Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects
The latest from the SWJ blog - Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects by Robert Bunker and John Sullivan.
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Gangs and Iraqi insurgents, militias, and other non-state groups share common origins based on tribalism, and therefore, it is expected that they will exhibit similar structures and behaviors. It is our belief that further insight into Iraq’s present situation and future prospects may be derived from a perspective utilizing 3rd generation gang (3 GEN Gangs) studies which present lessons learned from the emergence and spread of gangs within the United States, and other parts of the world, over roughly the last four decades. (1) Basically, from a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, three generations of gangs have been found to exist: turf based, drug based, and mercenary based. The first generation gangs, comprising the vast majority, focus on protecting their turf. These gangs, the least developed of the three generational forms, provide both protection and identity to their members and little more. While some drug dealing is evident, it tends with these gangs to be a sideline activity...
COIN comes home to assist policing
Moderator's Note
On January 18th 2012 this thread was merged with a smaller one, which started in 2010 called 'Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement' and the merged thread renamed 'COIN comes home to assist policing' (Ends).
Counter insurgency, particularly it's emphasis on good relations with the People, seems to be affecting police training and approaches. This article
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/loc...,5306468.story
about efforts to retrain the Baltimore Police Department shows a huge influence from lessons learned overseas. Even the trainers have served overseas;
"The lecturer, Eric Greitens, was a former Navy SEAL who led missions in Fallujah, Iraq, to hunt down insurgents. The city officers copied down four phrases he wrote on a white board: No worse enemy. No better friend. No better diplomat. No better role model."
This makes me wonder if lessons learned by the military will be reflected more police training and tactics
EC
Cops learning from COIN soldiers?
The quoted article is I suspect not unique - as urban police struggle to meet new demands. Using ex-military / COIN lessons is only part of the response, although using such trainers may make such intensive training more acceptable to the students and bureaucrats who make decisions behind a desk. Early days to make a judgement.
In the UK - for very different reasons - the military has had very little impact on policing, with the exception of firearms and specialist surveillance. Mention COIN and there'll be a stampede to the exit.
davidbfpo
Police learning from Army experience?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MattC86
Well, I should have been far more clear. I don't mean to suggest that COIN techniques are something that municipal police forces should take up and study. I would just assume there'd be a little more interest among police forces, given that people are always pejoratively calling COIN heavily-armed policework. . .
To put it another way, do you think that UK police (or any police, for that matter) could gain something from the proverbial lessons learned in COIN efforts in Northern Ireland or elsewhere?
Actually, as a follow-up, you take it, then, that the British Army took far more from its Northern Ireland experience than any police institution did?
Regards,
Matt
Far too many issues to easily answer. COIN is not for me heavily armed policework: COIN is usually where government legitimacy is weak, with little if any popular support and the opposition comes from capable armed insurgents whose identity is largely unknown. Most Western policing operates where legitimacy is far from weak, albeit contested in some areas (inner city slums); popular support exists and the identity of the opposition is known - although not actually what they do.
The military operate with precison regarding their opponents; the police often do not know who their opponents are.
Yes, policing can learn from COIN, but with care. Tasking and co-ordination groups (TCG) from Ulster is one of the most visible lessons learned; alongside technical aids to surveillance, notably ANPR and CCTV. Looking for other options to arrest, charge and convict is another - notably seen in using disruption. Use of informants is another, although many are critical of those lessons (from the Army & RUC).
What did the UK Army learn? Biggest lesson, never get involved overtly at home! That maybe reflected in seeking better policing, notably in riot control / public order (No.1 issue in the early 1980's for the UK government for the Home Office, less now). Other lesson - remember I have no miltary expereience - how effective small unit leadership was. The best example being responding directly at incidents to press enquiries with those there and not a press officer miles away.
I am not aware if anyone from the UK Army has written publically on what lessons they learnt. I know the official reflections on UK Army deployment, called Op Banner, was posted on the web and a quick read in '07 left no lasting impression.
I am sure we will talk about this next weekend!
davidbfpo
Washington D.C. becomes Sadr City.
http://www.examiner.com/a-1423820%7E..._violence.html
This sort of thing works, to an extent, in COIN. In America? Not a chance. And if it does lower crime in certain neighborhoods, why not do it in EVERY neighborhood? Slippery slope, there. I'm thinking the overturning of the DC gun ban (very likely to happen this month), neighborhood watches, and people who don't go along with the "stop snitchin'" mentality would work a whole lot better. This is a fine example of a COIN technique that should NOT come home.
