U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy
U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.
Quote:
During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.
"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.
The Iraqis have learned that these captains, many still in their 20s, can call down devastating American firepower one day and approve multimillion-dollar projects the next. Some have become celebrities in their sectors, men whose names are known even to children.
Many in the military believe that these captains are the linchpins in the American strategy for success in Iraq, but as the war continues into its sixth year the military has been losing them in large numbers — at a time when it says it needs thousands more.
Most of these captains have extensive combat experience and are regarded as the military's future leaders. They're exactly the men the military most wants. But corporate America wants them too. And the hardships of repeated tours are taking their toll, tilting them back toward civilian life and possibly complicating the future course of the war...
Good and very valid point. Everybody has
I suspect many share your concerns
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
Getting those in higher positions to buy off on the risk and subsequent necessity for occasional imperfection or mistakes not being the end of ones career for NCO's will be pretty hard to get. Officers already carry immense responsibility in their own jobs let alone in CI type environments. The'll have a hard time being comfortable with such a thing unless there is a good training and education base to show that those NCO's should be able to do it. Without that they will probably be wary of placing too much on their NCO's shoulders.
Just my thought but I could be wrong on this one as things may have changed in that respect in the last few years
My belief is that they're dead wrong -- and while I acknowledge that attitude is probably quite prevalent today, it hasn't always been that way. Fortunately for the Army...
I also am sure that many more do not have that concern which is a good thing as my suspicion is that, as was true in Viet Nam and at other times (the average rifle company in the 82d in 1962 probably had 2.5 Officers, priority was to USAREUR), there'll be an Officer shortage and sooner rather than later.
Officers probably need to get used to the thought of having SFCs and SSG as acting platoon leaders. They'll do okay. I've seen SGTs as Acting PLs and one serving as a 1SG -- all of 'em did a good job. One gets responsible behavior when one expects it; if one expects poor performance, that's generally exactly what one will get. And certainly, IMO, deserves...
I spent over six years as a PSG, peace and war, had four Platoon Leaders and only one of them for eight months in 1961-2 at Bragg; none of the others were around for more than two or three months. Do the math on that. They only gave me a PL in Viet Nam after seven months without one when I got promoted and was getting transferred up to Brigade. I had two weeks to train him. He made Colonel so I guess we did okay. I made SGM in a little over 11 total years (there was a war on ;) ), every stripe in a different unit, so I don't guess I screwed up too badly running Cav, Scout and Recon platoons on three continents. :D
Recollection often calls for recognition
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
there was a time not so long ago when a first sergeant could end up running the company because the three assigned officers were either on leave or detached duty. Sergeants actually took out extended scouting patrols, and corporals often did the same. Amazing sometimes how little we recall of our own history....
And not everyone likes the thought of that
True - but there is a counterpoint to that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
120mm
...
While it's a lot easier to have an even marginally competent officer to pick up the slack, the bad ones are just bad and we should just give up trying to fill the slots.
I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."
And there are too many of those lousy dudes about. Fortunately, that's changing as a lot of the deadwood that got hired in the 1975-1985 time frame depart to retirement...
I realized reading my post from last night that it read like I was sniping at Ron. I was not. I fully understand how he feels and I know that many, maybe even most, would agree with him. I'm sympathetic, understand but do disagree with that approach.
My point, which I didn't make at all well was that it hasn't always been that way and that it doesn't need to stay that way.
In 1968, the average Bn Cdr in Viet Nam found he had few if any Captains and senior NCOs, he had a slew of brand new 2LTs and SGts. Good, dedicated kids who'd do anything -- but they didn't know much, so he had to watch them closely. He didn't break that habit when he got to be a General in the 70s and 80s. Unfortunately, all those 2LTs and SGTs thought they were supposed to act the same way as their mentor had so when they got to be senior in 90s and 00s, they kept micromanaging. It became embedded in the Army; total lack of trust. It's dangerous, an Army is built on trust. Or should be.
