1 Attachment(s)
The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes
Gentlemen,
I scratched out this paper and I would like to receive your feedback. There are many great COIN papers already in existence, but I couldn't find anything that you could actually get every man in a conventional infantry platoon to read (down to the privates). So that is what this paper is targeted at- it's short and to the point. It doesn't really lay out COIN strategy, but talks about the platoon-level tactics and techniques required to implement a COIN strategy. It is also not the ideal, perfect answer; but rather is something that you could expect out of any run-of-the-mill platoon. It attempts to bridge the gap bewtween strategy and platoon-level implementation.
The organization is still rough and I would appreciate comments on how to better seperate the COIN techniques from the counter-guerilla techniques and still have a good paper. Or should I just get rid of the non-COIN-specific stuff? Thanks. All comments are appreciated.
CPT C
1 Attachment(s)
CPT C - A paper for your consideration
Here is something I wrote many years ago.
1 Attachment(s)
More thoughts on how to explain COIN...
CPT C -
I've experienced the same frustration talking to some of my peers about how to approach COIN / Phase IV at the battalion and brigade level. Either because they haven't seen it done, or because the approach they observed didn't work in their AO when they were there, they are convinced this stuff "just doesn't work." So I started brainstorming on different approaches units can take...not as a list of "best practices" but more of a menu for "how we might conduct business in our AO, given the current conditions, taking into account a multitude of considerations."
This is a working draft...I need to make it more objective. I do not intend for it to lean in one direction or the other, but I obviously show my bias as it is now. There are reasons to go either way, given one's context.
All feedback is welcome. Please let me know if this is a useful tool for discussion.
I'm more than aware it's not reality -- and I've been railing
about that failure for over 50 years to anyone who would listen and a lot who didn't want to listen -- and I've been doing so on this board for a year.
It is pathetic that we do not teach the basics to new entrants, officer and enlisted -- it is even more pathetic that five years after we went into Iraq the Army still isn't teaching the basics. Isn't pathetic, it's criminal.
The paper is a good effort -- regrettably, it doesn't address the broader problem which is way above both our pay grades.
Pardon the venom but you hit a long standing sore spot. I've seen way too many bodies caused by massive stupidity in high places and failure to properly train people when they enter is a pet rock of mine. You also obviously missed my comment above that the fact we do not train well is a lick on us...
If you're talking about having Platoon get togethers fairly frequently to just talk about what's going on -- that shouldn't need to be trained...
After my rant yesterday, let me join Dave and say
Welcome Aboard.
I'll also reiterate Cav Guy's suggestion that you go to the "Tell us about you #2" last page (LINK) and join the crowd. Can't tell the players without a program... ;)
Good to see people writing things down.
CPT C,
I think it is good thing when people think enough about things, and feel passionate enough about it, to get up and do something about it.
Whilst not intending to be negative towards the industry and application you have displayed, I am not sure that a lot of the material you detail is not just 'sound' small unit TTP rather than specifically 'COIN' material. ( I guess this is similar to the view offered earlier by Ken).
Whilst there is a need for such material, I am relatively confident that most of it must be being taught somewhere, as it is currently practised in theatre. The US infantry units I have spent time with all appear to practise this stuff to varying degrees. Some of them are very, very good at it.
I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.
Are you aware that the COIN CFE had / has a COIN Handbook for junior leaders that was given out for a few years?
It was put together by an Aussie SF SNCO and a few US Navy Seals with some supervision at the end by an Officer on staff who had been involved in FM 3-24. It even evolved into a second edition. Whilst not 'perfect' it was more than adequate, and I beleive in parts quite good considering the speed in which it was drafted and created in theatre.
If you PM me and provide a .mil address I will see if I can find a .pdf or other form of e-copy to send to you.
Issue of the handbook was suspended in late 07 in anticipation of a replacement item being issued in CONUS. (It did take a fair bit of effort to keep it current and publish it - the CFE is not assigned personnel or resourced for a doctrine writing task).
I recently became aware that the issue of an handbook in CONUS still has not occurred (Cav Guy might know more about when this will actually happen).
Cheers,
Mark
Since I'm the only one that said
""hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... "" Let me clarify that the comment referred specifically and only to Marc T's comment about the advisability of having routine Platoon confabs; simply getting the joes together and everybody talks about what's happening...
It did not apply to training or to your very good paper.
With respect to the tactical stuff, I said that what Raymond Millen said concerning TTP is in fact basic infantry / maneuver unit tactics and should be taught, adding; "''in other words, what you highlight that he's suggesting is basic -- and we Americans do not do the basics well because we have to learn on the job after the war starts and as we go instead of being trained in them upon entry.""
IOW, I agree with you that we do not train it in the institution, at both officer and enlisted entry training -- and we should. I can totally understand the thrust of your comments just above and can empathize -- but I do know some units, as Mark O'Neill said, do train themselves and do a very good job. That comes down to the personality and the desires of commanders and there are indeed too many who do not want to do the COIN thing at all.
Keep on pushing.
