US Military Information Operations FM

In further proof that the conspiracy theorists of the world use the military's unique language and misquotations to their advantage, DOD's 2003 IO Roadmap has been severely maligned as a document that advocates destruction of the internet in an attempt to prevent free speech. The quote below is from the "Knowledge Driven Revolution" (http://www.knowledgedrivenrevolution..._Fight_Net.htm)

"The Pentagon's Information Operations Roadmap is blunt about the fact that an internet, with the potential for free speech, is in direct opposition to their goals. The internet needs to be dealt with as if it were an enemy "weapons system."

The actual quote, from page 13 of the IO Roadmap refers to DOD's Computer Network Defense efforts, stating that "DOD's Defense in Depth" strategy should operate on the premise that the Department should "fight the net" as it would a weapons system."

Military folks understand the concept of "fighting" a tank as a weapons system, meaning that you're going to employ the thing as an integral element of your operation, not attack it. Furthermore, this specifc reference is to developing better defensive capabilities against enemy penetrations, not about developing offensive tools to attack the internet at large to prevent free speech.

Unfortunately, this sort of ridiculous stuff gets traction. This specific, misquoted posting has been repeated on dozens of other sites, yet we do nothing to counter this sort of activity. Offensively countering this sort of posting would obviously prove it true, but we can sure do better about debunking some of the more overt BS gets disseminated.:mad:

The DOD IO Roadmap signed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed that all the services make IO a core military competency. The Army has come a long way toward this goal but five years later the Army still does not have an Army Regulation that provides policy guidance for IO. During the 26 April 2007, Council of Colonels meeting, DAMO-ODI was tasked with developing the draft copy of an Army Regulation that provides guidance on IO.

With this in mind AR 525-20 Command and Control Countermeasures dated 31 July 1992, has been rewritten and renamed AR 525-20 Information Operations.

AR 525-20 is currently in staffing. For those with an AKO account, PM me and I will send you a copy of the draft. It goes counter to FM 3-0 and the rewrite of FM 3-13. It is more nested in Joint Doctrine.

I'm interested in receiving the draft of AR 525-20.
ken

PM sent

Team Infidel - What is your PM on AKO? Thanks

And it is about time. Congrats to COL (P) John Davis.

Not bad since the FA30 stream/proponent doesn't actually have any 1-star slots ... hopefully it heralds a realisation that people that understand the info environment are strategic thinkers and have a hell of a lot to offer at the senior levels. Here’s to uniforms having a bigger say in things rather than just employing civvie PR specialists on contract.

With a little luck, after his new assignment he will find his way over to the G3/5/7 as the deputy director for IO. We just need the power behind a star to push things where they need to go.

It looks like the new FM 3-13, Information, will be released in the next week or so. The intention of the manual is to go into much greater detail concerning the doctrinal changes made to Information in Chapter 7 of FM 3-0, Operations.

Specifically, there is going to be further development in the processes and techniques required to ensure Information is properly executed in full spectrum operations. With the elevation of stability and civil support operations on par with offensive and defensive operations, Information has become even more important. The war fighter that wakes up to the reality of the importance of Information across all operations will be given a much stronger base from which to engage in one, or all, of the Army information tasks or communicate with those staff and operational elements that do.

The update will also help the force “open its hand” and use Information to engage, communicate and elaborate by, with and through relevant publics and actors as opposed to merely using the closed fist of the destructive capabilities of information.

I'm interested in what information practitioners, and others that are interested, have to say about evolving information doctrine a la US Army.

The Army has now in fact released its latest version of FM 3-13, Information.

This version of FM 3-13 describes how commanders can use Information as an element of combat power to shape the operational environment. It expands the Army’s approach to the use of Information beyond “Information Operations” to one focused on applying the five Army Information Tasks that are fundamental to full spectrum operations.

