Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency
Congratulations are in order for Major Niel Smith (many of you know him as Cavguy on the Council), US Army, for submitting the winning entry in this month's Armed Forces Journal essay contest. His entry, Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency, is indeed one fine read.
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The book that most changed my career path was
The Army and Vietnam by Andrew Krepinevich. Krepinevich’s book fundamentally altered the approach I took as a company commander during my second Iraq tour in 2006.
When I returned to Germany in 2004, fresh from my first 15-month tour in Iraq, I was convinced there had to be a better way to fight this kind of conflict. A year of operations in Baghdad and three months fighting the first Sadr rebellion made it clear to me that our strategies and methods were inadequate to meet the demands of the environment. As a new company commander, I had an obligation to become as educated as possible on counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, I didn’t know where to begin. As an armor officer, my professional military education to this point included great detail on how to fight at the National Training Center or in the Fulda gap but contained absolutely nothing on counterinsurgency...
Much more at Armed Forces Journal.
Thank you for describing how many of us felt...
Sir,
I re-read The Village and then The Army in Vietnam during holiday leave in '05, shortly after returning from Iraq. Anger, frustration, disappointment, and disbelief are all words that describe how I felt throughout this holiday period. My wife and father couldn't understand why I was so mad at myself.
I'm going to ask my wife to read your article; it does a much better job explaining why than I ever could. Thank you.
Sigh. Speaking of selective use of history...
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Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
...what if Krepinevich is wrong; or, at least only half right?
What if he is? I submit that most works of history suffer from that problem. Certainly it is my observation, experience and firm conviction that all history I have read covering events in which I was involved and of which I thus have personal knowledge is deficient to nearly or more than that extent. That is, I suspect for ideological reasons, particularly true of Viet Nam. History as writ is an imperfect art.
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What if he wrongfully neglected to mention in his book that the reason why Westmoreland had to go conventional with the American Army early on was because there was a substantial regular South Vietnamese communist threat along with a NVA regular threat that he could not just dismiss and go-Galula?
He could have mentioned that but he, a 1972 USMA Grad, would have been wrong to do so -- he could not possibly 'know' and thus had to rely on the papers of the MACV Staff -- who were a bigger problem than all the VC Main force in South Viet Nam. They were essentially a spent force -- well, the Staff was,too but I meant the VC Main Force, their combat units -- by early 1965 and that's why Uncle Ho sent the PAVN (later NVA) south in 65 and later -- after Westmoreland had committed to big battles. Giap was a sharp cookie...
Westmoreland did what he did due to a fundamental operational misunderstanding and a preference or desire to 'win decisiviely.' Laudable aim, wrong venue. Most revisionist looks at Viet Nam have been prompted by his former staff loyalists in a postwar attempt to justify what many perceive as a failure.
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What if Krepinevich way overplayed the amount of difference between Westmoreland and Abrams? Basically what if he was just flat wrong in his interpretation of Vietnam?
He wasn't 100% right but he was close enough for guvmint work... :D
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I am sorry buddy, but your essay essentially argues that Vietnam was just like Iraq, only this time since we have the lessons and principles provided to us in books like "The Army and Vietnam" we are on the road to success because we have learned and applied those lessons.
That was not my or apparently some others sensing of his essay and my perception is that you have elected to take it that way simply to make this point:
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...your essay fits perfectly in with the Surge Triumph narrative. That Triumph Narrative is based on the trope of Vietnam.
We can disagree on that as well. That is, disagree on the thrust of his essay...
As you know, you and I essentially agree on the 'surge.' We differ only in that I mention it (was not necessary and only may have speeded things up slightly) occasionally instead of routinely ;)
just a couple of more comments
Cavguy said:
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I strongly disagree here. I also argue with your use of "directly", which is pejorative...Why study history if we can't learn from it and use it to inform the present?
