How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?
by Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, Lieutenant Colonel Lee K. Grubbs, Commander Brian J. Malloy and Lieutenant Colonel Craig R. Wonson, Small Wars Journal

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan? (Full PDF Article)

Quote:

---

In the fall of 2006, the security situation in Iraq had deteriorated to a level worse than at any other period during the previous three years of U.S. occupation. Violence was on the rise and attacks by insurgents continued to increase even after the top Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, was killed by U.S. forces. Calls for a drawdown of U.S. troops gained considerable support in Washington as policymakers questioned whether long-term stability in Iraq was achievable or if continued U.S. presence would merely add to the growing number of casualties. Reinforcing the perception that U.S. forces were not making sufficient gains was the release of a Marine Corps intelligence report stating that the struggle against Sunni insurgents in Al Anbar Province could not be won militarily.

U.S. military commanders concluded that the best way to improve the security situation in Iraq was to adopt a more proactive “clear-hold-build” strategy supported by a significant increase in the number of ground combat units. This increase in forces, often referred to simply as “the surge”, introduced five additional combat brigades into Iraq that provided the means to wrest the initiative from the enemy. It allowed U.S. forces to simultaneously conduct large-scale operations to clear enemy safe havens, train Iraqi security forces, and disrupt insurgent lines of communication without having to leave key urban areas unprotected. In less than a year, the surge helped reduce the number of enemy attacks, increased the support of the Iraqi people, improved the security situation throughout the country, and all but defeated the insurgency.

The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated since 2006 largely due to the lack of forces required to execute an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. As the U.S. struggles to find a viable solution to this problem, calls for an Iraq-type surge of forces to help stabilize security and set conditions for political and economic improvement in Afghanistan have increased. President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have both acknowledged that additional forces are needed in Afghanistan but have not specifically outlined how many or what type. Although the goal of executing a surge in Afghanistan would be similar in nature to that of Iraq, the challenges presented by a larger, rural-based population with unique tribal dynamics, a harsher geography, and an enemy operating from bases outside the country will require a different focus and force structure...

---

Noting that at least one of the authors has been to Afghanistan, I'm somewhat surprised he assists in this proposal.

My first hint that not all was going to be well was this:

Quote:

---

"...five additional combat brigades into Iraq that provided the means to wrest the initiative from the enemy. It allowed U.S. forces to simultaneously conduct large-scale operations to clear enemy safe havens, train Iraqi security forces, and disrupt insurgent lines of communication without having to leave key urban areas unprotected. In less than a year, the surge helped reduce the number of enemy attacks, increased the support of the Iraqi people, improved the security situation throughout the country, and all but defeated the insurgency."

---

They mention several times that Afghanistan is not iraq and then attempt to apply Iraqi lessons to the 'Stan -- not smart. Large scale operations in Afghanistan against whom? Clear safe havens? Where are they, other than those we know in Pakistan which are out of reach...

Urban areas? In Afghanistan, those are not the problem they were in Iraq. They further say:

Quote:

---

"the British in Malaya, or the U.S. in the Philippines, remain much the same even though the methods used to implement them often differ."

---

In both Malaya and the Philippines, the counterinsurgent WAS the government so those are probably bad examples; that is not true in Afghanistan and any effort to co-opt or remove that government will exchange the current Afghani tacit support of ISAF et.al. for hostility. One is also advised to note the time period involved in both of those insurgencies and ask if that amount of time is available to us in Afghanistan.

Quote:

---

"...be focused on accomplishing the same primary goals as the surge in Iraq. These include establishing persistent presence amongst the population, denying the enemy safe haven, and increasing the number of indigenous security forces."

---

Eight Brigades will not do the former -- and if it's a surge, use of that word implies its a one time shot. Then what?

You will not have enough people to establish persistent presence -- and a one year tour is far from persistent in any event; the local hoodlums will just wait it out -- they are not stupid. You cannot deny them the use of Pakistan thus only the possibility of the last item, improving indigenous capability, has any merit.

Quote:

---

"...To accomplish this at the district level, U.S. and NATO forces must reside in the villages and live amongst the Pashtun population."

---

Good luck selling that to most of NATO and even if we do it, dependent upon what is meant by 'reside,' the potential for problems is significant. We cannot 'reside' -- to do that, double your eight Brigades at a minimum would be required. We can provide presence but that will require small mobile forces and we not mobile or agile enough to do that even if all Commanders would agree to allowing Platoons to operate independently; the bad guys are simply far more agile and flexible than are we.

ADDED: They should not be and it doesn't have to be that way but today it is that way. It would take three to five years for us to improve training to the point we could compete fairly in anything other than a head to head firefight; those we'll win now.

They conclude:

Quote:

---

"A surge would establish and maintain a continuous presence in areas currently dominated by the Taliban, allow security forces to relentlessly pursue the enemy, and support the training of additional Afghan army and police units to augment, and eventually replace, the surge forces...

---

The surge will be effectively for one year. Then what? Relentless pursuit of non-armor wearing persons by armor wearing persons is unlikely to occur or be successful. One thing for sure, we will not in one year train enough ANA and Police to do much augmenting and certainly not to replace the surge force.

Quote:

---

"...If the U.S. does not surge these additional forces into Afghanistan, security will continue to deteriorate, the Taliban will assume control over much of the country, political instability will follow, and the U.S. will face strategic failure.

---

Perhaps; they may; political instability is already there; and how can we face strategic failure?

What was or is our strategic aim? Your paper didn't address that.

The answer to that question is important for both Afghanistan and the US and any future effort or proposals thereunto pertaining should be based on a realistic and achievable answer to that question..

This is the third thread in a row in this forum on Astan over the last 3 days, which is not a complaint. Each thread raises slightly different issues, but all are related.

