Posted in another forum today. Interesting laydown of how State and DoD organize and view the world. Interestingly, some major hotspots are divided between COCOMs in DoD's laydown (Israel/Arabs, India/Pakistan). I think in general State's boundaries make more sense.
Is there any wonder why our government approach to foreign/mil policy is disjointed?
I don't see the difference as a problem. I think it is actually a good thing.
The organization I work for has intentional differences in our geographic regions to keep us from being absorbed by our larger counterparts w/i the VHA. This does work to a degree but also has some challenges when the borders do not make sense with regional connections (i.e. WA and OR belong to different regions even though there is a great deal of cross-traffic and shared identity). The specific DOD divide that drew my attention was that Pakistan and India are in different COMs. I have to wonder if that creates a barrier in coming up with a concise and effective roadmap for dealing with these two countries.
Reed
You could also make the same divide comment about Mexico and the rest of Latin America. I do find State's more logical, but that may just be me.
and correct observation. In general, the US National Security Council institutions ought to divide the world into the same regions. While there may be exceptions (Northcom and Southcom are a possibility) they should be rare and for very good reasons. Not putting Mexico in and AOR (until the creation of Northcom) because the Mexicans wouldn't like it is not a very good reason IMO.
But I think the problem is not the regional differences so much as the fact that international relations are bilateral for the most part. The Assistant SECSTATE for WHA is not over the Ambassador to Chile who, BTW, reports to the President, not the SECSTATE (I know I exaggerate a bit for effect ;)) Best way to look at Bureau of WHA (or whatever) is "in support of" the Ambassadors to the countries of the region. In some senses, the GCCs are also operating in support of those same ambassadors. For that reason, it would probably be useful to rationalize the regional structures of the NSC institutions. At least, that way, one could have easier coordination of the supporting institutions with the supported Ambassador.
Cheers
JohnT
Personally, lumping N. Africa in with AFRICOM makes no sense to me, and lumping India into the rest of Asia makes less than no sense.
Well as an Africanist and a Middle East guy I would disagree. Egypt is perhaps the sole exception in that most of Egypt's international efforts are regionallty focused on the Middle East as we define it. But even Egypt spends a great deal of effort looking south toward Sudan.Quote:
Originally Posted by 120mm
The remainder from Libya west to Morocco spend their greatest efforts dealing with issues that are Africa-centric. Exceptions do emerge as no division is clear cut; Muammar Qadaffi's pan-Arab posturing offer a great example. At the same time, he did play the African regional gadfly in Sudan and Chad.
In contrast I would say that you are on the mark on India--State, like DoD, treats it as a sub-region even though the boundaries show it as Asia.
Best
Tom
Has anyone given any thought to relooking at how the Allies divided up the world for operational command and control during WWII? It seemed to work pretty effectively for that global conflict.
the logical difficulties of any reorganization of how we divide the world in terms of departmental/agency responsibilities. Ultimately, they are all arbitrary.:eek:
Organization - or reorganization - will not, of itself, solve problems, for a couple of reasons. First, and foremost, it must be executed by flawed human beings. Second, organization can only make executing policy, strategy, operations, and tactics easier or harder. People still have to execute - which brings us back to "who's on first?" Raionalization among USG agencies would, I think, make execution easier to coordinate because it would, at least, get the people who have to execute talking about the same countries and, more often, the same people.
Cheers
JohnT
This had more to do with immediate priorities and available resources than anything else, and even then its effectiveness was undermined by a number of turf squabbles and the like. It also relied on ignoring certain areas to at least some degree while focusing on one or two major areas. And even then there were problems. Look at how the turf squabbles between MacArthur and Nimitz shaped the Pacific Campaign, for example, or the CBI's issues.Quote:
Originally Posted by wm
This whole shebang can be summarized by the Haves (CINCs) and Have-Nots (State).
Back when I first performed an MTT in Sub-Sahara (Pre Goldwater-Nichols military reform act), State had most of the toys and controlled mucho cash. Our minuscule and hopeless mission would be dictated by the Ambassador (who had yet to serve a minute in the US Military).
