Manging the Barbarians

Doug MacGregor's interview below led me to just have an interesting discussion with Ray Millen (one of the perks of working in a think tank). Thought I'd float my admittedly half formed (and perhaps half baked) ideas here.

I've felt for a long time that what American strategy today is about is "managing the barbarians." States and empires have done this for thousands of years. Thus we could learn a lot by looking at the techniques our forebears have used to do it.

Basically, managing the barbarians was done through a range of methods: 1) assimilation; 2) raids and campaigns of punishment; 3) establishing settler communities; 4) cultivating and maintaining buffer states; 5) dividing the threat; 6) defensive measures, and, 7) co-opting/paying off the threat.

But current American strategy does not use this full range of techniques. Instead, we seek to make the barbarians like us (a variant of assimilation). Perhaps we would be more effective if we did, in fact, use the full range.

This has a very profound implication: I think most historic states and empires lost their ability to manage the barbarians less because of military weakness than because economic weakness eroded their ability to pay off buffer states, proxies, and enemies. This may mean that America's economic problems--decline of the dollar, declining competitiveness, etc.--will ultimately effect our ability to sustain our security more than anything that may or may not happen within the military and the security services.

OK, that's it. This is hereby declared a free flame zone (NOT a flame free zone. That would be wussie).

Is our supposed "forward assimilation" strategy really a genuine policy, rather than simply a culturally-based IO strategy? Basically, all hat no cattle?

I don't think it's that black-and-white, but I think when the rubber meets the road, it definitely leans towards the hat side.

Also, the "settler" strategy doesn't really sound viable for the U.S. in the 21st century, and I'd argue was never very effective. Off the top of my head, I cannot think of a successful settler strategy that actually involved "management" of a "barbarian" problem rather than out-and-out conquest.

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Originally Posted by tequila

Is our supposed "forward assimilation" strategy really a genuine policy, rather than simply a culturally-based IO strategy? Basically, all hat no cattle?

I don't think it's that black-and-white, but I think when the rubber meets the road, it definitely leans towards the hat side.

Also, the "settler" strategy doesn't really sound viable for the U.S. in the 21st century.

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Agree with your point on settler strategies. To flip it around, one of the most effective techniques that barbarians used against states and empires was penetration by settlers. Are we today in a period of "reverse imperialism"?

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

Agree with your point on settler strategies. To flip it around, one of the most effective techniques that barbarians used against states and empires was penetration by settlers. Are we today in a period of "reverse imperialism"?

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I would buy that one especially given the issue of illegal immigrants. In the effort to absolve the "guilt" associated with colonialism, we (and this includes Europe) have essentially set the stage for such a movement, albeit one not so organized as an invasion. In contrast, the former colonial areas are hyper-sensitive to anything that smacks of settlers. The only arena where the anti-settler/colony issue is white hot is of course Israel and Palestine.

best

Tom

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

I would buy that one especially given the issue of illegal immigrants. In the effort to absolve the "guilt" associated with colonialism, we (and this includes Europe) have essentially set the stage for such a movement, albeit one not so organized as an invasion. In contrast, the former colonial areas are hyper-sensitive to anything that smacks of settlers. The only arena where the anti-settler/colony issue is white hot is of course Israel and Palestine.

best

Tom

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It's not just illegal immigration. If you look at the downfall of the Roman Empire, you had lots of barbarians who elected to live within the empire because it was just a more pleasant place to hang out than their homelands. Over the long term, this eroded the coherence of the empire.

"This may mean that America's economic problems--decline of the dollar, declining competitiveness, etc.--will ultimately effect our ability to sustain our security more than anything that may or may not happen within the military and the security services." (Metz)

-makes alot of sense to me. Dependence on cheap, 3rd world labor for goods and services simply means to me a nation can no longer fight for lack of collective will to do so. When the collective dream and will centers on acquisition and possession, the drive and desire to create and sustain is about gone and the latter is all that is worth fighting for.

Now I'm trying to remember who wrote this, but sometime in the past few months I read where the effectiveness of Roman strategy progressively declined as Rome moved away from partially surrounding itself with client-states. The client states of course financed their own military forces and campaigns against external threats while Rome was able to reserve much of its own force for major threats or decisive operations, and not have to foot the anything like the full bill themselves. Augustus and his immediate successors had something very good going.