I agree with Ken that "Why Should" is a better question than "How Should". He added a more central question (actually two questions in one):

Quote:

---

What was or is our strategic aim?

---

I'll add some more (which drive the question of "What Should Be Done" in the longer term):

1. Is "Pashtunistan" a nationalistic movement (as the map suggests) ? If so, it has consequences for both Afghanistan and Pakistan:

Quote:

---

See, article's Map, p. 2 - roughly 100 km Pashtun "halo" (in Pakistan, adjacent to Afghanistan border), with a population of 28 million - as compared to 14 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Source: from article (with its sources):

(p.5)
There are approximately 42 million Pashtuns spread throughout the region with over 14 million living in Afghanistan. [9] These Afghan Pashtuns serve as the center of gravity for the Taliban, or in Maoist terms, the “sea” that supports 10,000 – 15,000 hardcore insurgents.[10] While most of the population in Iraq is concentrated in or around urban centers, 77% of the population in Afghanistan is dispersed throughout rural areas. [11] .....
.....
While Taliban activity is directed at the rural districts, their lines of communication transit across an ambiguous and unsecured border. Two-thirds of Pashtuns live in Western Pakistan along a 2,430 kilometer border with Afghanistan. The operational problem centers on the Pashtun population extending across the border which provides the Taliban protection and freedom of movement. ...

9 CIA Factbook. “Afghanistan Country Study.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publicat...k/geos/af.html (accessed October 5, 2008).

10 McMichael, William. 2008. Afghan Defense Minister Suggests Border Task Force. Defense News. October 6.

11 MSN Encarta Encyclopedia. “Afghanistan.” http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_...ghanistan.html (accessed October 5, 2008).

---

2. Have the Taliban co-opted Pashtun nationalism ? A cf. to the VietCom co-option of Vietnamese nationalism. The same thing if the Pashtuns on both sides of the border view the Taliban as their best shot for some kind of autonomy.

3. Can there be a long-term "acceptable" solution without dealing with the Pashtuns on both sides of the border (2/3 of them living in Pakistan) ?

4. Can there be a long-term "acceptable" solution without solving Pakistan's problems ? Kilcullen suggests that would be a three-decade project.

5. Can the US afford the long-term solutions needed here - or is there a better way to get at AQ and "neuter" it from launching future attacks against the US (which was the primary reason we went into Astan, as I remember back to 2001) ?

Well, the first thing is to not/not refer to it as a surge. The surge is now inextricably linked to a significant increase in security in Iraq that has subsequently been maintained by generally competent security services. So, when the surge in Afghanistan takes place and the troops eventually go home, you are preparing yourself for failure by establishing expectations that were never realistic to begin with because Afghan security forces are not ready to take up the mantle of security. Additionally, we have not eliminated the safe haven of Pakistan, the Afghan state is simply not up to the task, and the tribes are no where as well organized and competent as Iraq's tribes. We have to approach Afghanistan informed by our experiences in Iraq, not dominated by them, and be careful about using terms and concepts that worked in one theater and transplanting them in another.

...but agree with all of his concerns. For me the first and principle problem came in the third paragraph:

Quote:

---

The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated since 2006 largely due to the lack of forces required to execute an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.

---

They have wrongly defined the problem. Defining the problem this way DOES lead one to conclude that a "surge" is needed, but I find the problem as they've stated it completely wrong.

Later in that same paragraph:

Quote:

---

Although the goal of executing a surge in Afghanistan would be similar in nature to that of Iraq, the challenges presented by a larger, rural-based population with unique tribal dynamics, a harsher geography, and an enemy operating from bases outside the country will require a different focus and force structure.

---

Count me skeptical that the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan will only change focus and force structure of a "surge" and not something more fundamental. Combined with the problem statement above, the authors are laying a sandy foundation for the rest of their arguments.

I wish I had answers. All I have is the three paradoxes of Afghanistan that bedeviled me as a planner and make achievement of an 'acceptable end-state' there, well...impossible?

Paradox #1. You can't eliminate the military threat posed by the insurgents without destroying their sanctuaries in Pakistan...but you can't destroy their sanctuaries in Pakistan without creating a much larger and more dangerous situation (now with nukes!). Effective action against the sanctuaries would turn Pakistan into...well, Afghanistan.

Paradox #2. The more you build effective governance, the more opposition you generate. The majority of local and regional power brokers in Afghanistan have little stake in a strong central government. Why is the north quieter than the south? Because the Germans, Italians, and Spanish are so ineffective at interfering with their various satrapies. Want to see an increase in violence around Herat? Send in some Marines.

Paradox #3. The more achievable your strategic end-state, the less likely NATO will support it. I predict that most of our allies will have abandoned the field by 2011 in the best case. Scaling back your goals will only accelerate the process -and adding more US troops will also accelerate NATO withdrawals, as anyone who has attended a force gen conference can attest.

Great points Eden, especially #1 and #2

What he said...

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Eden

Paradox #1. You can't eliminate the military threat posed by the insurgents without destroying their sanctuaries in Pakistan...but you can't destroy their sanctuaries in Pakistan without creating a much larger and more dangerous situation (now with nukes!). Effective action against the sanctuaries would turn Pakistan into...well, Afghanistan.

---

The solution is centuries old.

http://beijingchina.files.wordpress....pg?w=238&h=300

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Eden

Paradox #2. The more you build effective governance, the more opposition you generate. The majority of local and regional power brokers in Afghanistan have little stake in a strong central government. Why is the north quieter than the south? Because the Germans, Italians, and Spanish are so ineffective at interfering with their various satrapies. Want to see an increase in violence around Herat? Send in some Marines.