D.C. cops using lessons from Iraq?
Interesting story I heard on NPR on the drive into work today.
D.C. Police use Radical Tactic to Combat Homicides
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...oryId=91379525
They're setting up Bagdad style checkpoints (in a "failed state" type neighborhood you might say) to check IDs of people coming in to determine if they have a legitimate use to be in the neighborhood.
Obviously, this is controversial. And residents of the neighborhood have differing opinions. The D.C. police chief seems determined, though, and thinks it is working to lower homicides.
More Agree than Disagree, I'm Afraid
Very much agreed that "there are a lot of myths about that time and effort" - time being roughly 1960-1970, and effort being Civil Rights issues and Vietnam as well. I also will babble forth before reaching my bottom line - which also agrees with "Lot of shrewd, party enhancing domestic politics though, that's for sure."
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1. Integration and Armed Services
I am in violent agreement with this:
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from Ken
First, as a result of WW II and Korea and Truman's desegregation of the Armed Forces plus a lot of returning black veterans and a lot of white guys who became aware that black was not bad, the south was in process of changing. Barriers were falling all over the place.
Or, as my dad said, "I don't care if the guy in my foxhole is purple with pink polka dots - so long as he shoots straight."
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2. Goldwater
As I was a Goldwater Preacher from 1958-1964 (when we got clobbered), you are preaching to the already converted. I was taken by Goldwater's view of the 9th and 10th Amendments; his view on Indochina (in particular) and on the Cold War (in general - "Why Not Victory ?").
In any event, he set out his views on States' Rights and Civil Rights in chaps. 3 & 4 of The Conscience of a Conservative, available here - my 1961 copy cost 50¢ !
A good discussion of that book & Goldwater is here.
As you correctly point out, Goldwater was firm on the 15th Amendment (Voting Rights) and the 14th Amendment as interpreted by the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Where he drew the line was on education and public accomodations - his view of constitutional history (interpreting the 14th in light of the 9th and 10th) precluded a Federal "cram down" in those areas (see pp.34-37). On the merits of integration, Goldwater was firmly on the side of its objectives (including integration in the military) - see p.38 for his classic statement.
So, Goldwater did precede Nixon in opening the door to Southern conservatives.
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3. Breach of Covenant - Democrats become Republicans
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from Ken
Secondly, the 'antis' were vocal but really rather few in number and the so-called Nixon southern strategy while real was successful not because of blacks becoming strong Democratic supporters or because the Democratic party had passed the CRA but because Nixon, whom no less an authority than Noam Chomsky calls the last liberal American President signed more legislation that helped the south than did his democratic predecessors. Most of the later stuff -- school and busing issues were more a result of mishandling and bad court decisions as anything else. Not to say there weren't bitter dead enders; there were -- but poor handling exacerbated things significantly.
Some disagreement here. Let me be clear - I'm not saying that Southern Democrats went into the Republican Party because Blacks were coming into the Demoratic Party. Rather, the loss of Southern Democrats started in 1948 with the Dixiecrat "revolt", which was a consequence of the Hubert Humphrey "revolt" at the 1948 convention - and continued through the 50's and 60's. The crux of it was a perceived "breach of the covenant", which had governed the relations between the two wings of that party for roughly 75 years.
Agreed that Nixon's overall program was not race-baiting. While Goldwater appealed to Southern conservatives, Nixon broadened that appeal to Southern populists (and to Midwestern and Western populists as well).
Now, as to "the 'antis' were vocal but really rather few in number", that is true about the violent "antis" (for which, God be thanked); but the non-violent "antis" (e.g., George Wallace and Ross Barnett) were very vocal indeed - especially in the earlier years. Wallace, of course, later shifted gears - and appealed more to populism than anything else (he did very well in certain sections of Michigan).
We can also agree about "bad court decisions", which have marked the course of Civil Rights from Reconstruction on. In the late 1800's and early 1900's, the SCOTUS pendulum swung too far in one direction - e.g., as pointed out by John Harlan I in his dissents (Plessy v Ferguson being his classic). In the 1950's and 1960's, it swung too far in the other direction - e.g., as pointed out by John Harlan II (grandson of I) in his dissents.
Not for nothing that those two folks of Kentucky lineage were named after John Marshall.