The word "directly" was not used in a pejorative sense (sorry if you took it that way) but in an argumentative way to make a point. So I use the word again, your essay (as I read it) does use the "lessons" from Vietnam as highlighted by Krepinevic (K) and "directly" applied them to Iraq in your second tour there. K says that the US failed in Vietnam because it didn’t focus on classic coin and population security, you say in Iraq the first three or so years (mostly) the US failed (or at a minimum performed very poorly) in Iraq because it did not do classic coin and did not focus on population security. How is that not applying the lessons directly?
How would it seem if some brigade or division commander right after the march up to Baghdad said that before the assault he had re-read his Jomini, realized that it had been overlooked in the American Army for the past 20 years, applied its Principles in the assault, and as a result of applying those principles the march up to Baghdad in Spring 2003 was a great success?
Qualitatively and with assuming a reasonable amount of context, how is this example of "using" history any different than yours?
Again, it is a different philosophy of history that you and I have. To quote one of your words, you see history as something that can be "used." I see the "using" of history as dangerous because it produces a mindset of the templating of the past into lessons and principles to be plucked at will for "use" in the present. But in so doing this you end becoming a-historical in the sense that by detaching these lessons from their historical moorings and plotting them in the present you remove them from their context. What is it about this period of history of the Vietnam War and counterinsurgency that we privilege it over other periods? As a matter of abstracted historical philosophy, why do we privilege the writings of Galula for lessons learned in Iraq say over the British imperial officer CE Callwell? The conventional answer to this question as given to me by one of the primary authors of FM 3-24 is that Galula's world of the early 1960s is simply closer to ours than Callwell's. Well back into the reality of the present, I don’t buy such arguments. But those that do have thus detached the early 1960s counterinsurgency theory and practice and have plotted in the present as a template and have elevated it to the absolute oracle of historical truth because they align in analog fashion to current experience in Iraq and say in a reductive, simplistic way that here are the lessons from Vietnam, we have learned them, have applied them in Iraq and because we have learned and adapted we are winning.
That is what, in barest form, is happening here.
Congrats Cavguy ... and a few comments
Niel, an excellent article. :D
Something worth reading: Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISIONMAKERS. Richard Neustadt, a political scientist - like me, was a staffer for President Truman and is best known for his book, PRESIDENTIAL POWER. Ernest May is a historian. Their point, briefly summarized, is that we all reason by historical analogy, Wheile there is no avoiding this, thinking rigorously can help us avoid historical interpretations that are too facile.
As a political scientist, I usaully have to take my disciplinary colleagues to task for their utter disregard of history. One cannot do good political analysis without knowing the history of the country, organization, or events that are the subject of research. That said, many of my historian colleagues are so convinced that every situation is unique and, therefore, no generalization is possible. For what it's worth, a plaque on both extremes!:eek:
Cheers
JohnT
If anyone takes anything away from this thread,
it should be this:
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
...professional malpractice on the part of the Army, because in my opinion that failure prolonged our stay in Iraq and thus cost soldiers' lives.
as amplified by this:
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The Greek tragedy in all this is that the "learning" was mostly "re-learning" what was sitting on the shelves of our library. Men died because we failed to train or appreciate the lessons of past counterinsurgency warfare....
He's obviously not alone:
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
...It is a strong indictment from Niel's (and from mine) perspective given that many of the leaders who'd determined our DOTMLPF path...for whatever reasons, they left a hole where that knowledge should have been.(emphasis added /kw)
Because those are truths; they are not just a theory, they are a statement of fact and many of us know it all too well. We cannot know that had the failure not occurred, Iraq would have been different -- but we can speculate and I submit the possibility that it might have been only 10% better would have saved several hundred lives. It's not a Greek Tragedy -- it's an American tragedy. One that must not be repeated.
There is also this:
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Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
...Again, an indicator of a thoughtful article is its ability draw out debate. I am not being critical of Niel, but drawing on his fine article to apply criticism and thought to problems that I see in the US Army.