---

Then don't build central government. Build/reinforce/co-opt/local governments/tribal leaders/warlords.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Eden

Paradox #3. The more achievable your strategic end-state, the less likely NATO will support it. I predict that most of our allies will have abandoned the field by 2011 in the best case. Scaling back your goals will only accelerate the process -and adding more US troops will also accelerate NATO withdrawals, as anyone who has attended a force gen conference can attest.

---

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

http://www.whereistheoutrage.net/wor...-in-berlin.jpg

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Rank amateur

The solution is centuries old.

---

Good plan! A wall that took 20 years and the lives of a couple of million to build can be replicated today in two years with less than a 1,000 dead -- but it'll cost about $75B -- who pays?

More importantly, who provides the troops to man your wall -- then tech or high tech; it'll still have to be watched or it'll get breached. Unless they use the Manchu solution and buy someone to open a gate or two...

Quote:

---

Then don't build central government. Build/reinforce/co-opt/local governments/tribal leaders/warlords.

---

Good idea. Could you broach that at the next NATO Foreign Ministers Conference? See how it flies with them?

Better yet, try it with our moralistic new Congress and see how it flies... :wry:

Quote:

---

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

---

Heh, yeah, messenger... :rolleyes:

We'll see what happens when the message meets reality. You may nor have noticed but Europeans can be just as or more fickle than Americans. Eden said by 2011 -- it'll probably be us the Dutch, the Poles and the Romanians doing the fighting. France may stick but I wouldn't bet on it. The Canadians insist they're leaving then, the Brits are problematic at best. I suggest you not make heavy wagers on Europe following the messiah.

As for different, of course it's different. Europeans are different. So are Americans. Different from Europeans. Both are different compared to Afghans...

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Rank amateur

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

---

We will believe that at our own peril. Support for Obama was the ultimate gesture of disapproval with President Bush. It was not an endorsement of anything that he will do in office. Once Obama gets sworn in, he will be - simply by virtue of being President of the US - at odds with all of those naive young unemployed college students who swooned at the rally in Germany. As for the leaders of Europe, their actions are generally more favorable to our interests than their rhetoric and than the blustering nonsense of their people.

Since Astan is probably going to get much more attention, you might be interested in the Afghanistan News Service - Afghan news archives since January 1998 with more than 50,000 articles. Site is maintained by Fawad Ahmad Muslim, who worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from January 2002 to June of 2006 - recently opened his own IT company, the Jahaan Technology Corporation.

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...hive_2008.html

Ran into it when looking up background for "Defending Hamdan".

-------------------------------
Whether you want to build the Great Wall of Pashtunistan, or engage in PCE, TCE or a mix of both, it might help to consider the world as seen by the Pashtuns, without the artificial border. So, an overlay on the map in the article, which illustrates what Eden said.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by DGreen

So, when the surge in Afghanistan takes place and the troops eventually go home, you are preparing yourself for failure by establishing expectations that were never realistic to begin with because Afghan security forces are not ready to take up the mantle of security.

---

Not advocating any position discussed here, but it's worth noting that the Iraqi security forces were not ready to take up the mantle of security in Iraq in late 2006 - something we should have recognized much sooner - which is why we changed strategies. Also, there's a big difference between getting the security forces to do the "clear" part vs. the "hold" part. The Iraqi security forces now seem to be able to to hold areas already cleared by the Americans, but are they at the point where they could take on the insurgency themselves if it were to begin anew? I'm not so sure.

And if Afghan security forces are not yet ready to take up the mantle of security in Afghanistan (an argument with which I agree), the idea going around (O'Hanlon in the WSJ earlier this week) to intensify building and training the Afghan army seems a recipe for disaster. You'd think we learned from almost four years that simply training indigenous forces may be an exit strategy, but if all you're interested in is getting out, then why bother even sticking around at all? There will be mass bloodshed either way, whether you go home right away or stay around a little while longer to train an Army in order to convince yourself that that is the answer. Either way, it may be an exit strategy, but its not a strategy for "winning" (however you define winning)

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Rank amateur

The solution is centuries old.

http://beijingchina.files.wordpress....pg?w=238&h=300]

---

Didn't work all that well then either.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Rank amateur

Then don't build central government. Build/reinforce/co-opt/local governments/tribal leaders/warlords.

---

And create Somalia. No central government. Lots of warlords squabbling over control of resources. Complete lawlessness. Fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalists. AQ would love for the government of Afghanistan to fail.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Rank amateur

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

http://www.whereistheoutrage.net/wor...-in-berlin.jpg

---

Lets see how long that honeymoon lasts.

SFC W

Once "Pashtunistan" and "Baluchistan" are stripped away from Pakistan, the narrowness of Pakistan becomes apparent. So, it has been very logical for the Pakis to ally as much as possible with the Pashtuns. Another outstanding geographic feature is the nearness of Islamabad to the hot spots - sort of a forward command bunker.

Currently, the Paki focus is on military operations against its Pashtun allies - not in Pakistan's best interest from an historical standpoint.

Leaving aside Chinese and Russian interests in the region, the major player is India - which traditionally has allied with the Non-Pashtun Afghans. The animosity between India and Pakistan runs deep and has lasted throughout my lifetime.

The symbolic region where that animosity has been focused is Kashmir - which conveniently is located at the confluence of the Non-Pashtun Afghan, Pashtun, Pakistani and Indian areas. Since Kashmir is symbolic, its "solution" would require a real solution of the problems between Pakistan and India.

Based on the geography, our problem in Astan and "getting AQ" is a Pashtun problem, which will be only partially addressed by our efforts in Astan itself - no matter how well they are carried out. The largest part of "Pashtunistan" sits in Pakistan (as does the Taliban "government in exile" and AQ "HQs").