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4. Detroit Riots - 1967
Detroit, Newark, LA, etc. - were among the 1967 "urban disorders" in the North. I'll stick with the Detroit riots where I have some knowledge and experience.
The Michigan Citizen ("America's Most Progressive Community Newspaper") calls it the Detroit Rebellion in its multi-part series celebrating its 40th birthday, which starts here.
My reasons for citing this left of center reference are, firstly, it represents (even today) a flavor of the views held by that "insurgency"; and, secondly, it is based in part on the 86 page Michigan Law Review study of the riots and their aftermath - see part IV of the series, which is here:
Quote:
.... Prof. Kamisar, now a nationally recognized authority on constitutional law and criminal procedure and the Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor of Law Emeritus at the UM Law School, recalled how he encouraged students, including two members of the Michigan Law Review, to make an on-the-ground investigation.
While learning theory in class was important, he told them, the best way to learn the law would be for them to “go to Detroit.” In doing so, he added, they would also be recording a significant historical event.
In the immediate wake of the rebellion, the students interviewed defendants in regular jails, makeshift detention centers and courtrooms, as well as defense attorneys, prosecutors and judges. Their 86-page study, “The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit Civil Disorder of July 1967,” was published in the Michigan Law Review, vol. 66, no. 7 (1968), pp. 1544-1630.
“The Constitution and its guarantees,” it concluded, “are applicable to all citizens at all times. Panic, disorganization, and lack of preparation should never excuse granting a defendant less than his full measure of constitutional rights.” ...
I still believe that - although my "full measure of constitutional rights" were and are admittedly somewhat more limited than many (including Yale Kamisar) would grant.
Truth in lending - Yale Kamisar was one of my Crim Procedure & Con Law profs - and yours truly was one of the law review editors involved in the project.
Bottom line - the 1967 Detroit "situation" certainly looked like some form of insurgency to me.
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5. Galula's "Cold War" - insurgency and war.
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from Ken
Long way of getting to the point -- I don't agree that the era and the civil rights imbroglio were a COIN effort in any sense.
Can't get dogmatic against what you say - Calling the Detroit riots "War" or a "Rebellion" doesn't float my boat either; but they (and other incidents of domestic violence in the 60's) were far from "Peace" - as I thought of it then and now.
If Bob's World wants to wax on about what "phase 0" should be called - and how to define it more precisely - more power to him.
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PS: Since I was conceived about the time meatballs were flying over Oahu, I can't claim Baby Boomer status - instead I belong to your generation as one of the tail-end runts of the litter.
BTW: was thinking about putting red hair on the Unicorn, but that seemed excessive.
Good points all and I learned something, hoever, I suspect we're
roaming rather far afield. My fault for getting overly politically oriented in simply disagreeing with O'l Bob's World.
Not sure you should have held back on the Unicorn though, I have a soft spot for Redheads (first wife... :o ).
On topic, from you:
Quote:
Can't get dogmatic against what you say - Calling the Detroit riots "War" or a "Rebellion" doesn't float my boat either; but they (and other incidents of domestic violence in the 60's) were far from "Peace" - as I thought of it then and now.
If Bob's World wants to wax on about what "phase 0" should be called - and how to define it more precisely - more power to him.
I can sure agree with both those points...
I think you're right -- but...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
I only offer the "phase 0" construct as tool to help address what I see as some of the major problems that tend to crop up in COIN operations:
1. The reluctance of Civil leadership to take over all charge of a comprehensive program of engagement due to seeing insurgency as a combat operation that the military needs to resolve so that they can get back to work conducting civil governance...
my fear is that few politicians will make the necessary decisions due to fear of political risk. Some will not see the problem because politicians as a class tend to dissimulate about everything and thus believe everyone else is doing the same thing -- they routinely suspect that religious leaders, like the politicians, do not themselves believe what they are saying. Iran in 1979 and Iraq in 2003 are good examples of this folly.
Some Politicians will see the problem and hope it goes away, some will be too timid to act, a very few may take some action which may or may not make sense and thus it behooves the Armed Forces to be prepared for most anything...
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The tendency of threat-focused military COIN forces to become too counterinsurgent and not prioritze addressing the root causes of the problem over that glaring symptom of it.
Too many examples in history of the accuracy of this -- and we're one of the worst offenders.
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3. The reactive nature of COIN in both name and deed. How do we get more proactive and nip these situations prior to their going kinetic on us.
Crux of the problem, isn't it? How do we fire up the politicians to do their job so the Troops don't have to do theirs?