It wasn't always like that. Prior to 1968, there were micromanagers but they were rare and, far more importantly, they were actively discouraged (as opposed to recently when they have been encouraged). In 1966, my Bde Cdr, A senior BG had a standing night order "Wake me if all three Bns are in heavy contact." In late '68, the Division we were OpCon to had one also -- either the CG or one of the DCGs would be awakened if A Bn (out of 12 counting our OpCon) was in contact. yes, they were different people but the climate led to that glaring difference. Been downhill ever since
Climates can be changed.
I saw some briefing slides somewhere from COL Roper's last trip to Iraq. One bullet made me chuckle. It said; "Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort." Just so.
JCustis tells of the future; heed him. And don't fear it, it'll work. Has before...
Siorry for delay, CavGuy, had to go
get my ears lowered and swing by Lowe's.
Well, I first became a PSG with four years in the Marines but then a three year break before I entered the Army as a PV2. I ended up as a PSG three years later, I'll leave it to you to determine if that was seven years or three. Either way it was less than your today average. Different time...
I have to note that my rapid climb was due in large measure to being in Airborne and SF units the entire period. Those guys got promoted faster than did most of the Army during that period. That was also before the centralized boards at DA (with which my court martials might have had an, uh, adverse impact ;) ). Having said that, I was faster than some, not as fast as others all due to a variety of factors. The DA board removed some inequities in the old system but they also added some new ones. One of the terrible flaws is that the current system rewards mediocrity; stay around, keep out of trouble and eventually you'll get promoted. Like Vic say, that was then, this is now...
There used to be a paragraph in AR 600-200 that said the central board will select and the individual will be promoted unless his commander writes a letter to have him removed from the list for cause. I used to tell evey Officer I could "When you get to be Chief of Staff, change that to read 'the indivdual will be promoted only when his commander writes a letter to approve that promotion.'" Rationale being commanders won't take the time to write a letter to remove a marginal gut, so they slip through until the Peter Principle strikes; conversely, they will make time to write a letter to promote the sharp guys.
Believe it or not, the foregoing isn't a digression, it's part of the answer to your question -- todays system rewards mediocrity.
Time in service is a major criteria for promotion today -- I submit it should not be; performance and potential (EVERYBODY gets promoted based on perceived potential. Well, theoretically, anyway) should be the sole criteria. some people are quite mature and capable at 18; others are still childish and insecure at 40. Five years of being a TC or a Squad Leader give a guy a whole lot more valid experience than the guy who spent three of those five years as a Recruiter or Drill Sergeant; yet the system says five years is five years and that to look at it otherwise is not 'fair.' My answer to that is that war is not fair. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't sway the Per community or Congress... :rolleyes:
It's like I said about Officers, same thing applies -- a round peg will fit in a square hole -- but it has to be smaller.
I cannot speak to the NCO Education system today other then to note that Hacksaw discussed it when I was lamenting about its poor quality based on my son's experience in the 90s and talking to others from the same period. If they've improved it and gotten a combat focus, good -- but six years and more ago it was a check the block effort and almost a total waste of time. your later NCOs may have suffered from that.
On Tank Gunnery, you hit on one of my pet peeves -- I was at Knox, as a DAC when OAFM created the Master Gunner program -- I violently disagreed with it then and I still do. Thus your PSGs knew little because it wasn't their job. If it had been, they would've all been Master Gunners. The Master Gunner program was a quick fix answer to declining NCO quality in the late 70s and it was, as usual, a poor band-aid that can't take water. I started out in life as a Tanker; gunnery is a PSGs job just as Tactics are the PLs job. The sad thing is that in mounted units in peacetime, Co / Trp and Bn / Sqn Cdrs get graded on maintenance and gunnery -- because they're hard numbers and 'objective' (what happens if I do Gunnery on a nice June day and you get a blustery March day is not discussed). All the foregoing was a digression of sorts, sorry... :)
There are always some NCOs who dislike Officers for a variety of reasons. Generally, there aren't that many and most NCOs understand why there are Officers and accept them pretty well. My observation has been that if there are as large number of 'Officer dislikers' in a unit, then there may be an Officer problem in that unit. Most NCOs realize they ain't edumacated but most are smart enough to know when they're being patronized or [1] misused; [2] inadequately or inefficiently used; [3] overused and they tend to react negatively. Alternatively, sometimes a senior NCO somewhere in the chain has an attitude and it pervades the unit. In any event, it's been my experience that if such a sensing occurs, a pretty thorough search for the root cause ought to be made.