Since the present Afghan government (Karzai and some aside) is regarded as Non-Pashtun and an Indian ally, extension of its governance over Pashtun areas would be contrary to Pakistan's historical policies based on prevention of Indian influence in Astan. Which brings us back to the problems between India and Pakistan, symbolized by Kashmir.

So perhaps we have a connection between the Pak and India conflict after all. Perhaps the best way to help Pakistan is to facilitate diplomacy between them and India? Wheres Bob's World? I would love to hear his thoughts on this one.
Reed

Quote:

---

Wheres Bob's World? I would love to hear his thoughts on this one.

---

to the extent that he can share them with us.

An interesting, in-depth article by RFE/RL on an apparent change in posture in the center of Deobandi Islam, which is in India, intended to affect and effect events in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Quote:

---

Taliban's Spiritual Fathers Denounce Terror. Could Taliban Be Next?
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty November 18, 2008 By Jeffrey Donovan, Abubakar Siddique

What would happen if the Taliban’s spiritual fathers denounced terrorism? That, in effect, is what has taken place in Deoband, the northern Indian hometown of the austere form of Sunni Islam followed by the Taliban.

In May, Darul Uloom Deoband Madrasah, located north of New Dehli, issued an unprecedented fatwa, or religious decree, against terrorism. Earlier this month, 4,000 senior Indian ulema and muftis -- Muslim clerics with the authority to interpret Islamic law -- backed the fatwa in a mass gathering in the city of Hyderabad.

Now, the Deobandi political leader in India has told RFE/RL that the next step is to gather Muslim leaders from across South Asia, including the Taliban, to discuss endorsing the antiterror decree.

It looks set to be a hot debate.

“The killing of innocents or atrocities against them is terrorism,” Maulana Mahmood Madani, general-secretary of Jamiat Ulama-i Hind (JUH), the conservative political party founded by Darul Uloom Deoband, told RFE/RL in explaining the May 31 fatwa. “That is how terrorism is defined.” ....

---

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...v182008.html#6

One certainly wishes them well if their movement would cause the Pashtuns and Taliban to say goodbye to AQ.

Please note well the following quote from Maulana Syedul Aarifeen, the Deobandi spokesman in Peshawar, capital of Pakistan’s restive Northwest Frontier Province:

Quote:

---

In the 1980s, Aarifeen’s late father -- Maulana Rahat Gul -- was instrumental in bringing together ulema to issue a fatwa declaring the fight against Afghanistan’s Soviet occupiers as jihad. But Araifeen now wants an end to nearly three decades of war in the region. He tells RFE/RL the jirga between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the best forum to bring an end to the Taliban insurgencies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

“This jirga should be held among Muslims,” Aarifeen said, “because Allah and his Prophet [Muhammad] said that when two Muslims have differences among themselves, you should seek rapprochement among them though consultation. And this process is called jirga in Pashto [language]. Now we see that there are differences among Muslims, who were united before. Now, the jirga is a good forum for us to unite again.”

---

In short, non-Muslims should stay out of the process - as he notes "called jirga in Pashto".

--------------------------------------------
However, before becoming too happy, the news is full of the Taliban rejection of Karzai's peace feelers. E.g., 17 & 18 Nov:

Quote:

---

Taliban Chief Mullah Omar Fails to Renounce Violence, U.S. Says
Bloomberg By Michael Heath Nov 18 , 2008
Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar has failed to renounce violence and shown no inclination to negotiate, the Bush administration said, after Afghan President Hamid Karzai proposed peace talks with the Islamist movement. ....

---

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...v182008.html#1

Quote:

---

Taliban spurn Afghan president's offer for talks
By Noor Khan Associated Press November 17, 2008
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan – Taliban militants rejected an offer of peace talks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, saying Monday there would be no negotiations until foreign troops leave Afghanistan. ....

---

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...v172008.html#1

Zawahiri's response to the Deobandi fatwa will be that, for example, all those killed in the 9/11 attacks (except for his martyrs) were not innocents, or were religiously acceptable collateral damage - he has already written that ("Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents", issued prior to 9/11).

So, the Sharia legal argument hinges on how one parses the definition: “The killing of innocents or atrocities against them is terrorism.”

I suspect that AQ and the loose conglomeration of multiple entities known as the Taliban have tipped over the edge from messengers of ideology to ongoing commercial concerns. Terrorist 'organizations' inevitably develop in one of two ways: either sustainment of the organization becomes an end in and of itself (see IRA, FARC, PLO) or they disappear from view (Red Brigades et al).

I doubt that any number of anti-terror fatwas, while welcome, will at this point have much effect on 'matured' Islamic terror groups.

Quote:

---

I doubt that any number of anti-terror fatwas, while welcome, will at this point have much effect on 'matured' Islamic terror groups.

---

The hope (realizing that is not a strategy) is that more Muslim states and national groups will find it to be in their enlightened self-interest to take action against 'matured' Islamic terror groups. Baby step by baby step.

Afghanistan: What Lessons to Apply from Iraq? - SWJ Blog

Last month the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) solicited feedback concerning a statement made by General David Petraeus (Commander, US Central Command) as quoted by the New York Times:

People often ask, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" he said. "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture," he said.

Counterinsurgents have to understand that in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.

The COIN Center's OPSO, Major Niel Smith, put out the challenge - We would like to ask for feedback - what lessons from Iraq are applicable to our operations in Afghanistan? and in the October COIN Center SITREP, the CO - Colonel Daniel Roper - summarized the key points from the responses as follows:

(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.

(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.

(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.

(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.

