Is US Fighting Force Big Enough?
Is US Fighting Force Big Enough? - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor
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American's armed forces are growing bigger to reduce the strains from seven years of war, but if the US is confronting an era of "persistent conflict," as some experts believe, it will need an even bigger military.
A larger military could more easily conduct military and nation-building operations around the world. But whether the American public has the appetite to pursue and pay for such a foreign-policy agenda, especially after more than five years of an unpopular war in Iraq, is far from clear.
Last week, the Army released a new manual on "
stability operations" that outlines for the Army a prominent global role as a nation-builder. The service will maintain its ability to fight conventional land wars, but the manual's release signals that it expects future conflicts to look more like Iraq or Afghanistan than World War II. While Defense Secretary Robert Gates has not publicly supported expanding the force beyond what is already planned, he has said the United States must prepare for more counterinsurgency wars like the ones it is fighting now - a hint that a larger military may be necessary.
Some analysts are certain of that need...
Much more at the link.
I'l buy that with a twist
Will, a reasonable question:
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The question should not be "Is the Force big enough?" - but what can the force of X number do?
I'd also say its counterpart might be:
What can a force of "X" not do?
Also worth considering:
"X" is not always going to be quantitative; "X" has a qualitative aspect as well, and that one is defined by the requirements. The requirements = policy/military objectives + conditions. Which may get to the root of what Ron is asking as both the conditions and the policy/military objectives are subject to change in ways that cannot be predicted very well. They are both interactive, and unstable.
Best, Rob
The other side of the coin
The U.S. Armed Forces are correctly sized now. They will also be correctly sized in the future, regardless of what that size is. However, that "size" (really a capability/capacity cap) will limit what we use that force for. It will mean that the U.S. cannot run willy-nilly (especially unilaterally) at every boogie man that raises its ugly head. Other elements of national power will have to play a greater role.
And for those potentially massive, can't afford to lose contingencies, we'll have to have well-prepared alliances and coalitions to lend a hand.
This is not being fatalistic or idealistic, it's simply being realistic.
There exists a problem with these theories
I think...
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
This means until we come to some agreements on ends, ways and means, roles and missions, etc. its may not be a good idea to address the DOTMLPF issues in such a way that become either self constraining, or do not meet the needs of policy.
It has been my observation over the years that we're highly unlikely to ever get such an agreement that has the slightest permanence and therefor lends itself to the coherent development of doctrine -- or even of force structure. The Politicians will always want and get wiggle room barring a major existential threat -- as WW II was perceived to be.
Accordingly, this:
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...my sense is they are doing the things they need to be doing based on their mission - e.g. they are writing the doctrine that needs to be written.
is probably as correct as it can be under the circumstances.
As it has generally been and will most likely continue to be... :cool:
I nominate * patmc * for Quote of the Week
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Originally Posted by
patmc
...
The Army has a very heavy tail.
Priceless!
I also agree with his Post. Good one...
It is unlikely to change until all the services
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Originally Posted by
Entropy
...The services simply can't continue like this - something has got to give.
realize that their personnel system (DOPMA !!!) forces them to rotate unqualified or poorly qualified people into positions they should not have on a two to three year cycle in a fruitless attempt to be 'equitable' and create an Officer Corps of generalists. How has that worked out for us, all things considered?
Each change at the Action O, Branch and division Chief and Project Manager level introduces a cascading series of 'desirable and necessary changes.' While aiming for state of the art -- a moving train -- is desirable it is costly and in many cases totally counterproductive.
When you add the changes desired by senior leaders -- who also rotate entirely too rapidly -- above the Project Managers, you get a never ending series of ECPs that the contractors absolutely love. They bid in low, knowing that will occur and that they can thus realize a healthy profit.
Add to all that micromanagement by Congroids and their staffers (not at all influenced by Lobbyists ...) and you have a recipe for a mess.
That's where we are. So. How to fix it?
All we gotta do is clean out Congress, reduce their staff by 60% and make it functional, discard DOPMA, select people who are competent in the field for jobs, quit rotating people to 'manage personnel' every 18-48 months and stop trying to prove everyone can do anything.