Just before I retried from my retiremnt in 1995, a few of us were sitting around talking and an old Colonel mentioned that when he'd been a LT at Hood, the Div was on the way back in from an exercise and LTG Ulmer, then the III Corps commandante, stopped, told them to move ALL the Officers to a theater for an Officers call with him and let their NCOs bring the units back to garrison. A young LTC sitting there said "That was wrong" (of Ulmer's order) and an even younger CPT said "No way I'd ever do that." I'm uncouth so I just looked at both of them and said "That's dumb." The Colonel, who of course had been to Couth School, did far better. He looked at 'em, smiled and said "If you can't trust your NCOs, whose fault is that?"
As to the 'deadwood.' It occurs naturally in all societies and groups at all ranks. If the advancement process is skewed to produce more at any cost instead of holding to quality control, then it will float to the top. It has to be culled and thrown ashore. It's hard to do that today but not impossible. Command and Leadership IS hard work but it's imprtant. It is often difficult for those in the Army to remember that quality is more important than quantity.
Which leads me at long last to answer your final questions. Rapid promotions in Viet Nam didn't hurt that much; most of the folks thus promoted were okay. There were a few over warlike / zealous type who couldn't adapt to peace time but they left pretty quick; plus a few loser, most of whom got run out. What hurt the Army post-Viet Nam was the move to time in service as the arch criteria for NCO promotion -- a lot of folks who had hidden out for years suddenly got promoted and many were marginal. That was followed by an influx of sub-standard recruits in the 1970-80 period who were around for years and in some cases, were not too helpful. Many are just now retiring...
That led to things like the Master Gunner bit and Officers overly involved in training (allowing the NCOs who will ALWAYS take the "no sense in both of us doing this " route to sluff off) and we end up with a perfectly natural and predictable decline in NCO training ability. As my kid the former1SG says, "...they don't know how to do it because no one ever made them do it -- or even let them do it." He, by the way, did not and does not believe the 1SGs job is beans, bullets and paper -- he considered himself the most experienced guy in the Troop and so he was the 'Master Trainer.' Made sense to me. Officers direct training. NCOs do training -- or should.
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future, said Nils. True dat. At a guess, I expect you'll see a continuing misuse of Officers and overlarge Staffs that keep them away from troops and, unless NCOES is radically changed from a few years ago, a decline in the ability of NCOs to act as trainers. Thus there will be pressure for Officers to oversee nut and bolt training which will be a mistake. If the Officer shortage gets significant at unit level (50:50 chance, I'd say), then you'll see NCOs step up and learn the job and do it. OTOH, if we continue to be over Officered then I'd expect a slight decline in NCO quality. If the system lets them do their jobs, they'll improve themselves. Too early to tell which way that'll go.
The high reenlistment rate today, particularly in the Combat Arms is likely to create a glut of SSGs soon unless HRC gets smarter than they've ever been before (an unlikley occurrence). If those guys come back to the peaceful US and the Army returns to its pre 2001 state, there will be hate and discontent and they won't reenlist again; then there'll be an NCO shortfall :D
All in all, the system will cope. There are enough lessons learned available to the Army leadership to stop most potential problems. Whether there's the vision to do that remains to be seen.
Sorry for the length, rather put too much in and let you throw out what you don't want than cut it too short to provide a reasonably decent answer.
Taking something a little different from the article...
From the article:
Quote:
During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.
"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.
