The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces
Many times the subject of training has come up here on the SWJ – we’ve discussed it here in regards to COIN skill sets: such as those associated with operating in a COIN environment; the traits, skills and attributes needed to advise foreign forces; how SOF has benefited from DOTMLPF; retention of soldiers and leaders (to include the attraction to PMCs), and we’ve even shared some lessons about training and how to make units good. SWJ member Ken White has written on many occasions that our biggest deficit resides in the funding of, the planning of, the execution of, and the lack of respect for proper training. We have also had many serious and in depth discussions on organizational (ex. best squad configuration, mech vs.light), equipping (materiel –ex. MRAP, small arms), doctrinal (ex. 3-24, 3-0), leader (ex. Best generals, the Yingling article), etc. – but I don’t feel we’ve spent the same quality time on training. It could be because its not so sexy, hot button, or emotional as many others – but the truth is, you can have the best quality folks with the best gear, and with poor training, somebody else will come along and ruin your day. We’ve succeeded because we do have “better” training then most of our opponents, and that when you sum up our efforts across the DOTMLPF spectrum – we do reasonably well as an aggregate.
The genesis of this thread came out of the final chapter of Field Marshal Viscount Slim’s book: Defeat into Victory, his account of the Burma Campaign during WWII. In the chapter entitled “After Thoughts” Slim ponders a number of things that I believe are timeless and as relevant today as when they were penned. Within that chapter there is a section marked “Special Forces”, where Slim ponders their utility based on his own experiences. He certainly had an opportunity to consider them, as he saw various special formation in his AOR, and many times had them assigned to him as part of the campaign plan – most notably for many is probably Ord Wingate’s Chindits.
You have to keep in mind, Slim was a superb trainer - having taken over a Corps in the midst of withdrawal in contact with the Japanese Army back to India, Slim had to face some tough realities – lacking resources, facing tough political pressure, and in the face of a foe that had been attributed bogeyman proportion, Slim grew formations of general purpose forces that eventually became better then their mythical opponents and conducted daily operations of seemingly great complexity under conditions that we’d have to scratch our heads at and wonder how they pulled it off. The terrain and weather in Burma are some of the most inhospitable to large combat operations and the enemy held many advantages at the time – Slim had few resources being among the lesser important areas in comparison to North African and Europe, or even the Pacific theater of operations. Slim had a host of challenges to overcome – he waged Joint and Combined Warfare (working with the Chinese, and the Americans), he had to train and equip indigenous forces from as far away as Africa (a BN, Regiment or Division of this and one of that), he had to overcome politics and egos, he had to overcome insurgent forces that had been brought over to the Japanese side (some Indian and some Burmese), and he had a tenacious enemy who had a great deal of wind behind them – he was not exactly primed for success – certainly not if your in 1942/43 looking forward vs. 2008 looking back! But Slim new he had to start with training – he opened a Jungle School, worked Air Operations (air landings, resupply, parachute, air mechanization, close air support, etc.) - hard given the operational conditions, and he worked staff training – Slim new training was the only thing that would make up for deficiencies in other areas. Slim had a vision and new the path led through some tough training that would prepare the men of what would eventually become the 14th Army for operations that by today’s standards would be those of SOF.
My own experiences lead me to believe that Slims observations are largely correct (since I was not there I’m limited to what I know through command and staff and applying it to what I read). I was once given a largely blank check about training – for 1 year my team of my 1SG, my PLs, my PSGs, and their NCO leadership had a surplus of resources – time perhaps being the most critical followed closely by land and ammunition to take a 100 man light Infantry company and transform it to a 170 man Stryker equipped rifle company – this is not about the vehicle, but it adds a level of complexity to it that requires additional time (and other resources) to train. We had a great team behind us helping us out – the BN and BDE CDRs and their staffs – but largely the task fell on the soldiers and leaders of the company. The rational behind opening up the flood gates fro resources were that a/1-24th of the 1/25th SBCT would be one of two companies to conduct the IOT&E (Initial Operating Test and Evaluation) of the SBCT concept at Fort Knox in the Summer of 2003 and big Army and many others from DoD would be watching to examine the results – there was (and remains) a war on.
