The editor butchered it.
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The editor butchered it.
note your interesting corollary of flawed COIN efforts and our flawed cities.
The linkage that occurs to me is the US Congress... :mad:
Ditto to what Ken said; very good piece.
I especially liked it because it places limits on what American military power can realistically accomplish. This is an especially important point for policy makers to consider.
But ref the other thread on Coin I still disagree with your premise that we should treat, when we do get involved in them, counterinusrgency wars as something other than war. I think that in so doing this you actually make it easier for policy makers to violate the analysis that you provide in this article because by telling people that it is not war but something else it somehow creates the idea that people wont die and it will be easy.
Particularly since, from a national perspective, I suspect we are generally unwilling to support the length of time, political dexterity and depth of commitment required to prevail (as Steve does point out)...
And COIN is never easy; relatively simple as conflicts and the TTP go; yes. Easy; No, never.
I like the article overall and I can buy most of it.
I do have a question though about your statement regarding concerns of interference or puppetry by other large interests being unfounded or not having come to fruition.
Although it's true the whole world didn't go communist on us during the cold war there was quite a bit a expansion which was of issue, Right?
Also can we really say today that if we're not involved someone else won't get involved instead?
I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).
But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."
If we look at South America wasn't the whole thing certain groups of leaders going after other groups of leaders in order to forestall expansion?
I'm afraid to go to much into detail considering I don't remember where I read what and when:D
I can go with the premise of establishing precedence to bring more bite to our bark though:rolleyes:
But in Latin America we eschewed massive direct involvement in counterinsurgency. We provided fairly significant counterinsurgency support. I have no problem with that. What I take issue with is reaching the conclusion that if a partner regime is not able to manage and execute a counterinsurgency campaign on its own, we'll come in and do it for them. What I'm suggesting is that a regime that is too incompetent or unpopular to defend itself is a bad bet. What we tend to do is demonize the insurgents so as to convince ourselves that this bad bet is worth making.
I would think we're pretty much in agreement then.
Honestly I'm pretty sure the plans were never to go in and do what we are doing now, but you make a mess you have to clean it up, and any time there is major change in a countries leadership there is going to be a mess.
The overarching concern you have may be somewhat a moot point in the long run but I guess considering politics and its ability to screw things up it's probably good to get out the no-go recommendations ahead of time:wry:
You're right there. I've kind of played around with that idea: with conventional war, there is usually a discrete decision point when the president can weight options and balance benefits against costs and risks. With counterinsurgency, there is seldom such a discrete decision point. We find ourselves enmeshed through a series of seemingly minor decisions.
What I'm trying to say is that I think we overestimate the strategic costs of disengagement. And we do ourselves a double disservice by this. It leads us to throw good money after bad. And, it takes away the incentive for our partner regime to undertake deep, hard reform. I'm convinced that one reason the government and military of El Salvador undertook the reform that allowed an eventual resolution of the conflict was because they were convinced that Congress would cut them off if they didn't. The elites in South Vietnam or Iraq never believed we'd walk away, so they refused to undertake reforms (which would have cost them in both power and money).
Phrased differently, we need a strategy of "tough love."
I have argued in the air power posts here at the forum and over comments to the blog entry by Major General Dunlap that the country never again will give us ten to twelve years to conduct COIN operations, although I was castigated for saying so.
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...terinsurgency/
And I have also argued that timeliness was missing from the campaign, extending it and strengthening the insurgency to the point that we fueled the fire rather than extinguishing it.
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2006/...l-wars-manual/
The rest of your paper is interesting, and I am not per se commenting on it or your other theses or arguments in it. But I am mentioning that I agree in the superlative with you that the David Galula ten year COIN operation (these were not your words, they are mine and mine alone), while interesting, is an artifact of history. Professionals might like to think about it and train on it and read about it and wish for it -- but modern day America will never support a campaign through two and a half Presidential administrations. Things have changed too much. Pie in the sky, says I.