At the word "viceroy", my ears pricked up. This is very much the sort of thing that I have been watching and waiting to see develop in the U.S. Army and USMC. If the US Army and Marines were to take only one thing away from Iraq (and to a certain extent, Afghanistan), it would be this: that even (especially) the subaltern, or junior officer, would become fully self-aware and self-confident of his role and status as a de facto proconsul, the agent and executor of his nation's policy and strategic interests. This growing self-awareness and self-confidence of the junior and field-grade officer classes is very "Imperial", and in a good way.
Twenty years ago, even ten years ago, there would have been no shortage of officers intensely aware of the political nature and realities of war, and still more filled with initiative; but until the reality of massive and long-term SSO and COIN campaigns made a virtue of necessity, there had been a marked reluctance (which still remains in so many ways) for military professionals to in fact act in political fashions, for political ends. Afghanistan and Iraq have changed, and continue to change, this. Commonwealth Armies had to do much the same back in the days of the British Empire, as the comparatively rigid and "cog on the machine" mentality considered desirable for MCOs had to give way to more responsibility and more trust granted to field-grade and junior officers in order to get the job done. And if that meant that even a platoon commander had to wear the hats of diplomat, spy, engineer, mayor, and His Majesty's unofficially-official plenipotentiary, in addition to his military hat in order to get r' done, well, then that's how it would be done.
The ultimate disintegration of the Empire notwithstanding (nor the examples of the two World Wars, in which rather more automaton-like qualities were sought, or at least developed - with more or less predictable results:wry:), the concept of the officer as a political actor first, in the sense that he was first and foremost the agent of his Government's policies - being a soldier meant only that he specialized in the more violent forms of diplomacy and persuasion - worked well, on the whole. War, being an intrinsically political beast, is ultimately one or lost at the political level - even if that requires brute force to achieve. As such, the developing "politicization", used in this sense, of the Officer Corps in the USA and USMC is a welcome development. Nearly an entire generation of junior and field-grade officers have experienced this development, and for those who are able to remain in service, this may well go some way to breaking down the traditional, and unnatural, divide in the US between the political and the military.
The US, though not "Imperialist", is certainly an Imperial Power, and in Afghanistan and Iraq has had to assume much of the role and burdens of such. As an Imperial Power ipso facto, it denies what it is at its own peril; US officers need to be self-aware political actors, fully cognisant and involved in their "political" tasks, and always acting with a view to the achievement of their Government's political objectives, not just their assigned military objectives. The traditional American radical divide between politics and the military has got to end, and Iraq and Afghanistan is bringing it much closer to an end; in any case, it is a luxury that an Imperial Power can ill-afford. This article shows that it is in the process of ending.
Great thread for old farts
As a brand new cavalry platoon leader - 'H' series MTOE, real cav, not the poor substitute we have today - in 1983, the troop's senior NCOs were a mix of burn-outs and shake-and-bake Vietnam vets. By the time I took over my first company in 1986, the quality of NCOs was uniformly better - better trainers, better maintainers, better motivators - and continued to improve while I stayed with troops. I think this improvement was partly due to improved enlistment standards during the Reagan years and an improved NCOES. We were getting better material and it showed. When I went back to troops as S-3, XO, Bn commander 1996-2002, I still thought highly of the NCO corps, but I did note some disturbing developments.
First was the erosion of motivational skills. In the '80s we made it much easier to get rid of problem soldiers. This was a good thing because there were plenty of boys lined up at the recruiting station and you had to spend less time on the knuckleheads. But we were also getting rid of kids who, with a little more effort, might have made the grade. So a whole generation of NCOs grew up without being forced to 'motivate' somebody who you were stuck with. Call it the loss of 'wall-to-wall' counseling skills.
Second was an abdication of the sense of ownership we had with our problem children. The Army has created such a web of support groups for alcohol abuse, wife beating, financial idiocy, and the like, that our first line of defense became sending the soldier elsewhere when things went wrong. In fact, it has gotten to the point that trying to solve problems in-house is seen as malfeasance. NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.
