into Kansas. The underlying political problem of the day, as a prelude to the American Civil War, was fought through violence and death on the rolling hills of east Kansas. Ultimately the issue of slavery in America would be decided not by compromise but by the American Civil War.

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

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Funny, but the story I heard in Lawrence, KS when I was a grad student there was a little bit different. They viewed most of what happened in Bleeding Kansas as outlawry, pure and simple. Folks from over in Missouri were able to use the "slavery" issue as an excuse to commit rapine, loot, and plunder. Of course, having your town burned twice by "ruffians" in less than 10 years can change your outlook significantly and make you much less sympathetic to others' concerns. I suspect that folks in Independence, MO have a different view of what happened with things like the Pottawatomie Massacre, John Brown, and the Jayhawkers.

Moral of the story for me is that Tip O'Neil was right(:eek:I'm agreeing with a Massachusetts Democrat :eek:): All politics is local and you can't legislate a solution from afar.

Given Lawrence's history and that of your own educational institution, that sounds pretty much like what you would expect. Delegitimization of the "other" side's activities as little more than criminal violence is one of the more historically common propaganda tactics. Of course, as you noted, the proslavery "ruffians" from Mizzou would probably view the "outlawry" as legitimate resistance against an aggressive invasion by ideologically-driven abolitionist partisans.

Actually, I think Gian's point and the historical example of Kansas show just how much local politics can be influenced by national disputes. Kansas would never have bled at all, and likely Lawrence would never have been founded, if not for the Kansas/Nebraska Act of 1854 and the nullification of the old Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Compromise of 1850.

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Originally Posted by tequila

Given Lawrence's history and that of your own educational institution, that sounds pretty much like what you would expect. Delegitimization of the "other" side's activities as little more than criminal violence is one of the more historically common propaganda tactics. Of course, as you noted, the proslavery "ruffians" from Mizzou would probably view the "outlawry" as legitimate resistance against an aggressive invasion by ideologically-driven abolitionist partisans.

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I would offer the Outlaw Josey Wales as proof :D

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Originally Posted by tequila

Of course, as you noted, the proslavery "ruffians" from Mizzou would probably view the "outlawry" as legitimate resistance against an aggressive invasion by ideologically-driven abolitionist partisans.

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Don't you mean "Abolitionist Crusaders" :D.

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Originally Posted by wm

Funny, but the story I heard in Lawrence, KS when I was a grad student there was a little bit different. They viewed most of what happened in Bleeding Kansas as outlawry, pure and simple. Folks from over in Missouri were able to use the "slavery" issue as an excuse to commit rapine, loot, and plunder. Of course, having your town burned twice by "ruffians" in less than 10 years can change your outlook significantly and make you much less sympathetic to others' concerns. I suspect that folks in Independence, MO have a different view of what happened with things like the Pottawatomie Massacre, John Brown, and the Jayhawkers.

Moral of the story for me is that Tip O'Neil was right(:eek:I'm agreeing with a Massachusetts Democrat :eek:): All politics is local and you can't legislate a solution from afar.

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This is certainly true, although Jennison's Jayhawkers did their fair share both before and during the war. Although if memory serves the bulk of the initial aggression did come from elements within Missouri. It was at least a staging area, and then the process was accelerated by elements from outside both Missouri and Kansas.

Where it took a nasty turn was after the outbreak of the shooting war proper.

And never fear, Tequila, I'm watching the Crook stuff closely....:D Crook was successful, but in very limited situations and circumstances. Many also don't understand that by the time he arrived in Arizona most groups aside from the Apache (Yavapai and Hualpai, with Navajo elements thrown in) had been subdued and commanders like Thomas Devin had built rough wagon roads into some of the interior regions and (perhaps more importantly for Crook) mapped many areas that had before been uncharted by whites. It's also worth remembering that Crook didn't do so well when confronted by the Sioux and Cheyenne.

And that's my mandated Crook deconstruction for the day....:D

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

In Iraq today there is much talk of how the recent lowering of violence is allowing American commanders along with the Iraqi government to re-hard-wire the social environment in Iraq thus setting the stage for political reconciliation. However, another way to view Iraq, with Bleeding Kansas providing historical insight, is that since the fundamental political and social problems have not been resolved what we are really doing is hardening the sides in the Iraq Civil War and not softening them; just like Stephen Douglas thought he was doing in 1854.

