IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?
Lots of terms moving about these days. Two of them that have some weight are "Irregular Warfare" and "Stability Operations". At the SWC we have a pretty good group that is confident, well read, inter-active and interested to expend grey matter in pursuit of getting it right. So lets open up a discussion on the matter. I suspect that if this thread does take off, it will go in some unexpected directions. No need to limit yourself to IW and SO - there seem to be many other terms out there that conflict, parallel or intersect at points. I'd also say it is worthwhile to consider what the implications are for favoring one term over another.
Another good reason to do it here is our diversity - as definitions build, they may use other terms or contain ideas which seem out of context to particular disciplines or cultures - this is one of those cases where the discussion is probably worth more then the definition itself.
Not to avoid initiating the discussion while avoiding any “published” doctrinal definitions in order to consider the nature of the words:
For myself, I'm suffering from the component of the terms themselves - IW contains the term "warfare", which to me means a "way" or manner of waging war. E.G. – “irregular” could mean something out of character to the norm - which could mean everything from the type of means used to wage the war that then drive irregular tactics, operations and strategy, or just an "irregular" use of the "regular" means to wage war.
Stability Operations sort of hits me the same way - the key word being "operations" which to me indicate a type of undertaking to achieve an objective - in this case "stability" of something - a state, an area, a group, a problem, etc.
I recently read a definition of a "term" that because it used other like terms in its definition limited the utility of the term it was defining to a point that put the original term at odds where it has been used elsewhere in the greater lexicon.
While there is goodness in defining things, I think the real value in this case is probably the discussion about how they are perceived. Its not too hard to find out discussions or speeches where the multiple terms are used to describe the same things, and others where the same terms are used in ways that put them outside the context of an accepted definition.
Best, Rob
I waited. Crickets. So I'll step up with a simplistic stab,
noting that all my stabs are simplistic... :wry:
I think when the 1 MarDiv was tracing down the remnants of the fleeing North Korean Army north of Wonsan in 1950, we were engaged in IW. We were again in early '51 when we and the 5th RCT [1] hunted down the remnants of the same Army left behind in far south near Pusan due to the US / ROK push northward in the fall of '50. They had reverted to using guerrilla TTP [2] and were not attempting to move north [3].
When I went to Laos in 1960, I was engaged in a Stability Operation (which entailed a very minimal amount of IW). In Viet Nam in early '66, prior to the bulk of the buildup, same situation. Later in that year, it morphed for several reasons into more IW and less SO. When I returned in 1968, we had CW (generally less Tanks), pure and simple and little concern in units for SO. That, after Tet, pulled down rapidly to IW as opposed to CW -- and SO was ramped up [4].
To me, the 'classic' definitions are appropriate, simple and not ambiguous. CW is major military force using current technology in moderately to highly intensive combat. IW is characterized by one or both opposing sides using what are conventionally called guerrilla TTP. Stability Operations are as you described and may also involve a spectrum of force through none to simple Police or constabulary effort through Paramilitary Constabulary effort to IW in varying intensity and, rarely, up to CW. That said, it must be acknowledged that variances in that are, IMO, of small concern. Most words in the English dictionaries have multiple definitions and that seems to be acceptable [5].
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[1] The 5th RCT in 1950-51 contained then CPT Hank Emerson, who from that experience probably developed his Checkerboard Theory of COIN Warfare. IIRC, he refined that theory and published it while at Leavenworth in 1963-64. It should be in the Archives there.
[2] I use the phrase 'guerrilla TTP' as shorthand for any combat effort by a force (organized, uniformed or not) that uses stealth, evasion, clandestine operations and short sharp actions while avoiding decisive commitment against superior force as a combat norm. Their actions may include infrastructure destruction (human and machine), attacks solely on opposing military forces, attacks on any opponents to include civilians, terror, intimidation and other tactics short of fully engaging major forces in combat.