So from about August of 2002 following the MAV-CE (Medium Armored Vehicle –Comparison & Evaluation) test at FT LEWIS between a platoon of the improved M113A3 and the Stryker (I was one of the BN AS3s at the time and involved with the observations and AAR of the TTP used by the platoons) back in the South Rainier Training Area – then took A/1-24 to begin NET fielding) – we were off and running. For about 1 year we were given a lion’s share of resources to ensure that training deficit would not enter into the results of how the IOT&E played out. I had lots of ammunition, land and a long, long leash (then LTC Emmet Schaill and COL Bob Brown underwrote allot of mistakes and risk on my part - this is also a good place to mention 1SG Joe House, BN CSM Art McCann & BDE CSM Carlton Dietrich - all critical leaders in the endvour). We went about it I think in a smart manner that addressed the task and challenges associated with the scope of the mission. We were all over the place – all of FT Lewis and Yakima, the only folks we played second fiddle to were 3/2 SBCT preparing for their OIF deployment, 2/75th and occasionally the Washington ARNG as it prepped for its OIF deployment – but even then since time was provided, we found ways to train. We had shared vision from the BDE CDR down, and the resulting training of continuous distributed operations from squad through company (with BN and BDE attachments) was exactly what was needed.
The IOT&E turned out to be a great test – continuous operations across pretty much the entire training areas available (at the time most of it), some mounted, some dismounted, offense, defense, stability, security, etc – for three 14 day iterations with some smaller excursions in between we trained. It was fully resourced and some of the best training I’d ever seen – even when compared to my CTC experiences. We emerged a fantastic company, and I left command of Alpha shortly thereafter to take the BN HHC.
In the meantime LTC Schaill and COL Brown (COL Schaill now has the EBCT at Bliss and BG Brown is out at PACOM) had been refining their ideas about training to extend it to the rest of the BN and BDE. COL Brown and his staff came up with some great ideas and resources to extend the quality of training to the other BNs and special companies in 1/25th and fostered that kind of thinking in subordinate leaders all the way down to lowest PVT (if you Google COL Robert Brown, Lancer BDE, SBCT, Agility and Adaptive Leadership – you’ll probably find several great articles he penned). The 1/25th went on to have two great MRE/MRXs at the NTC and JRTC, then a deployment to Mosul that went up against a tough enemy – for some good reading take a look at Michael Yon’s blog as he covered it.
My point in writing about all this is to inform some of our non-uniformed folks in the SWC about the critical role good training (and there is such a bad thing as “not so good training”) and resourcing training play in creating good soldiers, leaders and formations that deploy and win in the adverse and challenging conditions in the places where we fight our wars. It is also to show what is possible in a relatively short time when “better then adequate” resources are combined with good leadership containing a vision about the challenges that will face that force when it goes from training to facing a cunning and creative enemy that wants to survive and win as much as you do.
I’d also like to ask if we think we could do better? Is the training and resourcing available to our SOF the best we can do, or could we extend that level of training and resourcing to the larger force like I had it extended to me and A/1-24th (and later the whole of 1/25th)? I think the regular forces can achieve a great deal more then given credit for (we certainly see it in Iraq and Afghanistan) on a consistent basis if given the resources and the responsibility/ authority to achieve those results. It’s a case of priorities and underwriting junior leaders so we grow (and sustain) a culture of innovation, adaptiveness and agility that flourishes not only in war, but in our peace time preparations for war – so regardless of where we go or when we go, we can seize and retain the initiative much faster. Some of it is culture, some of it is resources – but the consequences are of vital importance to the health of our armed forces.
A few additional thoughts
Is the thinking that its too resource intensive to provide the quality of training available to SOF to the larger GPF/MPF force pool? Or is it the thinking the GPF/MPF formations can not achieve the same (or close to) standards of the smaller elite force populations? Or is it the idea that only SOF forces require that level of training as they are deployed on a smaller scale, in immature AORs and must be better trained to cope? I'd say with the current challenges ahead to the existing force structure if its the last on we can certainly justify the need.
Best, Rob
A really good thread Rob!
I think much of the disconnect between the non-uniformed (not meaning uninformed in the least, though) out there who may postulate about the military, technologies, and strategic underpinnings, is the fact that it often takes a uniformed mind to appreciate the impact of training.
The realities of the training grind are often lost on those who would propose wholesale shifts in capabilities, mission, T/O&E, etc. Heck, it's even lost on the procurement folks who at times throw equipment at the troops when it has only been tested by Marines in their formal MOS school.
I concur wholeheartedly that main forces can do so much more (and probably have a baseline of training to do so well) than they currently have the authority for. It's that trust and confidence that's lacking. The opposite attitude rears its ugly head when SOF cannot accomplish some things (I'm currently reading Robert's Ridge) and the more conventional folks start to throw the Rambo moniker around.
When I was in Australia this summer, I had an interesting discussion with one of my counterpart umpires. He mentioned that among the Australian Army, the main forces are generally considered better prepared for COIN, humanitarian assistance, FID, and all-round small wars, while their SOF formations are better trained to execute conventional ops.