Three main ideas frame the organization and content of the FM. They are:
- Complexity, caused by world-wide connectivity and information saturation, is the unique challenge for conducting full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century.
- Understanding and leveraging this information-driven complexity is fundamental to the art and science of military operations and impacts all aspects of those operations.
- To be effective in this environment, Army forces must be as highly skilled in the art and science of engaging, communicating, and collaborating as they are in disrupting, corrupting, or usurping enemy decision-making.

The manual continues a doctrinal evolution started with FM 3-0. Very interested in thoughts and comments you have.

Anyone got a link or .pdf handy? I can still only find the old one.

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Originally Posted by haughtdd

The Army has now in fact released its latest version of FM 3-13, Information.

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Not completely correct.

An Initial Draft - Not For Implementation, dated 27 Feb 09, is out, but not in general release. (AKO Log-In Required)

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The material in this field manual is under development. It is NOT approved doctrine and CANNOT be used for reference or citation. The approved FM is still current and must be used for reference, or citation, until this draft is approved and authenticated. When published, this manual will be approved for public release; distribution will be unlimited.

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Edit to add: The linked pdf is set up to facilitate participation in an e-mail based review. Once you've saved the pdf, you can use the Commenting toolbar to add comments and then submit via e-mail once complete.

Interested parties can obtain a copy of the 27 Feb 09 DRAFT FM 3-13 by:
- clicking on the link graciously provided by Jedburgh - or -
- send an EMAIL request to: FM3-13_CRM@conus.army.mil

Appreciate all the interest.

Unfortunately this is a great work of fiction.

The concept of IE is good and will work at the Brigade level and below, but Information OPERATIONS officers need to have the flexibility to utilize all 5 pillars of IO at the Corps level and above. Divisions can utilize both concepts to be the linkage between the Brigade and the Corps. Like the Field Artillery (another effects based organization) you don’t have the same capabilities at the battery as you do at higher levels. IE can be effective at tactical level, but IO is effective at the Strategic and Operational levels.

Back in December, the concepts of IE were introduced into Afghanistan and it caused such a stir that the European NATO allies, specifically Germany, threatened to pull out of media operations there. It underminded the credibility of the information released to the public. Another ISAF official confirmed that the amalgamation of public affairs with Information Operations and PSYOP was part of the planned command restructure. This official, who also declined to be named, said the merger had caused considerable concern at higher levels within NATO which had challenged the order by the U.S. general.

Another significant change is that the G7/S7 will be primarily focused on conducting IE while the other information tasks, will be performed by other staff sections. If this comes into effect, the IO officer won't be conducting full spectrum IO or rather, all the information tasks, but they will be limited to conducting IE. In fact, CAC has already submitted a similar change to DA PAM 600-3 (commissioned officer professional development and career management) redefining the duties and responsibilities of the IO officers for doctrine that is not yet approved.

Information Operations is truly about the ART of warfare, and this new document now ties the hands of the IO officer to utilize all of the capabilities offered to him/her to shape the battlefield and the information environment for the commander.

TI,

Thanks for the re-energizing this thread, I was kind of waiting to see where it would go. I assume the writing team is monitoring the wire since they announced the staffing release. I also assume they are looking for input to determine points of contention and possible adjustments...

A couple of points of clarification...

I assume your concerns are referring to Chapter 5 (Information Task Execution and Integration) and Chapter 6 (Information Engagement)...

