This is from the SWJ blog and one of the best documents I have read. We could even use it here at home USA (United States of Alabama):D
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/121-jones.pdf
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This is from the SWJ blog and one of the best documents I have read. We could even use it here at home USA (United States of Alabama):D
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/121-jones.pdf
It's hard to criticize the basic idea that spreading good governance is a better long-term solution for the world's ills than just killing bad guys. After all, that has been a basic tenet of the National Security Strategy for the last decade. But COL Jones, I think, depends too much on the assumption that troubled states share our belief that government exists for the good of the governed.
Many states - I won't be so cynical as to say most - are organized for the good of the governors, not the governed. Where we have become involved in counterinsurgency, the supported state will pay lip service to our values and stated goals because they want our money, manpower, and killing power. They will give nominal and often half-hearted support to our initiatives in good governance. But...the institution of good governance practices would work against the ability of the elites to maintain their power and sources of income. Even amongst the exploited populace our ideas of good governance often do not resonate, or are seen as positive threats. They welcome the material largesse we bring, but resist the softer aspects of what we consider good governance ( a strong central government, protection of minority rights, rule of law as opposed to customary privilege, etc).
So, a populace-centric as opposed to a threat-centric (not my terms but his - I hate any idea incorporating the pseudoword 'centric') strategy would certainly be as problematic in counterinsurgency.
Not least because he reinforces my long standing point that Goldwater Nichols and the "We won WW II" mentality have given the Geographic CinCs way too much clout in setting national foreign policy -- by default, admittedly but it still needs to be corrected.
Every person in Congress and all their staffers should be forced to read this.
State, with all its flaws needs to lead our foreign policy effort worldwide...
Exactly.
This is pure western/white thinking. Try explaining this to some very influential middle eastern families, or talking about this in Africa. It's the quickest way to chase folks into the hands of China and anyone else who just wants a baggage free beneficial relationship.Quote:
Populace-Centric Engagement (PCE): A holistic family of engagement that places primacy on understanding and facilitating meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance, as shaped by its own unique culture and values. PCE is driven by the key concepts that governance is of, by and for the people; that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best; and that insurgency occurs when governance fails.
...and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him. The spanner does not tell the plumber how to fix the leak, any more than the brick layer tells an architect how to built a house.
As a Lieutenant Colonel, Wilf I was intimately involved in strategic level policy on central Africa. I wrote the campaign plan for the area in Kigali for US European Command and it was picked up virtually word for word. Your methaphor is both inaccurate and misleading. Inaccurate in that the trades have a direct effect on the total design because the design can only use what a trade can provide. Misleading in that there are any number of colonels, majors, and captains who have had strategic effect.Quote:
...and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him. The spanner does not tell the plumber how to fix the leak, any more than the brick layer tells an architect how to built a house.
Tom
1-What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea.
2-Here is some white man/western thinking. In another article Colonel Jones talked about an International Civil Rights Act that correlates to our domestic Civil Rights Act. Both based upon our Constitution and used to guide our Domestic and Foreign Policy.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rS4Qw4lIckg
Link to SWJ original article by Colonel Jones
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/46-jones.pdf
You are signing (get it?) to the choir. Rank has nothing to do with it. Sometimes the lower the rank, the better the idea.
Probably because you were the best qualified in that circumstance, based on proximity and experience. You were doing what countless British Army officers have done for generations, all over the empire, usually with beneficial strategic effect.
My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall.
"War is the setting forth of policy with an admixture of other means."
I noticed the same item Wilf highlighted:but took it differently, I cued in on this portion "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.Quote:
"...PCE is driven by the key concepts that governance is of, by and for the people; that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best; and that insurgency occurs when governance fails."
* As it appears we tried (are trying???) to do in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is flat not going to happen... :rolleyes:
The principal benefit of his paper to me is that it espouses removal of DoD from de facto primacy in foreign affairs and accurately points out that this:is not the best way to look at the rest of the world bar a potential existential threat.Quote:
Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE): A program of engagement designed to defeat a specific enemy or alliance of separate enemies. TCE is driven by the key concept that ultimate victory is achieved by defeating the threat.
I gotta agree with Slap; "What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea." I'm about as rank as anyone and I have some good ideas. Occasionally. Well, rarely... :D
Added: Wilf chimed in ahead of this with:I agree. Being de facto Johnny on the Spot has worked fairly well for the US Armed Forces and DoD since the late 50s in the foreign policy business -- that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is.Quote:
"My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall."
[QUOTE=Ken White;59358] "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.
Exactly!!
Wilf the fear as you state it is a red herring when it comes to soldiers versus diplomats as in many cases soldiers are in fact diplomats. Separation of affairs political from affairs military at the strategic level is a impossible and trying to do that is dangerous.Quote:
I agree. Being de facto Johnny on the Spot has worked fairly well for the US Armed Forces and DoD since the late 50s in the foreign policy business -- that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it isQuote:
Added: Wilf chimed in ahead of this with:
Quote:
"My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall."
Secondly it is often a soldier's duty as a diplomat or a strategist to advise and counsel policy makers on where policy should go. In reality things move so fast that the folks on the ground may in fact be setting policy. That works well if the framework is established for what they can and cannot do. Where it goes astray is when those limits are not set.
I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda. Switching to the present time, I believe we could have used more of that in the senior ranks of the military circa 2002 into 2005.
Ken, the defacto Johnny on the spots may in fact be there because they were put there to do the job. The country team is designed to do just that. It is not always a succes but with the right mix of people and proper training and leadership it works quite well. Without a country team or an element on the ground to do those sorts of things, you get decision-making from a distance without any reality from the scene.
I agree with Ken in that I read the colonel's piece as suggesting we set strategy according to the reality of the place, not what we decide it should be.
Tom
I seem to have that problem here a lot; my fault for lack of clarity and using too much shorthand I guess. Penalty of a wordy old Dude who thinks he's a comedian trying to be brief. Apologies to all. I'll try to do better.Totally agree, the issue is who has primacy -- who's in charge?I totally agree and I acknowledge that those on the spot do set often policy and must do so; again, the issue is who's the adviser and who's the decider on the spot...Quote:
Secondly it is often a soldier's duty as a diplomat or a strategist to advise and counsel policy makers on where policy should go. In reality things move so fast that the folks on the ground may in fact be setting policy. That works well if the framework is established for what they can and cannot do. Where it goes astray is when those limits are not set.
I also agree totally with that. That, in fact, is the point of my comments.Quote:
I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda. Switching to the present time, I believe we could have used more of that in the senior ranks of the military circa 2002 into 2005.
I think we have a misunderstanding. I totally agree with this and with the country team concept -- and nothing I have written says one thing remotely in opposition to that; so I'm unsure why you would assume that I'm opposed to an idea that works.Quote:
Ken, the defacto Johnny on the spots may in fact be there because they were put there to do the job. The country team is designed to do just that. It is not always a succes but with the right mix of people and proper training and leadership it works quite well. Without a country team or an element on the ground to do those sorts of things, you get decision-making from a distance without any reality from the scene.