This is why I have been so interested in the campaign in Anbar (and in particular, Fallujah, Operation Alljah), because it has occurred as if on steroids -- in three years as opposed to ten.
What I've tried to suggest is that the public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major, direct involvement. It will tolerate a long period of advisory, support, and indirect involvement. To me that says we need to be able to really surge a massive capability quickly because the clock is running. In Iraq, we didn't get serious until the three year window of opportunity had passed.
My feeling on Dunlap's argument is that there is a lot of truth and value to it. My problems are: 1) it comes close to equating strategic success with servicing targets; 2) it as much a barely camouflaged ploy to retain service budget and force structure as it is a idea for a more effective American strategy.
I've literally screamed at my Army colleagues when they use the word "Army equities." I contend the Army has no business having "equities." That's like talking about the accounting department's "equities" in a corporation. I often suspect that idea would be met with utter comprehension within the Air Force.
Steve that is just plain scary, that combination of words has that business/short term investment feel to it that I hate and feels so at odds with everything else we say we stand for. I think that getting comfortable with terminology like that helps make politicians, appointees and perhaps others see this as a "business" and see us as "assets and liabilities". We should work to identify ourselves in terms that reflect how we want to be seen - maybe - people, leaders, soldiers, combat vehicles, weapons, etc. I'd prefer to be referred to as a "knuckle dragger" vs. and "equity" or a "share".Quote:
I've literally screamed at my Army colleagues when they use the word "Army equities." I contend the Army has no business having "equities." That's like talking about the accounting department's "equities" in a corporation. I often suspect that idea would be met with utter comprehension within the Air Force.
Best, Rob
You'd be amazed at how often it comes up. And at very senior levels.
The Strategic Studies Institute has, over the years, been criticized for not "promoting Army equities." Every time I hear that I feel the need for a Howard Dean primal scream.
http://tbn0.google.com/images?q=tbn:...nch.scream.jpg
Nice to see my thoughts expressed by someone people might actually listen to. We might want to add, "Bomb the hell our of your palaces, party headquarters, army, secret police etc." Since new regimes will understand the US reluctance to take causalities, they are much less likely to call our bluff if we threaten bombing which we can do without causalities.
Thirty percent of the country is going to call that "cutting and running." How could we execute your recommendations in the current political environment?
Funny thing (well, not I mean funny like I'm a clown, not like I amuse you, I make you laugh) but I was just writing a section on that. I was arguing that President Bush seems inclined to a high risk/high potential payoff leadership style. In terms of the initial intervention in Iraq, he greatly overstated the certainty of his case. Since then, he has portrayed the only options in Iraq as "victory" or "cut and run."
But here's what I tried to suggest: our conundrum is that to get the public and Congress to support involvement in counterinsurgency in the first place, we have to overstate the threat and the extent of American interests. Americans don't want their sons and daughters dying for something that is peripheral. That then limits our strategic flexibility because it creates the impression that disengagement would be disastrous. It would be a defeat.
To me, that is just one more reason why the United States is ill equipped to undertake major counterinsurgency operations. My solution is that we no longer "do" counterinsurgency, but we do peace enforcement/stabilization. Two strategic and political advantages of that: it makes it easier to disengage when the costs exceed the expected benefits (while Clinton's withdrawal from Somalia and Reagan's withdrawal from Lebanon may, as commonly believed, give al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and others the impression that the United States can be influenced by terrorism, they were probably the right moves). So long as we treat counterinsurgency as a variant of war, that means that one side (the side we support) is "right" and the other is "wrong." Americans don't like ties.
Second, casting the activity as peacekeeping/stabilization rather than counterinsurgency (with its Cold War overtones) will make it easier to attract multinational support.
I think that the "US reluctance to take casualties is restricted to about a third of the population -- the most visible and vocal third, to be sure -- and that they are joined in this concern only on occasion and that occasion is whne the casualty causing effort is either taking too long (Steve's three years, my two...) or is obviously not doing well. The remaining third is comfortable with the casualties.