This is a great thread...
Thanks, Rob. It preempts a blog article I was working on but that's good -- hopefully, it'll get more discussion here. Everyone above has some great points!
Rob asks:
Quote:
"I’d also like to ask if we think we could do better? Is the training and resourcing available to our SOF the best we can do, or could we extend that level of training and resourcing to the larger force"
That is an important question and it gets obscured here and elsewhere because, IMO, the issue becomes not one of roles, missions, capabilities and the attainment of the desired effects for the US but rather a battle of egos, turf, dollars and spaces. Having been on both sides of the Big Army and SOF curtain I have no doubt that BOTH sides are guilty of this.
There is no question of a need for SOF or for SF -- the two are not synonymous regardless of efforts to make them so -- but I believe there are roles and missions questions that will impact training. We are confronted with the fact that a Battalion from the 82d is doing Ranger like missions for a variety of reasons -- and doing them well. We are confronted with the fact that organizations designed for the UW mission (and some of its highly classified adjunct missions) are being employed on ID missions. There are certain skill sets form UW that translate very well to ID; there are also a number of UW skills (to include those adjunct missions) that are not needed for ID.
As Norfolk says, most Armies use their conventional forces for ID and do it well; thus we are confronted with SF being essentially over qualified for the ID mission. We're using Hummers to do pickup truck work. A further concern is the quantity of folks required for ID; the SOF community cannot and should not provide the quantities required, to even attempt to do so will cause a dilution of quality problem in the community. My question is that, accepting the need for a UW mission capable force for a large variety of missions in both peace and war, should that difficult to obtain capability be roled as a primary ID element to the detriment, however slight, of its primary mission?
The Groups are also used for DA missions -- that amounts to using those same Hummers for sports car work. Not that they cannot and do not do the missions well; just that it's misuse and has the potential to do damage as individuals switch between missions. The great guys will cope -- everyone isn't great. The question to me is should DA be a SF mission or are competing skill sets and perhaps a different mental attitude and full time focus required?
Look also at Strategic Recon, an openly known mission. Is SF best for that job? They certainly can do it but in some cases they are again overtrained with regard to total skill sets and perhaps not as well trained in some desired skills as they might be. That mission is so difficult and dangerous that we may be sending that Hummer to do a job better suited to a Motocross bike (IOW, are we spending a quarter mil to train folks for a 60 K job? Can we afford the loss of the hard and long time to develop UW skills to a mission a different training regimen can handle?). The question is should that mission devolve to a new and different sort of unit that is culturally tuned to use extreme stealth?
The issues then for UW versus ID are that the Groups are over qualified and their critical skills are degraded (and this is even more disadvantageous when the DA mission moves to the fore; in the current or most envisioned environments mentoring local Security Forces is perhaps more important than taking down HVTs even if it isn't as much fun), they do not and probably never will have the quantity of people needed for ID in a medium sized nation. Regardless of all that, the question that then arises is can they do it better than conventional forces which have been provided better training? I think not but that is certainly arguable. What is not arguable in that case is that best is the enemy of good enough...
None of that should be construed as SF/SOF bashing, it is not. Been there and done that -- I am merely asking questions that I think deserve honest consideration. This is not the place to answer them in any detail, certainly -- but thinking it through wouldn't hurt.
All that is way off the question that Rob raised; can we do a better job of training our conventional units. I submit that the answer is, emphatically, yes. That we do not is due to habit (we're still operating on WW I parameters), inertia (as Wilf said:
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"More than you know. US SOCOM is a hostage to the institutions and events that created it. You always get back to the "I wouldn't start from there, if I were you." Look at all the mucking about in the re-creation of the 75th Ranger Regiment. If you started with a clean sheet of paper, things would look a whole lot different. - same for UK SF." (emphasis added / kw)
and parochialism. We really need to take an objective look at what we're doing, realize that the Army of today is not much like the Army of even 2000 -- much less 1918 -- and fix the problem.
Lieutenants today are routinely doing things that the LTs of 2000 in most units could not dream of doing and that's a good thing. Joe today has gear that only some SOCOM elements had in 2000 -- and generally, he uses it well. It's a different Army, it trains better than it ever has before and, IMO, that's still not good enough. It deserves better training, most particularly at the enlisted and officer entry levels.
Another part of the problem is that there are senior people who are not terribly enthusiastic about fighting wars, they'd prefer waxing and polishing combat vehicles, brassoing cartridges, fretting over uniforms and haircuts and worrying unduly about their and their units reputation or mystique -- and I have, unfortunately, worked for folks who did all those things -- instead of truly thinking about how to do the job better and doing what's best for the nation. Those kinds of folks have always been around and probably always will be. There are more of them in the big Army simply because it's bigger; they also exist in elsewhere. They just have to be bypassed.