What I am opposed to as I thought I rather specifically said is the de facto situation that lets the geographic CinCs set much of our foreign policy as opposed to the DoS doing that. I fully understand that due to several reasons, not least funding and reach, DoD is doing that by default and not particularly because (in some cases) they want to do so.
I'm also aware of the fact that State is not capable of doing that well at this time and I believe I mentioned that; What I'm pointing at is a, IMO, to be desired situation versus what I know (and understand why) is.
Just as the Ambassador -- flawed though he may be -- has primacy on the Country Team (and is a fool if he does not listen carefully to his DAO), so State should have primacy in regional policy and they, not DoD, should set the policy (but not the specifics) of contacts and operations about which they -- and the National command authority -- should listen to DoD (who need to be more forthright and honest in their advice...).
If you saw this from me ""...that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is."" and thought that was a knock on anyone or anything, it was not -- it was merely a comment that perhaps too briefly stated my opinion that DoD (as a corporate entity) has over the years made some decisions by default or specific Administration permissively that were in strong contradiction to State positions and that some of those have been in error. A few have been correct and State was wrong. That and I did not clearly state my broad point -- I agree with Jones that a threat centric approach has not been good for the Nation.That, too... :DQuote:
I agree with Ken in that I read the colonel's piece as suggesting we set strategy according to the reality of the place, not what we decide it should be.
Exactly! I have no argument with that, but I assume that you limited your advice to that flowed from your military expertise, and relevant local experience.
Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.
...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.
I also submit that the circumstances where this may be appropriate or actually in the interest of the US Govt. are pretty limited. When the Aliens turn up, they will say "take me to your leaders." Not "how can we meet your requirements?"
Let's go back to where I came in and it was due to this statement. I agree that State should have lead and with Ken's concerns on Unified Commands. But when you state that the colonel has nothing to do with strategic policy that is an erroneous statement. If he takes his teams on the ground as an instrument of said policy, his effective or ineffective implementation of that policy influences, guides, and even sets strategic policy.Quote:
and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him.
Well again I did it as a LTC and I had to fire 2 Majors who tried to do it when they decided the policy set by the CT was in error.Quote:
Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.
Sure it is, one done in conjunction with the foreign policy as captured in the campaign plan. Saying it is not a military task is wishful thinking; we had enough of that in 2003 I would submit.Quote:
...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.
Tom
De Oppresso Libre-(To Liberate The Oppressed) is the motto of Special Forces and since oppression is often part of the cause of an Insurgency it certainly is a Military problem.
Colonel Jones makes some very good points about this and why poor governance is the true root cause that has to be dealt with, and since violent force has often already been used it will be a military problem. But it is a special military problem hence the reason SF was created in the first place.
Governments are created to provide for the health and safety of ALL the people, but insurgencies start whenever Governments begin to protect only certain members of the populace and forget or ignore the other members and that begins the process of an alienated populace that either begins an insurgency internally or the alienated populace will be subject to exploitation by an outside element or both.
Which is why Colonel Jones makes the point that COIN operations are so protracted and costly in nature and are prone to reignite at some point in the future. The core problem of poor governance was never completely solved. Which will lead to certain portions of the populace becoming alienated again and creating a rich source of recruits for the future cause.
He also makes the point or warning about our being careful about being on the right side of the revolution...a good piece of advice IMO. Again COIN takes so long because we often choose the wrong side to support because of some idealogical dispute(hearts and minds thing again) as opposed to looking at the environment/situation these people are in and how poorly they are being treated by their government.
I said Strategic Level FOREIGN Policy. I am not saying Colonels should not have missions or aims with Strategic Effect. Clearly there are times when they should. I am saying Colonels should not set or define policy. They should carry it out. If they are setting or defining foreign policy then there is something clearly wrong.
Soldiers are instruments of policy. They should have nothing to do with formulating the policy, bar advisory input.
I submit T.E. Lawrence as an object lesson in someone failing to understand the bounds of carrying out policy and setting it.
Well De Oppresso Libre is certainly more catching that "Selectively free the oppressed in line state department policy and ensuring that we end up with a foreign leader who is well disposed towards to the US, regardless of his/her human rights record."
PCE sounds good, but it must be done in line with overall interest of the US Govt, and that may well mean allowing people to be oppressed, if you want to do business with the leadership that has their hands on the power.
No, you said this. Using bold and an all caps response does not change what you said in the first place.Quote:
I said Strategic Level FOREIGN Policy. I am not saying Colonels should not have missions or aims with Strategic Effect. Clearly there are times when they should. I am saying Colonels should not set or define policy. They should carry it out. If they are setting or defining foreign policy then there is something clearly wrong.
As for the pronoiuncement that Colonels do not set or define foreign policy, that makes great slogan but is in fact in error. Much of what emerges as a nation's foreign policy toward another nation begins on the ground. What the colonel is writing about has eveything to do with him and his mssion.Quote:
and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him.
Tom
Funny thing about the military and political spheres—they proceed toward success in almost exactly opposite ways. Successful political change is implemented slowly and incrementally by way of consensus. Successful military operations tend to be quick and violent. I suspect it is very valuable to have a country team whose members include people who can assess what kind of action needs to be taken and then act. In fact, I pointed out in a thread a long time go that we need to have state and defense joined at the hip to make this stuff work right.
Quote:
Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now.
One would think that DoD and DoS should be joined at the hip throughout the planning and execution process whenever the US gets ready to involve itself in some OCONUS adventure. Likewise, one would think that a similar relationship would exist between DoD and DHS for a CONUS-focused operation.
It is not clear to me that we need a bunch of Ph.D's in uniform to solve the problem in Iraq. Someone else on this thread masterfully described a Ph.D. as a person who has gone from a macroscopic grasp of knowledge to becoming an expert in a piece of minutiae (I admit I have wordsmithed that other post greatly). What we really need are people who can see that many folks are stakeholders and have a part to play in the solution; we need people without blinders on or otherwise afflicted with tunnel vision. We need some folks who are wise, not just smart. Solomon, where are you???
So do you mean that when the man on the ground comes to write his reports, and recommends actions, that such recommendations could be said to be "setting and defining foreign policy."
I guess the line from "Charlie Wilson's War" - "we don't have a policy on Afghanistan" - must have been true.
Ignoring the later sarcasm, I mean the sum total of interaction on the ground--be that writing reports, meeting with counterparts including the Vice Presient/Secretary of Defense one on one, or sharing information with a senior operations officer or a senior intelligence officer--enter into the creation and defining of foreign policy. If one is summoned to the VPs office and he is poised to pull out of a reciprocal program, then what you say in that office and how you react defines where the foreign policy that established that program in the first place. That is but one example.
Tom
No sarcasm intended. At was an attempt at mood lightening, observational humour.