[3] Sort of an aside to your question but somewhat appropos, I think. With 1 MarDiv and with the US Army in Korea, note the changes in a short period from full bore conventional warfare involving defense against Armored attack to a major offensive operation entailing full bore urban warfare to IW to CW against a different enemy with very different TTP to IW and back to CW. This is why I contend that the Armed Forces of the US are completely capable of conducting full spectrum warfare. If a marginally trained crowd could do it reasonably well in 1950, with todays training we should be able to do it very well at a high performance level.
[4] Again, note the sliding between categories of combat. US units translated between the various forms of combat and other operations relatively painlessly and generally fairly effectively. Most failures I observed were not at the unit level but were command failures at Division and above. Something to ponder is that most Bdes did well; most Divisions did not.
[5] Reasonable people could disagree with me on some of that transitioning between forms of warfare -- and warfare itself is constant evolution. For those two reasons, I think that a quest for excessive accuracy in terminology is probably not possible. That does not mean we should not try to be more precise, simply that accord may be difficult.
Random thoughts before earning my paycheck
Interesting topic, though dangerous to deal with without sufficient caffeine in the system.
To my mind, there is a fundamental divide in ways of applying organized violence - though actually it's not so much a divide as a fuzzy grey area.
Conventional (or regular) war is an artificial construct in which force is directed at the avatar of an opposing body politic. In its purest form, 'civilians' and their works are not affected except incidentally, mostly among those unfortunate enough to be located on or near the battlefield. Both sides have essentially abandoned rationality and entrusted the issue to brute strength. The two avatars contend until one side is either completely destroyed or concludes that it can no longer shield the body politic. Since this construct is completely artificial (and in many ways counter-intuitive), it has to be hedged about by the many laws and rules of war to ensure that it remains a non-rational contest of intellectual, spiritual, and material strength, unrelated to the actual issues at stake.
Unconventional (or irregular) war, on the other hand, is the application of organized violence directly to the body politic - or attempts to shield the body politic from such violence. In other words, at least one side is purposefully evading the opponent's avatar to starve, kill, rob, persuade, energize, terrorize, liberate, etc, the 'civilian' sector. Attacks on the opposing avatar are limited to what is necessary to allow access to the body politic.
No war is an unalloyed example of one or the other, of course.
Victor Davis Hanson alert: I will now use questionable and simplistic historical examples to illustrate.
The Hundred Year's War was largely irregular. It consisted mostly of raids, pillaging expeditions, massacres, and the like, designed to enrich one side directly at the expense of the other. On the flip side, each side was also trying to prevent the enemy from inflicting such harm. The key was that any fighting was directly aimed at gaining access to the body politic. Both sides were manned, trained, and equipped for this type of war - the medieval army was a supremely fit tool for irregular warfare in every sense. From time to time, conventional war was resorted to in the form of pitched battles (Agincourt et al), but this was the rare exception.
The American Civil War was originally purely and consciously conventional, but it was won by the north when they began to employ irregular warfare directly against the body politic of the south - and it was the vulnerability of the south to direct attacks on its body politic that in the end ensured there would be an actual surrender rather than a resort to a continuing guerilla campaign.
World War II had aspects of irregular war in ways obvious (partisans, saboteurs) and less obvious (terror bombing) I say less obvious because terror bombing employed the same tools used in regular warfare (bombers, fighters) in very similar ways as those used to attack the opponents avatar. The difference is that it was aimed directly at the body politic, rather than the material strength of the enemy.
Sure it was a war, no question. That doesn't change the
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.
fact that there was an ongoing stability operation (pursued over the years with greater or lesser effort and ability -- as was the combat portion) at the same time. That is absolute fact.
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I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.
You can say that and we can disagree on it. My guess is that most people involved in either type of operation would like to have it your way but realize that's not always possible. If it was, why would there be a need for any stability operation?
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So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.
How then do you account for the times when you're in full, non combat stability enhancing mode and some churlish demagogue stirs up a minor or major bit of combat? Do you stop the stabilization effort? That doesn't seem very smart...
No reason in the world that both states cannot exist concurrently; they did in Viet Nam, they did in Malaya, they did in Greece and in the Phillipines from 1900-1913.
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Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say...
Again, we can disagree. While that would be an ideal state, life isn't that neat.