True on the first part.On the latter portion, no one can object to that and your opinions have merit and weight. However, I too can apply criticism after much extremely long and hard thought to problems that I see in the US Army today; there are three that are IMO quite critical:
Too many seniors are reluctant to trust their subordinates; This either causes or is caused by risk aversion -- I'm still trying to determine which but I do know inadequate training is at the root of it. Those are the first two items. Lastly but most importantly -- and in the vein of this thread -- I see a very worrisome and strong trend on the part of some senior people to return as quickly as possible to business as usual...
That is not a good idea.
Cautionary historical notes & a disagreement
Gian--
I agree with you that one should be very cautious about applying lessons from Iraq to operations in Afghanistan. Particularly, one needs to consider issues of small COPs in light of other historical experience there, such as the Brits in Kabul twice in the 19th century. That doen't mean that my friend John Nagl is necessarily wrong in his assessment but rather that it is both more complex and requires more in depth analysis before we decide on a strategy and operational plans and tactics. One fallacy is that we have a tendency to focus on a singular historical experience without comparing it to other similar and contrasting experiences. Another of our errors is that we prefer not to remember our own history at all (or rather remember it very selectively). I am thinking here of 300 years of American (both colonial and national) military experience fighting Indians and later the Philippine Insurrection that we did not wish to recall in the 30 years between the end of Vietnam and 9/11. Again, from my poly sci (and old soldier) perspective, the essence of using history to garner principles and lessons is to look for multiple cases that shed light on the subject.
In that context, I must disagree with your interpretation of the war in El Salvador. Our allies won! They won, largely because they learned from the lessons taught by the MILGP and 3 superb Ambassadors and their own pragmatism. I watched that fight up close and personal as the XO of the Combined ESAF Assessment Team in 87 and 88 and later at SSI and as a civilian prof at Leavenworth as the fight wound down and ended with the peace accords of 1992. Obviously, there is significant disagreement as to how much the Fall of the Wall in 89, the ending of Soviet aid to Cuba, and the fall of the USSR in 1991 contributed to the GOES victory. I believe it was important but not decisive although I am sure that many would disagree. But, my real point is that MILGP commanders like John Waghelstein and Ambassadors like Ed Corr and CINC's like Jack Galvin and Fred Woerner brought a much broader view of historical experience than merely that of COIN in Vietnam to the table.
Cheers
JohnT
Sodium Chloride to the rescue...
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Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
Ken:...although I have to tell you I often disagree with your interpretation of Vietnam and history, but naturally, this is OK...
Of course it is. I will again point out though that I don't so much disagree with your interpretation of what you read as I do with those sources and their reliance on the 'record.' I have a great deal of experience over many years with that record and know that it is often deliberately skewed to cover mistakes, blunders, accidents and bad decisions and to protect or embellish reputations; bureaucracies tend to do that... :wry:
As Steve Blair said earlier, both the written and oral histories need to be taken with quantities of NaCl... :eek:
We do agree that training and effort for MCO are imperatives and must take precedence over COIN issues; we only disagree on what else must -- and can -- be done.
Oh, re: Veet Nam. I'll also point out that this
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JMM: ... the fact that the American Army tried to do classic coin in El Salvador (by using the El Salvadoran army and government as its proxy) and it did not work in the ways planned.
selective use of history by you is not perhaps refuted by this:
...From John T. -- ""In that context, I must disagree with your interpretation of the war in El Salvador. Our allies won! They won, largely because they learned from the lessons taught by the MILGP and 3 superb Ambassadors and their own pragmatism. I watched that fight up close and personal as the XO of the Combined ESAF Assessment Team in 87 and 88..."
However, that rebuttal certainly does raise the question of the accuracy of observations of people on the ground at the time versus the 'record' written by others who were not there and who may or may not have a bias... ;)
Ken, it's even more complicated
since some of those who were there - including Waghelstein, whom I greatly respect and who is a good friend - have written that we didn't win...
