How do We Train to Match our Actions to Our Narrative?
It may have been said before, but the guy who said it so it clicked with me was Dave Kilcullen at the Quantico pitch he said (paraphrased because it was a few months back) -"We must match our actions to our narrative, not go back and change the narrative to match our actions". This came up again recently at the SWC non-virtual get together with Jack Holt, and later in a conversation with a senior leader.
This goes to the idea that there is an "Information Component" to every operation - lethal or non-lethal. It may be a message we want to send, or it may be a message we did not intend to send - but never the less, there it is. Further the messages that go forward may influence different audiences in different ways, and may even send very different messages beyond the intended audiences. Even something that like how we use media can be considered - ex. when LTG Caldwell put up a blog here - what were the responses around the "Blogosphere"? What messages does that send? What are the messages we receive when we don't see other senior leaders doing likewise? In some cases, even no message at all still sends a message.
At the strategic level it would seem there is more thought of how the use of the elements of national power send messages - the questions would at least seem to be asked. If the Israelis hit a target in Syria that would "appear" to be the beginning of a nuclear effort - then the action would seem to match at least one narrative - "we will take action against any threat to our survival". I say "appear" because I think part of the challenge we have is not only understanding our own narrative, but the narratives of others we inter act with. It may only be that at the strategic level it is sometimes easier to link the narrative and the action when the actions are "in bold" and stand out for a number of reasons.
However, what about the numerous actions that take place at the tactical level? Its harder - its like being at a large party where everyone is discussing things in terms that often sound very similar, however - the use of those terms and the context of those terms my be very different. Occasionally there is a different tone that stands out - and for one reason or another, that is the voice that is heard above others. The understanding by others of what that voice is saying is effected by not only the conversation the individual was having, but by the proximate conversations around between the listener and the voice that stood out.
Often when we discuss a "narrative" at the tactical level, we think of "talking points", things to say to the media, things not to talk about, things not to put on a hand-bill, or on some other media, or things like that - it seems reactive. I don't think we think in terms of all of our actions in terms of matching our narrative -of synchronizing our lethal and non-lethal actions at the tactical level to support a tactical narrative that is nested with an operational and strategic one. We do pursue Objectives & Endstates, Task and Purpose, and CDR's Intent - but I'm not sure these lead to matching our actions to the narrative we'd like to be heard and understood. Instead, I think our actions are often abandoned to interpretation - sort of hanging outside the narrative to be picked up and placed within the context either the listener chooses, or a third party who wishes to use our actions to reinforce their narrative.
I'm not sure its possible to match all our actions with a narrative - war is full of fog, friction and chance - #### happens - targets are going to misidentified, confusion about what a particular event means, or just the very nature of warfare at the tactical level where sooner or later combatants are going to try and kill each other at a time and place that is advantageous to them -and anyone else who gets caught in the middle is often seen as unfortunate, but necessary, or as someone that chose the wrong side - can mean that the narrative gets subsumed for the moment.
However, can we do better at those actions that are planned? At certain levels where we at least appear to control the tempo, can we better match our actions to our narrative? How do we train that at the tactical level (2 stars HQs and below)? How do we train the Commanders and Staffs who generate orders and synchronize resources to consider and integrate the information component of all of our operations - so that where possible our actions, at least more closely match our narrative? How do we identify the narrative - no matter what we decide (or have decided) to call it - and then communicate vertically and horizontally - not only to our forces, but to our enemies, our friends, and the many, many others caught in the middle, but who may have more weight in determining the outcome then any of the former? I’m not trying to repackage something we all know by another name - I am trying to consider something I think we do know as one thing, but maybe have not thought about in ways we may not have considered.
We often say this is a war of ideas, and I think we often have an appreciation for the information component after something happens - which leads us to either explaining our action(s) - could be to take advantage of that action, or it could be to mitigate the damage done by that action(s), but I don't think we give too much thought to considering the effects on the narrative when we plan the action, or before committing the action. Part of this gets back to LTG Caldwell's comment about providing the soldier (used to represent all of those whose actions effect the narrative) the tools and training (and I think we could also include education here) to not only avoid actions which detract from the narrative, but enhance it!
SWC Member Jack Holt said a couple of things Monday night I think we need to acknowledge. First is that the enemy is using his narrative in ways we dn't fully understand and to greater effect then we are, and that if we are going to beat him in this area - which ultimately may prove more important then any other area of the battlefield since it gets to the heart of our Will, and the Will of those we wish to attract and retain, and because in our system our Will effects our Means - which even for us, are not infinite. The second is that the generation of Americans coming into service has an expectation of freedom of speech and the means they pursue it that has been influenced by the technology and cultures we've seen evolve with the improvements in Information technologies. You can't stick you head in the sand and believe its a problem with a solution - its a condition - there is a big difference.