Admittedly, the Romans did not face anything like an equivalent threat in the east until the Persians overthrew the Parthians in the 3rd Century A.D., and it is doubtful that even reasonably capable client-states of Augustus' time such as Commagene would have lasted long against a Persian attack.

The author whose name I cannot recall did point out something critical about the Rhine and Danube frontiers. When the Romans disposed of their barbarian client-"states" in those areas during Augustus' time, the burden for the defense of those frontiers fell mainly upon the Roman Army (the remaining client-tribes were of little value beyond local reconnaissance and early-warning so to speak). After the failed attempted Roman pacification and annexation of Germany and the Pannonian Revolt in the Balkans, the Romans not only had to rely upon their own raw military force to keep both the local populations in order and the barbarians in check, they lost their ability to move the better of the Army to decisive theatres of operations, all in considerable part due to the fact that they had eliminated most of their client-state allies.

I would argue that prudent great powers had established systems of client-states prior to needing them in a crisis, whereas imprudent great powers had established or re-established client-states when their own military weakness had become critical. The Romans were good examples of both prudence and imprudence in the use of client-states. Prudently maintaining client-states while one was still militarily strong rather than imprudently annexing them and thus having not only to bear the entire military burden oneself, but also losing the freedom to move the bulk of one's military forces to decisive theatres of operations, is the way to go.

Once one finds oneself in the position of needing to create client-states (or tribes), or re-create said after one has already eliminated them, due to military weakness and over-extension, then such client-states are at best a measure of desperation. Given that the clients are aware of one's military weakness, they are then in the position of being able to either demand more resources from the weakened great power, or of throwing or threatening to throw their support to a rival power, etc. Attempting to assimilate, as Steve observed, is strategically futile in most cases.

In short, as far as client-states go, they're good before the fact, when you don't immediately need them, and a drain when to have to create them after the fact. The key of course, is not to militarily over-extend oneself in the first place. This may well be the condition the U.S. has entered into recently. As such, its options may be a good deal more constrained, especially when it comes to client-states/tribes and the like.

As for immigration, well of course it's reverse-colonization. Go to the great cities of Western Europe and North America and you'll see immigrant communities that have reached a critical level in that assimiliation of many of them into the general population is no longer possible. I live only an hour-and-a-half from a city of some millions where over half the population was born outside of North America. There are tens of thousands of kids born in Toronto, never been to their parents's homeland, but have never spoken any langauge other than that of the parents and rarely associate with anyone outside of their particular ethnic group. They don't even speak English as a second language. It's a growing problem, and the authorities are at a loss to know what to do about it.

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

It's not just illegal immigration. If you look at the downfall of the Roman Empire, you had lots of barbarians who elected to live within the empire because it was just a more pleasant place to hang out than their homelands. Over the long term, this eroded the coherence of the empire.

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Oh I agree; the illegal problem is just the latest wave,,,

The point of the title is not that we should adopt empire building but to note that former world powers undestood how to deal with non-state threats more pragmatically. As Dr Steve Metz and I bat around ideas, it occured to me that we of the modern nation state view the global environment through the eyes of state dominance in international politics. The state as we know it probably reached its pinnacle in the twentieth century, likely because of the tremendous resources devoted to both world wars and the cold war. That said, non-state threats were subsumed by the larger conflict and attention...and largely seen as part of the cold war struggle. So, as the cold war environment has faded, non-state threats are assuming their traditional position in the global and regional environment.

For great powers, it is a mistake to treat non-state threats as a state threat, turning a conflict into a minature WWII, ending with occupation and nation-building as the final signal of success. Rather, sometimes punitive expeditions often send the correct signal to non-state actors that provoking the United States has severe penalties without the payoffs (e.g., protracted insurgency and extensive financial investments) in the region.

As any great power recognizes from the Egyptians to Eisenhower, economic strength is the primary concern and anything which disrupts the financial health of the power should be avoided. So, when considering how to deal with traditional non-state threats, the United States would be wise to sue traditional means--punitive strikes, pay-offs of involved actors, creating buffer states or buffer tribal regions, etc. Whenever the United States intervenes with large and multiple headquarters, extensive military bases/camps, and economic incentives, it sends the message to the host state that the United States is invested in its success. Hence, both the host state actors and insurgents conspire whether they recognize it or not in prolonging the conflict. Financial gain is the driving incentive.