I'd like to suggest that the respective 'thirds' are immutably the same people but they are not. A great deal of objection is ideology based. Look no further than Kosovo and Iraq, respectively, to see who goes to which third.
Apply that rule of thumb to any war we've ever been including the current efforts and you see the American people will accept massive casualties if results are being produced; if there are no good results in their belief then the tolerance starts to slip. You can even review the domestic history in WW II -- after the summer of '44, tolerance for the war started downward precipitously.
As a corollary and an aside, that same two years (or three) applies to those fighting; after a couple of years, it gets really old. That really need to be considered. Troop run down or wear out can have really adverse consequences...
Just by leading and accepting that 30% will ALWAYS exist; that's been true in every war from the American Revolution forward (again to WW II -- the nation was not as unified on that as many now like to believe). The key is not that 30%, it's the 30% in the middle, the swing vote as it were. As long as they see 'progress' of a sort, they will vary from 'tolerate' to 'support' and that gives the Admin of the day about 60%. That's enough for government work.Quote:
Thirty percent of the country is going to call that "cutting and running." How could we execute your recommendations in the current political environment?
All that does not even address the chimera of "bomb" -- that just flat doesn't work, it NEVER has (the Serbs in Kosovo didn't start coming undone until the KLA was in on the ground). That aspect of Air Power (a power which I support and respect) is a very dangerous myth -- as the Israelis found out last year.
You make two important points.
1. Finding someone else to be the boots on the ground works extremely well. (Even Rumsfeld couldn't screw up the first few weeks in Afghanistan.)
2. I agree that for certain tasks, soldiers are absolutely necessary, but Hezbollah hasn't launched an attack into Israel since the war which supports my point: if the objective is deterrence, a ground war isn't always necessary. (With all the work Hezbollah has done rebuilding, they don't want it all destroyed again over minor disagreements and airpower can easily destroy bridges, buildings etc.)
Steve, Colonel Warden gave almost that exact speech during the workshop on SMART Wars. This is somewhat the basis of his decapitation strategy. The Air Force and the Army should get drunk togather and eat some of your BBQ and I think they might find out that their thinking is not always as differant as people assume.:wry:
Ron, I think that has a lot to do with it.
Thesis: A part of me senses it comes from the fact that the Acquisition Corps has such high promotion rates (per Congressional mandate, I think?), ergo a lot of senior people probably have done time in acquisition somewhere.
Any guess if I'm right?
I remember when I was 11-12 and read the stuff my dad brought home from work on occasion. I know acquisition work basically -is- the military gone corporate, knew it then...But it still unnerved me, when I really paid attention, to see the focus be on "profit" for the government orgs, etc. It all made sense within context, but I was always worried that the terminology seemed to make the whole matter too...pedestrian, I guess. (As I recall muttering to my dad after being nosey and looking at a powerpoint print-out he'd brought home, something like, "The fact that everybody else measures profit and loss on this by how many flag-draped caskets come home, rather than line item budgets and cost-plus contracts...There are people in these meetings who actually remember that, right? That we're not talking about production of chips for the PlayStation?")
As if fielding stuff for the guy out in God-knows-where, who lives or dies on the little things, was the same as producing cars for GM, or chips for Intel.
I saw plenty of times where that wasn't the case, where what was really being dealt with came slamming to the forefront, but I always wondered what that did to mindsets.
You must be trying to be generous to find an example counter to your argument, because by the time of the Cold War, the CCP/PLA was not involved in an insurgency but rather a party to an outright civil war. They were insurgents/guerillas against the KMT in the 30s (particularly amongst those who did not make the march north, best chronicled in Benton's Mountain Fires), and in WWII against the Japanese -- to the benefit of the Allies. Given the state of the KMT and its army (if Dreyer's account, China at War, 1901-49, is even 1/10th correct -- boy, is that a dismal chronicle) after the Japanese invaded, one has to wonder whether the latter might not have prevailed in China. The course of the war in Asia might have looked very different without the PLA* insurgency against the Japanese and amongst the Chinese. Who knows what course the Cold War might have taken -- for American national interest good or ill -- without the Chinese communist insurgency.