Third was a rise in - well, I won't call it careerism, but a heightened concern over 'careers'. I blame the explosion in sergeant major positions for this. Personally, I have never met a sergeant major at the brigade level or higher who added value to his unit. I am sure good ones exist, but for the most part they are part personnel clerk and part mafia don. Why we take our best NCOs and move them away from troops is beyond me. This from a guy who owes what limited success he had to several first sergeants and battalion command sergeants major. Anyway, I think the measure of success for an NCO has receded a little too far into the ether of higher headquarters.
Finally, one of my least favorite Army inventions - Sergeant's Time. For the uninitiated, this was setting aside four hours a week reserved for the NCO to train his soldiers on whatever he felt ws necessary. Of course, it should be the other way around. There should be four hours a week for the officers to train the troops on whatever they want. The presumption should be that sergeants are spending the other 56 hours on Sergeant's Time. And of course, Sergeant's Time had to be briefed to the officers and reviewed up to the brigade level, so the whole thing became a bureaucratic exercise, while implying that NCOs were not the unit's primary trainers. Of course, this horror is only a symptom of 'fill-in-the-white space' training briefings and micromanagement that ultimately weakens the corps it is meant to strengthen.
Don't get me wrong, we still have the strongest NCO corps in the world in terms of breadth and depth of quality. And I suspect that my largely peacetime experience doesn't reflect what is happening today. But my point for the younger members of the forum is that the culture of the military often works in mysterious and invisible ways.
As for the officer corps, my memory tells me that junior officers are pretty much the same as they have always been, but that quality is declining once you hit field grade. But when the promotion rate to Lt Col is in the 90's, what can you expect?
Great post, Eden. As the O-est ORF, I agree...
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...I think this improvement was partly due to improved enlistment standards during the Reagan years and an improved NCOES. We were getting better material and it showed. When I went back to troops as S-3, XO, Bn commander 1996-2002, I still thought highly of the NCO corps, but I did note some disturbing developments.
Yep, the army owes Shy Meyer a lot for the changed focus in recruiting. I also noted the downturn in the mid and late 90s and agree with all your reasons that occurred.
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NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.
Amen!
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Personally, I have never met a sergeant major at the brigade level or higher who added value to his unit.
Having been both a Brigade CSM and a Brigade Ops Sgt, I can truthfully say I had more power to do good as the latter. Brigade and higher CSMs mostly have negative power. I have known a few who did some really good things (I wasn't one of 'em) but for the majority, I'm inclined to agree with your assessment. It's too personality dependent.
What CSMs exist for at those levels is to keep their Boss out of trouble on people (and unit) handling. Too many today seem to be too sycophantic to tell their boss what's right instead of what he wants to hear. I've been out of that loop for a while but visits to my kids when all three Boys were in and to the one still in seem to indicate that's still a problem.
Absolutely agree with your take on who's supposed to be training who and Sergeant's Time. What a yo-yo idea...
You answered your own questions...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ranger94
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How does he know this? Was it his own character? Was it training? Did his Lt give him that detailed a mission statement (task and purpose)?
In the article about the captains, Capt. Gilbert "ordered traffic control barriers....checked on refurbished water pumps...approved money...soccer uniforms..dropped off..."etc. At any given point he must have left an NCO in charge as he moved on to the next task. Did that NCO understand that a secure TCP could deteriorate to the point were his tactical decision could have strategic implications. If he did know, then how?
Hernanadez knew because he learned due to not being mishandled as you say in the next quote; Gilbert's NCO knew for the same reason.
Quote:
"Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort.” Micromanagement is not really an option in COIN, is it?
Only if the boss is stupid...
Then you can be guaranteed that Hernandez and the other guy won't know...
Eden - target cease fire!
You nailed the essence of NCO/junior officer relations in the transitioning H/J series army. As a young cav platoon leader in the mid-80s my junior NCOs were sharper than my platoon sergeant. He was a good guy - had the cleanest vehicles on post - but he was functionally illiterate and tactically deficient. My E5s and I just worked around him in a strange but effective manner. Those junior NCOs were platoon sergeants by the First Gulf War and were magnificent, sharper than anything but the most seasoned platoon leaders.