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Originally Posted by RaymondMillen

The point of the title is not that we should adopt empire building but to note that former world powers undestood how to deal with non-state threats more pragmatically. As Dr Steve Metz and I bat around ideas, it occured to me that we of the modern nation state view the global environment through the eyes of state dominance in international politics. The state as we know it probably reached its pinnacle in the twentieth century, likely because of the tremendous resources devoted to both world wars and the cold war. That said, non-state threats were subsumed by the larger conflict and attention...and largely seen as part of the cold war struggle. So, as the cold war environment has faded, non-state threats are assuming their traditional position in the global and regional environment.

For great powers, it is a mistake to treat non-state threats as a state threat, turning a conflict into a minature WWII, ending with occupation and nation-building as the final signal of success. Rather, sometimes punitive expeditions often send the correct signal to non-state actors that provoking the United States has severe penalties without the payoffs (e.g., protracted insurgency and extensive financial investments) in the region.

As any great power recognizes from the Egyptians to Eisenhower, economic strength is the primary concern and anything which disrupts the financial health of the power should be avoided. So, when considering how to deal with traditional non-state threats, the United States would be wise to sue traditional means--punitive strikes, pay-offs of involved actors, creating buffer states or buffer tribal regions, etc. Whenever the United States intervenes with large and multiple headquarters, extensive military bases/camps, and economic incentives, it sends the message to the host state that the United States is invested in its success. Hence, both the host state actors and insurgents conspire whether they recognize it or not in prolonging the conflict. Financial gain is the driving incentive.

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Shouldn't you be working instead of playing online? :eek:

A great deal to chew on here.

The cost benefit analysis for any military operation has to be measured very carefully - how much is it going to cost in terms of money (both long term estimates and short term estimates) and in terms of human costs. That's the major difference with how the US conducts warfare (in my opinion) and other empires (not equating the US with an empire).

The US follows moral codes for the most part. The Geneva conventions, laws of war, etc are treated with the utmost respect and soldiers are expected to be trained on them and know what the limitations of violence are. Empires in the past did not have to do that, so it was quite easy for Genghis Khan to eradicate Baghdad with little fear of reprisal. Now we have a 24 hour news cycle that reports on the most trivial of "news" and we are limited in what courses of action we can take. We are almost forced to adopt assimilation as the only method...

Norfolk raises a great point about how many immigrants do not adopt the culture, language and societal rules of their new countries. I remember driving through Milpitas, CA and seeing street signs in Vietnamese for an example. France is acting as labratory of sorts for this disconnection with their North African based communities.

The problem with Iraq is that we've used some techniques - paying off tribes/shieks as an example - but we haven't taken a side because there is some kind of belief that all groups are to be treated equally, which is an extremely foreign concept (along with democracy/mobocracy) to most Islamic cultures. We can't really ask the peshmerga to take care of that nasty Sunni insurgency because it means placing one group above another. This would be blogged to death by the media.

We also have been guilty of not taking our borders (and therefor, our soveirgnty (sp.)) seriously. The political parties, for differing reasons, want people from Central America to come in. If it was seen as being a serious problem, the measures would be enacted to strengthen our borders significantly instead of half assed measures we've seen for the last two decades. Even our legal immigration program has been slanted since the 60's towards certain areas of the globe, while other areas have been given fewer quotas on the number of people who want to legally immigrate.

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Originally Posted by Ski

A great deal to chew on here.

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I've always considered myself chew-worthy.

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The problem with Iraq is that we've used some techniques - paying off tribes/shieks as an example - but we haven't taken a side because there is some kind of belief that all groups are to be treated equally, which is an extremely foreign concept (along with democracy/mobocracy) to most Islamic cultures. We can't really ask the peshmerga to take care of that nasty Sunni insurgency because it means placing one group above another. This would be blogged to death by the media.

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Ski

Good post but I would say we have taken sides and not always recognized that we were in fact doing so. We have certainly accomodated the Kurdish side all along. We took the Shia side early on under the rubric of reconciliation when it was anything but that. Now we are in bed with the Sunnis of all sides.