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Gian is absolutely right. Any consideration of "small wars" must consider issues beyond tactical considerations. A failure to address (and I don't mean solve) the root problem will result in a failure of tactics. As Gian points out, "Bleeding Kansas" offers an excellent case study.

The same applies to many of the longer campaigns of the "Indian Wars" which is why Rex Bryman is absolutely wrong. As historians, soldiers (airmen,...) we can not let the perceived "discomfort" of our past limit where we look for learning examples. The US military professional education system has a real problem in this area which, IMHO, leads to stagnant thinking.

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Originally Posted by marct

Good example, and there certainly does seem to be an analog. I'm hesitant about how to extend it to Iraq, however. In the period you are talking about, there are significant demographic and economic differences between the North and the South. Slavery, qua slavery, was more of a hot button, rhetorical and emotional issue than a causus belli, and the real root was in the differences in productive and distributive economic systems (and their products)l a difference between two modes of production to use the Marxist term...This very difference might point to one, potential, way out of the "hardening the sides" model. Since you don't really have a major conflict between economic systems, a revenue sharing model that was generally agreed to even if it is not generally agreeable may be enough to create a breathing space for multiple new economic systems to develop. If this is tied in with either a centralized development plan, such as Dubai or Brunei have used (as, BTW, did Canada and Japan), then that could reinforce the central government, at least in the short term (speaking as an Anthropologist, so 15-30 years :wry:).

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Hello Marc:

Agree and which is why i used the word insight from history rather than analog or lesson because as a historian i shy away from making direct links from past to present; too many mediating things in-between that always seems to obliterate such clear links.

Actually Marc i think the fundamental cause of the American Civil War when you peel it all back was slavery and not the differences between the two sections' economic systems. Clearly slavery was what produced such distinct systems but slavery was the root and necessary cause of the War. So this is why I used the case of Bleeding Kansas when thinking about Iraq because if the fundamental issue in Kansas was economic differences between north and south then Douglas and the Kansas/Nebraska act should have been a durable compromise. But it was not because the Act did not address the root problems in America--slavery--which as WM highlights played itself out on the local level in Kansas.

In Iraq we think we are softening the root causes or problems by "hardwiring" the tribes to the national government. But, using Bleeding Kansas as an insight, that "hardwiring" does not address the fundamental political and social problems in Iraq today which are still there and sadly will, I think, produce much more violence and fighting in the days and months ahead.

gian

Hi Gian,

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Agree and which is why i used the word insight from history rather than analog or lesson because as a historian i shy away from making direct links from past to present; too many mediating things in-between that always seems to obliterate such clear links.

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Agreed; it is always a problem and direct parallels are exceedingly rare. On whether or not to use analogs (and how), I think we are dealing with a disciplinary difference; Anthropology (and Sociology) are both more "engineering" in their orientation than History.

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Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Actually Marc i think the fundamental cause of the American Civil War when you peel it all back was slavery and not the differences between the two sections' economic systems. Clearly slavery was what produced such distinct systems but slavery was the root and necessary cause of the War. So this is why I used the case of Bleeding Kansas when thinking about Iraq because if the fundamental issue in Kansas was economic differences between north and south then Douglas and the Kansas/Nebraska act should have been a durable compromise.

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I think we will have to agree to disagree on this. I don't think there is much evidence to support the idea that slavery created the differences between the two systems, at least in a causal, economic sense. I do think that slavery was supported by the specific crops grown in the South, cotton being particularly labour intensive (don't forget that a mechanical cotton picker wasn't developed until the early 1950's; Wm J. Wilson has some interesting insights on this in When Work Disappears).

Still and all, by the 1850's slavery was pretty much dying out (I can hear you choking on that :D). Take a look at what the number one US internal export "crop" for Virginia (and North Carolina I believe) was around 1855, I think you'll be surprised :wry:. The particular geography required for cotton was also disappearing as the US moved further west so, unless the US expanded into the Caribbean, you weren't likely to have many more slave states appearing.

Of course, you also had a rather precipitous "balancing act" going on between the slave and free states (hence some of the suggestions to annex Cuba as a slave state in the late 1850's), and that political problem certainly centered around slavery.

Marc

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Still and all, by the 1850's slavery was pretty much dying out (I can hear you choking on that :D). Take a look at what the number one US internal export "crop" for Virginia (and North Carolina I believe) was around 1855, I think you'll be surprised :wry:. The particular geography required for cotton was also disappearing as the US moved further west so, unless the US expanded into the Caribbean, you weren't likely to have many more slave states appearing.