No problem... :mad:
Ted Stevens holds onto his Senate seat...for now.
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Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
And in a related matter, the idea that Senator Stevens will continue to run for office after his conviction and pending appeals makes the likelihood of a sudden rush to reform from within Congress doubtful
Next week will tell many tales
Tom
Tom, I don't know if you have seen the Alaskan election returns or not. But it looks like a victory for (drumroll, please)...Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, of all people.
I believe that makes him the first person in the history of our republic to be re-elected to the U.S. Senate after having been found guilty of a felony. Any Senate historians out there who can come up with another, correct me if I am wrong. I thnk it takes 2/3 of the vote in the Senate to expel a Senator. Stay tuned for more on this one.
Same Bat-Time, same Bat-Channel.
Good exchange. A couple of minor thoughts for consideration
First, on this:
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Agree on the living conditions for most, but Vietnam was one year and out.
Living conditions for most in Viet Nam were, to the extent possible, as close to todays as was possible at the time. That was also true in Korea, again relatively. In both those as in Afghanistan -- though not so much in Iraq -- time in the boonies was long and without creature comforts but that goes with the job.
As for Viet Nam being one year and out; true for the single enlistment folks and for those drafted. For those on a second or later hitch the rule was a year in the States and a year in Viet Nam, MOS dependent -- didn't need or use too many tankers, though a lot of them, did get sent as Grunts or Advisers. People with four or five tour in Viet Nam aren't all that rare. I know one guy with seven Purple Hearts, all entailing Hospital time, over four tours...
Point of all that is there aren't as many differences between then and now as many seem to think.
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Poole argues in his books for US small units that live off the land and patrol for weeks on end. I don't see Roger's Rangers returning any time soon, though.
I'm not a Poole fan and I think any Westerner who tries to 'live off the land' in Afghanistan is gonna be an advertisement for 'Weight Watchers ®' but I do think the only thing precluding smaller units out on their own is senior leader excessive caution. We are still risk averse to too great a degree. That said, I know some units in Afghanistan were / are prone to kick out Squad (and smaller) sized patrols while others will not.
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...unless we or the Afghans "surge" reconstruction, the Army will just be there forever.
Doesn't that depend on what ones desired end state actually happens to be? I suggest there's a happy and realistic medium between dropping a copy of the Federalist Papers and leaving versus the alternative of 'forever.' While pondering where that 'medium' should fall, recall two things; be realistic and aim for something achievable. Best is the enemy of good enough.
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We had a SEVERAL time DWI make the E7 list. Same with officers, near 100% promotions to fill slots. A lot of the guys we are retaining are motivated, but not necessarily the ones you want.
At the risk of drawing fire, I'll just say that I've known a slew of highly competent drunks, Officer and NCO. it's a tough job and it drives to a vice of some sort... :D
IOW, don't write those SFCs off. Nor the Officers who were just there. I'll also suggest that I'd rather have five guys who are motivated and drink than ten who are 'superbly qualified' but are not motivated -- whether they drink or not is really irrelevant...:wry:
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...but many do consider time away from their families as a sacrifice. The Army won't survive without people willing to pay the price. Lack of mission and too much down time is bad leadership at the top. COLs and CSMs can surely find better missions, though I remain doubtful.
True on the first, each person has his or her own level on that. Some will wave the Family goodbye for the job, some will not. Too much down time is bad, always has been -- penalty of a large bureaucracy. So is mission allocation and, believe me on this, COLs and CSMs have been known to fight bad ones quite strenuously and lose. It's not usually their call. That too goes with the territory and if the territory is not conducive to an adequate comfort level, people will -- and should -- find something else to do. The Green machine is better than it ever was, it isn't perfect but it is trying to improve -- and it will all work out.
One more nit and I'll go away and let you enjoy Sierra Vista...
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Originally Posted by
patmc
...Agree that you get the missions you get, but the buck stops at the top. If large numbers of troops are not utilized or under utilized, those in charge need to find a better use for them, or send them home.