And in a note: the COIN Center continues to solicit additional feedback on the CERP issue and invites comments on a blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"

Quote:

---

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy. (emphasis added / kw)

---

It is easily the most important point raised.

Afghanistan is too large geographically, too demographically large and diverse and the terrain is too inhospitable -- particularly on and near the critical border with Pakistan -- to achieve much using COIN strategy and current techniques unless well over 8 to 12 BCT, possibly more, are moved in-country and retained there for several years. That is obviously not possible.

We do not have the troop strength; most of NATO is neither inclined nor does it have many more troops available in any event and other nations have not shown much interest in providing personnel.

It is equally critical that everyone realize that Afghans are not Iraqis and there are significant cultural and behavioral differences so different techniques are necessary. I'm not at all sure that is fully realized...

Hopefully, someone is working on Plan B.

and that no response to the COIN Center apparently addresses is the unity of command problem in Afghanistan. Tangle may be a better word... :(

How does Commander ISAF get a handle on NATO troops who engage; those who do not and the SOCOM assets in theater? How does he mitigate staff interference from CentCom?

Anyone have any ideas on how to crack those nuts?

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Ken White

Anyone have any ideas on how to crack those nuts?

---

IMO those nuts are uncrackable. :(

CAC CG Response to SWJ Blog Post “Afghanistan, What Lessons to Apply from Iraq” by Frontier 6

Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, Response to Small Wars Journal Blog Post, “Afghanistan, What Lessons to Apply from Iraq”

Quote:

---

The discussion unfolding here and on the COIN Center’s blog is an important one, since the situation in Iraq continues to improve while in Afghanistan it deteriorates. As ideas of an Afghan “surge,” similar to the course of action adopted in Iraq, circulate among decision makers, the nuances of the Afghanistan situation remain particularly relevant. GEN Petraeus recently noted in a New York Times interview, “The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture.” In light of these remarks, what are the peculiarities and strategic nuances inherent in the Afghanistan situation?

The Army Field Manual, FM 3-07, “Stability Operations,” states, “Understanding is fundamental to planning. Without understanding, commanders cannot establish the situation’s context.” Adopting a “Comprehensive Approach” that includes understanding regional dynamics is central to crafting any kind of successful Afghan strategy. Pakistan, seeking strategic depth, has systematically sought influence within Afghanistan for decades. If the Kashmir conflict was resolved and tensions reduced between India and Pakistan, the latter would no longer need to pursue the strategic depth Afghanistan could provide. Reconciling regional conflicts should be a part of any Afghan strategy.

Afghanistan does not have a tradition of a strong central government. The kind of government NATO helps Afghanistan build is of paramount importance. Perhaps a federal system with much more power vested in regional and even local entities would allow tribal structures the autonomy they have historically enjoyed. As COL Roper noted, the bottom up method of building security was one of the keys to success in Iraq. That being said, building governmental capacity is also important. Afghanistan throughout its governing structures needs the kind of mentoring PRTs can provide. The Vietnam-era CORDS program is an example of the kind of interagency cooperation and unity of effort required to build governmental capacity down to sub-district levels.

GEN Petraeus has also noted that reconciliation must become a key line of effort. The Army’s new Stability Operations doctrine emphasizes the roles that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration play in security sector reform. Again, the diverse capabilities inherent in PRTs could assist training and reforming Afghan security forces, while legal assistance might strengthen the Afghan judiciary. Long term stability will emerge only when Afghan police forces protect Afghan citizens and enforce the rule of law through a functioning Afghan court system.

Finally, developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure must remain a priority. More money is spent each month in Iraq than has been spent on Afghanistan infrastructure since 2001. The judicious use of CERP funds is a start. However, as some commentators noted in the COIN Center blog, training Afghanis in various trades is a necessary part of building Afghan capacity and enhancing employment opportunities. Human resource development is one of the main elements of capacity building, as emphasized in the Stability Operations doctrine.

---

Frontier 6 is Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

IMO.

I remember our company being replaced by a battalion in 03, our battalion by a brigade in 06. Now we are saying if only we had divisions instead of brigades.

This doesn't seem to be a question of mass. It seems to be a broader problem, maybe one of direction.

Frontier 6 is exactly right to bring the larger, regional picture into this. It is also exactly why the DOS should probably have lead on these sort of endeavours. Another can of worms.

All the small solutions (ditching weight, dismounted patrols, longer presence, imbed with locals, focus on SWEAT-MS, and PRT) have been identified and in my experience we have been implementing them by half measure for a while.

Some of this is best viewed through the locals perspective. How long will it take a very backward and primitive people to accept these newer institutions? What benefit can we show a federal Repulic has for the traditional Afghani, what good is an appelate judicial system for one who sees no lack of justice in the Talibs administration? Remember there are still Indians on reservations in the US, they didn't all get on board given the chance.

There have been a great many comparisons to previous insurgencies, but I think the most apt and overlooked are the wars with the Plains Indians. For the most part, the more warlike tribes had to be defeated by force and they had to be starved onto a reservation to do that. There were many other methods tried, to include improving their quality of life, offering our instituions of health and justice, among others. These carrots largely failed without the judicious use of the stick.

One thing in to keep in mind about this is the Army end strength during this time, about 27,000. Given our vastly increased lethality, intelligence gathering abilities, and mobility as related to our enemy, and given the scale of the American West as compared to Afghanistan with that increase in commo and trans capability, when we start saying we need more troops in country now than we had in the Army then, my eyebrow goes up.

Afghanistan could see 30,000 new U.S. troops
JASON STRAZIUSO
The Associated Press

Globe and Mail
December 20, 2008 at 6:15 PM EST

Quote:

---

KABUL — The Pentagon may double the number of American troops in Afghanistan by next summer to 60,000 – the largest estimate of potential reinforcements ever publicly suggested, the top U.S. military commander said Saturday.

Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said between 20,000 and 30,000 additional U.S. troops could be sent to Afghanistan to bolster the 31,000 already there.

---

20,000-30,000 more troops to do what? Unlike Iraq there are very few major population centers to secure. Now if you want to completely cordon the country go for it. Nothing in nothing out. We can't even make that happen here, so much for that COA.

A major problem we seem to have as of late is not using the right forces to do the right jobs. Unfortunately everyone wants to be everybody else, instead of looking at the capabilities units have and using them in ways that meet their capability. I am still having a very, very hard time swallowing the latest and greatest COIN manual. I'll leave that for another thread one day.

Can anyone tell me how an additional 20,000-30,000 troops would be utilized? Where are they going to come from since according to some we are bringing the troops home. Oh wait all we are doing is robbing Iraq to pay Afghanistan. How are we going to do this under NATO? Are we going to send them packing and take full control again? One only has to look at the effectiveness of NATO operations in country and there is no question as to why things have declined in my opinion. Additionally we all know what happens when you take your eye off the ball.

Finished typing this then came across this, I think it is spot on as to waht is happening politically within the services. This is the number one problem all over........stop playing politics and start playing soldier.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/1...surge_122908w/

Not sure this will be proper employment of ODAs...

Quote:

---

A Surge Of Special Forces For Afghanistan

Defense officials say it will fill urgent gaps but Special Forces officers are skeptical.

By Gordon Lubold, Staff writer

Washington - The Pentagon is likely to send up to 20 Special Forces teams to Afghanistan this spring, part of a new long-term strategy to boost the Afghan security forces' ability to counter the insurgency there themselves.

The "surge" of elite Special Forces units would represent a multiyear effort aimed at strengthening the Afghan National Army and police units that the US sees as key to building up Afghanistan's security independence, say defense officials who asked to remain anonymous because the controversial decision has not yet been announced. The US already plans to send thousands of additional conventional forces to Afghanistan sometime next year. But it is hamstrung by limited availability since so many of those forces are still in Iraq.

The deployment of the Green Berets, the independent, multifaceted force skilled at training indigenous forces, could fill critical gaps in Afghanistan almost immediately, defense officials say.

There are currently about 31,000 US troops in Afghanistan. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said this weekend on a trip to Afghanistan that as many as 30,000 additional American troops could be deployed there within the next year or so.

On Monday, the Pentagon formally announced that about 2,800 members of the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division will be sent to Afghanistan this spring as part of the conventional forces deployed there. Once he assumes office, Barack Obama is expected to receive recommendations about how fast a drawdown can occur in Iraq – and how many forces can be sent to Afghanistan.

The deployment of the additional Green Berets has not yet been approved, but a senior defense official indicated it was very likely and would be finalized next month.

The deployment would be relatively small, probably only a few hundred individuals at first. Ultimately, other special operations forces, such as marines from Special Operations Command, Air Force special operators, and Navy Seals could be deployed under the plan.

The initial deployment of the Green Berets would expand the size of the Special Forces contingent there by 30 or 40 percent, defense officials say, and represent a significant new commitment to developing and expanding Afghan security forces.

---

MUCH MORE HERE:

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1223/p01s01-usfp.html

"NATO member countries apparently not toeing US line"
Voice of Jihad, via theunjustmedia.com, 17 Jan 09
Link to full statement

Quote:

---

....The American announcement to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan is possibly a war gimmick because other NATO member countries have not pledged to send even ten soldiers to Afghanistan in 2009. To compensate for this failure and at the same time, play out the despondency attached with this obvious fiasco, the USA has launched propaganda of dispatching thousands of her troops to Afghanistan. The American claim to send thousands of her troops to Afghanistan is also doubtful from another perspective because American themselves are trying to devolve the responsibility of war on the shoulders of the Afghans and are resorting to the creation of tribal militias....

---

My favourite attempt at colloquial English in this one....

Quote:

---

....The Empire of Obama will fall smithereens like other empires crumbled in Afghanistan....

---

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by milnews.ca

"NATO member countries apparently not toeing US line"
Voice of Jihad, via theunjustmedia.com, 17 Jan 09
Link to full statement (.pdf attached if link doesn't work, or if link is firewalled)



My favourite attempt at colloquial English in this one....

---

Of the term when their operations start getting blown to smithereens

From today's BBC, Russia offers Afghan defence help

Quote:

---

Russia has said it is ready to help Afghanistan's defence sector by supplying equipment to the nation's armed forces.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Moscow was responding to a request from his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai.

A spokesman for the Afghan presidency said that despite the request, Afghanistan was committed to its ties to US and Nato-led forces.

Soviet forces fought a bitter war of occupation in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Complaints

A statement from Mr Medvedev said Russia was "ready to provide broad assistance for an independent and democratic country that lives in a peaceful atmosphere with its neighbours".

He added: "Co-operation in the defence sector... will be effective for establishing peace in the region."

The Afghan presidency said Russia was also prepared to provide any other assistance that would help bring peace.

There have been complaints in Afghanistan that despite the huge Western presence its armed forces have not been properly equipped.

The US has pledged to send up to 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan in 2009, adding to the 32,000 troops already there.

---

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by jmm99

to the extent that he can share them with us.

---

A few thoughts (mine) on Afghanistan and U.S. involvement there:

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

3. We helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban, but I don't recall the people of Afghanistan then signing on to help the US wage our war on terror. Somewhere we twisted "we are here to help you" into "we are here so you must help us." We need to back up 10 yards and reassess why we are there before we just plow ahead with executing the current mission harder and faster.