The sad part about the latter is we grow some of the best natural communicators here in the United States - we also grow many of the world's best ideas from our values and culture that are attractive - and attainable - but we don't get them out. We have the means to do so, but lack the understanding of the significance of inaction, and as such allow the unattractive and unattainable messages that come from the darker side of capitalism - Baywatch blondes, rampant materialism on reality T.V. and other shows, etc. While we know that this is only one aspect of who we are, we leave the rest of the world to place what comes over their satellite T.V., through the Internet and across their cell phones to form the context of our narrative.
Often, the first real American that someone in a remote place will encounter will be wearing uniform - how will they interpret their actions within the narrative they have formed about us? Can we provide them a better narrative - our version? To do so means the actions must reinforce it. This is not restricted to non-lethal actions! Sometimes showing up and challenging someone like AQ by killing them or compelling them to move elsewhere is part of the narrative. There is a lethal component to information operations, and there is an information component to lethal operations. The same is true for non-lethal. I think "Full Spectrum" operations must include the Information domain - and being proficient and better then our enemies in this domain will not occur by ignoring it, or by making policies which restrict us from operating in it - all that does is create vacuum and opportunity for the enemy to operate unopposed - much like ceding the areas of population and concentrating of securing the MSRs for our own use - we've seen what happens when we do that.
Best Regards, Rob
How do We Train to Match our Actions to Our Narrative?
When the narrative is simple and emotionally powerful, it's easy. The classic example is World War II "Hitler is evil and needs to be killed." Everything the military did, from invading Normandy to ordering winter boots, was moving towards the goal of killing Hitler. Eventually, even the Germans came to accept our narrative. (Partially because our generals were smart enough to open up the concentration camps and make sure that the population saw the truth.)
I think Mark's paper had an excellent suggestion. If you find yourself without a strong narrative, or with a narrative that is not being accepted by the population, make up your own narrative in conjunction with the local population.
Understand that you can make up your own narrative without trying to or being aware of it. (When we occupied Saddam's palaces we sent out the message "the new boss is the same as the old boss," even if we didn't mean to. If you promise peace and quiet, and the Air Force practices strafing runs over the village, you are creating the narrative that the Americans are lairs, even if you have no control over the Air Force's decisions.)
Also, as an ad guy, I would strongly suggest that you are asking the wrong question. Marketers don't ask, "How can we sell more soap" even though their objective is obviously to sell more soap. They ask "How can we make soap that makes consumers better cleaner, healthier, etc." (Or "How can we convince them that our soap does that, even if it's just the same as the other brand of soap.") It's never about us. It's always about what our soap can do for our customers. (Even if we spread BS, it's BS that the customer wants to hear.)
If I add any value to the council, and it is certainly possible that I don't, it's these nine words "Our military sucks at understanding our enemies narrative." As an example, I would suggest that in Vietnam, given their history of being invaded by foreigners, that no matter what we did we would never be able to change their narrative. We'd always be perceived as the next in a long history of foreign invaders. But we kept insisting that by changing tactics we could win.
I think that in Iraq if we had left after getting rid of Saddam, a lot of people still would've been upset with us, but they would've needed to admit that we did what we said we were going to do.
On your next deployment you will probably find that there is no strong narrative for why you're there: at least not one that is accepted by the population. Understand the local narrative, and weave yourself into it. (If you don't understand what Saddam's palaces mean to the local population, you may weave yourself into it in a way that makes your life difficult.) I would suggest that your life will be much easier, and you'll be much more successful, if you avoid cultural narratives and try to create more of a business transaction narrative. For example, "Together we kicked AQI's butt." "Together we brought peace." "Only the Americans could cure the cancer of the tribal chief's son. The chief expressed his gratitude in the traditional way. We humbly accepted his gift. It was the start of a partnership."
So to answer your question succinctly. Make a simple narrative that most of the population supports. (Or even better,learn the narrative that your predecessor wove.) Make it simple. "I promised this village peace and quiet. They promised me they'd get rid of AQI." Make it clear to your troops that they can bomb a school if AQI is hiding in it, but that if they ever drive noisy tanks through the middle of town, they're going to make you look like a liar, and you'll make sure that they regret making you look like a liar.