Age old problem. CALL does great stuff but
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
I wouldn't quite go that far. The idea is that there are plenty of TTP manuals from CALL out there, (and there's lots) and enough COIN articles and ideas. In fact, the major issue is there are too many handbooks and TTP's, often conflicting. What is now needed is to 'codify' what is going to be the Army answer for tactical application of COIN principles, and settle some of the debates going on.
unless things have changed radically, the dissemination is spotty. Hopefully, that has changed...
Divisions and Schools do their own thing focusing on their experience and AO in the case of Divs, area of expertise for the Schools. Then the Theater tries to standardize a bit. Both of 'em...
Getting everyone on one sheet of music has never been easy; communities vary in their interests and approaches. It generally gets worked out even if it is too often not very timely.
The lack of standardization is a problem in a sense; it's also an advantage in a sense as competing ideas aren't all bad and can be advantageous -- in the end, it boils down to what works for the unit where they are when they're there and no book is ever going to cover all that. Still, the basics are what's important and they don't change much...
An even better idea than a handbook would be to train people a little better (Sorry, the debbil made me do it... :D).
That's always been the problem...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
...Bottom line: the information is out there. If there is a problem, it deals more with sorting through it all.
Tom
that and getting the document / info to the right place at the right time. I saw some really neat and very helpful stuff about fighting in Viet Nam, published in late 1965. Would've been great stuff to know; wish I'd run across it before 1972.
Not trying to attack CALL or anyone else in the documenting and informing business. They all do a vary valuable job. All the services mean well and spend big bucks trying to do that -- but the info generally doesn't get where it should in a timely manner and our use of short tours and the rapid rotation between tours is not helpful in that regard. I base that comment not only on my long bygone experience but in talking to people who are out in the field today. Distribution may be better than it was in my day but the spear chunkers tell me they rarely get it in a timely manner.
Nor does the great work by the documenters excuse the fact that we do not train the basics at all well...
Thanks for a good, thoughtful response
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
Going to disagree some with you here Ken. If the soldier is interested, he only has to take 1 or 2 steps to find what he's looking for.
I do not doubt that; always been true. I can recall many years ago being hassled by most of my peers for visiting the Post Library about one a week -- and I wasn't looking for new fiction.
Quote:
...CALL now has a POC in EVERY installation whose sole job is to find information at the request of users in CALL's database. It's the COIN L2I program. Soldier can say "I want everything on Detainee ops for a PLT" and within 48 hours call will send it to them.
If the line isn't getting it in today's information environment, it isn't because the Army hasn't led the horse to the water.
The larger issue is one of willingness. I was a heavy user of Company Command and LOGNET forums. Both allowed me to tap into the expertise of peers and experts in fields. I was a much, much more effective commander because of Company Command. Want some creative ideas on rewarding soldiers? It's there. Want a good supply room SOP? It's there. Want creative ways to train house clearing training? it's there. Have a question? Your peers and those who have gone before will answer it in a few hours. I saved countless hours because I was willing to read and learn from those who have gone before.
However, out of 13 company commanders in my BCT, I was the only one active on that site. Whenever I found something good, I passed it on to my peers. But it just amazed me that they were unwilling to utilize a resource that would make them tremendously more effective at leading soldiers. The lick is on them, not the Army.
Good for CALL. I've never doubted the info is available, from what I hear, it still doesn't get there unless people work at it and I'm sure efforts to fix that are being made. That said, if it is available and unit doesn't have it, then it's the units fault. Basically, we are in total agreement on all this. That has long been the problem -- IMO, it goes back to selection and who gets promoted. One size does not fit all...
I'd also submit there is a significant training shortfall. We tell folks "You are responsible for your career." Ridiculous. What they should be told is that "You are responsible for the training and capability of your subordinates; screw it up and you're toast." I know a number of reasons we do not do that -- and I submit that if you're going to send people to combat; you have an obligation to do that which transcends all those valid sociological and political reasons to not do it.
Quote:
I did see a good idea from the Israeli army at a recent conference. They appointed a "KM" specialist additional duty in each PLT, whose job was to scour fourms and sites and bring the latest relevant info to the bosses.
That is a good idea but I was doing that forty plus years ago, that's no brag, I did it because my first PSG tabbed me to be the searcher 20 years earlier and I was far from alone, most good units back in my day did that. All of the change in the post Viet Nam Army was not the golden gift some make it out to be.
Quote:
Dissemination of good knowledge is also faster than ever. Let's take the CO CDR document Jason Pape linked above, which I think is the best current OIF AAR I've read at company level...Talk about KM success! Thousands of accesses in just a few hours.
Yes it is -- and a lot of Attaboys due all involved. We can be thankful there was not a loser or excessively bureaucratic stumbling block among those involved (and in fairness, there are far fewer of those about today than there were even five years ago -- ain't combat great? :D)
Quote:
I just don't buy that motivated professionals can't find useful and relevant info today. If they're not getting it, it's because they're not making the effort. IMO. Effective range of that excuse is zero.
While I agree, can I suggest an issue is what to do about those who do not make the effort? As you said above; one out of 13. As Martha Stewart would say "That is not a good thing."