Following the circa '86 reform act... Whoa Nellie! Among many other advantages, this act provided the CINCs with sweeping authority over any other weenie operating in their theater.
The CINCs then were affectionately known as America's Warlords :D
It's all about toys these days except for perhaps the Northern Command covering (ahem) the Homeland and scarfing up Mexico and Canada.
A little perspective is in order:
SECSTATE is the one and only US diplomat with an airplane (His minions must fly commercial or ask for space-available on military transports :p).
Wait for it !
In contrast, each CINC has his own aircraft (and helicopters for short flights). In-flight refueling? No Problem. Most CINCs travel with a platoon of officers and senior NCOs.
So, why all the differences between State and DOD? Haven't the foggiest idea, but, do almost know why DOD pounds a different drum :cool:
About every two years DOD gets to reorganize the CINC (doms) and shuffle the countries based on current relations. Such reshuffling took place with the Baltic States under EUCOM sending a clear signal to President Putin and even more evident when the review board gave Islamic States and Central Asia to CENTCOM.
When I would ride the subway in DC, in uniform, I was a magnet for random schmoes who, based upon their 3 years of service as an enlisted man 2 or 3 decades earlier, fancied themselves sufficiently versed in national security strategy to give me their opinions and a) thought that I would actually care and b) seemed to think that I was in a position to make changes that they recommended. If I were to critique the specific borders chosen by DoD or State, I would feel like I am turning into "that guy." But on the general issue of whether two organizations should stovepipe their organizations or create overlap, I think overlap makes more sense. If you get DoD and State with the same AORs, then you increase the tendency for them to view things in terms of their AORs with less regard to the big picture. More troubling, you increase the tendency for them to think alike. When they overlap, you can create a climate in which State is telling DoD, "your Afghan-Pakistani border games are complicating our India-Pakistan initiatives" while DoD tells State, "your India-Pakistan initiative is very quaint, but we've got a war to deal with here on the Afghan-Pakistani border and it is intricately linked to our conflicts elsewhere in CENTCOM."
At risk of becoming that guy on the subway, I think it makes a whole lot of sense for State and DoD to have different AORs in the India-Pakistan region, first off, for the reasons stated above (stovepiping versus overlap to spur different thinking and bigger picture perspectives). Second, barring some event of world historical significance, we're not going to be conducting major combat operations in India. We are already conducting routine air strikes in Pakistan, I would not be surprised if we routinely conduct special operations in Pakistan, and this is directly related to activities occuring elsewhere in CENTCOM. On the other hand, the diplomacy issues on the subcontinent have much more to do with Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan and much less to do with Iran or the Arab world.
Full disclosure: my degree is in biology and I never served at an echelon above battalion (but now I'm gloating!:D).
I did serve most of my career in various echelons above reality:o and, while I disagree with your conclusion, you make a very good, logical case not to rationalize regions. As I suggested above, (read between the lines:)) any effort at organization/reorganization has its advantages and pitfalls. IMO the advantages of "rationalization of regions" outweigh the pitfalls but in the long run, it won't make too much difference.
Cheers
JohnT
The thread that just started up on the loss of another Pakistan Valley as a possible result of redistribution of forces to the Pak/Indian border also highlights the challenges between GCC boundaries.
Best, Rob
As someone who has had to interact up and down the chain as well as across the interagency, it's much more complicated than DOD vs State in determining which country is in which planning and coordinating function. To my memory, the Joint Staff, OSD, DIA, CIA and State all have different names for their country desk collections, i.e. Central Asia/South Asia, or Near East Asia, or something else. At first, it was confounding because if you had to coordinate something, you had to figure out which office to call.
I see both sides of the coin, by allowing flexibility, differing agencies can task organize as they see fit, I mean US AID or State has valid reasons why they are organized just as within the DOD. I also see the reasoning for whole of government "let's all row the same direction" methodology. This would have to be a push down from the NSC or National Security Advisor to change.