Norfolk also mentioned the training and employment of Battalion Scout Platoons in Canada and here. I have to agree with him. I've watched Commonwealth Armies do Recon and they have us beaten across the board. Our so-called Recon elements are ideally structured and equipped for Flank Screens, Covering forces and Economy of Force employment and they do those things well -- they are not trained and equipped for reconnaissance and, mostly, do not train for it very well so they naturally don't do it well. That doesn't address the problem of Commanders who do not know how to use their recon elements -- or are afraid to 'risk' them doing their designed job...
I noted the organization for the HBCT Cav Squadron and was happy they had created a true Recon element (except for the M3s, don't get me started on that vehicle) -- until I found out that the new proposal is for three Brad plts and two Tank plts per troop. Great for the combat missions but they ain't gonna be Scouts. Regardless of the fact that both CTCs have nicked most units for poor to non-existent recon work for years and still do so...:mad:
Back to the north German plain...
Rob also posts some more of Slim's thoughts, all of which are still totally valid, all of which we also learned in WW II and all of which we too often ignore today. We need to take care of Joe -- and we are not doing that.
Exactly. We agree on the problem
but see different solutions...
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Originally Posted by
Global Scout
Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight...
Yes and no, some Army units defied the Sanchez 'wisdom' and did that. The bigger issue is why did not the initial Army units into Iraq know what to do in the situation in which they found themselves?
Simply because they hadn't trained for it. BCTP in those days; you won the war with a final attack, turned off the lights and the computers and left the room. Armies do what they're trained for; the US Army found itself in a situation it had not trained for and it floundered -- that's a lick on 20 plus years of very senior leadership and the then commanders in Iraq...
There will never be enough Special Forces to do a wholesale attack and occupation.
I'd also submit that if both SF and the rest of the Army would start talking to each other instead of acting like a pair of females who wore the same dress to a party, they both might learn something...
(and yes, I know SOCOM is part of the problem)
Maybe there's hope, I heard 3d Gp and the 82d pulled off a good op not long ago...:cool:
Quote:
"...Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts."
Sort of sums up the problem, doesn't it? What if those specialized forces are not available in the quantities required due to either sheer numbers or diversion to other missions?
Why is that E2 nervous? Why are you not prepared to trust his LT? Because neither has been adequately trained and we know that.
The issue is not who does what, it's what forces we have and how well they're trained. On that score, even SOF can screw the pooch on occasion, foul ups are not confined to the big Army. There was this suburban full of interesting gear my son's rifle platoon from the 82d found in the street back on OIF2... :D
I've seen a lot of clown operations on both sides of the SOF / conventional fence. Combat'll do that. One of the worst firefights I saw in VN was between two Mike Force Companies...
I'll also mention that a recurring theme from both Afghanistan and Iraq in addition to the major point I cite below is that there is a lack of unity of command...
"...You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.[/QUOTE]
I agree that our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts. That's the real point here, is it not?
Given the absolute fact that the US Army recognized as far back as 1986 that these types of conflict would be the future norm, whose fault is that?
However, you can compare our Army to the Brits, I do it all the time. There's one massive difference -- the Brits train well on the basics; we ignore the basics. Every after action report I've seen, every CALL bulletin, everyone I've talked to (and that includes some SOF folks... ;) ) who's been in any of the three current theaters says the same thing -- we do not do the basics well.
The point is, as you so amply illustrate, we don't train well enough.
Our problem with the basics is not that we don't
recognize them and know they need to be trained, it's a combination of philosophy, cost and human fallibility.
Most of our initial entry training, officer and enlisted is based on WW II models (which in turn was predicated on WW I models). Those techniques worked marginally for a large mass Army of draftees and by the end of WW II, were generally fair. However, given the fact that the US Army has been at peace since 1945 (I know parts of it have not been but the institution has been..) and given the general softening of society, the mothers of America are not willing to accept a significant number of injuries to their kids in training. Thus those items that can be injurious are softened or eliminated.
The broader problem is that the Army has not adapted to the fact that Joe Entrant, 2007 version, is far more mentally capable (and less emotionally and physically capable but not terribly so) of absorbing more and better training. We train a mile wide and an inch deep; many of the basics are taught but only superficially and they are not drilled in (a critical point). Initial entry training for combat arms enlisted folks should be around 32 weeks -- it's only a little over half that in many cases; Officer accession training should be about a year, it's less than half that. So the philosophy is bad.
In fairness, the Marines do better.