Obviously, being on the ground, studying the situation academically, or a combination of both will not automatically produce Truth. Reasonable people can, and will, disagree. But discussions like this can help to clarify all our views of reality.
Cheers
JohnT
May I paraphrase and wholeheartedly agree...
Since some of those who were there - including a few whom I greatly respect and who are or were good friends - have written things that differ from my view... :o
(Albeit only slightly, he said, shyly... :D )
Don't even have to paraphrase this one.
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Obviously, being on the ground, studying the situation academically, or a combination of both will not automatically produce Truth. Reasonable people can, and will, disagree. But discussions like this can help to clarify all our views of reality.
Well said, as always, John.
MAJ Smith, I was dead wrong in misquoting you.
Perhaps, that was my "inner voice" speaking.
Based on the facts as I know them, I will call it "gross professional negligence" on an institutional level by more than one general officer. Nice not to be concerned about "conduct unbecoming" there
Of course, it I hauled off with something like that involving SCOTUS, I guess I could get in trouble - assuming they would care (doubtful, too small a fishy).
Usually, I'm better at "cross-checking" facts. A lesson learned again :o
Methodology - Defining Terms
This sounds like a good start;
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john t fishel
Now, we political (and other social) scientists have a solution for such semantic discrepancies. It is called "operational definition." Essentially, we define (or redefine) a word the way we want to use it and say to our interlocutors that if you want to talk to me about the subject of that word you had better be using my definition of it.
except I would amend the last clause to read: "...if you want to talk to me about the subject of that word, we had better be using our definition of it." Mutuality, reciprocity, all that good stuff.
Since this is a military site, you can propose as substitutes for anything below whatever military terms that are equivalent and which make sense.
Literature Pecking Order
Since we are discussing a literature search, I'll start with some classifying types from the more specific to the more general (using some military literature, rather than legal literature, as examples):
1. Small case studies (how I characterized MAJ Smith's article, since its tactical events involved a limited area and timeframe in Iraq) - the Battle of Ap Bac.
2. Large case studies - Krepinevich’s The Army & Summers' On Strategy
3. Gigantic case studies (made that one up) - Asprey's War in the Shadows.
Note there is a difference in the authority of these sources (those in ## 2 & 3 are secondary authorities, which are at least one step removed from the original event - e.g., the Battle of Ap Bac).
While secondary authorities can be legal precedents, they are presumptively weaker than an original precedent - because of obvious factors, such as editorial bias, errors in reporting the original, etc. So, if we say Asprey has this to say about Ap Bac (but not much, pp. 1138-1139), one should ask "What is the rest of the story ?" - more on that below. Another note is that secondary authorities may include quotes from original sources; but you are always better to have the original source.
Another factor enters into the equation, which is related to the primacy or non-primacy of authority; and that is - each case is unique. There is no such thing as a precedent that is directly on point with the current case. Of course, some precedents are very close to, others are further removed from, the current case. So, context, context, context.
Precedents
A precedent is a thing or event. A precedent is not a principle, not a doctrine and not a rule of decision - although all of those abstract concepts may be derived from a precedent, more often they are derived from a series of related precedents.
Those who are familar with "War Crimes" know that a flock of habeas cases inhabit the DC courtrooms - most of which have filings citing Ex Parte Milligan as a precedent. We can go back to that opinion, look at its facts (context), and review its precedents - and so on, with each of them. We also could find some secondary authorities (e.g., Holmes Devise History of SCOTUS) which refer us to documents (media accounts, correspondence, etc.) outside of the purely judicial record (more context).
Now, taking up Ap Bac, Nagl's Learning briefly covers it (pp.133-134). He cites Vann's 91-page after action report. Now, I can't put the Battle of Ap Bac into my backyard - wouldn't it be something to have a sci-fi device that would re-create any battle as it actually occured. Barring that, I would want Vann's report, all other reports, maps, etc. In short, as close as possible to the original record of that event (context again).