(*I use PLA specifically here, because the party (CCP), as an independent organization was not relevant at the time (since '29) -- the Army led the effort, both the fighting and the politics/policies.)
This I like very much. Ah, the Theory of Spilt Milk. It alone is a good reason for folks to study economics.
I sense something of a pathological fear in the American psyche about losing wars. There tends to be an apocalyptic view on the consequences of such an outcome. But if you only look at the Brits in the Rev War (loss is followed by 150 years as a superpower) such a preconception about what loss means is not entirely founded. I might call it an examined portion of the American Way of War.
Cheers,
Jill
you seem to have decided to ignore it. Not only did you miss or at least not acknowledge my contention that most Americans do not care about casualties as long as there are results but you took my very minor reclama of an afterthought to your point and twisted... I'm sorry, spun it, to make your point(s) again...
Good try. ;)
Of course finding someone else to do ones dirty work is always preferable -- just not always possible. It also has the same downside as does commitment of Americans. To wit, if it takes too long and doesn't produce results, the clamor to disengage rises. I never cease to be amazed at how little journalists, marketing guys and politicians, of all people, know about the great unwashed. It seems some want to believe that Americans can be manipulated around their patience and tolerance levels. Those levels are really pretty high but they aren't inexhaustible nor are the finite levels really negotiable.
Deterrence is a very bad strategic policy. It, effectively, is bluffing. Never a good idea between Nations. Unless you're prepared to shoot, do not unholster your weapon...
Kosovo (among others) again offers an example.
I'd also point out that Hezbollah probably got told by the Pasdaran to cool their jets after last years unwanted war and that they have other problems right now. Not to mention that Rumsfeld and Franks DID screw up the first few weeks in Afghanistan. Badly...
Ken: Maybe Rummy only had a good couple of days. Using the Northern alliance accomplished a lot. Assuming it would do everything, was of course a mistake. One that still hasn't been completely corrected.
You'll notice that the first thing on my original list was palaces. Libya is a good example of what airpower can accomplish if you hit targets that the leader cares about. UPI April 15, 1986.
Reports from Tripoli said there were heavy civilian casualties, including Khadafy's daughter, Hana, who died when U.S. bombs smashed into the Azizzia compound just outside Tripoli, which the colonel uses as a headquarters. Two of Khadafy's young sons also were injured.
Threatening to bomb where the leader lives isn't bluffing. All you need to do is program the Cruise missiles. And while your point about support for causalities was excellent, why take causalities if you don't need to? Khadafy stopped supporting terrorism. That's what really matters. Reagan was pretty popular, so bombing isn't bad politics either.
Interestingly, I was thinking about starting a thread on retreat. Mao renamed his retreat The Long March and made it a victory. The Brits celebrated Dunkirk. I was wondering if one of the reasons there is so much talk about adaptation here is because we have denied ourselves the use of the simplest and oldest way to adapt - retreating to regroup on better ground- because we have a pathological fear of moving backwards.
I think Reagan was one who understood the value of effective bargaining through clarity in purpose.
If bombing something or someone would facilitate that then great, but I think you would find that the greater part of what has been accomplished long term, would be more do to wisdom and smart communication.
Don't forget O.P. Smith in Korea for a great victorious "retreat"! Oops, that wasn't a retreat, it was an attack in a different direction. Perhaps what it comes down to is how to frame the matter. (I am being a bit tongue in cheek with Smith's comment -- he was earnestly trying to make the point that getting from Chosin back to Hungnam was not going to be anything easy, that they were going to have to fight for much of it.)
