http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/wa..._r=1&ref=world
I'm not surprised by this story. I am surprised that some of these former officers now admit that what they were saying on TV was apparently not what they were really thinking.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/wa..._r=1&ref=world
I'm not surprised by this story. I am surprised that some of these former officers now admit that what they were saying on TV was apparently not what they were really thinking.
I had to snicker at Jeff McCausland getting rolled in there. I bumped into him a Lowe's today.
of their and other media outlets promotion of the views of many former Intelligence Community personages who wrote many OpEds in the Times itself in addition to their TV appearances. I'm sure they'll be equally forthcoming about the totally unbiased and straightforward defense of Intel shortfalls by those paragons of virtue.
This from the article linked:is particularly rich coming from that bastion of journalistic integrity.Quote:
"The decision recalled other administration tactics that subverted traditional journalism. Federal agencies, for example, have paid columnists to write favorably about the administration. They have distributed to local TV stations hundreds of fake news segments with fawning accounts of administration accomplishments. The Pentagon itself has made covert payments to Iraqi newspapers to publish coalition propaganda."(emphasis added / kw)
I'm not at all surprised that some of these former officers now admit that what they were saying on TV was apparently not what they were really thinking. Though I would posit that most of them are saying that in hindsight. I'd also submit that to expect unbiased commentary from anyone who's devoted 20 plus years of their life to any organization or calling, military or intelligence, is to expect more than will ever be delivered...
Not to mention that to expect journalistic integrity from US news media is expecting more than will be delivered.
Does this really pass the so-what test?
It does for me in a huge way.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
While I accept that the American media is not perfect, it is better than most of the rest and it is a pillar of our democracy. Too, reporters for major newspapers do not generally work on the side for large corporations.
This also plays large in the field of civil-military relations in that one would hope that the American people listen to these senior officers and GOs for their analysis with the assumption that it is relatively objective and truthful to their knowledge and experience as military officers. What this story points to is that honesty and objectivity has been severely tainted by their connections to big defense corporations and to the Administration.
You know Ken after Yochi Dreazen's WSJ article on me a few weeks ago I must have gotten 5-6 interview requests to appear on major national news shows. I turned them all down for various reasons. But if I had gone on them, or if I do someday when I retire, the only thing that I got going for me is colonel's pay, a few bucks saved over the years in mutual funds, a little piece of rental property down the road, and my family. No links to the big boys so the analysis they would get from me would be my ideas not tied to any special interest.
If Ken White writes a post on this blog even if I disagree with it I trust it because it comes from the mind and heart of Ken White. Now when I read something or hear something from many of these GOs, I wont trust it.
Remember MG Scales's oped in the WSJ (I think) of a few months ago where he talked about finally turning a corner or a tipping point in Iraq? I disagreed with it when it came out, but now I dont trust it to boot.
I think he has already deployed with his battalion but it would be nice to see a post from Paul Yingling on this matter.
gian
The newspapers are probably in the top 50% worldwide, all things considered. If our TV news is, the world is in deep trouble. Journalism as a whole has trashed itself pretty much worldwide IMO, I have little faith in any of the media and am generally distrustful of what they say. I hate that but they've done it to themselves...Quote:
Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile
I can understand that would possibly be a surprise to many; I find it hard to believe a healthy percentage of Americans weren't aware of that at some level.Quote:
...What this story points to is that honesty and objectivity has been severely tainted by their connections to big defense corporations and to the Administration.
Sadly, I got to that point many, many years ago...Quote:
If Ken White writes a post on this blog even if I disagree with it I trust it because it comes from the mind and heart of Ken White. Now when I read something or hear something from many of these GOs, I wont trust it.
Mark me down as "C, both of the above."Quote:
Remember MG Scales's oped in the WSJ (I think) of a few months ago where he talked about finally turning a corner or a tipping point in Iraq? I disagreed with it when it came out, but now I dont trust it to boot.
True. Generals are people, some are good, some are not. I have long been a Creighton Abrams fan (he saved me from a fate worse than death when he was the Vice Chief in '65... :D). My favorite quote from him; "Generals should be noted for their silences."Quote:
I think he has already deployed with his battalion but it would be nice to see a post from Paul Yingling on this matter.
Conversely I was not a Shinseki fan -- I am now.
Yep; former Generals and former spooks -- if either's speaking publicly, the truth is unlikely to be a significant issue.