4. Finally, we can't "fix" Afghanistan. Particularly if our definition of fixed is that they look just like us. One, they don't want fixed. Two, its none of our business. As I have always said, insurgents and terrorists do not find sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, they find it within poorly governed populaces. Seems to me we are being damn hard on the populace of Afghanistan in the name of fixing the governance of Afghanistan. Sounds a lot like we might be creating the very sanctuary we are trying to eliminate simply because we have misidentified what makes up a sanctuary in the first place.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

---

Excellent points which illustrate the fundamental paradoxes that will plague our efforts in Afghanistan until we 'change the game'. Our end-state right now is an effective central government. I think we are smart enough to have scaled back what we would accept as effective central governance - we're never going to turn this place into Switzerland - but the very concept of ECG places us at odds with a number of players in the region who would otherwise have little in common.

Neither the various insurgents nor the narcotic traffickers want ECG, for obvious reasons. There are also powerful regional figures - what the press normally refers to as 'warlords' - who have no desire for it either. And there are many local power groups to whom 'effective central governance' merely means more money picked from their pockets and less influence for them. Even some in the central government are happy for it to remain ineffectual, or at least unable to interfere with peculation, graft, and influence peddling.

Unfortunately, setting a lower goal for all the blood and treasure we're expending risks eroding political (and ultimately military) support. "Make Afghanisatn safe for warlords" is not likely to be much of a clarion call.

As for your comment on 'controlling the border', it is just another example of how applying standard COIN wisdom in Afghanistan can have as many negative as positive consequences. Not that I think we can do it, regardless of how many troops we ship over there - it would be like closing down the Appalachians from Harper's Ferry to Chatanooga, if the Appalachians were as tall and rugged as the Rockies. But even making the effort might be misguided, as you say, if it further exacerbates our problems with the Pashtun.

We have to rethink what we are doing. I will be very interested to see the results of the current CENTCOM review of our effort in Afghanistan. Anybody have any idea what it might contain?

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

A few thoughts (mine) on Afghanistan and U.S. involvement there:

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

---

It does seem like everytime you turn around theres something or someone new in the mix. However not quite sure that it can be laid completely at the feet of IC. Although it might seem so unfortunately a lot of it seems to actually be coming out of the woodwork so to speak almost as if there were efforts to overwhelm the operational capacity of coalition forces.

Can't imagine why anyone would want to do that:wry:

That said IMHO the biiigger problem we do face is the seeming necessity to GIT er Dun now, today:( This not only placing more and more requirements on less and less forces but generally stunts their ability to step back long enough to see the forest for the trees. That means a lot of hip pocket solutions which although sometimes effective in the long run equate to more trouble.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

---

Seems like yourself, Ken, and others have made it fairly clear from their experiences exactly how effectively any borders can or can't be controlled, so no arguments there. How then does one work out ways to restrict traffic of the "bad guys" while still facilitating commerce and social engagement among the populace. Perhaps the answer is that you don't really do either but rather find ways to recognize each and interact accordingly. Adding to that the fact that as oft as possible (less-is-more) can be much more comfortable for both the CI and the populace.

Are the rules really changing or has it just taken some of us a long time to realize that the rules we thought we knew weren't quite what we thought they were?

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

3. We helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban, but I don't recall the people of Afghanistan then signing on to help the US wage our war on terror. Somewhere we twisted "we are here to help you" into "we are here so you must help us." We need to back up 10 yards and reassess why we are there before we just plow ahead with executing the current mission harder and faster..

---

If we aren't saying (help us, help you) why exactly are we still there?

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

4. Finally, we can't "fix" Afghanistan. Particularly if our definition of fixed is that they look just like us. One, they don't want fixed. Two, its none of our business. As I have always said, insurgents and terrorists do not find sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, they find it within poorly governed populaces. Seems to me we are being damn hard on the populace of Afghanistan in the name of fixing the governance of Afghanistan. Sounds a lot like we might be creating the very sanctuary we are trying to eliminate simply because we have misidentified what makes up a sanctuary in the first place.

---

Agreed and would add FWIW Exactly what Poorly Governed looks like is not something that I've yet found an acceptable definition for in regards to Afghanistan with its particular dynamics.

Think of it this way- Can you define without a doubt what well governed will look like there yet if not than isolating and "fixing" whats wrong is still hiding out there in the ether somewhere.

I'd like to check something that maybe I don't understand:

The central state is weak, corrupt and without strong traditions in Afghanistan, but the regional/local institutions succeed at governing the country.
The COIN strategy will likely pay tribute to this in the future and aim to make local powers more effective, respected and resilient to Taliban (if they aren't Taliban or reliable Taliban allies themselves).

Some problems;

a)
Doesn't that exactly create a "failed state", something that we want to avoid?
b)
Aren't local powers historically dominoes in Afghanistan who change sides if the other team does some impressive power projection?
c)
Doesn't decentralized governance require a simple law code like Sharia that does not require a professional justice system?
d)
Doesn't decentralized power mean more drug production and more warlords in the future?
e)
On the other hand - why aren't we willing to stage a democratic coup and get rid of the central government and its discredited puppets for a 2nd attempt with the central approach?


Finally I'm interested in how the hell our stupid politicians had the idea to occupy the country with the most terrible occupation military history of mankind, but that's another issue.

in hearing your answers and solutions to the questions and problems you cite.

Given Germany's experience with decentralized and centralized governance over the last 1000 years, a German perspective on these issues should be better informed than most.

Were all the big, medium and small "states" that made up Germany during the later HRE era all that bad ? Was what ensued from Westphalia all that good ?