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Similarly, if all of the conditions of poor governance and disenfranchised populaces exist, complete with an external party conducting UW to stir up an insurgency, but no group has made that final metamorphasis from disident to insurgent, do you have a COIN mission that needs addressed?
Maybe, maybe not. What you do have is three questions; Is this issue important (not vital, just important) to US interests? Does the US need to get involved and if so at what level or to what degree? Is force required and if so to what level and for how long and is the US prepared to do that?
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How do we expand our vision? How do we become better at both prevention and resolution?
That's the big question. I don't have an answer other than that I believe very strongly that the One Third and the Two Year Rules are accurate enough for planning purposes; that we will never do COIN well because we are not prepared to train adequately or to risk our troops out in the wilds wandering about purposefully but with no armor, no hot meals, no easily provided support and subsisting on a ball of rice a day for weeks at a time. Our prospective COIN opponents will do that; we will not -- they will win due to that fact unless we spend years at it and just wear them down. That, IMO, is not a smart way to fight. In fact, I think it's terribly stupid. I know it is unduly expensive in every sense of the words.
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I think this Phase 0 concept will help some to do that. Others may not find it helpful. I can live with that.
I agree with your Phase 0, just not that it existed in the US as you postulated. I also agree with you that when it is occurring, we should make an assessment and act rather than waiting for Phase 1 to begin. Where you and I might differ is on what that action should be... ;)
Pre-hab instead of re-hab
I read Bob's World post with interest, and while I agree it is better to nip the problem in the butt before it goes kinetic, there are two questions/comments that I have.
First, I think elements in the USG and the UN attempt to do this. We frequently see that conditions are ripe for someone to stir up an insurgency and we "try" to convince the HN to address their problems, make whatever reforms are necessary, etc.
The military has role with security force assistance, which will hopefully better prepare that HN's security forces to professionally handle, or ideally contribute to pre-empting the problem. I need to think about this one, but I bet I think of some cases that are not classified.
Second, the HN must be convinced that there is a problem to solve, and this frequently is the long pole in the tent. We can't do it for them, and they refuse to reform, as Clausewitz said, war and warfare are an extension of politics. I still think an insurgency in many ways is an armed election process. Whatever side can most effectively mobilize the populace towards their ends will 'probably" win.
We should continue to identify the signs of an emergent problem and encourage others to take appropriate steps to prevent it, but I think it isn't realistic to weight our (the military's) efforts here, since most countries won't ask for help until it is too late.
Good post, definitely food for thought.
What do you think we can or should do better in the area of prevention?
Do we have the forces available to do it?
Been pondering this one ...
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from Ken
... I suspect we're roaming rather far afield. My fault for getting overly politically oriented in simply disagreeing with O'l Bob's World.
and I'm leaning toward saying that "getting overly politically oriented" is not a sin in analysing either Phase 0 (as BW defines it) or Phase 1 (in the classical Mao model), since political action is what those phases are all about - with perhaps an occasional riot or assassination to add some spice.
BTW: such political analysis is also necessary to establish that a Phase 0 situation does not exist (Ken's position re: 1960's US).
Bill Moore points out a serious issue - the GHN's refusal to recognize the political problem, or to accept solutions to resolve it.
cf., Government of South Vietnam in many areas - since GSV was not in a Phase 0 or 1 situation vs. PAVN-VC (except possibly in 1955-1956), it is not an exact on point example - I realize that.
Anyway, what is the best national strategic policy for the US in that case ? Pull the plug and use resources elsewhere ? Pour men and $ into an effort that is probably doomed from the gitgo ? Do what is feasible to buy time ?
I guess I need some more cases of Phase 0 - successes or failures - to grasp the parameters we face.
I still go back to square one...
Of recent FID / Support to HN actions, the only efforts of note I can recall are Greece, the Philippines, El Salvador (Guatemala doesn't count for several reasons) and the Philippines again. All those were small efforts in comparison with our three larger combat theaters of Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq which had FID aspects but which were all entered upon for reasons far from Mao's or other people war phases or of 'assisting the HN with its problems...'
So my question is; why all the FID emphasis and discussion for large bodies of troops when that has not historically been a commitment, rather our commitment to FID has been on the small scale SF model -- as it should be...