Good way to end the discussion; thanks for your thoughts. Gonna hit the rack, got to try and write something worth a darn in the morn.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
gian
no ... but unfortunately it will not stop it getting utilised as another nail in the conspiracy coffin.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
The Pentagon did not pay them, the Pentagon did not direct them and the Pentagon did not force them to say what they said. Instead these grown and experienced men made assessments based on their year's of service, loyalty to their former organisations and their extremely wide web of contacts and chose to use the information.
More importantly the media organisations knew exactly what they were getting ... in fact they actively seek it because the credibility of the source provides a level of credibility to the media organisation itself. Tell me you weren't fascinated with the one-upmanship between the organisations over who's former 2-star had a better grip or how Organisation A's former 4-star was much more important (read credible) than organisation B's lowly O6.
The process the Pentagon employed was not revolutionary, it was not deceptive and it was not wrong ... in fact it is taught in University's all around the globe ... it's called PR.
To come out and criticise the process after five years seems like ####ting in one's own nest to me.
But seriously, I think this is a very important issue but I'm struggling to come to grips with it.
I can't really blame Pentagon PAO because "strategic communications" is what they do.
For the media outlets, having a retired flag officer certainly adds gravitas and authority. But for retired flag officers, it's kind of unrealistic to expect that after 30 or more years of being a spokesman for the institution, they'd suddenly change. After all, being an articulate spokesman for the institution was one of the reasons they got stars in the first place.
So, is there a problem here? If so, is there is a solution?
I wish I had time to blog on this but that would take time away from my trip into Mr. Feith's never never land.
To put this in perspective, the MSM has seen its influence with the public steadily deteriorate. Circulation is down, viewers are down, public trust is down. In a normal business, this is a sign that you're out of touch with your customers. To the ideologues in the MSM, its a sign that some grand conspiracy is undermining you.
I read the article looking for:
a. Substantiated allegations that these retired officers had knowingly presented false or distorted information. Nope, that doesn't seem to be the problem.
b. Substantiated allegations that the Pentagon had used them to spread false information. Nope, again, that doesn't seem to be the problem.
Although, I'll give the NYT credit, they did a good job of writing the article to:
a. Leave an impression that the information was false, while never actually making an accusation they could be called on.
b. Leave an impression that the Pentagon was engaged in unethical behavior by providing information to a group of people who would pass it on to the public.
So here's what it boils down to: The Pentagon tapped into a body of retired officers in order to ensure the public had accurate information. The NYT is displeased - probably because the accurate information was getting out.
This doesn't pass the so what test for me.
BTW, Steve, we appreciate your taking one for the team and reporting back so that we don't have to take the trip ourselves. :DQuote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
But most of the guys discussed were on cable television. Where are people getting information then? I realize there are people who rely on Limbaugh, Newsmax, Moveon or other infotainment/ideological sources, but I'd have to think they're a minority.Quote:
Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger
Here's where I'm going with it, by the way. As soon as I finish the book and read Joe Collins' new monograph, I'm going to draft an article tentatively called "The Logic of Strategy and the Invasion of Iraq." The basic thesis is that there is a logic of strategy which says--to oversimplify it--that the expected benefits of an action (in terms of more security) must outweigh the expected costs and risks.Quote:
Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger
In deciding to invade Iraq, the Bush administration abandoned that logic. It used a legal rather than a strategic form of thinking, concluding that the establishment of guilt was sufficient. Once guilt was established, punishment proportionate to the guilt was applied. I contend that make sense for a domestic legal system, but not for strategy.
Feith, being a lawyer, fully adopted this position. He spends dozens of pages establishing that Saddam Hussein was a threat, and a few sentences on the costs and risks of addressing that threat by invasion and social re-engineering.
I believe--and I hammer this theme in my book--that this abandonment or distortion of the logic of strategy was made possible by the unusual post-September 11 psychological climate. Even those uncomfortable with it were unwilling to openly and vigorously oppose it. It was almost like being drunk--something in the back of the mind said, "this is a bad idea" but the inebriated part of the brain said, "what the hell--go for it!!"