This brings to mind Lupfer's point in his Leavenworth Paper on German tactical doctrine in WWI, that it was very hard for the German military, culturally, to accept that the utilization of a tactical retreat could be to their operational advantage.
I guess this is on my mind because the influence of culture upon warfare and military policy has emerged as a major theme of my dissertation. How we do things is significantly affected by culture, whether it's strategic, institutional, or even societal.
What I am grappling with is to what degree the notion that Americans tend to dismiss the importance of such irrational, qualitative, touchy-feely influences is correct. I don't have any hard evidence in support, but (and I recognize the irony of this construct) it seems that a part of American culture is the tendency to devalue "culture" itself. Ok, that's not very clear, but it's an idea still in the primordial stages.
Cheers,
Jill
What ya'll are talking about also came up at SMART wars it was called the surrender option. In particular defeat at the military level can equal success at the political level. One example was the Cuban Missile crisis. The USSR quit,backed down,withdrew,whatever you want to call it but at the Political level they got everything they wanted. A communist Cuba and pledge not to invade Cuba...what did we get...we can run around saying we made them blink:rolleyes:
The interference in the trooplist and the plans of people on the ground by both Franks and Rumsfeld had several adverse consequences. Using the Northern Alliance and the way things unfolded was as much serendipity as anything -- had little to do with either of the two named. Still, mostly it worked and that's all that counts.
I did and the gist of your report makes your paragraph below sort of moot...Quote:
You'll notice that the first thing on my original list was palaces. Libya is a good example of what airpower can accomplish if you hit targets that the leader cares about. UPI April 15, 1986.(url given)
Mixed metaphors? :wry:Quote:
Threatening to bomb where the leader lives isn't bluffing. All you need to do is program the Cruise missiles. And while your point about support for causalities was excellent, why take causalities if you don't need to? Khadafy stopped supporting terrorism. That's what really matters. Reagan was pretty popular, so bombing isn't bad politics either.
Causalities or casualties? If the latter, I agree, nothing wrong with avoiding casualties -- if you can. Sometimes we can, sometimes we cannot. If we cannot avoid taking them, then we'd better do a good job and do it quick. Regardless, under any sensible circumstances (not always a given with the overall caliber of our politicians) the bulk of the American people will not object to casualties as many seem to believe.
OTOH, if you meant causalities, I don't support 'em, I just have to live with them. Thus, I have to take some even if I don't wish to do so. Same thing applies to Nations, even this one. :o
Was Reagan popular because of the bombing or did his popularity allow him to commit an act of war by bombing a sovereign nation that had only allegedly been a participant in terrorist actions. Was he popular because after years of Carter and the Tehran debacle plus his own Beirut debacle, he did something even if it was sort of inconsequential?
Check the dates on El Dorado Canyon and Qaddafi's cessation of terror support. Causality or casualty? (LINK check the Europen reaction and said cessation, 2/3 of the way down the page).
In any event, what would you do with a guy like Saddam who was known to sleep at lots of places and to have doubles? As Kim is suspected to do. Put your faith in an air blockade and you're going to be disappointed, put it in Tomahawks and your potential for disappointment just rose. Both are great tools with many advantages and I'm sure glad we have them and that they work as well as they do but without really accurate intel, they are borderline inconsequential for your stated purpose.
I don't know what your confidence in our intel capability to provide the timely information to do that with those tools is but mine isn't very high.
You seem to be looking for a not too costly way to apply military power and one that will be acceptable to those of the liberal or progressive persuasion or just those who may not be fully committed. Good luck; I doubt you'll find such. War isn't cheap; either do it right or don't do it. Regrettably, "don't do it" isn't always our call.