Best

Tom

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

Ski

Good post but I would say we have taken sides and not always recognized that we were in fact doing so. We have certainly accomodated the Kurdish side all along. We took the Shia side early on under the rubric of reconciliation when it was anything but that. Now we are in bed with the Sunnis of all sides.

Best

Tom

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In my Rethinking Insurgency monograph (I know, I know--but I haven't plugged it for several days), I contend that our inclination to identify "bad guys" and "good guys" in counterinsurgency is a legacy of the Cold War (and of the difficulty Americans have dealing with ethical ambiguity) that serves us badly today. It complicates any resolution short of outright victory which is, itself, unattainable against networked, self-funding, terrorism-based insurgencies. Moreover, when we sell a counterinsurgency campaign to the American public as one that pits good guys against bad guys, public support erodes when, as invariably happens, our partners turn out to be less than pure of heart.

Hence I think that either a "managing the barbarians" or, to put a softer edge on it, a peacemaking/peacekeeping approach is more attuned to today's realities than is the kind of 1960s conceptualization of counterinsurgency that we still cling to.

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Hence I think that either a "managing the barbarians" or, to put a softer edige on it, a peacemaking/peacekeeping approach is more attuned to today's realities than is the kind of 1960s conceptualization of counterinsurgency that we still cling to.

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I would tend to agree but with a caveat; you have to know what you are doing as you do it. Otherwise you will simply be reacting to events, as we did for too long in OIF.

best

Tom

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

I would tend to agree but with a caveat; you have to know what you are doing as you do it. Otherwise you will simply be reacting to events, as we did for too long in OIF.

best

Tom

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So many of the aspects of everything brought out in the discussion are true and have been a part of what has added to the overall complexity of all our current struggles.

Lack of assimilation is something which has not only harmed our percieved sovereignty but due to the volume of illegal immigrants it has affected all portions of our political elements in efforts to get the recognition for letting it be ok.

The Roman empire was amazing in that it went through so many different types of difficulties ranging from internal political subterfuge, to client countries turning against it for every reason from religion to liberality.

Always at the forefront of any successful leader was a recognition of the need to address economic, social, and moral issues at hand. Generally this meant that about twice every generation taxes and debts would be forgiven, military would recieve land allocations and beautification projects would emerge.

Tom

What you say might be true, but I equate that to not taking sides at all.

Sun Tzu said "The ancient philospher Master Guan said, "Go forth armed without determining strategy, and you will destroy yourself in battle."

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Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

Lack of assimilation is something which has not only harmed our percieved sovereignty but due to the volume of illegal immigrants it has affected all portions of our political elements in efforts to get the recognition for letting it be ok.

The Roman empire was amazing in that it went through so many different types of difficulties ranging from internal political subterfuge, to client countries turning against it for every reason from religion to liberality.

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Not unlike what Western countries are going through now. Look at how many people want to come here because their families' and their own personal and financial prospects are so much better here, and then turn around and hate the society that offered them this same opportunity? Yes, there are clear, even grave wrongs in our society, but that is no justification to want to see it harmed or destroyed.

Active malcontents and terrorists may be an absolute minority amongst such people, but it was a small pro-barbarian faction (albeit ethnic origin unknown) that plotted and executed the opening of one of Rome's gates to the Visigoths in 410 A.D. that led to the sacking of the city. There can be real long-term dangers in seeking to redress the crimes and errors of the past, real or imagined, by going to the opposite extreme and seek to "reform" society for its past evils by deliberately suppressing its own cultural mores while bringing in large numbers of people who may be unable to properly adjust to the host society. These problems are really only just beginning for the West.

I think I've gone off topic-here.

Anyway, I think that using financial carrots and the like to influence foreign states or tribes, and especially the cultivation of client-states, is by far a better means of achieving strategic objectives where and when possible than by military force. Military force should only be used when necessary, for the sake of the survival of the country or its allies. It is much too expensive, and much too easily used up or tied up when it is used as a means to achieve "strategic" (or rather, ideological/economic/political, etc.) ends that do not merit it.