"The concept of IE is good and will work at the Brigade level and below, but Information OPERATIONS officers need to have the flexibility to utilize all 5 pillars of IO at the Corps level and above... Another significant change is that the G7/S7 will be primarily focused on conducting IE while the other information tasks, will be performed by other staff sections. If this comes into effect, the IO officer won't be conducting full spectrum IO or rather, all the information tasks, but they will be limited to conducting IE. "

You note that the draft doctrine proposes that the lead for IO tasks (as defined in FM 3-0) be moved into different staff boards, centers, cells, and teams... specifically Info Protect into G6, Mil Deception into Plans, C2W info fires/effects, and OPSEC into G3 protections; and that this will constrain the IO Officer's ability to utilize the 5 pillars at Corps and above. I suppose its a two-sided arguement: On the one hand if you lump all beneath the G7 then you have a single belly-button to work cross task issues; on the other hand, moving these tasks into the existing boards and centers better postures the command to integrate IO activities across operations. I leave it to the authors to explain, but I think they would argue that Corps and above HQ don't work (as a general rule) in staff pure smokestacks... rather they provide participants with SME to various boards, centers and teams, and that it is the G7s role to provide SME to those boards centers and teams to integrate information tasks...

Back in December, the concepts of IE were introduced into Afghanistan and it caused such a stir that the European NATO allies, specifically Germany, threatened to pull out of media operations there. It underminded the credibility of the information released to the public. Another ISAF official confirmed that the amalgamation of public affairs with Information Operations and PSYOP was part of the planned command restructure. This official, who also declined to be named, said the merger had caused considerable concern at higher levels within NATO which had challenged the order by the U.S. general.


I will refrain from discussing the context that surrounded how IE was introduced into Afghanistan, but I think the draft doctrine is very specific in Chapter 6 in discussing the unique role that PA plays in the IE task...

Principles of Info Engagement:
-Coherent
-Human-centered
-Adaptive
-Truthful
-Timely
-Persistent
- Balanced
-Pragmatic

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
6-19. Public affairs are a commander’s responsibility to execute public information, command information, and community engagement directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.
6-20. Public affairs proactively inform and educate internal and external publics through public information, command information, and direct community engagement. Although all information engagement activities are completely truthful, public affairs is unique. It has a statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize or manipulate public opinion. Specifically, public affairs facilitate the commander’s obligation to support informed U.S. citizenry, U.S. Government decisionmakers, and as operational requirements may dictate, non-U.S. audiences. Effective information engagement requires particular attention to clearly demarking this unique role of public affairs, protecting its credibility. This requires care and consideration when synchronizing public affairs with other information engagement activities. Public affairs and other information engagement tasks must be synchronized to ensure consistency, command credibility, and operations security.
6-21. The public affairs staff requires augmentation to provide full support during protracted operations. (JP 3-61, AR 360-1, and FMs 46-1 and 3-61.1 govern public affairs.)

While acknowledging the considerations you mention... I would think that this verbage takes into account the needs of the PA community...

I'm just a former operator who worked the spectrum from Div thru GCC, neither the brightest nor dimmest bulb on the tree, but the toughest issue was to bring all the assets to bear (otherwise known as cat herding)... The biggest problem was staff elements who worked their lane exclusively (usually leading to being out of sync with the remainder of the staff)... bring info tasks into logical staff forums for integration across the command makes a lot of sense in my brain casing...

In a related, anecdotal note, I had a front row seat to the III Corps/MNC-I After Action/Collection Team... less doctrine directing them to, this is how they conducted business to great effect....

I'm not sure their is a perfect solution, but this one seems an appropriate weighing of considerations...

Live well and row...

PM sent

I would agree with your assessment of AR 525-20 not accurately reflecting FM 3-0, capstone doctrine of the Army and the selected application of concepts by senior leadership. Having worked on this project and heard the guidance given by senior leadership, I find it interesting that the manual is not more in line with FM 3-0.

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Originally Posted by Nickel

I would agree with your assessment of AR 525-20 not accurately reflecting FM 3-0, capstone doctrine of the Army and the selected application of concepts by senior leadership. Having worked on this project and heard the guidance given by senior leadership, I find it interesting that the manual is not more in line with FM 3-0. (emphasis added)

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AR 525-20 is not a manual - it's an Army Regulation.

What takes precedence? Doctrine or Regulations?

