Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency
This article has been making the rounds among the USMC leadership - comes highly recommended!
Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen.
Quote:
Introduction
Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3-24 and now understand the history, philosophy and theory of counterinsurgency.
You watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life.
But what does all the theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action - at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don't understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen?
There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: you are not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply, to link the theory with the techniques and procedures you already know.
What is counterinsurgency?
If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people do not have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.
Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity - but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.
Preparation
1. Know your turf...
2. Diagnose the problem...
3. Organize for intelligence...
4. Organize for interagency operations...
5. Travel light and harden your CSS...
6. Find a political / cultural adviser...
7. Train the squad leaders - then trust them...
8. Rank is nothing, talent is everything...
9. Have a game plan...
The Golden Hour...
10. Be there...
11. Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions
12. Prepare for handover from Day One...
13. Build trusted networks...
14. Start easy...
15. Seek early victories...
16. Practice deterrent patrolling...
17. Be prepared for setbacks...
18. Remember the global audience...
19. Engage the women, beware the children...
20. Take stock regularly...
Groundhog Day...
21. Exploit a "single narrative"...
22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves...
23. Practice armed civil affairs...
24. Small is beautiful...
25. Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces...
26. Build your own solution - only attack the enemy when he gets in the way...
Getting Short...
27. Keep your extraction plan secret...
Four "What Ifs"...
Conclusion...
28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative...
Open the link above for the full article and an explanation on each of the 28 articles of company-level COIN.
Local forces should mirror the enemy
Tom,
I focused on this one also, but don't completely buy it hook, line, and sinker. I don't think trying to create symmetry is necessarily the right answer, because that puts us more in a react mode than an offensive (or taking the initiative) mode. Note insurgents do not have to model us to defeat us, they use their strenghts effectively, and we need to do the same. None the less the author's intent is well taken.
Furthermore I have seen many of our FID efforts produce limited results because we heap technology, weapons, and tactics, techniques, and procedures that are relevant to our culture and our military culture, but not the developing nation we're attempting to assist. FM 7-8 works for us (within limits), but not for armies without a NCO corps. Technology without robust maintenance systems or educated forces to employ them will soon be gathering rust, and we simply wasted millions of tax dollars. How many times have you seen our donated weapons, vehicles, etc. in category four condition throughout Africa during your tours?
It would be great if we could develop an officer corp in our military that could adapt to their environment instead of the dogmatic doctrinal officer corp we have now. We're still producing the same officers we produced out of West Point in the Civil War, and unfortunately more Westmorelands.
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cline.pdf
Quote: "The two major models of pseudo-operations are as intelligence collectors or as operators for direct action missions”.
Cline, like myself, didn’t fully understand the major models of pseudo-operations. I believe he didn’t divide the mission of pseudo-operations correctly. Cline’s two models are mostly one and the same. When pseudo-operations perform intelligence collecting, they are mostly using that information to carry out kinetic strikes against the enemy either directly as operators or indirectly as information gatherers for the military. Therefore I prefer to divide their functions into three major areas. They perform as re-orientation units, as intelligence collectors, and as operators for direct action missions.
Maybe the military doesn’t recognize these units as having this function of re-orientation or they don’t understand re-orientation, but their success rate for converting the insurgents to the government’s side seems extraordinary. While 4 or 5 converts don’t sound like very many, their conversion represents what is needed for a successful PISRR movement. PISRR is an acronym for Penetrate, Isolate, Subvert, Reorient, and Reharmonize. This is a natural constructive process as described by Col. Boyd.
When operating as intelligence collectors, pseudo-operators are mainly collecting information to get inside the orientation and decision making loop of the insurgency. Once inside they can mirror the insurgency and destroy them. This is the same loop that Col. Boyd also described as an Observation, Orientation, Decision-making, and Acting loop (OODA). The loop runs from the high potential and low kinetic energy of observation to the low potential and high kinetic energy of Act. The Act phase is usually carried out by latter military action. Death squads are not really part of an OODA loop, but are part of the Reorientation phase inside a PISRR loop.