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I'd like some more backup on the idea that slavery was dying as an economic institution. I'll have to wait until I get home, but most of my texts on this indicate just the opposite.

Also, the aforementioned westward expansion of the U.S. was driven to a large extent by slavery, or specifically the influence of slaveowners interested in maintaining a proslavery majority by carving out more slave states from Mexico and the West. The history of the Texas Revolution and the Mexican War and its backers, as well as the filibuster movement which sought to carve out an empire of American slavery in the Caribbean and Central America, points this out.

Hi Tequila,

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Originally Posted by tequila

I'd like some more backup on the idea that slavery was dying as an economic institution. I'll have to wait until I get home, but most of my texts on this indicate just the opposite.

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It depends on how you measure it, really. To a large extent, slavery was economically untenable outside of cotton (and a few other crops, but mainly cotton). Check out the number of slaves sold to other states from Virginia and North Carolina - that was the "crop" I was referring to :(. You will also need to look at the increased availability of cotton in India, and the fights between the UK cotton factories and the Indian cotton industry.

When I said it was "dying", it might have been more accurate to say that it had been diagnosed early on with a terminal disease :wry:. The real problem with it was the cost and, once the Brits managed to destroy the Indian cotton industry, that gave them an alternate source under their own control (as an example, look at how quickly they shifted once the Northern blockades were underway).

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Originally Posted by tequila

Also, the aforementioned westward expansion of the U.S. was driven to a large extent by slavery, or specifically the influence of slaveowners interested in maintaining a proslavery majority by carving out more slave states from Mexico and the West. The history of the Texas Revolution and the Mexican War and its backers, as well as the filibuster movement which sought to carve out an empire of American slavery in the Caribbean and Central America, points this out.

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Sure, and I agree - that was a lot of the political impetus. Still and all, that is dependent upon the economic base, which was dependent on cotton. I'll agree that if the US had expanded into the Caribbean, then that would have given a second crop, sugar cane, that would be quite salable and continue to support slavery. But it's hard to grow sugar cane outside of that area.

Another point is that by the 1850's there was an increasing resistance to "Buying American" in the European markets because of slavery. This was one of the factors that helped to push the British into destroying the cotton industry in India and using their raw cotton.

There are a couple of other things to consider, again at the economic level. Up until about the 1820's or so, the vast majority of wealth produced in the US came from the agrarian South. Gradually, that shifted over to manufacturing in the North, and corn and ranching in the West (neither of which works well with slavery). You also had mass waves of immigrants coming into the North, but very few going into the South, so the entire population demographic was changing. Part of the reason for trying to carve out the new slave states was to maintain parity in the Senate, since it had been lost in Congress.

But this push to grab new slave states in Mexico and the Caribbean could only garner so much support at the national level. How much longer would it be likely that the increasingly populated North and West would support the South through wars of aggression? Sure, you had the Mexican campaign, but do you really think that Congress would have gone for an attack on Spanish colonies in the 1850's-1860's? I really doubt that Britain would have stood by and let that happen.

BTW, I ever said that slavery wasn't an issue, just that it wasn't the root cause.

Marc

If you want I can get the missus professor to show up and bore you on the topic of slavery like only a former historian can. I sure do prefer talking about C++ code than I do the "Pastoral Letter" and the congregationalist ministers of New England threat towards William Lloyd Garrison and Anglina and Sarah Grimke to stop discussing anti slavery in 1837. It basically shut down a large part of the anti-slavery movement (specifically the woman) in the New England states. (Can you tell I'm being coached?)

She also says that the westward expansion was part of the slave power conspiracy movement and westward expansion was happening despite slavery or along with it....

All errors are mine (I can't type as fast as she talks)....

She's got some bonafides... She's the author of several encyclopedia entries on the subject.

Ask her about her Turner thesis that somebody else wrote..... :)

I'd agree that long-term demographic changes in the U.S. augured ill for slavery, and that indeed this tension was at the heart of the Civil War.

Slave states were dominated politically by the slaveowning aristocracy which saw slavery as key to both economic power and their own particular "gentlemanly" lifestyle. As the threats to this lifestyle loomed, this aristocracy sought to maintain itself through political domination of the national government through the expansion of the number of slaves states so as always to maintain a majority in Congress and control of the Presidency. This political majority was held to be critical to keeping slavery legal and the system intact - the loss of Southern slaveholding control over these institutions was thought to lead inexorably to the banning of slavery.