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(If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)
Could be both. Accepting that it is more likely the former what you suggest is abandoning an attempt to improve the stability until combat ceases. Ain't gonna happen and should not.
I'll give you credit, when you get it wrong, you get it way wrong
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
Then you are fighting with the objective of getting to your stability phase. (Which makes sense, because you can not create stability until the destabilizers are gone.)
Not so. Depends on the geographical size of the nation involved, demographics and a host of other factors. Again, look at the Philippines and Malaya. Look at Iraq -- parts of it are now stable, others are not.
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Ken, you make many good points, but I'd say that just because somebody tried to both at the same time - and it didn't work - doesn't prove that they can successfully happen at the same.
Where did it not work? The three I cited are places where a degree of combat and stability operations occurred concurrently and all were nominally successful -- and before you say Viet Nam was not, I'd urge you to consider it in some detail and not resort to the distorted US media version of what happened.
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The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.) Sooner or later everyone figures out some way they can live together.
In an ideal situation, that would happen -- what do you do if, as in both the Philippines and Malaya, the bad guys are sort of 'on again - off again?' Do you start 'stabilizing' when they slack off --and then stop when a few of them stir up hate and discontent in one small area of the country? How long does that 'figuring out' take? Do you do nothing until there's tranquility to get a functioning government and services during that time?
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I've seen no evidence that trying to stabilize a population, before you control it - before it has been cleansed of insurgents - can be successful. (But I am sure that if such evidence exists, someone will bring it to my attention and it won't be the first time that I've been wrong.)
I gave you three -- four counting Greece -- and there are others.
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I suggest that you're confusing population control with stability. I suggest that the reason for similar confusion here is because you guys are too darn nice. You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control. But that's the way it works. The iron fist comes first, then you can wrap a velvet glove around it. (If you wrap the velvet glove around it too soon, the iron fist becomes less effective.)
I suggest that you just proved you don't know what you're talking about. ;)
You've just gotten it totally backwards -- you're the one advocating population control. As you said above and I again quote:
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"The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.)"
You said that, I didn't. :wry:
Stability negates the need for control.
I'm saying you cannot do what you suggest. First, you can't control all of anyone's population, absolutely impossible to do. Second, in a large nation, no other nation is likely to have the available manpower to even attempt control the population (how many people would it take to control 25M Iraqis in an area the size of California?). Thirdly, if you go into full combat only mode -- as we did in Iraq early on -- all you'll do is antagonize the relatives of those you kill -- and you will kill people that do not need to be killed with that approach. Lastly, to provide stability and ongoing effort is generally required and you cannot start it when it's peaceful and stop it at a hint of violence; it has to be an ongoing effort.
I have no problem using force, not a bit -- but promiscuous use of excessive force does more harm than good. I think you might want to do a little more research, perhaps...
You are correct on one thing in that last paragraph. "...You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control." Not due to being too nice, that's a really, really bad misapprehension. The Armed forces don't want to 'control' (though that's a bad word if you'll give it some thought) or do stability ops because they're tedious, thankless and an absolute pain to do. Not to mention they take a long time (waiting for everyone else to "...figure (sic) out some way they can live together.")
Then this:
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To make sure that the violence doesn't come back. (While my definition may be wrong, it is logical consistent.) First you stop the violence. Then you use different TTPs to make sure it doesn't come back.
Logical? If you say so...
I'd be really interested to know what you propose to do to make sure the violence doesn't come back. Seriously.
Your plan is excellent -- what, precisely do you call what you're doing with those different TTPs? ;)
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Yes, but only in the area where the violence breaks out. (The population has proven that they can't be trusted with their new freedom, so you reestablish control.)
There you go again with that control you say I'm advocating. Heh.
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It's just like retreat/advance. Some troops can be advancing, others retreating. That doesn't mean a single soldier/unit/platoon can do both at the same time.
I'm sorry but I truly do not understand what you're trying to say here. Could you amplify that a bit?
Stability - more then just a set of tasks?