As a Reorientation unit, the pseudo-operator’s goal is to bring the insurgency or the general public into the government’s way of thinking, or at least away from the insurgency’s. As the article showed, this can be done directly to the insurgents (converts) or to the general population that the insurgents operate in. This is part of Boyd’s PISRR loop or movement. The movement starts from the high kinetic and low potential energy that Penetrate represents, and moves to the low kinetic and high potential energy of Reharmonize. When the society is Reharmonized, to the will of the government, there is a strong political structure holding it together. While it does take a physical structure to hold a society together, it is really the ideas (implicit laws) of the society that keep it working. I call these ideas (because they have no mass) potential energy.
This reorientation movement, as it relates to pseudo-operations, either “turns” the insurgents and bringing them into the pseudo-operations directly, or the pseudo-operators can bring terror and uncertainty into the general populace, bending the general populace to the government’s will or at least bending it against the insurgency. Because the insurgency needs the general population to survive, bending the general population to the government’s will (Subverting and Isolating) has a direct effect on the insurgency. Of course, as been noted, when used with pseudo-operations the effect may not be the desired one.
While Col. Boyd described OODA and its mirror image PISRR as loops, I describe them as movements. To me they represent a movement of energy per second. But energy is divided into two types: potential and kinetic. We are a combination of both, our legs move us but our brains tell us when to move, where to move, and how much to move. While in military terms kinetic energy usually means bombs or bullets, in physics terms it can mean the movement of any mass, which includes soldiers. Potential energy is the enabler of all movement. Politics is basically potential energy. Depending on what you are trying to accomplish, either destruction or constructive, it generally takes one of these two loops.
If you are nation building, you destroy your opponent’s forces, then try to Reharmonize the society into a form that you are able to live with (I believe this takes lots of troops, because you have to reorient the parts of the society that enables it to physicallyfunction. After Isolating Saddam, We should have reorient the civilian leadership not let it go). This is what the PISRR movement tries to accomplish.
An OODA movement starts when an adversary confronts you. Once you observe your enemy, the collecting of the information that is needed to destroy him begins. Then you orient yourself to the best position, either politically or physically, to destroy your enemy. The decision is made as to your course of action and you act. This generally doesn’t take that many troops because accuracy counts and it is usually easier to break something than repair it.
Because I have no knowledge of how the US military actually works, I can only speak in general terms. Generally speaking, I believe we used a PISRR movement in the Philippines with the use of US trained Philippine troops. North Vietnam used an OODA loop against us. The release of kinetic energy, or Act, happened as the tanks of the North Vietnam army rolled into the streets of the South Vietnam capitol and our guys hung on to helicopters leaving our embassy.
Like someone else said, this is just my .02 cents, thanks.
The Times They Are A-Changing
Spot on Shek… We (SWJ/SWC) have permission to reprint Marine Corps Gazette articles... That said, we are very selective as not to abuse that permission.
I was saving this article for Volume V of the Small Wars Journal Magazine where we will be featuring 4-5 original Small Wars-related articles written by students attending this years' Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
I am sure the other services are making similar adjustments to their PME curriculum – I offer this article up as I am most familiar with the Corps’ efforts. Lastly, my day-job allows for interaction with U.S. and Coalition officers working Small Wars and urban operations issues. There is truly a corps of “Iron Majors” (metaphor for “not-so-senior workhorses” – officer and enlisted) that GET IT.
Educating for the Future by Colonel John Toolan (USMC) and Dr. Charles McKenna. Marine Corps Gazette, February 2006.
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... During the past 2 years veterans of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have challenged the limited treatment of Irregualr Warfare and were looking for greater understanding regarding interagency operations, cultural intelligence, and improved campaign design techniques. These officers were immersed in both the planning and conduct of very complex operations that confronted our PME programs. The faculty at CSC, urged by Marine Corps leadership, set out to reexamine what we did and why we did it. The results included improving the warfighting portion of the curriculum, especially in the area of planning; increasing emphasis on culture and interagency operations; and teaching Arabic to our students, all without compromising either CSC's JPME or SACS accreditations. And all adjustments were to begin in academic year 2005-06 (AY05-06). CSC formed an operational planning team, energized it with clear guidance, and proceeded to examine the curriculum from top to bottom. The results of that examination, approved by the Marine Corps University Curriculum Board, led to a significantly different CSC curriculum, both in method and content-a curriculum that remained entirely consistent with the university's curriculum linkages of warfighting studies, professional studies, leadership studies, communications studies, and cross-cultural studies...