Which is where we end going directly backwards in time - battles don't cite prior battles as precedents. However, military historians do something akin to that. So, we may be able to go further backwards by going forward to works which discuss Ap Bac. And, in any event, we can find what others opine as to that battle (e.g., Palmer's Summons, pt.1, ch.6).
Shepardizing
Shepardizing ("crosschecking" was a fudge term - although descriptive) is essential to the trial and appellate lawyer. Shepard’s® Citations Service has its sales pitch here.
The original idea of Shepard's was to look forward in time from a case opinion and index every later case and secondary authority which cited that case. Given computer databasing, the service expanded to have some backwards in time capability, largely based on legal issue identification, keywords, etc.
The bottom line is that a gigantic amount of legal information is available. The problem is the time available to analyze the information. There are a host of specialized databases that cover specific factual and legal situations, both editorially and linked to the original sources. So, put in the CD and hit the right keywords.
Other Stuff
The abstracts developed from precedents - whether called principles, doctrines, rules of decision, blackletter law - are tougher than the precedents.
E.g., blackletter law (so called because it traditionally was the bolded heading to a section) is followed by a brief description of the major precedents supporting the blackletter - and then all of the exceptions to the blackletter. So, context, context, context.
For you academics, you might have access to a old book, Charles A. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969), written by an historian-political science guy, it offers a different (not necesarily better) approach than that taken by lawyers writing on the same topic. In his Intro, he makes some of the same points as John makes.
Brief Note to COL Gentile
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from you
JMM: My only comment to your excellent post is that what you say Niel's article lacked was a "crosschecking" which he corrected that problem later in his article by noting that when he returned from Iraq the second time he had read other classic coin authors like Galula, Thompson, Kitson, etc. That may satisfy your needs as a lawyer but not me for a historian trying to understand the past to help and inform me with the present.
I believe my comments above begin to explain what satisfies me as a lawyer. If you want to see what satisfies and dissatisfies me in a particular context, please feel free to browse the "War Crimes" thread. For an example of how I approach research, visit the "Defending Hamdan" thread. All of those posts are kind of rough (scarcely MI Law Review standards), but the substance is there.
Just to return to MAJ Smith for a moment. You know better than I that we have to deal with the situation in front of us, not the situation we would wish to have. Frankly, I do not know whether he took Krepinevich’s opinions (which is one thing), or took tactical examples described by Krepinevich (which is quite another thing), or both.
If we lived in a perfect world, he could have "shepardized" both. He did not have the resources (and lacked the knowledge at that time) to do that. Perhaps, he is blessed with natural intuition - and that explains the subsequent successes. I don't know him, except for his posts and avatar. Can't comment on the relevance of geographical and timeframe distances to applicability of a prior military precedent to a current military situation. That is a matter between you two serving officers.
I think I'm the guilty one...
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
I didn't use "criminal negligence", however, I did use "gross professional negligence"
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
MAJ Smith, I was dead wrong in misquoting you...Perhaps, that was my "inner voice" speaking.
I believe I have said on more than one occasion that the failure of the Army to embed the Doctrine, to organize train and equip for post attack occupation and for the possibility of FID or COIN operations was a major failure by the senior leadership of the Army for over 28 years, (1975-2003) and that that omission was borderline criminal malfeasance -- and I probably left out the 'borderline' on occasion. I have also said that concentration on the threat of the USSR from 1975 until 1990 was correct but need not have totally excluded 'small wars' (and, for part of the time, it was partially included) -- but failure to adapt to an obviously changed world from 1990 until 2003 was inexcusable IMO.
I have also occasionally cited senior miscreants by name and have excoriated DoD and previous administrations for not pressing the issue. I wouldn't say all that were I still serving; I'm not so I have said it and will say it again.
I believe it extremely important that the Army not forget and not repeat that error.