The Army believes it cannot afford to train an individual for more than his or her next job. This is obviously fallacious because at any institutional level, the trainees or students will almost invariably perform the duties of at least one more rank step and most likely two before they get additional training -- this is just dumb; by refusing to spend the money up front, we make subsequent training more expensive, shortchange those trained -- and we get people killed unnecessarily due to that. The Tillman case comes to mind. So the cost factor is very real and very false logic.
Then there's human fallibility. It's a big problem but I'll cite just two examples. Immediate action on an M16/M4 is simple but calls for drilling and muscle memory or it doesn't become the reflex action it should be. This may have changed but 30 years ago, the solution was not to drill it in but to extend the time allotted to perform the action to save training time (and go easy on the Drill Sergeants). Hopefully, they are no longer teaching any use of the forward assist assembly and I don't know what that time is today but if it's more than five seconds...
The second item is that those tasks which garner low pass rates in training are not trained in the schools and training centers in many cases, they are flagged out for "in unit training." Not because they're too difficult in all cases for the institution to train but because the low pass rate makes the school or center look bad. There's more but those are two examples.
Then there's the fact that units don't have time in too many cases to properly train because of the same three factors -- but that's another thread.
Some of my best friends are in SOCOM...
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Originally Posted by
Global Scout
. . .
thank you for recognizing that SOCOM is part of the problem for SF, but the reality is they are not "the" problem.
True and under some Commanders, they've been helpful at removing the bars. That will continue to vary. The big Army mindset on the part of some senior folks therein is also part of the problem. It's complex and not easily solved but it needs to be, I think...
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... As for 3d Gp and the 82d working together, that happens plenty of times at the Co and below level, where there are no political agendas, only a desire to win. Too bad most of the times you do it, you have to hide the cooperation from higher.
True, yet I think this one was a top down effort in both chains; not there so can't say for sure. In any event, the guys on the ground do generally work it out; if we could fix the budget and spaces problem we could get rid of some of the feuding. :o
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Please tell your son to return my stuff! (only joking)
I didn't know you were in the Navy! Quelle horreur... :D
The size of the plate, the learning curve, the # of requirements in addressing risk
A good chunk of exchanges in the last 4 or 5 posts. CAVGUY brought up a good point in a meeting we were both at yesterday – the training plate is really only so big, and attempts to just keep piling stuff on top of it means it does not really get absorbed, it gets finger drilled (could mean it gets done –but not to anyone’s real benefit), or everything loses its importance. So what does belong in the PME? What should be emphasized up front? I think you have to begin by looking at what we are expected to do, that no one else is – wage land war – conduct ground combat operations (I’m a ground guy, and as Joint as I am – people construct cities on land). The next step is to look at the wide ranging conditions and missions associated with that (incidentally there is a piece in today’s paper quoting Rep Skelton on pushing DoD to review service roles and missions).
This I think is where things start to get greyer – what a state requires its military to do – there are the enduring things – provide security for the state (don’t let the Huns into the gates), and there are the important, but “more” temporal interests – that while remaining vital – such as stability in a particualr region where we require ourselves and others to have access to secure strategic resources to fuel economies – are not “quite” the same as meeting an opposite's uniformed army upon which the outcome may likely decide the course of a declared war.
In 2005 DoD issued Directive 3000.5 that put stability operations on par with other types of operations. This also coincides with Army doctrine that now reflects “full spectrum” as description of what we do. For those unfamiliar with 3000.5 I think its purpose was to lay out a number of tasks that are to be accomplished (many are still in the process or may not have fulfilled the spirit of the directive) that would help us address our current shortfalls for the wars we are in, and what many say are more the norm then the exception (I hate to attempt to tell the future – it always surprises me some - warning BAITED AMBUSH here out in front of the FLOT and in a FFA :)). As far as I know there has been no report card on how we’ve done in implementing it. Why would that be? I have a theory – to direct a service or agency to become the executor raises the question of resources (time, people, focus and yes money – but more of the other 3 I think since money still only gets you some of the second, none of the first and the 3rd…) – so what falls off the plate? Who takes responsibility for saying – you no longer have to do this at all, do it well, or do it not so well – and what do the latter 2 mean when others start to apportion blame?
I think some of it comes back to the golden mean – you don’t make too many radical departures from the golden mean in what is inherently a conservative organization (we conserve/preserve the security of our state).