I could just as easily say:

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I find it interesting that FM 3-0 capstone doctrine (and the new Draft FM 3-13) is not in line with Army IO Regulations and Joint IO Doctrine.

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As a matter of fact, I'm sure there are probably people within the Army, and within OSD & the Joint Staff, that are looking at Army IO doctrine and thinking the same thing.

Perhaps those drafting the AR 525-20 actually tried to nest it within higher order doctrine and guidance, which is why there's a disconnect with FM 3-0.

Policy (AR) trumps doctrine....

Don't think you are right...

You don't have to wait on policy in order to change doctrine... Policy often follows...

This isn't an all or nothing, can't use an 525 AR as a final answer to this type of conflict...

Live well and row

I have been reading FM 3-13 trying to get a better idea of the role the G-7 has in IE. As I look at Figure 6-1, I come away thinking of the G-7 as a conductor directing an orchestra of five core competencies of IE (PA, PO, Combat Camera, STRATCOM, Public Diplomacy), Par 6-2. I understand that this is done in working groups; however, I am trying to figure out who has ultimate responsibility for IE. At the end of the mission, is the commander going to look at the G-7 for the successes and failures of IE, or will he look to the PAO, PO, etc.?

In Paragraph 6-36, it states, "PSYOP planning is conducted within the G-7/S-7section and synchronized within the IEWG."

Am I understanding this correctly to say that the PSYOP officer works for the G-7?

I definitely see the need for these working groups to be functional so as to ensure the command achieves a "coherent operational approach." Given the many overlapping responsibilities of the various competencies, I can see where there would be a real challenge in this regard.

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Originally Posted by invictus0972

Am I understanding this correctly to say that the PSYOP officer works for the G-7?

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Not sure what IO might want to say about it, but generally speaking, PSYOP is placed under the combatant command / geo-CDR. The supported force operations officer S/G/J/C3 will excersise staff supervision of the POO (hehe, can't resist.... PSYOP Officer) & PSYOP Forces. HOWEVER, things will appear less clear with POTF/JPOTF/CJPOTF operations (which is the more common way for PSYOP forces to deply in support of big-Army operations) where the PSYOP CDR may be a functional component CDR subordinate to a TF/CJTF. Likewise, things can appear down right muddy with regard to PSYOP iso inter-agency, non-DOD assets, & fer'n military.

Did that clear it up? :wry:
And don't talk about product approval, assigned v/s attached, tacon v/s opcon, special considerations, or dealing with large dogs that have orange eyebrows - if you figure all that out, please publish copies.

I don't think I've ever seen anybody called on the carpet for violations of doctrine, but I can't say the same for Regs. Regs dictate what you SHALL do, whereas doctrine dictates what your SHOULD do.

Of course there's also the theory that Regs and Doctrine are both "rules for fools, but guidelines for commanders." It all comes down to what your paycheck can handle.

Thanks for the reply. I have read at least one article in which there seems to be a little angst between PSYOP and IO officers:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...ngJanFeb08.pdf

The basic principle of the author, who was PSYOP, was that there was no need for the FA 30 officer because it caused redundancy and confusion. I am new to the field, but I find the debate interesting. As it has for more than 200 years, I am confident doctrine will evolve to the point that most of these questions will be answered. This article is new and may have been already discussed on SWJ, but it is new to me!

Reading through the posts on this topic, a couple of points come to mind.

First, I think it is important to separate skill sets, training and education, career field, and an officer's actual position or role on a staff or in a unit. For example, the PSYOP officer in a Division staff does, in fact and by MTOE and doctrine, work for the G-7. That is a very different thing from saying that PSYOP organizations attached/TACONed/OPCONed to that division - and by extension their commanders - also work "for" the G-7. Chains of command and the G-3 tasking authority haven't changed. The same thing holds true for a large variety of odd cats who start out or end up assigned as special staff officers to the G-7 who is himself a coordinating (i.e. "primary") staff officer.