You and Jill might want to consider the fact that most British battles of great note and which are celebrated in little Victorian and Edwardian chapel stained glass windows all over the UK even up to the present day in Afghanistan are defensive battles. Most US battles given similar icon levels are attacks. Our cultures differ. So do our 'great' battles...Quote:
Interestingly, I was thinking about starting a thread on retreat. Mao renamed his retreat The Long March and made it a victory. The Brits celebrated Dunkirk. I was wondering if one of the reasons there is so much talk about adaptation here is because we have denied ourselves the use of the simplest and oldest way to adapt - retreating to regroup on better ground- because we have a pathological fear of moving backwards.
Consider also that for years at the NTC and JRTC the glaring errors made by units on rotations almost always involved two aspects of combat. Reconnaissance and Defense (and there's a big message in that...).
You might also give some thought to the well known quote from Captain Lloyd Williams, USMC.
Jill's on the right track -- it's the culture, that's what drives our doctrine; more importantly, it's what drives the troops who are perfectly capable of acting in the absence of doctrine. It's also the reason most American are willing to tolerate casualties -- if the job is done right
Doing the job right isn't that hard. Trying to find a substitute to avoid that or avoid the job altogether is quite difficult.
Doing the right think is expensive: in blood and treasure. That's why it's worth "shopping around." Military/Politics/patience with Khadafy was cheaper and more effective than a military solution with Saddam.
Isn't this highly likely to lead to anarchy/failed state/growing extremism and other undesirable consequences?
I was wondering if an American could've written "The Art of War." It seems to be very much part of a ying/yang culture.
Qaddafi got no military pressure to speak of; El Dorado Canyon was a feel good exercise and little more.
The military effort in Iraq had very little to do with Saddam, he was almost peripheral, an included benefit as it were. The only thing he offered that attracted a military effort was that he was resoundingly despised and that Iraq -- whose geographic centrality was the reason for the military effort -- was, due to him, a relatively (note that word) easy military task. The scope of effort was increased due to poor intel going in (and I'm not talking about WMD, they were also peripheral) not due to a flawed strategy.
So in essence, the right thing was done and "shopping around" occurred -- Iraq was far easier and far less disruptive to the world oil supply than would have been Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Syria -- all of which were practically speaking more 'deserving' targets for regime change. Aside from several difficulties with them that Iraq did not pose, the geographic centrality was absent.
The only valid comparison between Qaddafi and Saddam is that both were Muslim and apparently weird if not psychotic. That doesn't even address the fact that Libya is not in the ME and therefor the desired effect would not have been achieved, nor would the rest of the world have been as tolerant as they have been (due to Saddam's bad boy status when compared to Muammar who's just mischievous)...
Probably but what I was suggesting was that adverse effects of becoming mired in an internal war are often worse that the undesirable consequences of state failure. I think we have accepted the notion that failed states are this huge threat without really thinking it through.
Look at it this way--which would pose a greater danger to the United States: Somalia the way it is today or a major U.S. military presence trying to stabilize Somalia? Contrast that with Afghanistan.
So in that sense it's a valid comparison.
However, we did have a very real national interest at stake in a forceful response to the Airplane drivers. The failures of Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton to properly respond to a series of totally typical Mid Eastern based probing attacks against the US or its interests for 20 straight years prior to the workup by said airplane drivers almost unarguably led directly to that attack in 2001.
Thus we're in Afghanistan because it was in the national interest even if being in the country, per se, is not in the national interest.
Thus, I suggest it is not a totally valid comparison. :(
I think there are times we need to intervene, but it doesn't necessarily follow that we should stay and try to fix things that are bad broke. We could easily have gone into Afghanistan, busted up AQ, and left. If necessary, we go do that every few years. It's what I've called the Israeli strategy. It would be a mental adjustment for Americans because we have this obsession with relatively quick and decisive resolution to security problems. Well, I think we need to get over that. The places that are the most trouble today are so screwed up that fixing them just isn't worth the effort.
And, on the Afghanistan issue, let the record show that October 2000, I wrote the op ed which I've attached. It was rejected at 11 newspapers and hence never published.
press ran screaming out of their buildings when it appeared. :D
Pity it didn't get published.