It is much cheaper and easier on the economy when from a position of economic and military strength, money is used to achieve legitimate strategic objectives. Conversely, when dealing from a position of military weakness, the use of money to help achieve strategic (and now operational or even just tactical objectives) is much more expensive (after all, you're paying for the full shot of the use of military force yourself now, and you no longer have the luxury of being able to use this force elsewhere), much more risky, and everyone knows that you're doing this because you're military weak.

As much as anything else, I suspect that military over-extension leads to economic weakness that in turn results in a cycle of progressive weakening of one's military power, because when you're weak, others tends to pile on and your need for the use of military force only increases. The Romans discovered that, in part, the hard way. Sorry for the long-winded post.

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Originally Posted by Ski

Tom

What you say might be true, but I equate that to not taking sides at all.

Sun Tzu said "The ancient philospher Master Guan said, "Go forth armed without determining strategy, and you will destroy yourself in battle."

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Ski,

There is a real difference between not taking sides as in remaining neutral and taking all sides in the interest of appearing to be balanced. The first is the peackeeping mode and is tough to do but it can work. The second is even harder and rarely succeeds. It does however tend to piss all sides off when poorly executed. We have over the past four years tried to do the latter in a sequenced fashion in considering the Shia and the Sunni. In the first phase, the Sunni certainly felt we had sided with the Shia. In the current phase, Shia leaders have made their concerns about our courting of the Sunni well known. Meanwhile we have to a large degree let the Kurds do as they please. The ultimate outcome has yet to emerge.

Best

Tom

Steve Metz said:

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In my Rethinking Insurgency monograph (I know, I know--but I haven't plugged it for several days), I contend that our inclination to identify "bad guys" and "good guys" in counterinsurgency is a legacy of the Cold War (and of the difficulty Americans have dealing with ethical ambiguity) that serves us badly today. It complicates any resolution short of outright victory which is, itself, unattainable against networked, self-funding, terrorism-based insurgencies. Moreover, when we sell a counterinsurgency campaign to the American public as one that pits good guys against bad guys, public support erodes when, as invariably happens, our partners turn out to be less than pure of heart.

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(Emphasis added / kw)
Seems to me the terrible truth of the item I placed in bold added to the fact that our egos in high places insist on reinventing the wheel instead of learning from history that this approach:

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Hence I think that either a "managing the barbarians" or, to put a softer edge on it, a peacemaking/peacekeeping approach is more attuned to today's realities than is the kind of 1960s conceptualization of counterinsurgency that we still cling to.

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Would be no more likely to succeed. The American psyche is perfectly prepared to slam anyone onto the mat and jump on their rib cage; it is not prepared for classic wrestling with the world media as a referee. As Steve points out, in a tag team match with everyone in black trunks, we'd have difficulty sorting out who to slam.

Not to mention that our national impatience means that long term stability ops are not going to sit well. The 1/3 Rule and the Two Year Rule draw a lot of snickers but I've never seen anyone really refute either. Add to that the facts that we have to be a full spectrum force with multi mission capability, that we are not going to develop an advisory corps, SOF is not likley to undergo an expansion and the Defense budget is going to get whacked and we had better look at a way to use the GPF to max advantage...

Ski said:

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Tom

What you say might be true, but I equate that to not taking sides at all.

Sun Tzu said "The ancient philospher Master Guan said, "Go forth armed without determining strategy, and you will destroy yourself in battle.

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Adding that to Steve's thoughts and given the fact that taking no side is, in a great many if not most cases, the best approach (due to all the factors Steve cited among others), it would appear to me the best strategy would be to avoid entanglements in most forms unless there is absolutely no alternative because as Tom said:

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There is a real difference between not taking sides as in remaining neutral and taking all sides in the interest of appearing to be balanced. The first is the peackeeping mode and is tough to do but it can work. The second is even harder and rarely succeeds. It does however tend to piss all sides off when poorly executed.

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Given several failures in foreign policy over the last 60 or so years plus the fairly good strategic idea in Iraq that was badly flawed in execution and therefor is not likely to produce a result as good as might have been hoped (Tom's "...even harder..." approach), our ability to interject in the affairs of others for the near future might be better curtailed and a strategy of some small but highly effective direct action, area tailored advisory and assistance capabilities -- say a MilAssistAdvisoryCom for each CoCom, working with the SOComs -- plus low key SF led ID and, most importantly an announced policy of "We'll play nice as long as everyone else does. If someone elects not to, we'll come in and smash everything, a process at which we excel. Oh -- and we don't do windows and we don't house-sit but we may help pay for the clenup" might be a far better approach.