Cheers
Otto
I'm also reminded of my experiences in OIF III when we had a company AOR that bisected the city from east to west. One company had the north, the other company had the south. Our AOR boundaries were not published on the internet, but the insurgents were able to quickly figure out where the boundary between us was and figure out that it was a great place to operate because when something went down on the boundary, we had to coordinate between companies to ensure there was no fratricide or other unforunateness. In response to this, we would occasionally shift the boundaries north and south to mix it up a bit. Once the MOI Commandos in our city became a more capable force, we tried to focus their attention on the boundaries between us. It seemed easier to have a third force overlapping our AORs and to keep tabs on them.
I think a similar arrangement could be imagined on the India-Pakistan border. CENTCOM and PACOM suddenly need to coordinate their response. State seems well positioned to help coordinate. Likewise if something goes down on the Iran-Afghanistan border - two State organizations need to coordinate, but CENTCOM is well positioned to help. In light of Otto's comment, obviously this is a simplified analogy.
To me the biggest concern with having different boundaries has to do with much needed integration and coordination at the inter-agency level. No matter how the map is divided up, each region should have a:
- Director of Regional Foreign Policy
Who is supported by:
- Unified Combatant Commander (from DoD)
- Deputy Director of Regional Aid and Development (from USAID)
- Deputy Director of Regional Affairs (from State)
Everybody looks at the same map, works with the same people, out of the same office. Major NGOs and regional powers are invited to send liasons to the Regional Commands. Maybe they don't get a seat at the briefing table all the time, but if the PACOM commander wants to coordinate Tsunami relief efforts with PLAN, they should be able to do that because they already have a working relationship.
Unless these new regions' boundaries correspond to one of the already existing set of regional boundaries, I submit it will result in the same "seams" problem, just pushed to a different, higher level. If the new seams correspond to some other organization's boundaries, then I do not see the value of creating another "chief" to manage that region. It might just be better to add new responsibilities for coordination/C2 to the person already in charge of the described region (or enforce exisiting responsibilites more stringently).
The substructure described below is a matrixed organization of a most complex kind. How does one manage the priorities and reporting processes of these deputy directors. Since they will supervise regions that overlap more than one of the regions under the purview of a Director of Regional Foreign Policy (DRFP), I suspect they will have responsibilities to support more than one DRFP at a time. Who sets/deconflicts those priorities?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Marauder Doc
We found three things:
1. Everyone breaks the world up differently, but all use 6 regions (state, DoD, National Geographic, etc), and they all have pros and cons.
2. It doesn't really matter how you do it, but you have to in order to gain a regional understanding, but...
3. You also have to ignore the boundaries that you just made, as you can not discuss or study any one region of the world without taking into account how it interacts with the other 5. hockey rules, you have lines but you get to go outside them as necessary.
Key is to not get too wrapped up in the lines you just drew, as they don't mean anything to the people you just boxed in with them.
As an asside, an idea that I am toying with is to take the existing MSCA processes and concepts and see if it makes sense to expand and divide it into "Domestic MSCA" and "Foreign MSCA." Believe that this could take us a long ways toward getting DoD back into the supporting role overseas. May also be a way to clean up new concepts like IW and old processess like Security Assistance under an accepted and practical mechanism that ensures that the GCC only sends his components into a country to engage upon a request from the country team. As ASD HD has lead for MSCA, would possibly be ASD SO/LIC for foreign, split between Stability Ops and Special Ops to lead for DoD on this, with the mirror image over at State doing same as primary over all lead. Real work happens at each individual embassy though
As I said there, the issue is not so much regional boundaries (which, IMO, should be rationalized - see both previosus posts) but rather the bilateral nature of US foreign relations. The current structure is specifically designed to address that. Thus the "chain of command" in US foreign relations runs:
President
US Ambassador to Country X
It also runs:
President
SECSTATE
Regional & functional bureaus in suppport of Ambassadors
And, it runs:
President
SECDEF
GCCs (generally) in support of Ambassadors
So, your regional organizational structure is based on, I think, the faulty premise that we do business - primarily - regionally. Any modification to the current structure must start from the position that US foreign relations are, and probaly will remain, primarily bilateral. Until that changes, all schemes for powerful regional organizations of US foreign relations will fail.