I agree. That's why I shuddered when Powell made the alleged pottery barn comment. My solution is that we break things well, let's stick to that -- don't go unless it's necessary, if it is, then go, destroy heavily and then leave, rapidly -- while dropping there lots of little cards that say "Now behave or we'll be back." Then mail the UN a check for the cleaning crew (okay, we need to do that in a softer, more cooperative and collegial manner but I'm trying to save space here with just the high points...).
Again agree but there are, I think, two problems. Both could be overcome with a little education, I believe. The first is that the western world believes -- and our opponents will use -- the pottery barn bit. The second is that so do many Americans. The second could be changed fairly easily for most Americans who cling to that model; simply point out the cost and ask them to do a cost-benefit comparison. There would still be a few who objected vociferously but not all that many. Americans as a collective are pretty pragmatic.Quote:
...We could easily have gone into Afghanistan, busted up AQ, and left. If necessary, we go do that every few years. It's what I've called the Israeli strategy. It would be a mental adjustment for Americans because we have this obsession with relatively quick and decisive resolution to security problems. Well, I think we need to get over that. The places that are the most trouble today are so screwed up that fixing them just isn't worth the effort.
The first is a harder nut to crack. When you're the 800 pound gorilla, you don't get a lot of sympathy but I believe that if we state that will be the norm and the gradually ease into it over a few years (or incursions), it can fly. Certainly few if any are going to offer to help.
Now, all we need is ten years or so of foreign policy continuity... :rolleyes:
Re: the places most screwed up; Yeah, and Tom Barnett isn't helping. :)
Everyone one of those places is where the Brits and French drew lines on the map -- and the NKVD /MVD / KGB worked on for years. I envision all these old retired spooks watching CNN in Ekaterineburg and chuckling a lot... :(
Considering how many Russians died due to American weapons in Afghanistan, I'm pretty sure they are laughing very hard at our current troubles in the same place.Quote:
I envision all these old retired spooks watching CNN in Ekaterineburg and chuckling a lot...
Conflating terrorist attacks from Iranian Shi'i revolutionaries, Shi'i Hizbullah fighters waging primarily a civil war, and various Sunni Islamist radicals into a some sort of singular "probing" is problematic at best.Quote:
However, we did have a very real national interest at stake in a forceful response to the Airplane drivers. The failures of Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton to properly respond to a series of totally typical Mid Eastern based probing attacks against the US or its interests for 20 straight years prior to the workup by said airplane drivers almost unarguably led directly to that attack in 2001.
That's what we tried to do in Afghanistan in 2001, except NATO got stuck with the bill instead of the UN. Doesn't seem to be really working that well.Quote:
My solution is that we break things well, let's stick to that -- don't go unless it's necessary, if it is, then go, destroy heavily and then leave, rapidly -- while dropping there lots of little cards that say "Now behave or we'll be back." Then mail the UN a check for the cleaning crew (okay, we need to do that in a softer, more cooperative and collegial manner but I'm trying to save space here with just the high points...).
Steve - the Israelis don't seem to be doing particularly well with that strategy, beyond the fact that their strategic situation is completely different with our own. Constantly venturing forth to bust up enemies and leaving shattered countries in our wake is not a long-term strategy - it will only encourage, in the end, our enemies to strike from places they wish destroyed, watch as we do their work for them, and then recruit from the rubble. "Butcher and bolt" really didn't, in the end, work for the Brits in the NWFP - that's why they went to a "political agent" strategy at the end.Quote:
We could easily have gone into Afghanistan, busted up AQ, and left. If necessary, we go do that every few years. It's what I've called the Israeli strategy.
Really? They're solvent. Not mired anywhere right now they don't want to be. As secure as can be expected considering they're surrounded by enemies.