Diplomatically worded, it would sound better, but I tend to get long winded so that's the country version.

The foregoing should be considered not only on the premise of domestic political probabilities but on the realities of todays rapid and efficient worldwide communications capability, the international scene and the globalization effect on commerce and the world economy. We no longer drive that train...

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Not to mention that our national impatience means that long term stability ops are not going to sit well. The 1/3 Rule and the Two Year Rule draw a lot of snickers but I've never seen anyone really refute either. Add to that the facts that we have to be a full spectrum force with multi mission capability, that we are not going to develop an advisory corps, SOF is not likley to undergo an expansion and the Defense budget is going to get whacked and we had better look at a way to use the GPF to max advantage...

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Great post, Ken. I remember when expanding SOF was trendy - that appears to have faded amidst the political din to expand the entire AD force. And to what end, exactly? To fight more Iraqs? Which systems will get the chop to pay for it, or we will just disband divisions again ten years from now?

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Originally Posted by tequila

Great post, Ken. I remember when expanding SOF was trendy - that appears to have faded amidst the political din to expand the entire AD force. And to what end, exactly? To fight more Iraqs? Which systems will get the chop to pay for it, or we will just disband divisions again ten years from now?

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I've been running around all over the place arguing that we're once again preparing to fight the last war.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

national impatience means that long term stability ops are not going to sit well. The 1/3 Rule and the Two Year Rule draw a lot of snickers but I've never seen anyone really refute either.

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I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the two year rule, but what I've been saying in writing and in presentations is that the American public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major involvement in stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, or whatever. So rather than kind of ease ourselves in, we need the capability to surge early (both military and political/economic efforts) and count on diminishing our role in three years. That one of my critiques of 3-24: it sort of assumes that we'll stay involved until "success." I think that's politically unrealistic.

I believe, for instance, that the current "surge" in Iraq is a good idea three years too late. If we'd done it in the summer of 2003, it might have made a decisive difference.

What this means is that the military and the other agencies of the government need a surge capacity. This means not just troops, but stuff and other capabilities as well. To give one example, we need the ability to reconstitute a defeated army and police force starting within a matter of weeks, not after we've had two years to spin up. John Agoglia, who was one of the CENTCOM planners for OIF, says that he found to his dismay that he wouldn't have been able to get contract police trainers in Iraq until months after a contract was signed. That's why we squander the "golden hour." Timing matters greatly in stabilization and counterinsurgency, yet we operate on our own time schedule unlinked to the life cycle of the conflict we're getting involved in.

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

but what I've been saying in writing and in presentations is that the American public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major involvement in stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, or whatever.

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I think it depends on casualties. Like Ken says, if people shoot at us, the public wants them crushed. If the Iraqis stop shooting at us, I think the public would support staying there until Jesus comes back.

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

What this means is that the military and the other agencies of the government need a surge capacity. This means not just troops, but stuff and other capabilities as well. To give one example, we need the ability to reconstitute a defeated army and police force starting within a matter of weeks, not after we've had two years to spin up. John Agoglia, who was one of the CENTCOM planners for OIF, says that he found to his dismay that he wouldn't have been able to get contract police trainers in Iraq until months after a contract was signed. That's why we squander the "golden hour." Timing matters greatly in stabilization and counterinsurgency, yet we operate on our own time schedule unlinked to the life cycle of the conflict we're getting involved in.

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Have you given any thought to the importance of using Allies for nation building/stability? It seems to have worked well in Kosovo. For the above example, could 200 German MPs have done the training stat?

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Originally Posted by Rank amateur

Have you given any thought to the importance of using Allies for nation building/stability? It seems to have worked well in Kosovo. For the above example, could 200 German MPs have done the training stat?

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Funny you should mention that. Well, not funny funny. There is nothing funny about German MPs. But I did touch on it at the end of Rethinking Insurgency and Learning From Iraq (which, let the record show, I've gone two whole days without mentioning).

The point I made was that we need to drop the term "counterinsurgency" in general. To many potential partners, it smacks of Cold War episodes of propping up friendly dictators. And, since Odom got out of the military, we don't do that any more.