All those things are good. In the British Army, that is what the "MILO" -military liaison intelligence officers - used to do. Maybe they still do. I have not carried a drunken one back to his hotel in 15 years.Quote:
I mean the sum total of interaction on the ground--be that writing reports, meeting with counterparts including the Vice Presient/Secretary of Defense one on one, or sharing information with a senior operations officer or a senior intelligence officer--enter into the creation and defining of foreign policy. If one is summoned to the VPs office and he is poised to pull out of a reciprocal program, then what you say in that office and how you react defines where the foreign policy that established that program in the first place. That is but one example.
Sure, always good to have military input from the coal face, but that is distinctly different from an officer on the ground, deciding to back X group against another or to reverse a policy already in place. Best he can do, is to argue his case and then act when instructed to do so, his plans first having been scrutinised by the diplomats. Historically the best I can offer is the difference between Allenby's success in the Palestine campaign, versus MacArthur getting himself sacked in Korea.
To whit, and my concern in this thread, while I applaud the Col Jones's insights as to "PCE", his paper does not, to mind, make clear that PCE is a going to have to be set against a very stringent and very specific policy context.
"...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." cannot be, or underpin, an overall approach to operations. It's like basing FM-3 on the universal declaration of human rights. Military Force is for the breaking of will, not the building of nations.
Again Wilf, a military officer serviing in a country team as an attache or a security assistance officer is a diplomat. As for backing a group, that is another decision that can be made at the local level if it is done so under a general policy umbrella.Quote:
Sure, always good to have military input from the coal face, but that is distinctly different from an officer on the ground, deciding to back X group against another or to reverse a policy already in place. Best he can do, is to argue his case and then act when instructed to do so, his plans first having been scrutinised by the diplomats. Historically the best I can offer is the difference between Allenby's success in the Palestine campaign, versus MacArthur getting himself sacked in Korea.
There are varying degrees of influence and decisionmaking authority accorded officers serving in such positions depending on country, crisis, and national interest. In the larger countries that would be much less than you would find in Africa or Latin America. It tends to be a case of management by exception; the framework is established and you make the decisions within that framework. If once Washington hears of those decisions, they accept, you are good. If not, then you may face recall. But if you believe that every single decision is vetted and scrutinized by a panel of policy makers, you are mistaken. It does not work that way, nor should it.
That makes a nice neat slogan, Wilf, and I know you like to repeat it. It bears little resemblance to the reality of the Congo, Iraq, or Afghanistan.Quote:
Military Force is for the breaking of will, not the building of nations.
We will have to agree to disagree.
Tom
Wilf,Quote:
That makes a nice neat slogan, Wilf, and I know you like to repeat it. It bears little resemblance to the reality of the Congo, Iraq, or Afghanistan.Quote:
Military Force is for the breaking of will, not the building of nations.
I'd have to say military power, in the context of being an element of U.S. national power, is for achieving U.S. political objectives. While it is perhaps best suited for compelling others to conform to our will, it can, is and has been used for other purposes such as freeing those being compelled or terrorized by others. Context matters.
To this end, there is a "build" component to our use of the U.S. military. You may not qualify this as the use of "military force", or even the use military power, but it is clearly the use of military forces. I'd submit that while one can argue the semantics of the "ways", the result is "means" committed to an end.
Best, Rob
...and that is central to my thesis. Freeing the oppressed still requires violence, as an instrument. Unless you are using armed force, there is little point in using armed forces. I am not talking hurricane relief or any other of the "can do" missions. I am talking about what underpins doctrines, configuration and training.
Context is critical, but force is force. Military force should be force and not the pedalling of influence. Leave that to the other arms of Government.
I have to admit when I read COL Jones' piece, my first reaction was 'mehhhh...' It doesn't appear to me to be saying anything particularly new or insightful. We should support good governance. OK. We should rely less on brute force. Check. The State Department should have the lead on foreign relations and setting foreign policy. No objections there.
Having followed the thread since, I'm surprised such a pedestrian essay should generate so much controversy. I mean, there are no new ideas there. And, practically, it is doubtful we could implement a PCE if we wanted to.
First of all, where good governance already exists, it would be superfluous. Where governance is poor, it is usually because an entrenched minority is governing for its own benefit. Promoting good governance is going to put us at odds with the existing power structure in many places - that is, we will become insurgents more often than we would be counterinsurgents.
Second, in those places where governance is poor but the government is altruistic, the cause must be poverty - of resources, of technology, of markets, or some combination thereof. Certainly we should promote good governance in those spaces, but I am skeptical of the US ability to truly address underlying, endemic problems such as those even where our indigenous partners are willing participants.
Thirdly, I don't see our State Department as becoming proponents of good governance in any but the most superficial sense. They are diplomats, trained (and organized) to deal with states and state structures, not with populations. I just don't see them becoming agents of change capable of reforming poorly governing states.
Finally, I'll repeat what I said earlier: I don't believe many outside the west share our paradigm of the purpose of government. The idea that governments exist 'for the people' is relatively new, though I will admit it is an idea in the ascendent.
I'm willing to be convinced otherwise. Can anyone provide an example of successful PCE? Especially, can anyone provide an example of successful PCE where the engaging power had to work through a local government - that is, where the engaging power did not rule directly the territory under consideration?
State Dept, in and of itself, can't do PCE, but USAID can and does do this. There are numerous examples in various countries.
I think there's a disconnect or misunderstanding regarding good governance. Governments, whether national or local, have certain functions to perform and meeting basic needs is the most important (providing security, delivering services, etc.). That's just governance. Most governments in developing countries and fragile states don't even perform their core functions well and that's where institutions like USAID can help to strenghten the effectiveness and legitimacy of the government. Beyond this, good governance refers to reaching out to and including citizens in decision-making, being open and transparent, etc. These aspects of governance are often new and unwelcome by other governments, hence the unwillingness. But providing core functions effectively and efficiently can and should reduce the root causes for frustration and dissatisfaction.
The new term now is good enough governance as good governance is a bit of a stretch for most governments. It has to be a model that works in the local context, is phased to address priorities and accepts the inherent trade-offs and realities of working in these countries.
We need to stop beating the drum of good governance. Frankly, the US govt doesn't do it all that well itself (in the broadest and most complete sense of what good governance entails).
Now that is a mouthful of truth...:DQuote:
We need to stop beating the drum of good governance. Frankly, the US govt doesn't do it all that well itself (in the broadest and most complete sense of what good governance entails).
I doubt Washington will swallow :rolleyes:
Tom
er. all three? four??...
Eden is correct in that overall it's a sort of pedestrian article but COL Jones does seem to argue two points with which I agree.
First and most important is a condemnation of threat centered engagement:
"Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE): A program of engagement designed to defeat a specific enemy or alliance of separate enemies. TCE is driven by the key concept that ultimate victory is achieved by defeating the threat."
I said before and will repeat, that is not the best way to look at the rest of the world bar a potential existential threat.