No snark -- that has long been a serious problem -- the problem -- and my sensing is it is better than it was but still has a long way to go. The same problem exists with NCOs, about one out 10 or so really wants to be tactically and technically proficient above the level of survival and future promotion. That problem really needs to be fixed...
Quote:
========
Onto FM versus handbook ....That's the point from our earlier conversation - the current "gap" is for a FM. A non-theater specific set of guidelines/methods for tactical level application of COIN doctrine that everyone can/will impliment. To settle on a "least bad" solution. Just like all doctrine, it's a baseline for everyone, and no one is restricted from innovating or using another system. But it will standardize what is "the" way, like MDMP does, 5 paragraph OPORDs, IPB, etc, so we can communicate between units and branches effectively.
Niel
Totally concur with all that and having done the doctrine and FM writing stint in my misspent youth am aware of the process (and its shortfalls) but my base point -- and I didn't say it well -- goes back to something I said here some months ago. I said handbook, bad shorthand on my part, I really meant a Co/By/Trp level FM. FM 3-24 is good, long overdue, needed etc. etc. -- but what about something Joe Team Leader can stick in his ACU pocket? We used to do the books by command echelon -- and we started at the bottom and worked up and much effort was concurrent in different departmens of the same school; now, it seems we start at the top and work down and we're far slower than we used to be (too many cooks?). The staff weenies (I used to one of those too :( ) and the POM should not be the priority, that should go to the guy on the ground.
And that's really all I meant.
A touch off the direct point, but
I thought it was an interesting piece and worth looking at on the viewpoints of the ISAF. In particular, the point that caught my eye was
Quote:
The trouble, the MPs said, is that the 37 countries contributing to NATO's International Security Assistance Force lack a "well defined strategic vision for its presence" in Afghanistan. While NATO troops performed "brilliantly at the tactical level, the alliance does not yet have a sufficiently explicit goal for what it wants to achieve".
Link here.
Have a confab and it will come...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
That was certainly how I took it :D. I'll admit, I was taking it a touch beyond a "confab" and more into the real of "collective sensemaking" across the ranks with, possibly, a touch of the old Maoist "speaking anger" added in (forget the source, it's a great group dynamics method ;)).
The first few will be vague and general, specificity and openness come with repetition. Unless firm steps are taken to stop them, the kids will open up. Needless to say, they should not be so stopped but encouraged to speak up. Unless one is afraid of them... ;)
Quote:
I keep thinking back to the founding of the 1st Marine Raider BTN and its use of Maoist principles for organizational learning, adaptation and motivation. In the type of topsy-turvy "reality" (?) that is COIN, such principle can stand a group in good stead.
Mao may have been Carlson's source but the idea pre dates Mao. Ever been to a First Nations Band Council meeting? 'Speaking anger' -- but quietly... :wry:
Some more ideas on your COIN Cliff Notes...
BOG - avoid absolutes. I (think I) know what you're trying to get at, and I'm often concerned we're not "on the ground" enough - especially w/ MRAPs, etc. But remember...you're encouraging a discussion here - not making rules. There are some missions (even within the larger COIN framework) that do not require you to be "on foot."
Language - check out http://www.tacticallanguage.com/ in addition to LingNet. If you have a boss who tells you to use Rosetta Stone...fight it. You need to know how to converse, not speak words, in IRAQI (not Arabic).
AO Expert - also discuss how you're going to continuously consolidate all of that information (including how you're going to get at the tacit knowledge your Soldiers don't even realize they've developed) so that it doesn't leave theater with you. Too often, we wait until to the end-of-tour to try and put it all together for the relief; it's almost always just a collection of data. Try to create a "Matrix-type download of what WE know about the AO" that remains with the unit after you leave and allows them to continue to explore and update as they go.
Here's an example I had all the way back in OIF I (condensed for space & to get rid of classified stuff, but gives you the idea; haven't de-clasified my newer one):
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/folder/7430604
(AKO login required)
Time Limits - again, avoid rules. Having a "time limit" is almost as bad as doing patrols for a specified time. Rather - THINK about time. eg. IF we are on-site for more than X minutes, we should do Y IOT mediate risk. Sometimes it takes longer than X to do what you need to do. Things like cache hunting and destruction take a long time! My scouts were typically "in sector" for 72-96 hours at a time. It's good that you talk about patterns and "schedules"...talk about those more!
Finally...another piece worth discussing at the platoon level: an article called "Operations David & Goliath" starting on page 9 of this link. It's certainly not the answer...it's simply something to have a discussion over.
Hope this helps...
It can be frustrating trying to put what you
know into context when describing it to others. Thats part of what SWJ gives is a way in which varying experiences and knowledge from others comes together in a picture which kinda makes sense.
Thanks for your efforts.
This kinda reminds me of a discussion I was in where the best I could do to describe what your speaking of was the following.
Quote:
If the population in your AO do not feel secure than you the counter insurgent aren't secure no matter how much armor you wrap around yourself.
It ain't perfect but I think it reflects some of what Galula, Kilcullen, and others have stated. And you having lived it can represent the validity of it by simply sharing your experience.