Your troops may never be able to explain to their families why bombing a school was OK and driving tanks thorough the middle of town wasn't, but they'll do the right thing.
Even more succinctly: if you can train your troops to rush into the teeth of a near ambush, you can train them to do anything. You just need to be very clear about how to recognize a near ambush and how to respond.
That is a good post, R.A.
You make some things more simple than they can ever be, as I suspect you know -- but your points are all right on. Clear, concise and germane. Good job.
Unity of Effort, Unity of Command
are two terms we use to achieve things. I guess what I'm thinking about is how actions (and inactions) are often incongruent and achieve desparate effects on (the narrative). There is both a synchronization and communication piece to this. I think the tools are largely there - be they terms or staffs - the thing is how we use them - its not just what we look at, but how we look at it, and how we articulate it to the different pieces that are at work in this environment. Even in the best of circumstances - the ones where nobody is shooting at you - things that seem like they should be easy are often some of the most difficult - training reduces the friction.
We do planning an execution pretty good in one sense - we've incorporated planning and training into our training pretty well (at the BCT level and below), but our planning and training is primarily geared toward finite type events - a rotation of one flavor or another, and within that sharp, tactical operations - that is what MDMP is geared for. What may be needed is to adapt that thinking to something broader. I don't want to use the term "campaign" - but that word probably comes closer in terms of a limited linear description. I think this is as much a military organizational culture issue as it is anything else. Like I said, still lots to chew on.
Best, Rob
Rob, one more thought....
I just realized that I didn't finish where I started to go with Wilf's observation. Basically, the emotional reactions are close to universal, but he mental / interpretive reactions may, and probably will, be different. Again o the C&S example, North Americans are pretty much conditioned by SWOT narratives to recognize the "kick the doors down, secure the building / people" type of action, always "knowing" that they will be able to fight back latter in court. What would Iraqi's predict from the same action? Well, they have pretty much been taught that it means you are dead (under SH), that you will be shipped of to be tortured and humiliated (an AQ narrative, but definitionally in keeping with US actions [i.e. AQ defines those actions as "torture"]), and that you are being treated as "worthless" and with no "power" hence "dishonoured". The emotional reactions are similar, but the interpretations are different.
Marc
"Army Leadership" and "Leading Marines"
The two differ somewhat -- "Army Leadership" mixes narrative and theory, where "Leading Marines" is almost pure narrative. I didn't want to rush to a classification of my own, as I prefer an outside point of view. Is the narrative in either of these manuals clear and consistent? Would they be better documents if they strove to conform to one of the narrative models you described earlier?
Having practiced - and experienced - the art in
both places, I'll simply say that in my view there's virtually no difference in practice with, if any difference, that of the Corps being slightly less tolerant of minor transgressions.
I'll leave the narrative construct definition to the scientific types...:wry:
Been kinda sitting out enjoying the discussion
but I'd like to throw something out there and see what comes of it. As Ken noted too often much of military writing is really overdone. By this I mean the same thing stated sixteen different ways with a few differences in vocabulary but in general presenting the same things. This may be effective in that it allows the reader several different ways of looking at the same thing and thus they are more likely to find something which reflects that which the themselves already believe to be the case. I think it may als be one of our greatest issues to overcome in trying to really address change in our perspective organizations. If you look at it on the outside it seems like what it really does is say what it wants to say without really requiring one to change their overall direction. Many of those here could probably bring out examples of how often revolutionary or even simply evolutionary ideas about how things should work have been sidetracked if not completely averted though a simple pick what you like approach at how to address doctrine.
(Here's where I really go out on a limb )
Narrative to me has always been about a general direction not really about any specific actions or guidelines. A common understanding if you would of Command Intent. Some of the other discussions have dealt with strategic policy or guidance and where it comes from and it is here where I think we really begin to work our way back to narrative and guidance through doctrine and /or manuals. What do you (the entities in question) believe your overall mission is. Then there must be a mutually accepted version of that what throughout all levels of the organization. Then such things as the hows and how much are determined and shared through release of materials such as manuals, directives, doctrine in general. Finally there is the perception and reception or rejection of said materials by those charged with it's implementation. How and if they receive it will determine what the end actions are in any given operation.
As long as a general direction that all parties can accept is found then it would seem that materials created along that vein will be more effective in sharing the overall vision and thus be more effective in the long run.
Of any organization out there one should probably accept the fact that defense is one area where the most undeniable need for being able to serve a purpose greater than oneself is not only recommended but in the end necessary to truly achieve the purpose for its existance.