Thus the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency despite the complete opposition of the South was seen as the breaking point for the Union - it meant that non-slaveholding states were finally capable of taking control of a key federal institution despite the near-unified opposition of the slave states. For proslavery radicals, it was the death knell of slavery in the Union and thus the system could only be preserved outside of it.

Selil - We need more female perspectives on the SWC anyway - bring her on!

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Originally Posted by marct

slavery wasn't the root cause.

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If you don't believe Marc, maybe this guy will have more credibility:

http://tbn0.google.com/images?q=tbn:...puPortrait.gif

"Actually, there were numerous causes. Aside from the obvious schism between the abolitionists and the anti-abolitionists, there were economic factors, both domestic and international"

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Originally Posted by Rank amateur

If you don't believe Marc, maybe this guy will have more credibility:

"Actually, there were numerous causes. Aside from the obvious schism between the abolitionists and the anti-abolitionists, there were economic factors, both domestic and international"

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Scotch Irish factor... :D

Not to mention international meddling by those who saw the potential of the US and preferred that it not become goliath...

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Originally Posted by Rank amateur

"Actually, there were numerous causes. Aside from the obvious schism between the abolitionists and the anti-abolitionists, there were economic factors, both domestic and international"

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Let us not forget the basic social form differences as well. Folks who immigrated to the north of what would become the Mason-Dixon line tended to be more attuned to the notion of an egalitarian society without distinctions of social class while those who landed in the southern half of the 13 colonies were much more likely to have come from a very class-conscious background that took the "patrician-plebian" dichotomy as part of a well-ordered society much more to heart. Thus, Southern culture was more disposed to accept, at least, and perhaps to demand, a society that included a distinctly serf-like serving class. Since there were few peasants native to America (Native Americans hardly fit the laborer-tied-to-the-land/peasant motif), importing slaves filled that void quite nicely.

Zombie thread, awaken!

South Carolina chose to begin the Civil War by opening fire on Federal troops at Fort Sumter. At any rate, here is their justification for secession.

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We affirm that these ends for which this Government was instituted have been defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive of them by the action of the non-slaveholding States. Those States have assume the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile insurrection.

For twenty-five years this agitation has been steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its aid the power of the common Government. Observing the forms of the Constitution, a sectional party has found within that Article establishing the Executive Department, the means of subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States, whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the administration of the common Government, because he has declared that that "Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free," and that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction.

This sectional combination for the submersion of the Constitution, has been aided in some of the States by elevating to citizenship, persons who, by the supreme law of the land, are incapable of becoming citizens; and their votes have been used to inaugurate a new policy, hostile to the South, and destructive of its beliefs and safety.

On the 4th day of March next, this party will take possession of the Government. It has announced that the South shall be excluded from the common territory, that the judicial tribunals shall be made sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States.

The guaranties of the Constitution will then no longer exist; the equal rights of the States will be lost. The slaveholding States will no longer have the power of self-government, or self-protection, and the Federal Government will have become their enemy.

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We, therefore, the People of South Carolina, by our delegates in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared that the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America, is dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State; with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I don't doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model ;)

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i think its is important to note that many people view counterinsurgency warfare as a liberal gloss over the tactics of brutal colonialism colonial conquest and, historically, it isn't incorrect. taking Vietnam as an example, you can trace the development of counterinsurgency doctrines used to pacify the country from the "collective punishment" of colonial France to "the oils spot doctrine" of the first Indochina war to the increasing scientifically managed COIN doctrines of anti-colonial liberal Americans whether it be Kennedy and Lansdale or Johnson and Robert Komer. The genesis of counterinsurgency warfare lies in battles to secure colonial domination and there is really no way of getting around that. i think the most interesting question, then, becomes can COIN transcend that or destined to reproduce so colonial logic?

also, interesting debate on civil war....

In 2007 Rex Brynen commented:

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How has Mozambique sustained democracy since 1992, despite having experienced bitter anti-colonial (1962-75) and civil (1975-92) war that left left almost a million people dead through its direct and indirect consequences?

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Six years later this question has become pertinent sadly:

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Suspected Renamo guerrillas killed seven Mozambican soldiers in an ambush on Thursday near the former rebel group's remote mountain hideout, local media said, the latest flare-up in a simmering insurgency.....Analysts say this year's attacks are a reaction to it being pushed into political and economic obscurity by Frelimo, which is expected to dominate municipal elections due next month and nationwide elections in just over a year.

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Link:http://mobile.reuters.com/article/id...31017?irpc=932

Mozambique rarely gets attention from the MSM.