I'll also again say what I said early on the thread reference governance: ""I noticed the same item Wilf highlighted:but took it differently, I cued in on this portion "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.Quote:
"...PCE is driven by the key concepts that governance is of, by and for the people; that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best; and that insurgency occurs when governance fails."
* As it appears we tried (are trying???) to do in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is flat not going to happen...""
I think that sort of agrees with you on not getting wrapped around the good governance foolishness -- none of our business and, as Eden and Beelzebubalicious said, we have enough problems in that area ourselves without trying to hassle others.
Not to get too sticky, but this statement needs further analysis. Do any of us really choose our form of governance? I didn't choose democracy. I accepted it. We can choose our leaders, mainly through elections or by other means (coup d'etat), but we choose them so that they create a government that we support and that suits us best. In terms of the last phrase, "suits them best", this is where it gets tricky. Do people even know what suits them best? In many cases, a more authoritarian government might be best and a democracy a disaster. I spent 2 years in Ukraine where most people preferred an authoritarian government and leader. They pined for the kind of strength and leadership that Stalin provided. Nobody wants Stalin back, but they want a strong leader.Quote:
populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best
This gets me back to choosing leaders and elections and whether people really know what's in their best interest. I was also in the West Bank in December 2005 preparing a proposal for a USAID-funded project. We had a good project designed, but the Palestinian people elected Hamas and that was that. It was, by all reports, a legitimate election. People wanted a change from the past and Hamas had legitimacy in terms of delivering services and listening to the people. They also had strong Islamic values which many people shared. But, like our own recent election, it was more of a referendum on the past administration.
In that case, the US had an opportunity to try and work with the democratically elected government and decided not to. It was a mistake. There are radical elements in Hamas, for sure, but were they all bad? Is anyone or any group all good? Hell no. You gotta work with what you have. If the USG had worked with Hamas, I wonder what would have happened. Could we have strenghtened the moderates, cornered and pushed out the radicals and helped them establish a functioning government?
For Eden and everybody, I have sent Colonel Jones an email to see if he will respond from the horse's mouth so to speak...so we shall see. Slap
New Article from SWJ Blog by Col. Jones. "Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency"
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/128-jones.pdf
Some of Col Jones statements are too absolute to be useful.
For example he talks about "failure of governance." In the three insurgencies, I know best, Sierra Leone, Algeria 1991-present and South Thailand 2004-present, there was no failure of governance.
In SL the bad guys came over the boarder and started killing, robbing and raping. It was criminal insurgency with no popular base. The solution was the kill the insurgents. Having a popular democratic government in Freetown made very little difference. I submit Angola showed some of the same problem, when Jonas Savimbi went "bush" after 92.
Thailand, most folks were fine, till some Muslim extremists started killing local Buddhist Thais, and terrorising folk.
Algeria was stable and functioning (not a democracy, but no arab country is) till an extremist minority started killing folks they didn't like.
What is more Muslims in England are no more subject to bad governance than I was when I lived there.
The earlier had some merit; if only in pointing out the Empire's lack of attire (or camouflage) but I sorta scratched my head after this one...
I've had difficulties with COL Jones' articles, which mix legal and military language and concepts in something of a pot-purri. That accords with his background.
Without doubt, his is a brave attempt to create a needed interface between communities that use different terms (for the same or similar things), all derived from different cultures.Quote:
E.g., Juris Doctorate from Willamette University (1995); Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College (2006); also a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon (2001).
I hope we can agree that, in a small war environment (and in its pre-small war environment), three of the components (leaving other components on the shelf for the time being) are:
1. judicial system
2. police
3. military
What do they do if there are communication difficulties (often semantic). Here is one suggestion (snip from another thread).
Here is an good example (I hope). Slap and I can communicate without the need for a translator, within the scope of our respective professions, because the judicial system (judges, prosecutors, public defenders, defense attorneys) and the police have been joined at the hip for so long that our "operational definitions" are well in place. Thus, we (US) can speak of a unified criminal justice community (## 1 & 2) - which does not mean that everyone agrees on everything - it does mean that we understand what we are arguing about.Quote:
john t fishel
Now, we political (and other social) scientists have a solution for such semantic discrepancies. It is called "operational definition." Essentially, we define (or redefine) a word the way we want to use it and say to our interlocutors that if you want to talk to me about the subject of that word you had better be using my definition of it.
......
jmm
... except I would amend the last clause to read: "...if you want to talk to me about the subject of that word, we had better be using our definition of it." Mutuality, reciprocity, all that good stuff.
On the other hand, the military community is not joined at the hip with the criminal justice community - in part because of constitutional and legislative provisions imposed for good reasons; in other part, because the criminal justice community primarily has been concerned with internal US matters, the military with external US matters. The exception is found in our Civil War and Reconstruction - a period of our tragic, personal experience with "small wars". There, the lack of mutual "operational definitions" led to more than one misunderstanding and conflict (e.g., Ex Parte Milligan).
Another interface which COL Jones brings into play is that between civilian policy makers and the military at the national strategy level, where mutual "operational definitions" are again critical to making progress. In the US, lack of communication has been ameliorated by men with military experience occupying the Oval Office (roughly 75%). The UK experience seems different, at least with its PMs (roughly 25%). As our all-volunteer model continues, we might move more toward what I perceive as the British model. My perception may be all wet.
I couldn't really begin with substantive comments on the two articles - pro & con arguments and modifications for almost every paragraph - perhaps. E.g., we learn that:
Now, there are various theories about the American Revolution. The one that forms my opinion (and all are really just that) is the more traditional view that economic factors (the Crown's trade regulations adverse to the colonies; and its limitations on westward expansion expressed in the Quebec Act), combined with a peculiar American view of English law (the "ideology"), were the bases for declaring independence.Quote:
(first article, p.5)
The U.S. is unique in that it did not create an ideology to fuel an independence movement; instead an ideology developed that demanded that the nation be independent.
The American "ideology" (which the Brits found insane - and justfiably so, in light of mainstream English legal history) was a radical extension of the Magna Carta, Simon de Montfort, Coke's Institutes and John Locke to what the rebelling colonists (perhaps a third of the whole) thought was a "new land". Part of that ideology was a selective incorporation of some English laws (as "adapted to American conditions"), and outright rejection of others. That process began with the Mayflower Compact and continued through the colonial period. As such, the American Revolution was more an American Evolution.
ALL,
Perhaps this supports JMM's statements about communications in that to me the latter contribution makes perfect sense in both it's presentation and applicability to what I "think" I have learned about insurgency in history.
Although Wilf may be right about absolutes I'm not sure I see how the statements Col Jones made aren't still true.
If the bad guys come from somewhere outside them their not insurgents they are(take your pick: Criminals, outsurgency, enterprise, etc). If these bad guys get enough locals(populace) to stand behind them by whatever means you have an insurgency. If the govt as it stands however is still able to effectively fulfill its obligations to the larger populace then does this not in essence mean that the opposition still remains more of a belligerant than a truly counter government movement. At least in so far as how any outside parties considerations for what type of assistance is required for that govt.