Quote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
This captures the difference between those who felt the war met Just War criteria and those who didn't. (I fell in the former group, largely because of his use of CW against the Kurds, and the genocide against the Marsh Arabs.)Quote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
What confuses the issue is attempts to bring Just War theory into the realm of international law, the hypocrisy and cynicism of the international community in living up to the ideal, and the clumsiness of the Bush Administration in making the case for war in Iraq.
I suspect the clumsiness had a lot to do with the second problem. I recall reading a quote from a UN official that there was debate over referring to the genocide in Rwanda as a "genocide," since calling it that would obligate the international community to intervene. Given that behavior from the UN, I can understand having a tough time figuring out how to present the justification for the war.
There are still a lot of solid sources. I use NPR, Fox, World Radio Network (also on Sirius), the Washington Times and Post, the NY Post, IBD, WSJ, etc.Quote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
But the experts in the story were prominent on those sources.Quote:
Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger
Originally posted by J Wolfsberger:
Little different take, but close - very, very close. After the last set of financials (coming out over the last few weeks), the media folks are all looking for scapegoats, and there's real tensions between the adminstrative/financial side of the different corporations and the media side. After all, "somebody" has to be at fault here - it can't possibly be the product:eek:Quote:
To put this in perspective, the MSM has seen its influence with the public steadily deteriorate. Circulation is down, viewers are down, public trust is down. In a normal business, this is a sign that you're out of touch with your customers. To the ideologues in the MSM, its a sign that some grand conspiracy is undermining you.
The sniping is starting to grow into something akin to a civil war at some organizations - over who's losing the business (See Tribune Co. as a good example). And over who they are losing the business to.
Bottom line: If the newspapers/media corporations had growing and profitable marketplaces, this wouldn't even being reported. Wouldn't even be a story.
But cable (and the Internet, of which cable is a big service provider) have been taking chunks (not just bites, CHUNKS) out of the conventional media (MSM) business. So their business isn't growing.
What you are seeing what looks to be a very creative way to create questions about the "journalistic integrity" of the cable / non-MSM version of the media, and the product they put out there. Not bad - very slick, actually. Worthy of presidential campaign staff, if they end up having to look for a new job.;)
Problem is, it's not just cable. It's craigslist, talk radio (not mine, but that's more potential eyeballs off the scene), youtube, facebook, all sorts of other options. I halfway expect a bunch of MSM scare stories along the lines of "Using the Internet can give you brain cancer".
Quote:
...
The itinerary, scripted to the minute, featured brief visits to a model school, a few refurbished government buildings, a center for women’s rights, a mass grave and even the gardens of Babylon.
Mostly the analysts attended briefings. These sessions, records show, spooled out an alternative narrative, depicting an Iraq bursting with political and economic energy, its security forces blossoming. On the crucial question of troop levels, the briefings echoed the White House line: No reinforcements were needed. The “growing and sophisticated threat” described by Mr. Bremer was instead depicted as degraded, isolated and on the run.
“We’re winning,” a briefing document proclaimed.
That certainly sounds like accurate information from the Pentagon to me. What a shame that the American people didn't get this sort of ground truth back in 2003-2005 more often. Then we could have continued on with the sort of remarkably effective strategies that brought us such enormous successes back then.Quote:
“I saw immediately in 2003 that things were going south,” General Vallely, one of the Fox analysts on the trip, recalled in an interview with The Times.
The Pentagon, though, need not have worried.
“You can’t believe the progress,” General Vallely told Alan Colmes of Fox News upon his return. He predicted the insurgency would be “down to a few numbers” within months.
That was a discussion within the Clinton Administration's NSC, not the UN.Quote:
I recall reading a quote from a UN official that there was debate over referring to the genocide in Rwanda as a "genocide," since calling it that would obligate the international community to intervene. Given that behavior from the UN, I can understand having a tough time figuring out how to present the justification for the war.
they see on the tube deserves their fate...
I thinks Spud and Watcher in the Middle have got it about right, the Times article passes the 'so-what' test ONLY in the sense it impugns the Cable networks -- who did almost certainly know exactly what they were getting -- so should any listener or viewer have known what they were getting.
Those who missed that can snivel about being mislead. I'm not too sympathetic, personally.
Steve,
(bold added by me)Quote:
I believe--and I hammer this theme in my book--that this abandonment or distortion of the logic of strategy was made possible by the unusual post-September 11 psychological climate. Even those uncomfortable with it were unwilling to openly and vigorously oppose it. It was almost like being drunk--something in the back of the mind said, "this is a bad idea" but the inebriated part of the brain said, "what the hell--go for it!!"