Cheers
JohnT
That's where I spent over the last decade of my career. I can tell you that life becomes very difficult when you have to constantly coordinate across "borders" with other agencies.
I am now working the PRT lane. In examining the pre-deployment and enduring training requirements, there are three uncoordinated sources of guidance from the State Dept. Iraq is owned by one assistant secretary (NEA), Afghanistan by another (SCA), and future requirements by a third official, a SECSTATE direct report (CRS). Since there is no analogous synchronization organization to the GCC, PRTs have different make-ups, different leadership, different training requirements, and on and on and on.
I have been a strong proponent for better border rationalization among U.S. foreign policy organizations for years (OK, a lot of years), and I have seen nothing here to change my ossified mind.
Old Eagle,
Human nature is that everybody likes to focus on their piece of the pie to the exclusion of the whole.
A German institution, SWP, has an interesting paper on coordination issues, CIMIC am Beispiel des ISAF-Einsatzes by Dr. Michael Paul that parallels your PRT observations.
It's a long article in German (and I'm to lazy to translate it) but the gist is that lack of unity of command in management structures, databases, digital languages, spoken/written languages, and military/civilian expectations were observed in the CIMIC/NATO/Bundeswehr arena.
We are not alone...
Regards,
Steve
This thread started with CavGuy posting a map that shows how DoD and State breakdown the world map into regions. So that is one big-picture question regarding the "whole of gov't" approach. I was also recently thinking about the activity down at the individual level. After googling for some statistics I made the following graph (I admit to not spending lots of time searching for the best data, but I think these are ballpark figures)...
The DoD numbers are from the FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill. Other sources - if anyone cares - are listed in my rambling blog entry. There seems to be a tremendous disparity in "troops available," which most likely causes all agencies to rely heavily on DoD and, as a result, tend to follow DoD's lead.
Here is the breakdown in Afghanistan (again, my data sources are not the greatest, but I think these are ballpark)...
If you add up State, DEA, and CIA, they are still outnumbered by more than 30 to 1 by DoD (none of the bars include contractors, of which, I think DoD has a whole lot more). I've seen "other" agencies get quickly marginalized on military staffs because the military staff wants to know "what do you bring to the table?" If the answer to that question is not what the military cmd/staff is looking for, then that person has a long, uneventful deployment and gets very little accomplished. The military staff drives ahead and the other agency individual is just along for the ride.
I'm not pointing the finger at DoD, so much as just observing that when one agency dominates the organization, then the other agencies are forced to fall in line and you get no real serious collaboration that differs from what a joint staff produces. You only get a few other agencies coming along for the ride. But they never take turns driving or even touch the GPS. They just sit in the back and stare out the window (and lounge around the pool in the green zone). Obviously, there will be individual exceptions here and there (I'm thinking, for example, of Pol-Mil FSO's comment on another thread - see his last sentence). But, for the most part, when DoD outnumbers everyone else combined by 30 to 1, you're going to get a DoD-run operation, not a "whole of government" approach.
To reiterate, I am not pointing the finger at DoD. On the contrary, I think the other agencies are doing themselves and the country a disservice by failing to field adequate personnel. Take State, for example. I signed up for the FSO exam months ago. I just took it yesterday. Depending on how I did (I'll find out in several weeks), I might get an interview at some point in the future. And then how long will I need to wait before clearing the next hurdle? And why is this time-consuming process so selective? I've seen Soldiers join the Army with a GED and criminal record who deploy to Iraq and are masterful at their jobs, interacting smartly with locals, gathering solid intel with only the assistance of a lackluster interpreter, and establishing a great rapport with entire neighborhoods. Maybe we're working too hard to recruit ideal candidates with fancy degrees and impressive resumes and not working hard enough at recruiting enough people who have enough potential to do a good enough job.