Yes. the insurgerncy in Viet Nam was that, however
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
You lost me, so I can't answer your question until I'm back on track. The insurgency waged in S. Vietnam was classic, by the book, Maoist 3-phase insurgency. The phase 0 part would have been in that period from when Ho and his buddies helped us defeat the Japanese to when we screwed him by letting the French have "their" colony back. After that they worked through the phases to defeat the French, to persuade us to leave, and then to defeat the South's government to reunite the country.
you left something out between "...the French," and "to persuade us to leave." Specifically, that Eisenhower, at the urging of Ridgeway refused to heavily support the French in Viet Nam, that the US was not a party to and did not support the Geneva Accords. However, the US was a signatory to the SEATO Treaty which pledged mutual support and South Viet Nam, not a signatory to the Treaty proper, was added in a Protocol. The Treaty called for mutual support to handle foreign aggression ONLY and intra country insurgency was specifically rejected by both the US and Australia -- thus we had no occasion to support South Viet Nam in Phase 0 through Phase 2.
The Phase 1 effort in South Viet Nam didn't start until 1960. Then the brothers Kennedy decided to boost the economy and get all idealistic and offered to 'help' and used the SEATO treaty -- wrongly -- as a fulcrum. We forced our way into a scrap that was not in US interests for domestic political and 'looking tough' reasons. I'm aware of the Domino theory and all the allied garbage but the bottom line is a bunch of us got sent to a war that was not in US interests and then the Army proceeded to screw it up for too long so that by the time we got our act together, the Politicians had given up on it. I think there are several cautionaries in all that...
My point was that my questions weren't asked (or properly answered -- always a potentiality) and that we elected NOT to get involved in Phases 0 and 1 -- and then elected to get heavily involved in Phase 2.5 when the PAVN / NVA got sent south to help out the then losing VC in 1964. We saw a problem and decided to help -- but it was not a problem with which we needed to help and even then we did it poorly. We were there as a result of a treaty and domestic politics, not solving a problem that was of concern to us.
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When I say phase 0, I am talking about the steady state dynamic between every populace and their government. Canada is way low in Phase 0. The US a little higher, Mexico quite a bit higher...
I understand and do not disagree with that. My caution is directed at what one should do to, by, for or in Phase 0... :D
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When using the phase 0 model, one can track the state of these governed-government relationships and take steps early to keep things from ever getting out of hand...
Understood -- just that my experience with 'models' is that they seldom reflect reality.
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One of our primary concerns now is that so much of our SOF is committed to the CENTCOM AOR that we do not have adequate resources to commit to important places around the world that are edging their way up toward phase 1. And yes, SOF is the force of choice for that type of engagement, but all of the other conventional engagement that goes on day in and day out around the world should be prioritized and focused toward phase 0 maintenance as well. Much of it is very haphazard. We can do better.
Far be it from me to suggest that CentCom is an extremely ineffectual, overstaffed headquarters that does not have a sterling track record or that certain USSOCOM decisions on employment of SF may have been ill advised.
Seems sort of amusing to me that the stepchildren, long ignored and on the back burner, now have to be employed not as they should be but to back up the hot shots who were and are not available in adequate numbers for their missions. I have noted the modification of missions within all elements of the command with a lot of clucking and "I told you" -- acknowledging that I did not tell anyone except a few friends and acquaintances. I doubt Jim Lindsay or Carl Stiner would've listened to me. :wry:
Barbwire Bob would have due to a brief moment of shared history long ago but though he was the father of SOCOM, he never got to command it...
FID in Early Stage Vietnam
This is addressed to anyone who can help me - that is, a better Google searcher than I.
The focus is on Ken's point about decisions to be made about FID in Phase 0 and Phase 1 "insurgencies" - and the questions that should be asked before jumping in to "help" the HN. The timeframe is 1954-1955.
I find the following JCS memoes (just after the Geneva Accord), which are summarized here.
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CHRONOLOGY
21 Jul 54 Geneva Cease-fire Accord
Ended fighting between Viet Minh and French; divided Vietnam at 17th parallel; limited U.S. military personnel in RVN to current level (342).
22 Sep 54 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina
U.S. resources could better be used to support countries other than RVN.
19 Oct 54 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina
Opposed U.S. training RVN army. Risk not worth the gamble.
17 Nov 54 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Indochina
Development of effective forces and prevention of communist takeover cannot be prevented without Vietnamese effort that is probably not forthcoming.
21 Jan 55 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Reconsideration of U.S. Military Program in Southeast Asia
Outlines alternative U.S. courses of action in RVN: present program, advice with leverage, U.S. forces, or withdrawal.