For just a second when I read the bold part I got an image of Larry the Cable guy sitting down with Ron White:D
I think there is a solid argument to be made that your analogy is well fitted; Rational Policy got a time out so to speak.
I'm sure you've seen it, but others here may not have - below is a link to Gray's piece that weighs the publicized doctrine of preemption over the realities of prevention. I think its a good read, and has bearing on broader discussion.
The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration.
Since we're still fighting the war, its hard discuss what the original stated goals, and grounds were while considering what the stakes are now as seen by the various participants, or the consequences of considering what the possible outcomes could mean.
I like Gray's choice of quote from Bernard Brodie:about the need to be pragmatic:
To me this ties in nicely with the dictum as articulated by Clausewitz (para-phrased): "that the first and most important action a political leader must make is to define the true character of the war upon which he is about to embark."Quote:
Strategic thinking, or "theory" if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a "how to do it" to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? More important, will it be likely to work under the special circumstances under which it will be tested? These circumstances are not likely to be known or knowable much in advance of the moment of testing, though the uncertainty is itself a factor to be reckoned with in one's strategic doctrine. pg.16
To me that means at least considering the range of possible consequences in light of the political end you are attempting to achieve through the use of military force; and the possibility that by entering into the environment where friction and chance create many more possibilities, we might create new ends that have to be addressed. This is where I think we are at now. Anything commentators have said in the past becomes somewhat circumspect when held against the changing context the original ends gave birth to.
Best Rob
Isn't this the rag that has to clean house every year or two for manufacturing Pulitzer Prize stories?
Also please consider Shallit's Razor -- Never assign to conspiracy that which can be sufficiently explained by ignorance or incompetence. Anyone close to the Washington bureaucracy, especially to the strategic communications piece, would know that the "gang that can't shoot straight" could never put together a real plan to accomplish what these authors contend.
I have never been a proponent of public affairs: the spouse tends to find out; bad things happen. International affairs, on the other hand...:D
One area you might want to look at is research into decision making between loss choices and misjudgments of comparative risks. In that regard, there are some parallels between the Japanese decision for war in 1941 and OIF. In essence, leaders, when faced with a status quo situation they perceive will result in a loss, often choose very risky options to prevent that loss and also delude themselves into believing that those risky actions contain less risk than they actually do.Quote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
There's been some research on this effect I can try to dig up if you'd like.
I think you are exactly right in pointing out the lack of solid strategic thinking on the part of the administration in the run-up to Iraq. My reasoning for that is that they did not really understand the nature of military power and what it can and cannot do, and hence they asked of it something alien to its nature, to loosely paraphrase Clausewitz. And, broadly speaking, the ideological belief in the power of freedom to solve all the problems of the Iraqi society definitely did not help whatever cost/benefit analysis it may have taken place.Quote:
In deciding to invade Iraq, the Bush administration abandoned that logic. It used a legal rather than a strategic form of thinking, concluding that the establishment of guilt was sufficient. Once guilt was established, punishment proportionate to the guilt was applied. I contend that make sense for a domestic legal system, but not for strategy.
Feith, being a lawyer, fully adopted this position. He spends dozens of pages establishing that Saddam Hussein was a threat, and a few sentences on the costs and risks of addressing that threat by invasion and social re-engineering.
I believe--and I hammer this theme in my book--that this abandonment or distortion of the logic of strategy was made possible by the unusual post-September 11 psychological climate.
But I am intrigued by your argument that they acted "astrategically" because they addressed the issue in a legalistic fashion. I've always been rather uncomfortable with the fact that so many lawyers end up in high decision-making position on issues of national security, so this would confirm to me that my bias against people with a legalistic frame of thinking making decision about war and peace may not be totally misplaced. I think lawyers are best at arguing for or against a course of action, not at actually analyzing and thinking through many options and choosing the most appropriate one. But I wonder whether this abandonment of strategic logic was due to 9/11, or it is something more endemic to the "American way of war" in general, as Colin Gray never tires of arguing, and something whose causes go beyond any particular administration and have more to do with, in his words, "a longstanding tradition of material superiority which offers few incentives
for strategic calculation; and the nation’s traditional theory of civil-military relations, which discourages probing dialogue between policymaker and soldier."