that's my story and I'm sticking to it :)
Posted by Schmedlap,
If DoD's role is to provide security to enable other agencies to be successful, then it is logical we'll have the largest percentage of personnel on the ground. In a JTF configuration it may appear that DoD is dominating the other agencies for a variety of reasons. One key one is that the JTF is focused on the "military" mission, and interagency LNOs are there to collaborate, share information and hopefully cooperate. They key is who the JTF answers to, to ensure that there military operations are facilitating political/economic success. If we don't have that structure (and associated strategy, then we're attempting to win via a military approach alone, which will probably be ineffective).Quote:
But, for the most part, when DoD outnumbers everyone else combined by 30 to 1, you're going to get a DoD-run operation, not a "whole of government" approach.
I can give two examples where size didn't matter. In at least one instance in OIF I, a local commander said the Civil Affairs effort was his main effort, so everyone else was in support of the CA effort. The CA element was relatively small compared to the combat arms folks. This effort was successful. During JTF Liberia, DoD provided the bulk of the personnel, but it was clearly a State run operation. This was another successful effort. In both cases, size didn't determine who dominated.
I think carefully worded command and control arrangements that clearly spell out who is supported and supporting, and what the main efforts are will facilitate the correct relationships despite what organization has the greatest numbers in country.
Regarding your other points:
Agree, and would add that State's folks largely focus at what we would call the Strategic/Operational level, but are grossly under resourced at the Operational/Tactical level (primarily USAID). Decisions that matter are being made at the operational/tactical level, where DoS is not well represented. That may explain why are foreign policy may appear to be off track at times. If we don't have the right folks on the ground to get ground truth, then who is informing the policy process?Quote:
And why is this time-consuming process so selective? I've seen Soldiers join the Army with a GED and criminal record who deploy to Iraq and are masterful at their jobs, interacting smartly with locals, gathering solid intel with only the assistance of a lackluster interpreter, and establishing a great rapport with entire neighborhoods. Maybe we're working too hard to recruit ideal candidates with fancy degrees and impressive resumes and not working hard enough at recruiting enough people who have enough potential to do a good enough job.
I agree, in terms of the number of personnel providing security. But on planning staffs and in the ratio of DoD civil-military operations vs non-DoD humanitarian/other (perhaps my charts aren't of much use in this regard) - I suspect that a better representation of other agencies may be prudent. Is that occurring? I've seen a joint staff composed almost entirely of DoD give other agencies a few shots to "bring something to the table" and if they didn't, they suffered a massive credibility deficit that they could not recover from until the next unit rotated in. Anecdotal, I suppose, but just trying to illustrate the point.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
You went on to write...
Definitely agree. But my impression is that this is where we're at (we don't have the structure in place). It seems that our government is looking at ISAF headquarters to do... something. Our objectives are... ???. There are some DEA/CIA/State/other personnel, but are their actions nested in - or at least coordinated with - ISAF's? If not, what influence do they have in correcting this? I suspect the answer to the first question is No and the answer to the second is Not much, in large part because there are a few non-DoD personnel swimming amongst an ocean of camouflage uniforms who have their own priorities and little concern for the priorities of the folks who are not in their rating chain.Quote:
"They key is who the JTF answers to, to ensure that there military operations are facilitating political/economic success. If we don't have that structure (and associated strategy, then we're attempting to win via a military approach alone, which will probably be ineffective).
In regard to your examples...
But isn't the Civil Affairs unit composed of Soldiers/Marines? How do the other agencies fit in here?Quote:
I can give two examples where size didn't matter. In at least one instance in OIF I, a local commander said the Civil Affairs effort was his main effort, so everyone else was in support of the CA effort. The CA element was relatively small compared to the combat arms folks. This effort was successful.
Just out of curiosity, how did State assert itself? I'm wondering if there is a lesson learned that could be applied in Afghanistan. A'stan seems like a military-run operation that any other agency would be hard-pressed to insert themselves into with any significant amount of influence.Quote:
During JTF Liberia, DoD provided the bulk of the personnel, but it was clearly a State run operation. This was another successful effort. In both cases, size didn't determine who dominated.