Still, at the end of the day, the commander has to have someone to whom he can turn in re the mission area of information engagement, that is for the coherent and coordinated use of words and images delivered through a wide variety of mediums in support of an operation or campaign. The draft FM 3-13 (ID) posits that the coordinating staff officer to whom the rose has been stuck for this is the G-7. This requires the G/S-7 to serve as the functional integrator of the work of everybody whose stock-in-trade is words and images - the PAO and any attached PA units, the POTF if one is assigned, potentially non-DoD folks (as in a PRT in Afghanistan), et al.

To help him with this, the G-7 has a section comprised of FA30s, PSYOPers, and PA personnel, among others. These folks provide the requisite SME in much the same way that a G-4 has transporters, supply specialists, property management types, etc. and yet serves as the single go to guy for the overall sustainment effort. The relationship envisioned in the manual between the G-7 and, say, the POTF is not itself dissimilar to the relationship between the old MI BN Cdr commander and the G-2. It's also worth noting that the role of the command's Public Affairs Officer as a personal staff officer does not change under this scheme.

At the end of the day, there are a variety of organizational solutions that have and could work as long as they result in a coherent story that resonates with relevant publics and actors, adjusts as required, and does not result in either lowest common denominator communications, or a cacophany of official voices all purporting to speak for the command.

Sir,

Thanks for that very cogent response; it was extremely helpful. I was talking just today with the PAO officer on the 1st ID staff, and he suggested that the G-7 was pretty much a "planner" for all the IO tasks. I am starting to get an understanding of the concept. I just have a little confusion when I consider the point you made in your post, which is also made in FM 3-13:

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Eric Henderson

It's also worth noting that the role of the command's Public Affairs Officer as a personal staff officer does not change under this scheme.

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Using your example of the G-4, he does not have another person on his staff who is considered a "personal staff officer." I can see scenarios in which the G-7 and PAO are at odds, and the PAO would use his position as a "personal staff officer" to push his own agenda. At the division and higher level, I suppose it is a trivial point; but if the egos of the parties were big enough, it could hamper the planning process.

Again, thanks for the response. You have cleared a few things up for me.

Invictus,

Happy to help. Re: the PAO and G-7; frankly I don't think the issue has settled out one way or the other in people's minds. I think everyone sees some degree of at least latent tension, both in the current de facto setups being used in theater and in this proposal. A variety of really sharp people with the best interests of the Army and the nation have different takes on how this ought to play out.

Bottom line: The Army is in a period of turbulence and change on this. Part of the reason we have thrown the initial draft to as wide an audience as we have is to try to get the maximum number of informed and thoughtful perspectives.

Regards,
H

The S/G/J-3's coordinate Eng, Arty, Avn, AD, etc, but we take what is their most important tool in COIN and place it in a parallel staff section -- the 7. If we really believe that information ops is operations, it should be in the domain of the combined arms integrator, the '3. Our enemies support info ops with kinetic ops, so have clearly figured out that they are one in the same.

I know, the DCO/CoS can be the integrator, but isn't he running the rest of the staff? Who's coordinating logistics support with operations? Seems like we've taken the burden off of the warfighter to really understand IO by taking it away from him.

The successful Brigades I saw had commanders who were the IO officers. MNF-I is consolidating the IO folks into the 3 for better coordination. Afgh does the same (although they have different names, Strat Effects, etc.).

Seems like the battlefield is telling us loudly that IO is ops, so why don't we write our doctrine that way?

Charles...

I think you are speaking past each other... that's the problem with trying to communicate in bullets...

This new version of 3-13, for whatever else you might take issue, you cannot debate whether this version is commander centric...

The actual text of the version in staffing right now, takes an approach of integrating info tasks into the extant staff processes...

Many thus far have taken exception with this version because they think it doesn't vest the G7 with enough authority/responsibility for info execution as opposed to the other way around.

Live well and row

Charles Martel,

Awesome namesake!