What I'm looking for are (1) online versions of the complete memoes; and (2) online background docs that might explain the rationale for the JCS viewpoint. A plausible inference is that the right questions were being asked and answered by some soldier(s) and/or Marine(s) in 1954-1955.
Along the same vein, I find this NCS memo summarized here.
Quote:
An unsigned, undated memorandum posed eight key questions to be answered by the NSC during the spring of 1954. Comment on the following four questions, in relation to the time at which they were raised, is unnecessary:
--Just how important is Southeast Asia to the security interests of the U.S.? Is the analysis in NSC 5405 still valid? Is the area important enough to fight for?
--How important is Indochina in the defense of Southeast Asia? Is the "domino theory" valid? Is Indochina important enough to fight for? If not, what are the strategic consequences of the loss of all or part of Indochina?
--If the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, can we count on the support of the natives? Can we fight as allies of the French and avoid the stigma of colonialism?
--Is there a strategic concept for the conduct of a war in Indochina which offers promise of early success. . . ?
What I am looking for are the same as above (1) online version of the complete memo; and (2) online background docs that might explain the author's rationale for the questions (finding those seems a long shot since the memo is both unsigned and undated).
Those same questions were being asked by many (including me) throughout the period 1954-1975; and, truth in lending, although I was asking myself the same questions throughout that period, the answers changed because the factual situations kept changing throughout that period (no surprise there).
Also have some thoughts on posts by wm and BW, but I'll do those separately.
I'm on the Lunatic Fringe ...
on this one.
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from wm
Two points:
(1) The final question above ["Do we have the forces available to do it?"] indicates the wrong mindset. I not so humbly submit that prevention (action during BW's Phase 0) is not a military option; it does not require "forces." One's military may be used for things like civil works projects (the kind of stuff the Corps of Engineers does for example) but not for doing warfighting or policing type activities.
(2) Prevention outside of one's own sovereign land is not possible. Trying to stop an insurgency elsewhere is an example of the "leading a horse to water" problem. As noted by others in this thread, the host nation has to see that the nascent problem exists and desire to do something about it. The only thing outsiders can really do is to keep identifying that, as Marcellus said in Hamlet (Act I, Sc 4), "Something is rotten in the state of Denmark."
So, we are solidly based (IMO) on political action as the key to Phase 0 problems.
To paraphrase Ross Perot, the devil is in the details. The first problem is the outside nation's sense of smell. If that sense is impaired (as badly as my own is in reality), it will smell nothing or get the wrong scent. The same thing applies to the HN. Given all the variations in cultures and politics, outsider and indigenous recognition of the existence of the problem, the nature of the problem and the solution(s) to the problem, are more likely than not to be on different pages.
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While wm calls this an "aside", it opened up a window and provided some daylight in my swamp,
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An aside:
I just started reading The Wars of German Unification (Modern Wars), by Dennis Showalter, published in 2004. In the first chapter, he discusses the period around 1848, describing, among other things, the work done by the armies of Prussia, Austria and the various Germanic principalities in counter-insurgency (he actually uses that term). He notes how poorly they did at it and how blind the various Germanic states were to the causes of the insurrections. He also briefly discusses the debate in Prussian military circles about the value for officers of an academic preparation/study in the art of war.
because it gave me a jump start to my problem of "I guess I need some more cases of Phase 0 - successes or failures - to grasp the parameters we face."
My thought is that we can take any rebellion, revolution, etc., and find a Phase 0 - which in those cases was obviously not handled well because an armed conflict of some kind resulted. We can then beat the horse to death finding the causes and the solutions - and all of that will be in hindsight and shaped by our present sense and mindset. From that, perhaps, we can glean some general principles and some future guidence - maybe.
What we want to head off in a Phase 0 situation is a Detroit Riot: Something north of 600 buildings torched directly or indirectly (DFD had to withdraw from the scene in many blocks); besides local LE, some 400 MSP troopers deployed (insufficient and beyond their operational scope); some 9200 NG troops (who were then at "summer camp" in The Mitten, 200 miles away - their Detroit deployment a total cluster flop) and 2700 regulars (Airborne), whose quadrant was the only TAOR with any sanity. A "police action" ?
Could reasonable steps have been taken before the "blind pig" raid to avoid what happened (other than the obvious - don't raid the bloody place). Maybe, but whoever wants to tackle that will have to have more time on his hands than I have.