See, the difference--and Steve Biddle kind of turned this light on for me--is we operate under the delusion that everyone except a few bad people likes us so we can, working through local partners, win "hearts and minds." The Israelis don't. That leads to very different conclusions about the appropriate strategy. I am more and more leaning toward the alternative.
Solvency is assisted when the U.S. provides a quarter of Israel's defense budget.
Not mired anywhere? Does this map look familiar?
And the whole "bust them up and leave" strategy looks decidedly less steady after the latest affray in Lebanon, when Hizbullah proved it could both take and land punches with the IDF.
The Israeli strategy also is predicated on what is, in essence, a reactive and defensive posture towards the region. Israel cannot directly influence any of its neighbors and has no pretensions to do so. The U.S., as strategic superpower, is economically and militarily involved with hundreds of nations and actors. Withdrawing from this into a Fortress America setup would require a massive institutional reset on the part of the U.S. and indeed a substantial cultural shift. It's hard to see this happening.
Uh, well, that was the point. That and all the other fault lines where few to no Russians died and we are today over-involved...
Not at all as hopefully you'll find out in the ME. It is not a monolith but the methodology and the willingness to learn from the actions of others and piggyback on them -- or steal them outright is a long standing tradition.Quote:
Conflating terrorist attacks from Iranian Shi'i revolutionaries, Shi'i Hizbullah fighters waging primarily a civil war, and various Sunni Islamist radicals into a some sort of singular "probing" is problematic at best.
Sure it is. Working out okay, that is. Some folks in NATO may not be doing their share but there's absolutely nothing new in that, been a problem since the inception. Afghanistan was always going to take an incredibly long time and a lot of effort simply because the start point was so low. Coming along better than I thought it would. Getting NATO involved was a good foreign policy effort on the part of the Admin.Quote:
That's what we tried to do in Afghanistan in 2001, except NATO got stuck with the bill instead of the UN. Doesn't seem to be really working that well.
Steve can of course answer for himself but I suggest that if you bust up a couple -- really bust them up, not just piddle around as we did in Korea and Viet Nam the message will take.Quote:
Steve - the Israelis don't seem to be doing particularly well with that strategy, beyond the fact that their strategic situation is completely different with our own. Constantly venturing forth to bust up enemies and leaving shattered countries in our wake is not a long-term strategy - it will only encourage, in the end, our enemies to strike from places they wish destroyed, watch as we do their work for them, and then recruit from the rubble. "Butcher and bolt" really didn't, in the end, work for the Brits in the NWFP - that's why they went to a "political agent" strategy at the end.
Said piddling contributed to our woes today; the folks in the ME saw it as a fatal weakness and their penchant is to take advantage of weakness. Couple those flawed wars with our failure to respond adequately to the probes from the ME and their perception was a nation in severe decline. We may be declining but it's not that severe. So far...
Also, if you'll note, the majority of the wars in which we've been engaged for the last 232 years got started because the opponents thought we either would not fight or would be easy to beat...
It's too late to apply that methodology to Afghansistan or Iraq, we have no choice but to continue there but war is not fun and games -- if it is going to be done, it should be done correctly. "Limited war" is a myth. Trying to be nice invariably kills more on both sides including civilians and causes more damage than just slamming in and getting it done. Invariably.
"Butcher and bolt" will not work against a group of non-state actors (as in the NWF) but it will work against nations. For the strategy Steve suggests and with which I agree for most -- not all -- cases and for those non-state actors, all that's required is an improved Intelligence and Special operations capability. We can do that; whether we will or not remains to be seen.
few years and they'll tell you we can re-invade in a few years.
They'll also tell you that if we leave too early, we will have to do that and it will be far worse then than it is now if we have to go back...
All the comments from JJ and Walrus aside, we won't get any more help in the future than we did in the past. None except for the British and the Australians are putting anywhere near enough money into their Armed Forces -- and the British are dropping steadily -- why should they as long as we'll carry the load...