The decentralized Germany had monarchy-like regimes, not comparable to what the Afghans have/could have on the local level afaik.
The greatest problems of the 18th century Germany were tariffs every few miles and an inability to resist foreign, unified powers (that's how France took some border regions in the 18th century. This is again not applicable to Afghanistan afaik. Afghanistan's problems with a decentralized governance would be a lack of modernization and infrastructure projects.


The only half-promising route (that I recognize) to a so-called "win" in Afghanistan may offer a formal victory for the history books, but would not lead to our war aims.

I would revisit our aims and attempt to set them shorter.

Let's recall our situation in 2000: We didn't care much about the Taliban. They blew up some statues, we regretted that, nothing else. We didn't care about what we're supposed to care about today; social life in Afghanistan.

The key problem with the Taliban is still that they didn't chase away AQ immediately - they didn't (afaik) because of Pashtun hospitality and because OBL claimed to be innocent of 9/11.
Both reasons don't apply any more (although intermarriage might be a new reason).
We could again approach the Taliban and simply offer to withdraw from Afghanistan if they get rid of AQ (forever).
Imagine a well-done diplomatic campaign around this - it might work. Win-win.
The nation-building aims were mostly discredited and are extremely difficult to accomplish imho.

The other problem is the internal pressure in Pakistan; it might help Pakistan in the short term if the Taliban focus on Afghanistan a bit more for some years - in a predictable continuation of the Afghan civil war (not so much against the government than against factions).


I'm no expert on Afghanistan, but I know that almost all wars in human history were quickly concluded once one side accepted its powers and its aims are no match.

Among the worst that could happen is that we fight till the end just "to win", forgetting our rationale and probably even achieving a "win" that hurts us more than a withdrawal and maybe wouldn't include our war aims anyway.

Consider also that our societies have a great need of internal reform; we have many really big problems (the current economic crisis is a smaller one) that deserve attention, effort and treasure - competing with warfare and the military in general.


Btw, I still don't know whether a) to e) were wrong perceptions or not.

This seems the crux of the matter. What are Germany's war aims in Astan ?

In short, why are your troops there (obviously they were so ordered) as a matter of German national strategic policy ?

Our (US) war aims in Astan are not clear in my mind - and from reading other threads here, not so clear at DoD and the NSC.

My war aim in Astan is quite simplistic - kill UBL, Zawahiri and whatever AQ types get in the way. Yes, simply a matter of revenge (payback for 9/11) - a concept which most Pashtuns understand very well. I don't care how that is done - and probably it is best that I don't know the details.

I expect that the Obama national strategic policy for Astan will be far more complex. Then, we here will deal with and discuss the situation we have, not the situation we believe we might like to have.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by jmm99

This seems the crux of the matter. What are Germany's war aims in Astan ?

In short, why are your troops there (obviously they were so ordered) as a matter of German national strategic policy ?

---

If I only knew...

The official texts tell about the mission (basically to buy time for and to assist the government there), but don't explain why the heck it's in our interest.

The usual suspects are

- to carress inter-Atlantic bonds (NATO): initially relevant
- to gain/keep 'weight' in international politics
- to defend us at the Hindukusch (that's the part when politicians get laughed at)
- to keep up to the inappropriate article 5 NATO treaty thing (which is actually quite irrelevant in the context and non-binding)
- to do good to the Afghan people (that's the PR spin)

It seems to me as if AQ and Taliban are pretty unimportant for us. AQ is a topic for BND and police mostly.
Here's a feeling that the affair there should be sorted out somehow and that we (=our politicians) don't want to appear to be unreliable.

Most other distant military missions were rather designed to increase the foreign political weight, maybe up to a permanent UNSC seat (that was apparently given up some years ago).

A majority of the population is against the war, but we've got a chairman of the CDU (biggest party) who turned out to be a war hawk and they are in a federal-level coalition with the SPD, the party that launched the mission.
Both parties lose voters and the SPD even broke apart (the left wing left it) - both big parties don't really listen to the voters, that's what happens if you do so in a democracy.
The Left and the greens win many votes and oppose the war.
The liberals (F.D.P., real liberals - liberalism, you know) would neither stem for nor against it as long as the CDU invited them into a coalition as junior partner. The F.D.P. wins votes as well for unrelated reasons.

We basically don't really know why we're in that war (and officially its none for us anyway), we just happen to have a stupid constellation in politics and are somehow stuck in that war.


Here are of course many rather primitive-minded people who would agree to bomb and occupy pretty much any Muslim nation, but they're rare, just loud trolls on the internet.
Just in case you think that said people were the far right - wrong. Our far right (who change their parties faster than I keep up with that) is extremely confusing. They oppose Muslims in Germany, but ally with them in international matters - crazy people. Well, every nation seems to have 5% nuts - and we distribute them evenly to far left and far right where they neutralize each other.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Fuchs

...Well, every nation seems to have 5% nuts - and we distribute them evenly to far left and far right where they neutralize each other.

---

How do you get only 5%? That's not fair, you need more -- we've got 10% on each flank... :D

Personal observation and election results. :D

10% is approx. correct if we look at men only...

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Personal observation and election results. :D

---

That's fair, same here...

Quote:

---

10% is approx. correct if we look at men only...

---

Now that is interesting. Here, I include females in the fringes on both sides because I really believe they are there and make their presence felt (no pun intended).

I think this means your women are more ladylike than some of ours... :o

Fuchs,

Your post on German politics was helpful.

and Ken,

Of course, German women are more ladylike - as attested by my wife who is 1/4 German (ggp's from Saxony) and looks like her 100% German gm. And further, from my friend Nick (German-American) who was stationed there for several years. He, as to the proper etiquette and phrases to use when discussing business terms with Hamburg ladies of the night. All very proper. :)