Anyway, I have been discussing this on the CAC blog, too. According to a string I read there, AR 600-3 is being changed to identify Information Operations Officers as Information Engagement Officers. This is in line with your notion that there is only one operation. As it really defines and clarifies the role of the G-7, I think I like this change. Of course the G-7 should have oversight of the other Information tasks, but I do not think it advisable that the G-7 should take full responsibility of C2W, OPSEC, IP, and MILDEC. There is a lot of variance in the types of skills that these competencies require. That being said, I keep coming back to the same question in my mind. If IE is the primary mission of the G-7 staff, why do we have a PSYOP career path? Aren't we doing the same thing? I keep thinking that the G-7 is kind of like a political officer whose job it is to make sure that the actions of the PSYOP (enemy focused) and PAO (friendly focused) officer are not too divergent from the over all strategic message. As FM 3-13(DRAFT) states, "The same combination of acts, words, and images that influence a particular group of people in one instance inevitably influence other groups of people in the same area of operations, adjoining geographic areas, and in locations on the other side of the globe." Because of the information revolution, these two skill sets cannot operate in a vacuum thereby necessitating the need for a G-7 staff.

I don't know. Still trying to work it out; it is fun, though!

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Originally Posted by Charles Martel

The S/G/J-3's coordinate Eng, Arty, Avn, AD, etc, but we take what is their most important tool in COIN and place it in a parallel staff section -- the 7. If we really believe that information ops is operations, it should be in the domain of the combined arms integrator, the '3. Our enemies support info ops with kinetic ops, so have clearly figured out that they are one in the same.

I know, the DCO/CoS can be the integrator, but isn't he running the rest of the staff? Who's coordinating logistics support with operations? Seems like we've taken the burden off of the warfighter to really understand IO by taking it away from him.

The successful Brigades I saw had commanders who were the IO officers. MNF-I is consolidating the IO folks into the 3 for better coordination. Afgh does the same (although they have different names, Strat Effects, etc.).

Seems like the battlefield is telling us loudly that IO is ops, so why don't we write our doctrine that way?

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I fully agree Charles - every successful unit I have seen with IO has treated it as a commander's program that drives operations, not an additional staff section. I am with you, the 3 should be the integrating officer, rather than a parallel staff head.

As long as IO is just an annex to an OPORD, we will fail at it.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by invictus0972

I keep thinking that the G-7 is kind of like a political officer whose job it is to make sure that the actions of the PSYOP (enemy focused) and PAO (friendly focused) officer are not too divergent from the over all strategic message.

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I would caution against the using the comparison you used for PSYOP v/s PAO - PSYOP is not "enemy focused" information. PSYOP is OBJECTIVE driven; designed to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to US objectives. It is not Command Information. It is objective focused, not information focused. It seeks to affect behavorial change.

Also, regarding the G-7 acting as a Political Officer to keep PSYOP in-line with Strat Objectives.. often PSYOP Objectives are approved at a level of higher authority (sometime even approved at EAG). In the past, this sometimes would lead to conflict with IO & Targeting Cells, as PSYOP Objectives can be directed & separate - obviously, this could be used in an exploitive manner.

Also, again - while a PSYOP Officer or element/cell may work for/with the G7 to coordinate/liaise - PSYOP Units, Dets, Teams are a BOS (non-lethal fire support tasked to seize & retain the most important key terrain in COIN :) ) and work for the 3.

For those that haven't heard. It is not currently believed that this draft will go forward. There is still quite a bit of controversy within the field now. I just finished the 12 week FA30 Qualification Course and there was still no answer on the future of IO by the end. I would venture that IE (Information Engagement) will remain an important task headed up by the G7, but I don't expect it to be the end all, be all of an entire primary Staff member.

For the time being, the G7 or S7 realistically will define their own role on the staff based upon how they can add value to the Commander.

Doctine? We don't need no stinkin' doctrine!