Also think in terms of the US or Britain in the large number of existing counter govt actors who remain simply LE problems due explicitly to the fact that they are not able to move enough of the populous to their chosen cause. This would seem to be particularly applicable to the theory that in almost all forms of insurgency the populace "are' the final determinate for what a movement is or isn't.
Sorry for the rambles but nothing new here:wry:
Ken just pointed out that this post already existed, so I'm transferring what I thought was a set of brand new ideas. I can see you guys addressed many of the concerns, but I tend to agree with Slapout on this one, with some caveats addressed below. Assuming we don't do this, and TCE isn't working all that well, what do you suggest?
COL Jones' article deserves serious discussion. Personally I disagree with many of his assumptions (or at least my perception of what I think he is attempting to communicate), but there are also a number of good ideas presented that are worth discussing.
In an insurgency/counterinsurgency type conflict it is generally assumed that the population is the center of gravity (this does not relieve leaders from assessing every situation for its unique causes and centers of gravity, or risk re-learning the fact that assumptions are the mother of failure). What exactly does it mean when we say the population is the center of gravity to the insurgent and the counterinsurgent? I think simply nodding our heads up and down in agreement leads to simple, but flawed strategies based heavily on civil military operations, propaganda, and other outreach initiatives. These activities are critical, but only if they support a strategy that brings the conflict to an acceptable settlement or end game.
Jones described population centric engagement (PCE) above initially as understanding and facilitating meeting the requirements of a target populace, which is fine, as long we’re working through the host nation government and assisting them in meeting the requirements of their populace. However, he suggests we should focus our message of inalienable rights, self-determination and the right and duty of every populace to rise up in insurgency in the face of poor governance. It appears that he shifts the argument from how to win an insurgency by focusing on the population to how to undermine the government (subvert) with a message that gives legitimacy to the insurgents. In some cases we do, especially during the Cold War when oppressive communist regimes were being challenged around the world, but the flip side of this argument is that many insurgencies are not interested in improving their societies, but simply gaining power whether it is to establish a narco-state, sharia law, an oppressive communist regime, etc. They are able to mobilize support through coercion and propaganda where the State can be falsely blamed for local woes. In other words, enemies of the State can create perceptions that have little to do with reality. Perhaps the State failed to counter their propaganda effectively, but that is hardly a reason to assume the insurgency necessarily has the high moral ground. Jones argues that insurgencies arise when conditions of poor governance exist that cannot be resolved through legal/legitimate means. In many (perhaps most) cases this is true, but insurgencies are not always the result of poor governance, this assumption can be dangerously misleading.
Another area that I would debate is the proposal to do away with Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE). Targeting the enemy at the tactical level is not a strategy, and it is normally doomed to fail if it doesn’t support a strategy designed to achieve our policy goals; however, failure to address the threat is equally short sighted. Assuming that it is our interest not to see a particular government fall, then we still have to help them neutralize the subversive elements within their society. Winning support from the population is generally essential to facilitate neutralizing the threat, but the point is both strategies must be pursued in a harmonious manner. I would agree that we could ignore the TCE approach entirely if we used PCE as a preventive measure before the situation deteriorates into an insurgency, but once an insurgency begins, there is still a requirement (admittedly subordinate to the political line of operation) to neutralize it.
Points that I agree strongly with:
- In TCE, intelligence truly does lead operations. The question then becomes, what is leading intelligence?
- focus of the daily briefs shouldn’t be on so called high value targets, but on how to fix the government (thus further isolating the threat).
- A TCE approach reinforces VEO ideology, a PCE approach undermines it.
- When the U.S. stops taking the position with others that we are in charge of everything, it will stop being held responsible for everything as well.
- If Al Qaeda ever forms a State, then it just becomes one more weak state that can be defeated easily by a stronger state.
- U.S. gov response to the Civil Rights movement in the 60’s was an excellent example of PCE, because it admitted shortcomings and passed the Civil Rights Act to address those shortcomings, thus preventing a full-fledged insurgency.
A great article, it deserves serious consideration by the SWJ community.
I will start here with the basics of Jones I (the first article)
Leaving aside, for the time being, ## 3 & 4 (which will generate a lot of heat), and starting with a very, very basic situation, let's look at ## 1 & 2 from my vantage point - a big county geographically, a little county in population.Quote:
(Jones I, p.2)
1. Populace-Centric Engagement (PCE) ....
2. Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE) ....
3. Good Governance .....
4. U.S. Ideology ....
Here, we have the following law enforcement resources (leaving aside village and township police):
1. Michigan State Police Post.
2. County Sheriff's Office.
3. Two city police departments, and two public safety departments at the universities in the two cities.
Not a very large army, but they do co-operate and get the job done. How do they look at Population and Threat ? Here is the HoCoSO mission statement:
http://www.houghtonsheriff.com/Quote:
Our mission is to preserve and encourage a safe community and to enforce the law with compassion, fairness, honesty and integrity. We will enhance our commitment through hard work, education and technology.
The first clause ("...to preserve and encourage a safe community...") is certainly Populace-Centric; but what of the second ("...to enforce the law ..."). You have to ask "enforce the law against whom" - and, to that, the answer requires that there be a threat, usually carried out. So, at some point, Populace-Centric Engagement moves to Threat-Centric Engagement.
Now, our Sheriff "Slim" (who ain't slim) would not likely use those terms - "get that egghead stuff away from me, Mike" - but he would likely explain it in an historical example, as he has done here:
Or, to translate what is clear to Slim and me, into the jargon of the articles: Populace-Centric Engagement of the Threat.Quote:
According to Anglo-Saxon custom, if someone broke the law it was not just a crime against the victim, but a crime against the whole community. ...
....
Under Anglo-Saxon rule it was the duty of the citizens themselves to see that the law was not broken, and if it was, to catch the offenders.....
What you will find by talking to cops here (besides the fact that they are not dumb) is that they have a very good handle on their respective populations - admittedly small populations. So, they can tell you who are the "good people" (who sometimes do slip), the "bad people" (who slip regularly) and those "we're not sure of". Their focus is on the "bad people" and their associates (the ones "we're not sure of").
Once a "threat" develops to the probable cause stage (a "criminal"), then we are into the criminal justice system. Now, cops are not social workers - they do not have the resources to address the underlying problems which, if solved, might prevent a "threat" from reaching the "probable cause" stage.
It is in their own enlightened self-interest to assist in doing so, and also in the interests of their populations. But, as Sheriff Slim says, the mission is "to preserve and encourage a safe community", not to build one.
-------------------------------------------------
Some terms are not easily defined. My own take is that examples are often more enlightening than attempts at formal definitions. I am placing four terms in a rough pecking order, based on where they fit into the "flow chart" of GC III, Arts. 2, 3 and 4.