I'll stop for now and give others a chance to straighten me out :wry:
I think that's exactly the point on both your counts
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Germ
Can you give an example of overdone doctrine/narrative?
I think commander's intent is not the focus here. Commander's intent is about visualizing the execution and end state of a plan. It's explicit. The cultural narrative I'm referring to should form the basis for guiding principal when commander's intent doesn't fill the bill. It's about common beliefs, guiding values, what makes us tick. If we were computers, commander's intent would be a computer program. Cultural narrative would be a big chunk of the operating system that allows the computer program to run.
This is one thing which I think constantly eludes the process of developing written guidance for operations. First yes as a soldier if I describe commanders intent it is as you say, however I would propose that when seeking to define the how too's and thus the basis for manuals, etc we need to go much deeper and actually think much more broadly about the who's and whats we are working with. Lets take religion for an example. Would you say that the narratives drive a given body of believers or the texts, or would it be easier to say that the texts more explicitly define the narratives.
We can go into example's if you would like but I would guess you know what I mean. Or in politics is there a greater following to an outcome or to a given set of talking points which are there to maintain a common (narrative) and what if anything defines what that narrative is.
I say all this to lead into where Marc speaks about informal narratives
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
Hi Guys,
Germ, let me toss out another distinction that may help with this oh so fuzzy term: formal and informal narratives. Formal narratives are projected by a culture into material/perceptual reality; think books, doctrine, public rituals, commercials, rules and regulations, etc. This is the type of "guidance" Ron is talking about. Informal narratives, which are often much "darker" and more powerful, are the stories and interpretations that are spread about, usually via oral culture.
Marc
Informal narratives such as those which reflect a direction for one's life or how to approach relationship's, what not to do in finance, literally stories which describe without detailing the ways forward carry much more weight in the real world than many would like to abmit. Tis may in large par be due to human nature in seeking the "easier" way to do things but personally I think it relates largely to our history and culture's. What if anything is language but a tool which offers more long lasting and definitive ways to express opinions, requirements, lessons, lifes mysteries to future generations. This doesn't change the necessity of having a guiding premise or standard (a narrative if you will).
If we try to separate the hows too's from the why's then it will constantly be a re-learning process. And when directions or instructions are provided without the context of why they are and what they represent (books withut pictures:D) then we have done exactly that.
This is a very round about way of saying you can't train to good narratives because you must live them. Orders and directives can be taught because they are developed. IMHO real narratives with the power to change simply exist naturally and the only thing we can do is teach ourselves how to see them and thus work with them.
I know that probably made less sense than before but at least I try :o
Got the link so I'll be reading it
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Germ
Thanks gents. I saw the references at small wars journal don't include "Leading Marines." I'll leave off of the discussion for now, with the hope that while I'm furiously searching for a text that discusses narratives in the terms marc used earlier, the two of you will have a chance to browse "Leading Marines." I think you'll like it. (Ron, it's a mid 90's pub so you may not have encountered it before.)
Marc, if you have a single text in mind that discusses grand, core and cultural narratives, help me out!
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/g...ng_marines.pdf
I'll be reading it this week , but right off hand the Forward seems to identify it as a core narrative, meat to express expectations and consideration but without implicit directives.
I'll check back when I'm done with it.
Many assumptions are in place here...
1. we can control a narrative...
2. that it is received in the manner we intend it (even if our actions match)
3. that the narrative is somehow important to achieving success
4. some of the same principles used when selling soap apply here
I hear military officers say quite often that "..if we could only get the press to stop writing about the bad things..." My response to that is - if they stop, will that change what is happening?
The root of the problem is that a narrative is developed over time by actions, and the form it takes may not be the form we intend (sometimes it may even be better)...in our culture of instant gratification (or "I only have 15 months to make myself look like an innovative, adaptable, and successful commander"), we are not giving it time to develop... matching actions to a narrative will most likely accelerate acceptance (perhaps), but (and it is a big BUT)...we have no control (no matter how much we perceive we do) over how an individual will interpret our narrative...
What we need to do is rethink information...its uses...its interpretation...etc...this thread has sparked my interest enough to start to conduct some research on the narrative theme...I wonder what hard research exists on the topic?
I find my curiosity peaked
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
I agree. I think it's very reasonable to assume that when you aim a kinetic weapon at someone you will get a primal "fight or flight" reaction. I think many of the problems in Iraq can be traced - at least in part - to the fact that our strategy depends on a different, more cooperative primal response.
Would you be able to expand on that? (Within the realm of open source, of course):confused:
