Good to see you here too,
I have agree about the definition and the need for somewhat more implicit guidance. The problem however as several of those among us who've been talking about it for a while know seems to be the my piece of the pie syndrom.
By this I simply mean that because real Information Operations is and should be inclusive of all the varied areas of study mentioned in joint pubs and more. With this being the case it has been my experience that those of any particular discipline percieve and approach it in that light. The EW guys can naturally find all the different ways to gain information superiority with their systems, the same goes for all other groups and as such what you generally get reflects who you've got.
The statement I've heard most often has been that it seems to get too complicated when you actually start breaking down all the various components and capabilities and there is often an assumption that those charged with doing it won't be able to do it well enough. I would tend to agree with MAJHEFNER in that
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IO is nothing more complicated than the art of influence.
. It's just made harder by those who try to place it in their own boxes.
I would suspect that 99% of what a good IO planner works with and the skill sets used are not much different than what most anyone does within the confines of their own lives on a daily basis. That said OK lets get a definition that is more explicatory, the toughest part is going to be making it such that all who read it don't read too much, or too little into it, but rather accept it for what it is.
BTW remember I always like to over simplify things:D
IO in a nutshell (or two)
IO is really A PAIN:
Availability
Privacy
Authenticity
Integrity
Non-repudiation
In its offensive form (nutshell #1), one denies one's opponent the above attributes of information.
In its defensive form (nutshell #2), one assures one's own side of the same attributes.
PSYOPS, OPSEC, EW, Fires, Information Assurance(IA)/Cyberwar, etc. are all TTPs one may use to achieve the above goals. Like pretty much everything else in the world of operations, each is METT-TC dependent.
What are we trying to build?
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Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
I was surprised that there is so much confusion on this issue...
Could that be because we're trying to pin down a process that is being learned on the fly and is in considerable flux?
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I think that much of the discussion on this thread is borne of misperceptions of IO rather than of some defect in the concept of conducting operations in the information environment. The real issue is how we organize our staffs and how we task various assets to accomplish it.
True and as wm said:
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...Like pretty much everything else in the world of operations, each is METT-TC dependent.
Could it be that the search for clarity and coherence in an effort to simplify (possibly oversimplify???) a very complex and conditional process might obscure the flexibility needed to adapt and cope with multiple changing environments?
Sounds like a way to inadvertently design a straight jacket to me...
Or is that a strait jacket... :D
IO really isn't as hard as we make it
Well, this is a fascinating discussion about what we think the definition of IO should be versus trying to figure out how to work with the definition that we've got. The longer we continue to debate "how come," the longer it will take to get things going in the right direction. All the debates about whether the definition of IO in JP 3-13 definition fits "what we're really doing downrange" appear to be lacking in the distinction among tactical, operational, and strategic applications of IO, which clearly employ different assets and different methods.
To answer the earlier question about whether or not IO should be used as shorthand for PSYOP and message management by Irregular Warfare practicioners, the answer is simple: "Only if you have no interest in being doctrinally correct." The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept specifically states on p36 that Information Operations fits into the current concept for Irregular Warfare, thusly "Conduct information operations (operations security, information security, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, computer network attack and defense; and physical destruction) in support of IW campaign objectives." Although the IW JOC itself got the definition of IO wrong (why should JOCs be constrained by doctrine??:mad:), the intent is clearly to employ a lot more than just PSYOP and message management. With regard to the use of IO as shorthand for "PSYOP and message management," it clearly sounds like a tactical (or possibly operational) application of IO by an element that doesn't have any other assets. In other words, IO for a unit that only has PSYOP and "messaging" assets will obviously only include those assets. Other units with more assets will conduct a wider variety of operations and use more assets when they conduct IO.
We seem to expend a lot of energy worrying about how "my IO doesn't look like your IO" when the real objective of IO is not to employ a specific set of capabilities, but to employ all available capabilities in order to influence the thoughts and actions of adversary and neutral parties. Fortunately, that includes killing those who need to be killed so they don't have thoughts or actions any more.:D
This stuff really isn't that difficult.
Policy is our biggest problem
Joel -- Good points across the board. Most of our problems with IO remain in the policy / permission / "lanes in the road" arena (what we may do) versus in the technology / TTP arena (what we can do). Because the first impacts so heavily on the second, it's policy that we really need to fix.
The concept of IO is simple: Control the other guys' view of reality, and don't let him do that to you. It's the execution where things really get tough.
The key here was that you knew the message and were empowered
The key to what you just wrote, in my opinion, is that you were aware of the message and that you felt empowered to give that message.
You were aware of the implications of taking off your hat and glasses as opposed to keeping them on and distancing yourself from the vendor. It was customary to accept a free cup of coffee, you didn't violate local traditions. You opened yourself up to local input by actually conversing with the locals. You actually listened to them, what they said mattered and probably had an effect.
What you did, as a Law Enforcement Officer, is almost exactly like what our troops face on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, they don't speak a common language and quite a few of them would love to shoot us, we don't share a common history and we invaded their territory... But we work hard at neutralizing these and many other 'negatives'.
If the guys on the ground know the Commander's Guidance and are encouraged to display initiative in unknown situations, this will go a long way in solving our problems on the ground. If the guidance is to promote self-help initiatives while negating the AQ, this broad guidance will help the NCO on the ground see a ditch-digging effort, help with security planning assistance, and he will seek to 'talk up' their efforts. I believe it was Marc Tyrrell, on his blog, that wrote about the initiative being taken away by arm-chair generals playing platoon leader, I think it's all interrelated. Passing the guidance down to the lowest level is key. Trust is a big factor and keeping the big guys out of the boots-on-the-ground leader's knickers.
Simultaneous planning at every level is also key. The briefback is most important. The leader passes his/her guidance down and, in return, will receive a briefback from subordinate leaders on how their plan dovetails and supports the senior guidance and plan. In return, this leader will give a briefback to her/her leaders, and so on. If a little tweaking is required, that's fine, but each and every leader must be aware of how their plan interacts with the overall strategy. Every leader must be flexible, lockstep plans are only sometimes good, trying new ways to portray a message must be not only encouraged, but supported. Every situation is new, there is no "same old, same old", therefore - even though the same message is being sent and/or reinforced, it must be made clear that we are still trying to do the same thing and we're trying to find the way that best satisfies both the guidance and meets the needs of the locals.
Guidance, empowerment, trust, initiative.
Well, COP and variants work well in the
3% of the US land area that is urban; less well in the 4% that is semi rural suburban and not at all well in the remaining 93% of the nation. Admittedly, that 7% of urban and near urban land is home to ~80% of the population but there are still >60M Americans outside the practical range of COP...
I would really dislike having to be on Bike Patrol in southern or northern Kitsap County... :D
Well said and I'd suggest that your
point 2. is where, in either Policing or COIN, the difficult to change crux of the problem lies.
This:
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"...Much of crime, let alone terrorism, is hidden from the public's view."
is all too true...
We're missing the point, or IO is a bogus concept
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the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own
Taking your hat and sunglasses off when talking to people on the beat (whether a cop or Soldier) is simply a TTP for building relationships, it is not the integrated use of EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC. It may in some "small" way influence the individual(s) you're talking to.
Ken you noted earlier that my call for a better definition was too restrictive, but without some sort of guideline, we end up grasping at straws, and now we have Officers who think talking to the locals is IO. If that is true, zero'ing your M4 must be offensive operations.
Maybe IO was never intended for the tactical level. At the tactical level we practice EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC (and influence events) as separate disciplines? At the operational and strategic level where different disciplines can be integrated we practice IO (one would hope). This IO integration turns into tasks and guidance for subordinate units and requests for support from other agencies.
Let's say we want to influence an insurgent group from attacking oil production infrastructure (you name the location, Middle East, West Africa, S. America, etc.), but we prefer not to get involved in the conflict, so are primary line of effort is IO to influence the adversial group to quit attacking oil infrastructure. Some sample activities include:
EW/CNO: disrupt their computer metwork communications to create a sense of uncertainty and vulnerability
PSYOP: Leak articles about potential western/NATO forces intervening on behalf of the government (most groups would prefer not to fight western forces if they can avoid it), use other methods to convince the insurgents that attacking the oil infrastructure is not in the their best interest.
Diplomatic initiative where our diplomats speak to the insurgents, and strongly suggest they quit attacking oil infrastructure, etc.
Deception: Conduct military exercises in the vicinity of the insurgents, include show of force demonstrations (Fleet off the coast, fast movers flying over, etc.), several articles showing western and HN forces training together and pledging their friendship, etc.
OPSEC: Protecting the information that could reveal our true intentions.
The point isn't whether any of these will work, but to quasi-illustrate how IO could support small supports. IO by definition is a much bigger concept than we're discussing here, and it isn't simple. At the tactical level we support IO, we don't necessarily plan and conduct the full breath of IO.
Sorry, Bill. I wasn't clear...
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
...Ken you noted earlier that my call for a better definition was too restrictive, but without some sort of guideline, we end up grasping at straws, and now we have Officers who think talking to the locals is IO. If that is true, zero'ing your M4 must be offensive operations.
I wasn't aiming at you nor was I trying to say a definition wasn't important; it is important.
However, I'm a firm believer in the Halsey dictum: "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." Been my observation that less than half the people in the Armed forces subscribe to that view. Unfortunately, that means over half cling to what's written as the gospel, no deviations accepted. Therefor, what is written is important. Put too much in and it'll get overdone, leave something out -- as I did -- and it'll get misconstrued. :D
For example, I agree with all you say in the rest of the post from which that quote above derives -- but I also understood that "talking to the locals" was IO as simply a metaphor for a whole gamut of things; I didn't take that comment as being the answer to the whole IO gambit, yet you did or seem to. I don't mean that in the pejorative sense, merely pointing out that different people can read the or see the same thing and arrive at quite different conclusions.
As you go on to say:
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"...IO by definition is a much bigger concept than we're discussing here, and it isn't simple. At the tactical level we support IO, we don't necessarily plan and conduct the full breath of IO.
I totally agree -- but at the tactical level what Joe does, what that Officer who stops to grab a coke does, all contribute and those things are important; doctrine can't get that far down in the weeds (or should not) but it's got to address the concept; all, hopefully, without getting too prescriptive. Failure to zero your M4, for example, can conceivably sort of ruin your day when you get into offensive operations...
On the macro level of IO, strategic, operational and tactical (and even those three levels may be too confining for IO...), the definition is important, no question. It is also equally or perhaps even more important that it be not too prescriptive nor too loose -- and that is not an easy task. It will take time and effort to get it right. While some aspects of IO are older than thee and me, in a lot of factors, we're in uncharted territory and feeling our way. I think that's both understandable and acceptable and I'm willing to accept that it does not have to be my way to be right. Long way of saying it'll take a bit longer to get a good solid working description of the facets of IO published.
We pay lip service to teaching people how to think and not what to think; we're even trying to do that and that's a good thing. Regrettably, there are too many out there who do not want to think, they want to be told what to do in excruciating detail. Since it's difficult if not impossible to cover all contingencies, the doctrine writers have to -- and hopefully will -- walk a fine line lest some of their words get adhered to rigidly by such people. Those types are dangerous but there are too many of them and they aren't going away so we have to be careful what we write. That's what I was trying to say...
Well, I'll buy the old part...
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Ken you are an old school Team Sgt
I dunno, I'm slow, took me too long to discover it was way better to seek forgiveness (even that's rarely necessary) than to ask permission (never a good idea and to be avoided at all costs). :D
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...I don't know if (his) mind ever expanded, but if it didn't wasn't because we were trying to help to him along.
Heh. Been there, done that -- it's one of the paybacks for putting up with mind numbing stupidity from high places. :D
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I would like to see doctrine provide a framework to work in (and it does in most cases), but I'm not happy yet with the IO doctrine, I think it does more harm than good in its current state. I do agree we're in new territory, important territory, so we need to evolve it into an effective framework. To do that you need a few naysayers out there throwing stones at the glass IO house, so we can rebuild it. I'm in that naysayer camp.
Agreed on all counts; my cautionary was directed at those who want too precise doctrine as opposed to sensible doctrine which leaves room for some flexibility, that and an acknowledgment that (a) it ain't easy and (b) it takes time when things change almost daily.