So I think this leads to a learning curve where we depart from the very basic and enduring responsibilities. What Ken has said and I agree with, is that maybe our perception of the need for a learning curve is at least parlty in our head (what I mean is the time required to address new and relative unfamiliar conditions -METT-TC) - and that we can do much better with the Army of 2008 then the one of 1917 and 1941. We do need to scrape some of the empty carbs, and over kill off the plate to make room for the things that matter, but to do so we are going to have to get comfortable with excepting risk, and the best way to mitigate that is to make a better investment in people – which ties us into a number of other threads like the ones on leadership and retention.
I think there is linkage between what our civilian leadership want us to do based on their short term perception, and the enduring roles that don’t always forward in their objectives because they don’t (all) understand what it takes to build and sustain a military and its competencies. There we have to temper their expectations.
I wrote all this because I’m thinking about the level where senior leaders who must interact with policy must articulate the risk to policy objectives (near and far) by pursuing a particular course of action that ripples across the Strategic to the Tactical.
Increasing the amount of time available to train officers and NCOs outside of their units has a proportionate effect on a number of areas. Other agencies don’t even have the luxury we do with regard to sending their folks to levels of education and training – their bench is not big enough. If DoS fills a ILE/CGSC seat with a butt, nobody backfills that guy or gal (however I think the CAC recently said he’d work with agencies willing to do so by backfilling the seat with a uniformed guy/gal of like specialty – good for them/good for us). We have that luxury – no BN CMD slot generally goes unfilled (for very long) when a LTC(P) goes to AWC (Army War College). OPTEMPO in the current war has made that harder to do, but we’re still managing to get guys education – and in many cases we’ve figured out ways to get them some advanced civil schooling (ACS) both as a benefit to the individual, the Army, and the nation. I’d also say that time away from a platoon or company to attend additional training is not always a good thing – the experience of leading, commanding and yes even doing staff work – is invaluable to leader development –given our broad requirements – to include those outline in the GN Act – you get barely enough of the first two – but given we spend a great deal of time on staff supporting other CDRs and units – the last is also critical.
I’m not trying to take senior leaders off the hook in making room for more and better training that will better prepare us for the variety of conditions we face in meeting our responsibilities to the men and women we lead. However, identifying the risks so that everybody goes in pretty much with eyes wide open is critical to making things work in a manner that won’t haunt us down the road – we don’t want to be playing Jenga and not know it. I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation.
Best, Rob
Creating, Managing and Sustaining a Training Base
A few other thoughts come to mind with regard to establishing, sustaining and changing a training base – the first is on self imposed requirements – who do we want teaching at our schools and courses, who do we want writing our doctrine, who do we want running our service academies? Why do we want folks with operational experience doing that, say turning it over completely to contractors – who regardless of their experience, might not either have the same vested interest, or the more recent ground truth? What does that do to the equation of managing the force?
How about considering something like forecasting requirements? It could be for CL V (ammunition) – a STRAC table is supposed to provide a unit an idea of what related training it does, and how often – but it also determines how much ammunition is to be ordered, how much space is required on the installation to hold it, how much the producer of that ammunition can expect to have to make the following year – etc.
The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible.
If we create requirements for example that certain types of units have the x- amount of capacity for various levels of proficiency in a skill set(s) (we already do this by MTO&E) then that establishes the training base requirements that must sustained in order to meet those needs – i.e. if you create the need for more snipers for example, then your capacity to train those new sniper requirements needs to grow in order to meet it (you could resource it internally, or you could outsource it). My point is that with an increased investment in training, there is an increased investment somewhere along the training and sustaining base – and also along the rest of the DOTMLPF – more of something in this case equates to more of something else as well – this is also true when we move things around – the consequences for moving the Armor School to Benning with its 400 tanks – more AHA space, more competition for ranges, more motor pools and maintenance bays, etc. If we want more training on tanks for example – its more of something else, risk associated with not doing so, or some substitute that while more efficient might not be more effective – we’re back to tough choices.
Anyway – as we go down the path – its worthwhile to consider the ripples.
Best, Rob
Some great thoughts, Rob.
Sam's post is also great and he's correct in that the Army has a tendency to adhere to "crawl, walk, run" at all costs without considering the fact that some can walk when they get there and some can even run (and that is particularly true at levels above entry -- how many in your Advanced course had already commanded companies...).
Addressing your comments in order of your two latest posts:
Yes, the training plates (plural) are only so big. The question to me is what is allocated to which plate. I suggest, for Officers, that the Basic courses are far too short and the Advanced courses (and CGSC) are far too long *. The same applies to NCOES which is largely seen a as a joke by most NCOs (that may have changed recently, I know they're trying to change it); initial entry training is too short and the levels of NCOES are all too long (and too garrison oriented). So the total plate allocation doesn't need to increase, nor do we need to pile much else on -- rather, we need to take some esoterica off -- we just need to tune the allocation between the plates.