Was it made clear from the start that State was in charge? Was State in charge at first, and then the military came in to augment? Perhaps when the military takes charge from the get-go, it is difficult to hand the reigns over to someone else.
Good questions, and I'll try to pull up some unclassified studies of this successful operation and send them later, because it is important to understand the context of this irregular conflict and our role vis a vis ECOWAS and the UN.Quote:
Just out of curiosity, how did State assert itself? I'm wondering if there is a lesson learned that could be applied in Afghanistan. A'stan seems like a military-run operation that any other agency would be hard-pressed to insert themselves into with any significant amount of influence.
Was it made clear from the start that State was in charge? Was State in charge at first, and then the military came in to augment? Perhaps when the military takes charge from the get-go, it is difficult to hand the reigns over to someone else.
However, to specifically answer your questions, DoS was in charge from day one. In some respects State didn't have enough manpower (but they had some real heroes working incredibly long hours), so to help them we pushed out augmentation teams that worked in support of State (we pushed folks all the way back to D.C. to help them there also). Gets to your original point about State being under resourced.
Since we supported ECOWAS (various West African nations) deploy peace keeping forces, we sent small teams to each representative mission to support the Country Team by providing military expertise as required. Our mission in Liberia at first was more security focused. We wanted to minimize the presence of U.S. forces on the ground, so the JTF was afloat on the ARG/MEU, but we sent reps forward to work with the Ambassador in Monroivia to ensure any action we took was in accordance with his objectives (which were clearly spelled out). As you know getting right person (personality) is critical, and our commander and the ambassaor complemented each other perfectly.
The transition to a UN lead was well executed under DoS supervision. Of course there were rough spots along the way, but that is to be expected with any mission. Overall this complex operation was well executed because there were clear objectives that were understood by all (U.S. military, State, UN, ECOWAS, etc.).
I can't speak to Afghanistan, but I think if we transitioned to a State lead in Iraq after phase 3, we may have had a different outcome. Hard to say, either way it would have been a tough row. The key is how do you transition from a Dod led to a State led mission? You have to also consider the personalties involved (Rumfield, Chenney, Powell, etc.) back in the beltway. Rightly or wrongly State was marginalized. It would be interesting to hear from State reps what they would have done differently if they were put in charge.
…using the indirect method with apologies to Robert Pirsig.
Harley Davidson Nightster’s are joy to view, ride, and tune and so are BMW Roadsters; despite many similarities however their respective twin cylinder designs lean towards drag racing and sport touring. Both motorcycles are products of organizations organized and staffed so that they consistently and profitably (productivity =output/input) meet the design specifications for their product (quality of conformance). Both organizations systematically produce designs, which meet customer (CRM) expectations (design for six sigma). HD has 9,300 employees and BMW has 98,261 while today’s HD (HOG) stock price is $ 21.85 and BMW’s (ETR:BMW) stock is $ 31.77. Although there is certainly a minimum amount of employees necessary to meet the mission of motorcycle development and production, focusing solely upon the number of employees does not sufficiently describe the situation so that we can confidently invest our hard earned cash.
The SWOT and Value Chain Analysis are pretty powerful ways to systematically assess an organizations reach and effectiveness. HD and BMW’s histories need to be considered as well.
To further examine where to invest scare resources for maximum return, modeling and simulation offer a cheap way to consider the effects of the good, bad, and ugly. Factors used to model stock prices with may be described as fundamental factors (valuation, solvency, operational efficiency, operating profitability, financial risk, and liquidity risk), technical factors (usually constructed from past price & volume data), and economic factors (GDP growth, yield-curve slope, unemployment, and inflation), among others (steel, aluminum, tires, etc). Knowing which factors to examine and incorporate into a model at which times can be tricky, time consuming and costly or profitable depending upon who is doing the modeling.