What about “stabilization” as a political objective to which military means independent of, or along with other elements of national power are applied? The resulting “stability operation” might have components of offense & defense, lethal and non-lethal in support of “stability” as an objective. The environmental conditions (METT-TC) within which the operation takes place drives the use of force.
It gets beck to my hangup on the word “operation” which means it is not just a set of tasks within a mission statement, but is term used to define the nature of an operation that may include the full spectrum of operations.
I’d also bring up that we use the word “stability” allot with regards to bilateral, and regional objectives. We say we want “regional stability in the ME” and that drives strategy and operations. The idea of “stability” I think fits how we see ourselves in the world from a strategic perspective (others may not) in that it creates conditions for potential political redress at a number of levels - and take some of the tension out of the bow string.
Marc, I enjoyed the post on “regular” and “traditional” – what are your thoughts on the word “stability” as to how it fits in western sense of culture?
Best, Rob
I just a couple of questions for you, RANK
If we step back from the context of operations in another place and simply use somewhere close to heart like home.
1- Do you suppose that government entities provide safety, security, empowerment, assistance, enhanced stability, and Kinetic operations against elements who choose to threaten that stability, safety, etc at the same time.
As this is a somewhat rhetorical question I have but one more
Why would it be any less important , let alone possible for the military to do the same in counter insurgency ?
Theories abound; reality sucketh...
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Originally Posted by
Rank Amateur
I don't. Kilcullen does.
Then either he's wrong or it's taken out of context. As I said, it is not possible to control the population in any mid size nation. Over 1.5M allied troops in Viet Nam, a population of 15M in an area the fourth of the size of Iraq and the population was never controlled.
In both nations -- most nations -- all most people want it to be left alone to get on with their lives. Only a small percent will engage in an insurgency; they need controlling or killing -- every one else needs to be left alone within reason.
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Stability is not the key activity...
Over course it's not. it's not even an activity -- it's a goal. operations of VARIOUS types are conducted to attain that goal.
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...Again, according to Kilcullen. Of course, I'm just a amateur theorist, talking about COIN theory. That's all I can do. But if you want to convince me personally that the theory doesn't work in reality, you'll need to come up with a better example than the successes of Vietnam. (I could be wrong, but I'm not accepting anything there as successful.) Besides I seem to remember you saying that Vietnam was fought as a land battle not a counter insurgency.
I don't really care if you're convinced or not, I'm merely pointing out that your theory is mssing a couple of points.
As to Viet Nam, you'd be wrong. you've been reading to much left wing scholarship and revisionist history (in fairness, there's a lot of bogus right wing stuff out there as well). For a pretty balanced account of what happened after the media lost interest in Viet Nam, check this out LINK. It tells of the success of the effort after we stopped fighting a land war in Europe. The land war phase was 1962-68, seven long years of doing the wrong thing by the command and many -- not all --units. The book at the link portrays the last three years when the right things were done, when it was a COIN operation fighting an insurgency and working to attain stability at the same time. That stability was achieved and it lasted for two more years before the North launched a major conventional attack on the South.
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Works for me. (You only stop in that one small area. Just like a platoon can temporarily retreat while the brigade is advancing.) It doesn't mean that my definition is wrong - or that Kilcullen is wrong - it just means that COIN is a lot harder in practice than theory.
It is far harder in practice than in theory -- as are most things. I said you were wrong in my previous comment but I was not clear that referred only to your comment on my being confused. The rest of your stuff wasn't right or wrong, it was your opinion. You and Kilcullen are entitled to your opinions and they are no more right or wrong than are my opinions. Though mine are backed with more than theorizing... :D
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I agree but that's what the experts say is necessary. (According to Google the word Kilcullen and population control is on the net 281 times)
Typical metric, proves nothing. The key is in what sense or context does he use that phrase. I don't know and don't really care. I know what I've done and I have a broad idea of what he's done. He's a smart guy. so am I. We can differ. I'm not an expert and I'm broadly distrustful of those that are purported to be... :wry:
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That why I am highly skeptical of our ability to win in Iraq, even if we adopt a new field manual and a new strategy.