* Shy Meyer tried to fix thatin the late 70s, the bureaucracy won.
Stability operations may or may not need to be on a par with other operations (whatever that means) the fact remains that the Army's primary mission is land warfare and keeping said Huns away from the gate. If the Army can do that, it is more than capable of adapting to other minor missions. As you say, predicting the future is a virtual impossibility and we should not waste time and effort trying to do so.
You say -- and I totally agree -- that we need to get comfortable accepting risk. That is a profound and important statement and our failure in ever increasing amounts over the last 30 plus years to be willing to do that is a large part of the problem. We have become a comfortable bureaucracy and we like it. That needs to change.
You correctly illustrate the conflicting demands of time in the unit versus time spent away in education or training -- and that is a knotty problem. I think there is no one answer or 'typical' set of answers. People vary; all do not absorb knowledge or skills at the same rate and thus each individual's path must vary. That is very difficult to accommodate but we should at least try; good leaders and commanders do that for their people -- but the institution does not try. It should.
Allied to that though is another time impact -- length of tours. If I had a nickel for every senior Officer I've heard say "...just about the time I learned what the job entailed and became effective, I moved..." I'd send you a whopping check to take the entire Kansas chapter of SWJ to KC for steaks and buckets of beer...
That needs a hard look. I've often said DOPMA is dangerous and I really believe that. A lot of congressionally imposed stuff to achieve "fairness" in promotions is antithetical to best military practice.
That brings up an aside of our penchant for adopting civilian education, training and management practices which should be totally stopped...
You say:
Quote:
"I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation."
Couldn't agree more.
Going on to your next post, you suggest using contractors for training -- I agree that their use could and probably should be expanded but with the caveat that the majority need to be old retired heads and in uniform, ala Junior ROTC instructors.
Doctrine writers should be serving folks, period -- do not let a civilian, even one who's retired, anywhere near that. The folks that write it need to be the folks who are going to execute it, period. :eek:
You also said:
Quote:
"The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible."
I thought that's what we did? :confused:
and:
Quote:
"we’re back to tough choices."
Always been true and we have a bad tendency not to make those because we don't think it through and tend to take the easiest solutions. We like to avoid risk... :mad:
"Everyone is entitled to my opinion"
And that's all they are, opinions... ;)
Interesting you mention Bliss (where I think that along with Dona Ana and White Sands the Combined Arms Center should be) and Hood -- which I think can support the range requirements. Though admittedly the range training, firing and qualifications processes all need refinement. Hopefully, for small arms the Army will stop insisting on the helmet and go routinely to hot ranges, that would speed things up a great deal... :D
So would moving Tanks and other tracks without ground guides. Never ceases to amaze me that we can and do manage that in combat but cannot do so in training. Sort of makes "Train as you will fight" suspect... :wry:
'Safety' is vastly overdone in training, the excessive and poorly thought out training safety guidelines are a significant training distractor. Risk avoidance, like Scotch, is an acquired taste...
I say all that about Bliss and Hood because the move to Benning is going to create major problems in regard to ranges and training areas (benefit of a political rather than a practical decision) and barring a major war, I'll be surprised if anyone can fire a tank main gun east of the Mississippi in the next twenty to forty years due to 'environmental' constraints -- activism, actually...
Not a TRADOC apologist, but...
As the title indicates, I'm not a TRADOC apologist. Stove pipes abound and despite the efforts of several professionals they tend to remain in place regardless of how many times they reorganize the deck chairs. That said, much has been done in the past three years to address issues described throughout the thread....
1. Initial Entry Training has moved out of the classroom and into the field. Warrior Tasks are trained in conditions that replicate (as best they can) the operational environment. Whether to standard? That is a leader issue, but it is the TRADOC commander's explicit top priority. From time eternal everyone has lamented the Soldier that comes out of BCT as "not good enough" - but he's alot better today than in 2004.
2. All new 2LTs and WO1 (loggies, JAG, MC as well) go through the Basic Officer Leader Course (I believe 6 weeks) that is conducted almost entirely in the field. It is only after this that they go to branch specific training. Again, are they competent combat leaders as they exit - probably not, but the product is a heck of a lot better.
3. All NCO courses are less than 8 weeks (possibly two exceptions), Tasks formerly in ANCOC are now in BNCOC, ANCOC is mostly old 1SG Course, 1SG course is dead. Again, nearly all the "filler" is done upfront using dL. Mostly MOS specific field craft. Perfect - nah but better
4. CCC (formerly known as OAC) is in the midst of the same type of change (refrained from using transformation).
To be clear is all this good enough - nope and more can and should be done from a generating base perspective.