I totally agree but the problem may not be quite as simple as it seems. The problem originates with Staffs, not commanders or CSMs. Staffs. Staffs from DA on down -- they are the ones that come up with odd taskings and a lot of make work; convoy security missions for the wrong units who just happened to be untasked at the time. Easier to put them on it than find a unit that's designed, trained and equipped to do that. Oh, wait...
Consider also that generally the actual impact falls about three or more levels down from their august height so the fact that it is not always a smart, well considered idea is really immaterial to them. They're insulated from direct complaints and every experienced StaffO knows that valid complaints at Bn level get to Div and sound like minor problems while Corps considers them whining. Give it some thought.
How to fix it? The Commanders concerned are busy guys and cannot watch or know everything, they depend on their Staffs and subordinates to keep them informed -- and there is reluctance to do that -- keep the boss informed, I mean, simply because he is busy. It's a matter of what's important and that, unfortunately is in the eye of the beholder. Better to say little and not annoy El Commandante. That, BTW, is one area where CSMs do have some play and I acknowledge many will not get involved for some bad reasons...
Practically speaking and in general, to get it fixed, Unit Staffs have to fight with their Bosses Staff and force them to fight with his Bosses Staff(s) -- and too many are reluctant to do that on make work, force protection or 'local security' issues in order to save their fights for what they think may be more important issues. I submit that misuse of troops is a very important issue but I know that many staff types do not see it that way; all too many want to do is keep their Boss happy and out of trouble and if Joe suffers a teeny bit or some LT has a tough job for part of his tour, well so what...
While convoy protection has been a greater or lesser problem in all our recent wars, it has occurred to some degree in all, yet, in peacetime, it is difficult to envision much less justify a unit trained and equipped just to protect convoys. even if that were not so, it would be difficult to predict the size and number required. So we have to ad-hoc it. Fortunately, we do that well but it does offer discombobulation to the ad-hocced unit.
One thing that all our wars point out is that we are not flexible enough in organizing and equipping units for theater and conflict unique missions -- which will always exist. We generally get around to it but we're way too slow to adapt -- that and the multi level staff problem are what I meant by the penalty of the bureaucracy
I suggest that a real solution to the problem in question lies in better training of Staff Officers -- and in Commanders insisting on troops not being misused instead of just accepting it and saying that's what "Corps wants, just do it." I've been told that or something similar several times by fairly good Commanders. I have never been told to do anything like that by a really good Commander...
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If a BN has couple dozen guys who do nothing but eat and go to MWR, put them at a gate or guard tower to increase force protection, free up others, and give them a purpose. This is micro-managing yes, but idle hands will do bad things. If a BCT claims to own battlespace, put people out in the battlespace.
That, OTOH, is to me not a mission issue but a unit tasking issue, it is emphatically a Battalion level issue and it certainly does impinge on the CSM and /or CO. It also impinges on the Staff who had to have some part in the design it and if that abuse -- and it is that -- continues, on the Co / By / Trp Cdrs and 1SGs...
So we aren't in much disagreement at all...:D
Have fun in Aridzone... ;)
When your Personnel system is a World War I (Yes, that's a One) model and refuses
to adapt, you can't expect much. I'm unsure why it is so difficult to transmute an individual replacement centric organization into one that supports rotating units -- unless it has something to do with the high number of people required to do the former and a lesser number needed for the latter. Nah, that can't be it -- that would mean that job security takes precedence over supporting the Army... :rolleyes:
Add to that the brilliance of CentCom staffers who took an Airborne Infantry Brigade intended for a high profile mission and instead put it on convoy escort duty for a year in MND-S and managed to turn a competent combat Brigade and a super high personnel (all ranks) retaining organization into one that put retention below the basement and became a borderline shambles that will take a lot of time to rebuild... :mad::mad:
When the Staff imperative at upper levels is to answer the mail as quickly and easily as possible instead of to do what's needed, right and sensible, bad things happen...
That said, we've been more short of these levels of experience before. Not that such knowledge makes it any easier for those who have to cope but it should reassure many that it can be done.