It all comes down to the quality of the incoming soldier and the experiences, mentoring, and responsibility they receive early in their careers. OIF and related operations would seem to provide tremendous opportunity for junior NCOs to exercise leadership and independence far beyond any garrison/NTC rotation reality that existed in the peacetime force. The danger of course is burning out these young warriors and losing them. Or losing them.
As for "Sergeant's Time," I'm just gonna let that old battle die...
Master Gunner? Training for Canadian Army Trophy we executed an abbreviated MG course taught by a mobile training team from Knox. I wondered then why this was not an automatic part of the armor/cav NCOES, a requirement for staff sergeant. The guys who had been to MG school acted like they some dark secret that only they could harness and control. I always just figured they liked being in the warm tower during winter gunnery rather than risk being on a track with a busted heater.
An expert on the British Empire
Taken from an article in The Times (UK) today commenting upon the situation in Basra, Iraq by Professor Michael Clarke: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com...cle3646296.ece
After the disastrous loss of the American colonies Britain built its empire, and its Commonwealth, on setting the rules, deploying few forces of its own and chancing its arm that it could keep order everywhere in a territory by demonstrating that it could keep order anywhere. It could do this only by having real influence at the political centre.
davidbfpo
Officer vs NCO: a negative?
All,
First thanks for the creation and maintenance of this site. I have been reading for some time and finally decided to post.
1. Promotions: My view of officer promotions is that we (the Army), as an institution, are making the worst decision possible. We are allowing the promotion of young officers who simply lack the ability to function as Captains. The criteria for promotion should be 'Captains command Companies'. If a BN CDR does not believe that a particular LT is going to be able to develop into a Company Commander that he would trust with the lives of his own children then do not allow this promotion to take place. The current policy of allowing a promotion at 38 months when coupled with the lack of OER accountability and sound mentoring from the CO and BN commanders is seriously flawed. Thankfully most of the 'baby Captains' realize they have been promoted not based upon their ability to perform at that grade but rather as a way of masking the attrition rate of more senior Captains. The incompetents, for the most part, are at least smart enough to realize it and continue to allow their NCOs to handle the day to day business. The competents, and there are more than a few, likewise continue to listen to their NCOs and their competent peers and competent young MAJ. The same holds true on the NCO side. The 'automatic' promotion is a problem only if we allow it to be. All that is required is for the leadership of the CO and BN, officer and NCO alike, to have the courage and tenacity to refuse to promote those who are not ready. The process involves holding leaders at all levels accountable for leadership development and mentoring. If a young subordinate has not made enough improvement, after being coached and mentored and counseled then the commander must do the paperwork to deny the promotion. Do not allow 'big army' to dictate who is going to be the future small unit leaders simply because the paperwork trail is hard and the BDE CDR or BDE CSM wants to know why 'x' number of NCOs were not reccomended for promotion.
2. Training: We have a generation of young Officers who have almost no experience in HIC. Shooting table 8 at Graf is not a substitute for a full up heavy force rotation at CMTC. How are these Officers supposed to be the lead trainers when they have almost no experience in gunnery or maintenance or manuever. This is going to hold true for the 'four year SSG' as well. This is going to require much involvement from folks who have that experience (informal training) or are school trained.
3. Experience: On the positive side of the ledger we have a vast amount of experience in actual combat operations as motorized and dismounted infantry. The actions on contact for a motorized or dismounted tank platoon are different than while mounted on tanks but the reporting proceedures and battlefield preperation is not. We can't forget that many of these lessons will carry over to HIC.
Solutions: If as a leader, you do not trust your subordinates enough to keep from micromanaging them why are they in the job in the first place? Find some competent hard charger, without regard to rank, and put them in the job. Many bruised egos will occur but this is far more preferable to allowing an incompetent subordinate leader to command troops in the field.
Sorry this went so long and for the tone but this is too important to 'play nice'.