Sometimes it’s faster and easier to find someone who represents the organization we are studying and who can share his or her insights with us. Some questions might be how long have John Olin and Stefan Quandt been doing their particular type of work, how many years/type of education do they have, who do they know, who are they related to, what are the resources at their command, how effective are they, and are they representative of the organization? Perhaps 'outsiders' have important information to consider.
Can business analysis methods apply to assessing public institutions? If not what methods are better suited? Lets consider some of the State Department’s internal QA/QC analysis, produced by it's Middle East Regional Office, of its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Review of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq, OIG Report No. MERO-IQO-09-09, August 2009
Performance Audit of Embassy Baghdad’s Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military Presence in Iraq, OIG Report Number MERO-A-09-10, August 2009
Lets consider some of the DOD's & DOS' internal QA/QC analysis produced by SIGR:
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management, January 2006
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, January 2009
How do you measure return on investment?
From the DOS Foreign Relations of the United States webpage
Quote:
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. The series, which is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 individual volumes. The volumes published over the last two decades increasingly contain declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies.
Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private papers of individuals involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy. In general, the editors choose documentation that illuminates policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Volumes published over the past few years have expanded the scope of the series in two important ways: first by including documents from a wider range of government agencies, particularly those involved with intelligence activity and covert actions, and second by including transcripts prepared from Presidential tape recordings.
A staff of more than 30 historians and editors at the Office of the Historian in the Department of State compile and prepare the volumes for publication. Agencies whose documents are included in a volume participate in a declassification review. The Office can appeal the results of these reviews in an effort to release as much material as possible. The Office receives guidance from the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, a group of distinguished scholars from outside the U.S. Government. The Committee meets four times a year to review progress and make recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series.
NYT Asia:
Civilian Goals Largely Unmet in Afghanistan
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/wo...2civil.html?hp
Clear, Clear, Re-Clear.
Either this civilian thing is going to get straightened out, or we are in for The Long Walk Home.
Steve
From the NY Times piece...
Not to say, "I told you so," or "look at how smart I am," but this is what I was getting at a little over a week ago. The civilian agencies are too small to field adequate numbers of personnel. They are too selective in their hiring to grow in size. So long as the military has all of the money, equipment, and personnel, then the other agencies are going to rely on the military to do everything while they hunker down in their compounds and spend their days typing emails and memos.Quote:
State Department officials also said they were close to their target of having 974 aid workers in Afghanistan by year’s end as part of what they called Mr. Obama’s civilian “surge.” They said 575 civilians were on the ground now...
But Henry Crumpton, a former top C.I.A. and State Department official who is an informal adviser to General McChrystal, called those stepped-up efforts inadequate. “Right now, the overwhelming majority of civilians are in Kabul, and the overwhelming majority never leave their compounds,” ...Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said in a telephone interview last week that 50 to 65 civilian agricultural workers would soon be helping farmers in Afghanistan, up from the current 11...
Advisers to the administration said the military was likely to do much of the civilian work in the foreseeable future...
(emphasis mine)
Bingo.
Steve
Dave Maxwell's blog post on the interagency void was spot on. Since for reasons currently beyond my control I cannot post there, I wanted to highight his final paragraph with the endorsement, if it works, use it. I would also add the following:
Before you think about what you want it to be, first see it for what it is
Thanks Dave
Tom
Quote:
Finally, the search for the “perfect solution” in terms of organization, training, education, lessons learned collection, concepts of employment and terminology hinders both effective operations and preparation for the future. There are two places where the Interagency process functions well – at the Country Team and on the ground in conflict areas. The men and women working overseas are getting it done despite a perceived unresponsive and inefficient National Security system. They have learned and adapted yet at the National and Strategic level there has been a lot of energy spent coming up with new ways to try to do old things and it has not helped the men and women on the ground. What is required is a national level system and processes that are simple, agile, and responsive to the challenges the US faces. Ideally, the system will defend against the 3 historical failures in conflicts around the world – the failure to learn, the failure to adapt, and the failure to anticipate.5