1. criminal - GC III is NA.
2. terrorist - GC III, Art. 3 ?
3. insurgent - GC III, Art. 3 or Art. 4; it depends.
4. belligerent - GC III, Art. 4
That is just a start.
All,
Ok, as the author of this debate, I imagine I have a duty to show up and either defend my position or fall back. This is all very interesting, and very helpful to me to see which points spoke to people (good or bad). This is definitely a spiral development learning process for me, and I am constantly refining my thinking and will absolutely look seriously at all of the comments provided here.
In review of the article, I probably tried to put the proverbial 10 lbs into a 5 lb bag, and there are some points that weren't given adequate context to make them as clear as I should have. While these few comments won't clear up all of the controversy, perhaps they will help:
1. Insurgency and all of the related mission-sets (UW, COIN, FID, CT, etc) all strike at that most fundamental and emotional of relationships:that of between a populace, its governance, and those outside actors who would intervene to influence that dynamic. In the end, the difference between a successful campaign and a failed campaign is generally one of nuance. A fair criticism was "there is nothing new here." True enough. Insurgency has not changed. What I had hoped to offer that was new was perhaps some small nuances on the various aspects of this dynamic that I believe would tilt our engagement toward being both more in tune with how we see ourselves as Americans, and toward greater success as well.
2. One thing that has changed is the environment. The real heart of the current surge in globalization is the way populaces are connected with each other like never before. This means that the counterinsurgent has a much tougher job. Governments, like never before, must actually perform. While all governments are likely to fall short in this regard, they better ensure that they have at least provided their populace with legitimate means short of insurgency to express their dissatisfaction. PCE is designed to recognize this new environment. No longer is being an effective counterinsurgent enough, nor is simply running an elaborate information campaign. Populaces like never before have access to information that gives choices as to who to grant sovereignty to, and also gives them courage to act (i.e., they know they are not alone, and they don't have to belive the official gov't line).
3. Lastly, while I do not advocate that the U.S. caused the problems currently going on in the middle east, we do, I believe, need to take responsibility for our actions there. This was a major Cold War battlefield, and 60 years of policy aimed at denying the Soviets access to the region left scars that can, and should be addressed. We did what we needed to do to win, and there is no need to apologize for that. Now we must do what we need to do to move forward. In my view, that is to put both the governances and the populaces of the region on notice that we believe in the principle of Popular Sovereignty and certain principles (uncolored by current concepts of US Democracy or US values applied to those principles); and to be more a global mediator than a global policeman. This will require a strong mix of carrots and sticks; and will be met with healthy skepticisim by governments and populaces alike.
Not sure if this helps, but I stand by for additional intellectual punishment!
On your recap and summation, I think I caught the gist of item 1 from the original essay. What resonated with me was the "If you have a hammer, everything is a nail" aspect and the suggestion that maybe we should put away our hammer unless we need it. So I'm in agreement on that. Strong agreement, in fact.
On item 2. I'm inclined to be skeptical. I think the insurgent has an easier job today and that, mostly due to societal changes in the last 40 years, governments have a much more difficult job in demonstrating an ability to perform. My belief is that the the culture of near total dependence on government that has developed in the populace in all the European hearth nations (including the US) has migrated through western media and cultural interplay an has thus embedded itself pretty much worldwide. People are placing demands on government that governments cannot possibly meet. I believe that to be true in the US, in Europe and in most of the world to include our current areas of concern. This syndrome gives potential insurgents a great deal of added influence.
I agree on Item 3. What happened is really immaterial if regrettable; it's happened and cannot be undone. We need to move forward and we can do that, hopefully without repeating the mistakes of the past. Putting the hammer in the tool drawer for use only if necessary would help...
I will just add that there is a significant difference between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance."
As I like to point out to all of my British friends, there was certainly effective governance in the British Colonies in America. Highest standard of living in the world at that time, the essentially free protection of the greatest military in the world, and also probably the greatest civil liberties (if you were white and male) in the western world as well. And yet the upper class led an insurgency.
Good vs Effective must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question. If that populace is not satisfied, then that governance is not good, regardless of how effective it might be. This is not rational, it is just how it is. This was true in America, and also in the other countries mentioned (Thailand, Algeria, etc).
Similarly, governance can be incredibly ineffective and not be "poor." Again, it is all in the eyes of the populace. A government discounts this concept at their peril...
To simply blame your failures on a small faction of trouble makers, or on some particular ideology and demand that the populace stop being rediculous and recognize the effectiveness of their governance and be happy is the kind of stereotype that we Americans laugh at in stories about the American Revolution. Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.
Good post, but one that I thinks supports a PCE approach. One element of good governance is providing security to its populace, failure to do so is a failure of the government of the worst type. Your argument only addressed one aspect of the government, which is the police. Jone's is arguing for a Whole of Government Approach, so at the town level, we're talking about everything the Mayor can influence, and what is overlapped on top by county, State, and Federal Government.Quote:
posted by jmm99, It is in their own enlightened self-interest to assist in doing so, and also in the interests of their populations. But, as Sheriff Slim says, the mission is "to preserve and encourage a safe community", not to build one.
Sheriff Slim sounds like he lives/works in a relatively safe community, but I would argue the mission statement would change if you were a cop in a city where certain sections of it were controlled by gangs (or insurgents). Law enforcement then has an obligation to build a safe community, failure to do so could result in the people organizing to address the security problem (outside the law), or seeking relief by joining forces with the criminals or insurgents because the government failed them.
You're points on targeting the criminals were correct. This is the apparent weakness in the population centric approach, although Jones did state it allowed TCE when applicable. Of course if it is applicable if you're fighting an insurgency; however, the there are different ways to get after the threat. Using Jones' example of the Civil Rights Movement, the government took away their cause, thus prevented an increase in tension and defused the situation. The government may be able to turn the populace against the insurgent as we did in Al Anbar. Ultimately the government must get the people to support the government without coercion or the government loses. All that said, key enemy subversives must still be neutralized. The difference is now the TCE is a supporting activity, not the main effort, and never a strategy.
There is much to disagree with in Jones' article, but
I can generally agree with the first four paragraphs. The one dissected above and below herein sort of confuses me. Sorry, you'll have to forgive me, I'm old... :confused:
I could make a very valid argument that the American Revolution was in fact started by a small faction of trouble makers and that many in the populace of the time here were in fact being ridiculous -- but all that is for another thread and another time. :wry: For this thread:Now that what is happening to us? In what way are we blind? What could we do to avoid 'it?'Quote:
...Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.
Just got home awhile ago and read my emails and I was going to tell everyone that Col. Jones had agreed to reply to this thread,but......it looks like he is already here:)
First, I think there are many cases where a handful of trouble makers did mobilize the population. The government may or may not have set conditions where the populace is susceptable to being mobilized. Your argument remains valid, because it is still a contest for winning over the population, but don't forget that many insurgents initially rely on coercion to mobilize support or neutrality. To counter that coercion requires something of a TCE to eliminate that threat.Quote:
To simply blame your failures on a small faction of trouble makers, or on some particular ideology and demand that the populace stop being rediculous and recognize the effectiveness of their governance and be happy is the kind of stereotype that we Americans laugh at in stories about the American Revolution. Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.