But where I was going with that is to drop counterinsurgency and instead focus on developing doctrine and concepts for a more holistic notion like stabilization which is less likely to scare away potential allies and better reflects the multidimensional nature of the conflicts we are now facing. (I.e., we could have doctrine and concepts. for dealing warlords and militias as well as insurgents).

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And, since Odom got out of the military, we don't do that any more.

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there you go, again, telling the truth and exposing my lies...:eek:

truth be known that with my reconstructed body and subsequent arthritis, I can barely prop up myself :wry:

so Steve, tell me again what was the title of that latest work? Learning from E-rock?

And as far as dictators go, you must admit Le Guide Mobutu a eu le style de lui-meme, n'est pas?

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

But where I was going with that is to drop counterinsurgency and instead focus on developing doctrine and concepts for a more holistic notion like stabilization which is less likely to scare away potential allies and better reflects the multidimensional nature of the conflicts we are now facing. (I.e., we could have doctrine and concepts. for dealing warlords and militias as well as insurgents).

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You've convinced me.

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Have you given any thought to the importance of using Allies for nation building/stability? It seems to have worked well in Kosovo. For the above example, could 200 German MPs have done the training stat?

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Hasn't worked so well in Afghanistan - the Germans were in charge of training the Afghan police and notoriously short-stroked the job - see this thread.

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Originally Posted by tequila

Hasn't worked so well in Afghanistan - the Germans were in charge of training the Afghan police and notoriously short-stroked the job - see this thread.

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But at least we have company on the blame line. That ought to count for something!

The Germans were not the only NATO country to have issues in Afghanistan in regards to OOTW/Stabilization/Training/Flavor of the Week....

Good comment.

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the two year rule...

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Year or so ago, I read a blurb by, IIRC, a northern Virginia HS History teacher whose name I regrettably don't recall who said he told his students that his study convinced him that about 1/3 of all Americans tended to be opposed to a particular war, ideology or party dependent, while another third supported it (again ideology dependent) and the remaining third could be swayed, mostly depending on how well the war was going. He also said that typically, the voters would support the effort for two years and then started losing interest and support would wither.

He acknowledged that seemed facile but posited it as a rough rule of thumb. I gave it some thought, went over our history and decided the guy had a good idea.

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... but what I've been saying in writing and in presentations is that the American public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major involvement in stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, or whatever. So rather than kind of ease ourselves in, we need the capability to surge early (both military and political/economic efforts) and count on diminishing our role in three years. That one of my critiques of 3-24: it sort of assumes that we'll stay involved until "success." I think that's politically unrealistic.

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Totally agree!

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I believe, for instance, that the current "surge" in Iraq is a good idea three years too late. If we'd done it in the summer of 2003, it might have made a decisive difference.

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Agree but would add that had we been better prepared going in (training and doctrine wise) there may have been no need for a surge at all...

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What this means is that the military and the other agencies of the government need a surge capacity. This means not just troops, but stuff and other capabilities as well. To give one example, we need the ability to reconstitute a defeated army and police force starting within a matter of weeks, not after we've had two years to spin up. John Agoglia, who was one of the CENTCOM planners for OIF, says that he found to his dismay that he wouldn't have been able to get contract police trainers in Iraq until months after a contract was signed. That's why we squander the "golden hour." Timing matters greatly in stabilization and counterinsurgency, yet we operate on our own time schedule unlinked to the life cycle of the conflict we're getting involved in.

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Again totally agree.

As has been said before, parts of the Armed Serices have been at war off and on over the last 60 years -- the USG and DoD -- and the Army -- have not. I suggest a big part of the problem is applying peacetime rules (everything from the way the Pentapod asylum, to congress, ALL the OGA and the contracting system work) in such situations is a big part of that crank up problem. That really needs to be fixed. We are masters at cobbling together solutions to problems -- most of which we create ourselves...

As to two years or three, I think he's got the low end but agree with you that three years should be the absolute top. Planning for more than that is an invitation to major domestic political problems.

I still say the Police training bit would best be served by dedicated ARNG/USAR MP Bns, located in metro areas converted into the Police training role -- those units already have a host of serving cops a members...