We were never going to 'win' in Iraq. Never were and never will. All we could -- and can -- hope for is an acceptable conclusion. That's all anyone can hope for in any insurgency (and Saddam told us before we went that's what we would face). Nobody wins or loses, they just get a decent ending. That's all the Brits got in Malaya, an acceptable conclusion. That's all we got in the Philippines.
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Just because some people are sleeping and some are awake, doesn't mean they're the same thing. Just because some are doing stability and some are fighting doesn't mean they're the same thing. (Which goes back to the original argument - way back when - that my definition must be wrong becaise I define them as two separate things, but they can't be people are doing them at the same time.) So, my definition could be wrong, but if it is it's not because they are both happening at the same time.
Well, you got there, part way, anyhow. To get all the way there, just realize they are both happening at the same times, with different people doing different things. Something like the Venn diagram below.
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Right, but according to the theory, if you control the population the relatives can't pick up arms, or at least the ones that do end up dead.
How did that theory work out in Iraq -- or Afghanistan? Both places where it's being applied. As I said, it is impossible to control an entire population. also recall that in both cultures, we very wisely allowed folks to keep weapons for self defense.
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I believe this is what we tried in Iraq for the first few years. Rebuild the economy, turn the lights on, everything will stabilize, people will stop shooting at us because they're happy. Didn't work.
Yes and no. You have a point but that's where another theory met reality. Don't you hate it when that happens? ;)
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Maybe Dr. Metz can jump in, but I believe this is more or less the belief that he felt needed to be changed when he started writing about COIN in 2004. (Don't worry steve. I'll still buy your book if you tell me am completely out to lunch:D.) ...When I was in grade 7, I bloodied a kid's nose. No one bothered me again. Once people know they can't hide in the population they are easily deterews by "the visible presence of kinetic weapons and a demonstration of the will to use them if necessary."
Hate to tell you this nut there's a difference between the 7th grade and people with guns; particularly when they're 18 or 19 and immortal.
How do you keep the bad guys from hiding in the population? Really. That's the question.
Sages and gurus require climbing mountains...
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
I guessed as much. (That's why I didn't dig up the precise quote.);)
Prescient ;) .
However, in getting to that, you forgot this exchange:
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Stability is not the key activity...
"Of (sic) course it's not. It's not even an activity -- it's a goal. operations of VARIOUS types are conducted to attain that goal."
That's really the issue, is it not?
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I have a theory as to why that is strategically irrelevant. If I'm ever able to articulate it, I'd be honored if you would attack it.
The whole Viet Nam war was strategically irrelevant so I'm likely to agree with you rather than attack your theory.
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People are people. You can make people put their guns down...
No you can't -- you can make them hide them and use them rarely but enough will cheat that you'll always have a problem.
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... It happens all the time.
It does? Name me a place where it's been truly successful.
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The crazy ones might not, but we have more bullets than they have crazy people. The trick is to make sure that the angry people don't follow the crazy ones.
Shoot too many crazy ones who are cousins of angry ones in the ME and wathc what happens.
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Making them put down their guns is the first step. Then you give them a decade or three to work out their anger because like you said before, as long as there is shooting, the number of angry people is going to grow.
What if you do not have three decades or even one? :wry:
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In a nutshell, I think that if you map out what we consider acceptable and what all the various parties in Iraq consider acceptable there is no place where all the parties overlap: no solution that is acceptable to everyone.
Well, of course not. That's always true of any situation from Iraq to social security to where my wife and I went for dinner to who the nominees for Prez will be. The key point is that the solution is acceptable to most and is flexible enough to minimally irk those who object. Will we get there? Don't know, I think probably so but it isn't over yet.
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Again, I hope to articulate this more coherently in the future.
Looking forward to it.
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As I understand the theory, you force the population to choose sides. What happens if they choose the bad guys is left unsaid, but fairly obvious.
That's the trouble with theories. It never seems to occur to the theorists that people have choices and may not adhere to either side. I'd submit they generally will not. It is absolutely stupid to force people to 'be with us or against us.' That's true internationally and locally. If it was wrong for W. to say that to the world, why would it be right to say it a nation full of people? Dumbb -- with two 'b's.