As for unit training, units are assembling and deploying on short time lines and I won't second guess commanders who are trying to prioritize what they train and do not. I do agree in the strongest terms that units/Soldiers rise (or not) to the level of their leader's expectations.
Live well and row
Many thanks, Hacksaw. That's all good stuff and
even with Google, it's hard to track down. Lot of guys in green right now aren't aware of all that (including my kid the know it all -- though he did tell me some of the bit about OSUT). An ORF like me is way outa the loop... :o
Still, I know we do better now than we've ever done, far better that in my day and even better than in 2004 as you say. Thanks again.
All you say is accurate, Rob and I don't entirely disagree.
However, three thoughts occur. I have three good friends, all retired COLs. the Tanker went to Leavenworth and later taught there. He agrees with you on all counts but even he admits that the length is nice to have as opposed to totally necessary. The FA guy went to the AFSC at Norlfolk, shorter and he later served on two Joint staffs and commanded twice as a LTC, one FA Bn and one more exotic outfit. He was quite comfortable with the AFSC as opposed to CGSC. The Infantry Aviator OTOH didjn't go to any comparable course and contends he never missed 'em. Different strokes...
In any event, that's above my pay grade; you Field grades can sort that out... :D
Second thought is that in seven years as a Civilian Instructor and Branch Chief at the Armor School, I noted that a surprising number of the Advanced course Classes adopted "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights" as the Class song. Sort of funny but that was actually the case, honest.
At the same time, the AOBC classes generally felt short changed on time. When Shy Meyer as CoS, Army tried to change TRADOC's approach, he didn't succeed in getting the OBCs to nine months to a year but he did get them all increased by a month or more. His attempts to get the Advanced Courses chopped to two to twelve week courses tailored specifically to the individuals next assignment flopped totally. Most cited the rationale you cite, the extended learning environment, for their resistance to his ideas. Unfortunately, the TRADOC Manpower audit process that determines School staffing on Instructor (to student) Contact Hours would have had a significant bearing on that proposal in the form of manpower cuts and thus made those arguments at least a little suspect...
Lastly, back then, when we at the Schools developed a new POI, we had to simultaneously develop a Mobilization POI for the course (or a replacement or similar course) to be taught in the event necessary. Those POIs were invariably more intense, covered more tasks and were much shorter in duration than the peacetime versions. I always wondered about the logic of that.
You also said:
Quote:
"This trickles right on down the line in different ways and in different measures, and hopefully never impacts the basic things we need to do in order to meet the primary mission of defending the Constitution and the state from the Huns - but does get back to why you have a military - and what types of policies will require (or stand a chance of requiring) military power to achieve. At that point I think is where we get (or should get) rational we need for basing agreements, long term contracts, how many C-17s and TSVs we buy, etc. (with a healthy dose of domestic politics for good measure) - but our foreign policy often seems "jumpy", inconsitent, and sometimes vague about what is really important to us - which should drive all the DOTLMPF train - maybe that is the nature of who we are -but it makes focus not so easy.
Boy, ain't that the truth...
I think you have the right of it
Hey Eden,
Pretty much concur. The problem I think comes with the clarity which provides the linkages to make it all flow, as well as issues that come with trying to turn the super-tanker (some good things about it, some bad).
Given the nature of what I think you pretty accurately describe - it may be the best we can do. However, if it is possible to change it (or desirable) then I think it might have to begin with clarity of purpose - the NSS I think sets the tone - all the other documents get their bearing off of it (as it should be). Could it be more succinct? I'm not sure - even if I wish it were - it is after all the "National" Security Strategy, and sometimes being more concise means being more constrained. So the essential tasks in the NSS state:
- Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
- Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends
-Work with others to defuse regional attacks
-Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with WMD
-Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
-Expand the Circle of Development by opening the societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
-Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century
-Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization
might be broad enough to encompass everything we might find ourselves doing, or required to do, but I'm not sure they do (or can) provide focus (they are not prioritized - nor does it say which ones might be more vital then others) - it kind of reminds me of writing your OER support form at the end of the rating period (I say sort of ;))
As they get translated along with other policy documents and speeches, etc. there are allot of disconnects that leave the pot holes you mentioned (or in some cases they might be broken bridges). Here is where leaders have to make decisions abut where to put the available resources (people, time, $$, land, etc.) Sometimes we get it right, sometimes not so much, and sometimes we get it wrong. There might be an element of risk at work here as well - it might be aversion or it might be mitigation - depends on how you look at it I guess. Could we do better - I guess that is the question on my mind at the moment, and if so how?
Best, Rob