And, in searching any given revolution for its Phase 0, how far do we want to go back to find that Phase 0 ?
I can make a case that Phase 0 before the French Revolution was broken some 180 years before heads were cut off - this incident from 1610 as an example - a map here.
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L’échauffourée légendaire du pont Monseigneur en 1610, au cours de laquelle François de Vigny fut mortellement blessé par ses paysans ...
The bottom line is that François de Vigny was un plus grand SOB, who abused his peasants, called in the army (probably the gendarmerie) to quell them, and got whacked in the process - which then meant more troops had to be called in, who settled all armed conflict issues in the effective manner of those times. 179 years later, the situation existed on a larger scale and most troops refused to fire.
So, how far do you want to go back to find causes and to develop hindsight solutions ?
BW, you can't really mean this ....
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from BW
The only ideology I really concern myself with is US ideology....
but maybe you do.
I can't see how you can understand an "insurgency" (whatever the phase) without understanding the ideologies involved and the political action that flows from those ideologies. E.g., Indochina. Ho's ideology (some SovCom, some ChiCom and some VietNat) and Giap's (slightly different from Ho's, but then Giap was a lawyer who became a general - that one for you, Ken). And moving south to - Diem's ideology (leaving an explanation of Personalism on the shelf for a bit); and the ideologies of the military governments that followed - or the lack of same, perhaps better.
I don't think you are saying "don't bother with knowing our enemy", but maybe you are.
If you are saying that we should be a hell of a lot more careful before we engage anywhere, and that our engagement when we engage should accord with our ideology (if we can agree on what that is), then you and I are on the same page as to that general principle of national strategic policy.
Our father speaks, Washington's Farewell Address
Quote:
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government. the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
While the international environment has evolved considerably since President's Washington's farewell address, much of his wisdom still applies. I'm very fond of his warning about interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe (today that would mean anywhere in the world). I don't think we need to get involved in other country's phase 0 insurgency problems, because to be frank it is seldom in our interest, and seldom in the interest of the other nation.
The take away from this debate is we should be very deliberate before we intervene. There are tens and tens of said situations around the world, that doesn't mean it our nation's role to address each one of them. As Ken stated we had an ideologue drag us into Vietnam against the advice of wise council to the contrary. Sometimes isn't a matter of doing the right things, the fact is some situations are unwinable and we don't need to spend American blood, treasure and sour our international reputation by intervening everywhere. We need to protect the homeland, and to protect our true interests overseas period. Anything else we get involved in will impact our ability, normally for the worse, to protect the homeland and our true interests.
BW. Galula (and Trinquier also) ...
are always at hand here - my secret: I don't have to share them. :D
Anyway, thought you might be paraphrasing that - and mixing "the Cause" (what is publicly expressed) with "the Ideology" (which is what is privately believed, and communicated only to the inner circle). Galula defines "The Nature of the Cause" (pp.14-15); and gets into your territory in "Tactical Manipulation of the Cause" (pp.15-16; where there were more than 4 changes) - window dressing, in effect.
So, "the Cause", to a dedicated communist, was totally casuistic - the end (based on ideology) justified the means (the expressed causes). To paraphrase the old priest in the Exorcist, "It goes by many names, but it is always the same." Mao illustrates the varied dances employed by the ChiComs; the announcers for Radio Moscow did the same for SovCom - and they had to be very good dancers, indeed.
Simple rule: a Chekist is a Chekist is a Chekist - regardless of the letters used. Not saying you can't deal with them; and total killing was never an option. So - trust, but verify (thrice IMO).
As to AQ, it seems to me (from reading UBL and Zawahiri; and earlier such as Maududi) that they pretty much practice what they believe (they ARE very "legalistic"). That structural rigidity is a strength (hard to get into their inner circle), but also a weakness - e.g., Anbar ("awakening") and Astan (under the Taliban - these "saints" eventually wore out their welcome).
BTW: AQ itself is not a monolith (again IMO); and their writings suggest various hardcore levels. But, that is really tea leaf reading and WAGs.
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Brief to Ken - I'm honored that you're honored - and that you admit you will never be humbled. Wouldn't have it any other way. I'll answer your PS elsewhere - if at all.
Bill Moore .. posts ## 43 & 44
Amen.
And a prayer to St. Jude (patron of lost causes) that our elected and appointed officials would read and heed them.