As for American ideas, your article was full of them. You did mention that the population has a duty to raise up against their government if it is seen as unworthy. Tell me how that fits the situation in the UK, where a internal and external actors are attempting to mobilize/radicalize the Muslim population to conduct terrorist attacks if the UK doesn't allow them to practice Sharia Law. Based on your argument, the Muslims have an obligation to raise up and fight the government, and we as Americans have an obligation to provide moral support.
I assume this is not your intention, but simply reading your article would indicate you may recommend supporting these radical groups if the government can't respond to their call for change. What they're advocating is a far cry from a Civil Rights Bill. The government could meet them half way, and compromise and perhaps develop one government with two laws, but I just don't think that will work.
My example is harsh, and perhaps even unfair, but I think it demands an answer. It may go a long ways to clarify what your intended strategy is.
I could take it further, and argue we should have supported Castro (actually I think we should have, they would no longer be communist if we did), Idi Amin, etc.
Good on you, and many thanks for showing up. Makes you a class act.
not being an American, I'll probably never understand, but my guess is that the heart of the issue is people not living in fear of their lives from violence. If it takes a dictator to make that happen, I have no problem with it. Stop the killing and all else followsQuote:
A fair criticism was "there is nothing new here." True enough. Insurgency has not changed. What I had hoped to offer that was new was perhaps some small nuances on the various aspects of this dynamic that I believe would tilt our engagement toward being both more in tune with how we see ourselves as Americans, and toward greater success as well.
I think this is not correct. The vast majority of the world does not have computer and internet access. There are now more nation states than there have ever been, so nationalism is still key. Conflict is mostly about land, and who controls it.Quote:
One thing that has changed is the environment. The real heart of the current surge in globalization is the way populaces are connected with each other like never before.
reference my last.Quote:
Populaces like never before have access to information that gives choices as to who to grant sovereignty to, and also gives them courage to act (i.e., they know they are not alone, and they don't have to belive the official gov't line).
take out the word "intellectual" and it sounds like you went to a British Public School! :DQuote:
but I stand by for additional intellectual punishment!
What I described was meant as an example, not as an argument. An example of what ? - A safe community whose residents are themselves involved enough to engage in Populace-Centric Engagement of the Threat (whatever it might be). In short, the endgoal of our little excursion in COIN theory - Pleasantville. To repeat, Pleasantville is the endgoal.
How you get from Unpleasantville to Pleasantville will depend on how screwed up Unpleasantville is. And, depending on where our particular Unpleasantville lies on the spectrum, the mission statements will have to be adapted for each of the three components I've mentioned: 1. judicial system; 2. police; and 3. military.
I've left out other components, not because they are unimportant; but because you have to crawl before you can walk. I did not present anything that purported to be a complete solution.
And, to anticipate Ken White, I am fully cognizant that changing Unpleasantville into Pleasantville may not be possible - in short, we may have to be satisfied with a somewhat better Unpleasantville, that is "acceptable".
Wherever Unpleasantville is on the spectrum, I think we can agree that it is necessary to know the "bad people", "the ones we're not sure of" and the "good people". And, to separate the "bad people" from the rest of the population. I suppose I could cite Galula and Trinquier chapter and verse here, but you already know them.
So, the particular solution, in any case, will involve both Populace-Centric Engagement and Threat-Centric Engagement in some mix. To argue otherwise, makes about as much sense as arguing that the US Army should be an all-conventional force or an all-counter-insurgency force.
Now, if Unpleasantville is a particularly nasty place, the initial solutions will have to be very authoritarian (relative to what we in our US criminal justice system believe is acceptable) - and the military will have primacy in addressing the problem. If the environment can be stabilized, then police and judicial systems (again, probably not your friendly district court) can start to do their thing. And, other components, as needed, as well. If the ACLU would somehow help - use it.
I believe an interesting at-home exercise for all here would be to imagine a situation where your little Plerasantville is about to be occupied by a military force, whose ideology is diametrically opposed to the mainstream ideology of Pleasantville, and which you cannot defeat by conventional military means. How would you organize the insurgency ? Sort of 2008 Red Dawn in Pleasantville. How nasty could you make Pleasantville ?
The more this discussion progresses the more I keep thinking about the whole idea of Insurgent, causes, coercion, etc and it occurs to me that honestly isn't the greatest thing any insurgent these days has going for them is that they don't really have to wait for a govt to get to the point where it can't provide enough services but rather with the information age and of course massive growth of younger population simply choose to propogandize new and often unfeasible requriements for a govt that are very far outside of its ability to address simply due to the lack of need for such things before.
In this context pretty much any country US, UK, Canada, Iraq, Balkans, Russia, China, you name it are easy targets for outside interests simply due to how foreign they are and what "new" requirements they or their cause bring with them.
??:confused:
Starting first with governance, where you use the American Revolution as an example, you define your terms as follows.
A few months back, Marc Tyrell and I discussed - with general agreement between the two of us - the failure of the US to gain support from either Canadian language group (from my perspective, the French speakers) in both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.Quote:
(from bob's world)
I will just add that there is a significant difference between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance."
....
Good vs Effective must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question. If that populace is not satisfied, then that governance is not good, regardless of how effective it might be.
There, I used the term "legitimate government" (also in quotes there) in a manner substantially the same as your definition of "Good Governance" - that is, it must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question.
In 1776-1815 Canada, we have the French-Canadians (from my viewpoint), the Scots and English (from Marc's viewpoint) and the United Empire Loyalists who came to Canada after the Revolution (again from Marc's viewpoint). No doubt that that mixed population came to the conclusion that the Crown was both "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance".
So, however you define it formally, we agree that "Good Governance" depends on the "perspective of the populace in question."
Now, moving to the "States", we can examine the perspective of the colonists as a matter of history. All who examine the historical record can agree that there were three groups in the North American colonies (excluding Canada): UELs, Neutrals and Rebels. Where people differ is what %s belonged to each group, variations by region, etc. Which brings me to my practical question.
How do we measure "Good Governance" in a particular country today with the sort of accuracy that would allow accurate intelligence analysis to inform a counter-insurgency effort ? Would you poll the populace to determine the "UELs, Neutrals and Rebels" ? What questions would you ask ? In short, what is your outlline for using the concept of "Good Governance" in the field ?
-----------------------------------
Ending up with Ideology, you and I would have some differences as to what is the "American Ideology" - even in (or perhaps because of) the stripped-down version you present. However, there is little point to two lawyers yammering on about Con Law and the Foundations of our Republic.
To me, there is a more basic issue which goes to the heart of the question - should we be marketing "American Ideology" at all (assuming arguendo that we could agree on what that is); and, if so, to what extent and to what purpose ?