It's wrong in an insurgency -- as I said, most of the population will just want both sides to go away and leave them alone. The goal should be to make the other side go away so you can go away and leave the folks happily alone. Any other course is doomed to failure at worst and to have massive problems at best.
As an aside, re: your other comment:
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"Ron, apparently we rounded up a bunch of Arabs after 911 without warrants, so I guess you can say that domestically we have perceived the need to control certain elements of the population and have done so."
You do realize we and most of the world have locked people up under those circumstances for centuries -- and will almost certainly continue to do so. I think it's a human, protect the organism thing...
I'd also suggest that, per your weapon and population control idea -- we probably got a few that needed getting, almost certainly got a bunch that did not need to be gotten -- and missed a bunch we should have gotten. :D
Theories and Gurus sorta stumble when reality crunches.
Marc, you raise some interesting questions
Marc - Thanks! That provides perspective to ask another question - albeit a broader one.
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Shifting out of theory and into reality, there are some other questions about "stability" and "stability operations" that are, I think, important to ask. What is the required end state of the people conducting those operations? Will "imposing" that end state lead to greater or lesser social stability? Given that we operate in a globally interconnected system, what are the states "at home" that contribute to the "instability" abroad that the operation is supposed to "fix"?
(bold added by me)
Aside from the excellent piece of advice "first do no harm" (which could be viewed from a first, second or third person perspective with regard to the consequences of interaction, what are the thoughts about countering agents of "instability" which are not normal, or routine parts of an organic system or culture? Consider for example, the introduction of kudzu, scotch broom or Japanese beetles to consider it as part of a biological, eco-system type intrusion? (don't we have a new SWC member scientist type named Margaret from Georgia? Don't be bashful, here is something you can help with:D)
What happens once that "intruder" plugs into the system - how does its presence change it? We might also could consider "resettlement" and "human migration" to fall into this, as well as transnational crime, and pandemics. What about when multiple agents of "instability" converge, or gain synergy from each other, or create new conditions from which change the environment to be attractive and accommodating to other agents of instability, what about their effect as accelerants?
Dave Kilcullen raised an interesting point about war and counter-war which relates.
I think there is also a relation between how these agents of instability change the nature of "regular" and "irregular"
Slap's points about systems, is also relative (and nobody probably needed me to point that out), but I'd like to take a slightly different tack on that as well and think about how agents of instability move between systems - be they closed or open - maybe consider the actual means they use to do so, and the ways they take advantage of the means (again - all disciplines welcome to chime in - biological, economic competition, computer viruses, people, crime, politics, etc.)
Best, Rob
No statement pertaining to warfare
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Originally Posted by
wm
I also think KW's assertion that both are occurring simultaneously is not completely accurate.
is ever completely accurate. War is too chaotic to codify and define precisely. We can have fun trying but we will not succeed.
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Doctors both stabilize patients and treat patients, often, but not always, simultaneously, and often, but not always, using different procedures. One goal of patient stablization is to try to ensure that they don't die on the table while the docs are trying to treat the cause of the problem--for example, they keep pumping blood into the patient (stablization) while they are figuring out which artery has been cut and then suture it back together (kinetic intervention or treatment). Sometimes however, I suspect that stablizaing the patient is also treatment--as when aspirin is administered to a person with a fever. Maybe I'm applying the wrong analogy, but it sure seems to me that peace is the political analogue to biological health.
Good analogy. Simultaneous efforts in different directions by the same actors (Doctors) and / or others on the team...:wry:
Sort of like pursuing an irregular or other war while attempting to stabilize the nation through various means. Frequently including Band aids... :D
I'd add that the hippocratic oath model, 'first do no harm,' is at best extremely difficult to accomplish and at worst a wishful dream if war of any type at any level is involved. War is by nature harmful and you absolutely cannot clean it up. The worst mistake we, the US have made in recent years (1950 forward) is to try to fight wars and do minimal harm in the process. Going light inevitably, without fail, always (I'm into triple redundancy...) increases own and other casualties and lengthens combat time. Always.