If our focus is on the population of a foreign land, it seems more logical to me to learn the ideologies which are native to that land - and market the indigenous ideology that is most likely to aid us in reaching our endgoal (assuming that we know what that is). E.g., in a given country, communism might be the best answer, simply because the other ideologies are not going to be helpful (even if some of them are closer to "American Ideology").
Note that I have no objection to presenting the "American Ideology" (assuming arguendo as above) to explain where we are coming from - to inform others. Perhaps that is what you are saying; but you seemed to be propounding a broader agitprop agenda than that.
This article, recently threaded here, has a good comment on the dichotomy between formal and informal governance in Afghanistan:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs...tt-agoglia.pdfQuote:
(pp.4-5)
Key to understanding the operating environment is both understanding the specific causes of conflicts in your tactical area of operations and understanding exactly what “governance” means to local Afghans. Coalition forces have proven notoriously incapable of differentiating between conflicts involving insurgents, vice local conflicts over scarce resources vice intra- or inter-district struggles over the distribution of power. Related to this, there does not appear to be widespread understanding of the relationship between the informal and formal structures of political power.
In its most basic sense governance is the provision of essential services, such as human security, food, water and shelter, as well as an acceptable degree of conflict resolution and justice for wrongs committed. This basic type of governance has been prevalent in rural Afghan communities for centuries; however, it is under threat today not only by insurgents but also by attempts to overlay a more formal governance structure on top of the informal structures. There has been historically, and it remains today, tension between the informal structures of political power (the mullahs, the mahliks, the tribal shuras) and the imposed, formal structures of political power (District and Provincial Governors, the ANP) at the local level. All politics is local, especially in Afghanistan. Understanding this distribution of local power is vital if we are to promote “legitimacy” of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster. A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome. And it should not be assumed that ANA or ANP, just because they are Afghans, inherently understand the tensions between the two structures of local governance or that they will be necessarily capable of maintaining a suitable environment of co-existence without substantial prompting, persuading and persistent encouragement.
Comprehensive understanding of the operating environment only comes through persistent and pervasive interaction with the people who determine the social dynamics of the environment. [italics in original] ...
The article does not outline a methodology for determining the precise metrics of support for one form of governance or the other. The concept of "pervasive interaction with the people" looks field anthropological.
The comment quoted does not as such distinguish between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance"; but (see quote from p.3 below) they do speak in terms of "legitimacy and effectiveness."
Based on the following comments, "the imposed, formal structures of political power" is neither (the context is primarily the Pashtun areas):
The authors recognize primacy in their focus on the population, with secondary focus on the enemy's armed force:Quote:
(from above)
Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster.
(p.3)
In many parts of the country, especially outside of major population centers, the legitimacy and effectiveness of GIRoA is under considerable threat not only from insurgents but also from widespread corruption and patronage, traditional tribal power structures, a xenophobic society in the south and east, and a lack of tangible, synchronized reconstruction and development.
A caution is probably due here - based on history.Quote:
(p.6)
3. Protect the people. If SCHB is to work, it is vital coalition forces (and by default the ANA) achieve the right balance between “hunting insurgents” to disrupt, and protecting the population and contributing to building human capacity. The former - killing and capturing insurgents - does not always contribute positively to the need to protect the people and build capacity and in our attempts to kill or capture we often sacrifice longer term enduring positive effects for short term tactical effects. This distinction between being population centric in our operations, which should be the main effort, vice being enemy centric, which is a supporting effort and a means to the end, sets the tone for the way we conduct operations, the way we interact with the people, and the way we relate to ANA, ANP and other GIRoA agencies. We do not have the balance consistently right across Afghanistan.
From the fall of DBP in 1954 to approximately May 1959 (start of the Laos dustup and formation of Transportation Group 559), one can fairly argue that the Diem government should have employed a population-focused approach - it did to some extent. In later 1959 through 1964, the PAVN (NVA) unleashed its cadres into SVN (roughly 100K southern Viet Minh traveled north in 1954-1955 for training and incorporation into PAVN).
After those 1959 events, GSV faced (but did not really recognize) the advent of the Second Indochina War - an externally-supported threat. See, Pentagon Papers, vol. I (esp. last section before the documents annex); and Fall's, The Two Viet-Nams, for a more professional analysis. The point is that the balance in a "small war" can shift rather quickly.
I hope everyone is keeping in mind as they read any of the articles that I have written, or the strings of commentary provided here, that what I am proposing, in its simplest terms, is merely a change of priority and focus, and a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad. Not a call to coddle criminal actors.
Instead of focusing on keeping any particular government in power regardless of their relationship with their own populace so long as they support our Government; Instead of chasing “threats” on an ever expanding list of “Violent Extremist Organizations” with the goal of "defeat the threat, defeat the problem"; Instead of either of these approaches I simply suggest that the true COG, the source of all strength and power, for any government and any Insurgency is the populace from which it arises.
To date, even where the populace is recognized as important, the position is usually one of “how can we get this populace to support its government and how can we separate them from the insurgent”? This is usually coupled with an engagement program aimed at building host nation capacity to defeat the insurgent and facilitating that effort with U.S. enablers; while at the same time essentially trying to bribe the populace with all types of aid based upon what WE think they need.
What I am suggesting is to simply begin with the populace in mind, and to always keep them in mind as the focus of your engagement throughout. If there is an insurgency (not to be confused with a handful of violent nut jobs like Tim McVeigh), then by definition there is a movement with some degree of active and (primarily) tacit popular support. You must understand why that is before you can aid a government in addressing the problem.
Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings. Insurgent acts are criminal acts, so the government is technically and legally correct to blame the insurgent and to prosecute him for his actions. That will not, however solve the problem. He exists for a reason. Determine that reason, and design a program of engagement to address it. The focus of this engagement must not be on dumping aid on the populace (which often makes the problem worse by highlighting the failure of their own government to provide such services), but to instead focus on fixing the failures, with any engagement with the populace being executed with and through the populaces own government.
Meanwhile, if you have VEOs operating in the area, they must be dealt with AS A SUPPORTING EFFORT to the larger operation. First, sort out the PURPOSE for each organization operating. If it is a nationalist insurgency, is it a revolution, a separatist movement, or is it a resistance movement (that you likely gave rise to with your own clumsy misguided intervention efforts in the first place)? Tailor your engagement, again working through and with the Host Nation security forces, accordingly. If it is merely a criminal organization, deal with it as such. If it is an isolated group of malcontents, likewise. If it is a cell of either state or non-state actors working to incite insurgency to support their own agendas (unconventional warfare); then you must tailor a “counter unconventional warfare” campaign to deal with the specific threats. One cannot simply apply a blanket Counterterrorism approach to every group that uses terrorism as a tactic. To do so tears at the very fabric of the populace you are trying to support (yes, it is the job of government to support the populace).
So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.