Rank amatuer said above we were too nice -- I disagreed on the premise that he was talking about the Armed Forces. We aren't nice, we do what our civilian masters say. They are too nice (left handed compliment), seriously. Unfortunately, that attempt to be nice sends a message. To the western mind, it's that we're really basically nice guys who want to be loved -- to everyone else in the world, it's a sign of major weakness. The unnecessary debacles of the handling of Viet Nam, Tehran, Beirut and such sent a message that we did not intend -- that we're not up to the tough stuff. We are now paying for that utter stupidity.
There's always a time to play nice -- unless force is involved; then to play nice or attempt to is to invite a disaster. Fortunately, we're pretty good at cobbling together band aids and fixes to prevent total melt down -- but we lose too many good kids in the process...
I digress...
Irregular Warfare is indeed a western construct and is not an applicable term to either the Asian or Middle Eastern forms of warfare and those forms do differ in considerable detail. Still it is a handy term and there's no reason not to use it to describe, to western minds, a form of conflict.
Irregular Warfare (and / or other types of warfare) and Stability Operations may be simultaneously conducted. Or they may not be. Or there may be a time phased melding. I believe that METT-TC applies in that determination...
Uncountable accountability
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
I certainly didn't mean to imply that we were worse than anyone else.
Didn't think or mean to impute that you did so imply. My point was that is not an aberration or a new, specific to the 'GWOT' thing; here or any where else in the world.
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I agree with you that war is chaotic and destructive (which is why it shouldn't be entered into lightly, and if you do it, you need to win.)...
I agree with you. Now which of us is going to get the Politicians to wake up and get real? :wry:
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...Except for one thing, when one of our guys is killed building a school, paving a road or handing out candy. To me, that is avoidable and means someone has screwed up somewhere.
Not sure how you avoid that. Roads need to be built; having Schools is a good thing -- somebody's gotta do it. If the bad guys appear while either of those things is being done, a fight is likely -- no different from a fight started by an attack on a resupply convoy or an attack on a combat outpost...
Candy handout by American troops has a long and mostly honorable history; the Troops do it on their own -- even when they're ordered not to do it. Thus, I'm not sure why those three things (or somewhat similar things) being done and resulting in a death are any worse than any other reason...
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I think you need to hold the people who screwed it up accountable: even if you voted for them. (If you give a politicain a free pass, you know that the next one in line is going to feel entitled to another free pass in the same situation.)
I agree with that but I'd strongly suggest they be held accountable for what they screwed up and not for the screwups of others or their subordinates who screwed up. That only seems fair. For example, the invasion of Iraq was done fairly well; the subsequent 'occupation' and the unnecessary insurgency were the fault of, respectively, unelected Generals and to a lesser extent, equally unelected Intell Community types. If you have a way to "hold them accountable" let me know what it is and I'll jump on that bandwagon.
Harry was just another politician.
They're all pathetic and say stuff like that but rarely follow through. He wasn't much better than any of the others.
Still, accept that the premise is valid. That means you vote against Bush. Wait, he's not running. What to do...:D
Seriously; you can obviously believe that and act on it. Fine with me (my general rule is to vote for the least bad candidate and to vote out incumbents, all party immaterial) -- however, you do realize that if I'm correct and the Intel Community and the Generals bear considerable responsibility for their errors, your solution does not fix that problem and it will just recur...
Edited to add:
Some how I missed part of your response above; three items:
Re: "Right here. The Brits left and we only use them for peaceful purposes. Except for the criminals, but there are criminals everywhere: always will be." Obviously you missed the period 1861-65 or had no history classes and are unaware that there are probably more firearms than there are people in this country. We're a lot of things, disarmed is not one of them. So, that won't work. Find me another nation that has effectively totally disarmed the populace -- and Criminals count, the tool is the object, not the user.
Re: "If you can't do the time, don't do the crime" -- nice juvenile and facile answer but sometimes things happen due to gross miscalculations. One can play 'Who's to blame for this?' all day long; doesn't change reality
Re: "Just wanted to save that for future reference ;)" Your preorgative -- one would hope you would use it in context...