On Edit: Looking for posts on all U.S. Service and Coalition / multinational partner's efforts concerning Professional Military Education - in-house and civilian... Also, anything our Interagency (U.S. and multinational) partners are doing along these lines...
Exceptions may be the norm, but we still have
Shek, we obviously have many talented officers, but I still have bared witness to "several" officers at Bn level and higher that simply don't understand their operational environment. This isn't a manner of professional disagreement with an approach, these are guys who simply want to apply fire power to a problem and have no understanding of using other tools to infuence the population. For lack of a better term they're "simple", and in a complex world simple doesn't cut it. Perhaps dogmatic was too strong a term, and a more accurate describtion would be that they have a cultural bias towards certain approaches to solving the problem, and are not open to more effective approaches. I think the up and coming generation of officers (hopefully many of you will stay in) are our shinning hope for the future, but the challenge is sustaining until we have a generational change in our ranks. One BDE Cdr can lose the war for us, just like one SPC in Abu Grab lost a strategic IO battle for us.
Selous Scouts: Top Secret war for $30 softcover
http://www.galago.co.za/orders.htm
Galago Press seems to have finally gotten it's website offerings squared away, and softcover editions are available for $30.00 US, including surface mail shipping.
I highly recommend snatching up a volume if you can. From a TTP perspective, the lessons are invaluable, even though the AO was very different from where the US currently operates.
Liberating Anah - Lessons
Assuming Naylor's account below, and in the following link, is true, these soldiers appear to have really worked COIN well, given their disposition, strength, and resources. The article is very much worth a full and slow read, as their are valuable TTPs embedded. Perhaps the good Captain has read Kilcullen?
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By Sean Naylor for the Army times
Liberating Anah
How Apache Company freed an Iraqi city from the grip of a terrorist cell
ANAH, Iraq — insurgents had freely waged a two-year reign of terror on this sleepy, affluent Sunni city of 30,000. They blew up the police station and chased out the nascent police force. They murdered the chairman of the city council and cowed the local populace.
members of Jama’at Al Tawid Al Jihad, known as the JTJ or Group of Monotheism and Jihad — a branch of al-Qaida in Iraq — settled in. This city in central Anbar province came to serve as a convenient sanctuary and way station for fighters going southeast to the real action in Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad.
But about 20 kilometers outside Anah, a Stryker squadron commander determined it was time to end the insurgents’ grip on Anah.
Lt. Col. Mark Freitag, commander of the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, installed a Stryker infantry company in a combat outpost just outside Anah in late March. The grunts of Apache Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, attached to Task Force 4-14, took aggressive action against the insurgents, whose leaders made a move to regain the initiative: They dispatched a shadowy commander named Abu Hamza to take charge of the insurgency in Anah.
The stage was set for a showdown here on the south bank of the Euphrates River.
Steep learning curve
The 131 troops of Apache Company assumed responsibility for Anah and the nearby village of Reyanah on Feb. 2 while still based in Rawah. Theirs was to be a steep learning curve. No coalition forces had been stationed in Anah since the 2003 invasion, and the JTJ was used to having the run of the town.
A few weeks before Apache took over, Freitag himself had detained Sheikh Qatada Sa’ad Tehsin, the city council chairman, for his support of the JTJ. On Feb. 17, the JTJ struck back, gunning down Qatada’s replacement, Sheikh Noori Abdul Fatah Askar, on his way to prayers. Noori was also the senior Anah representative of the Islamic Party, a bitter enemy of the JTJ, and the JTJ blamed him for Qatada’s demise.
Soon thereafter, the city council stopped meeting with Apache troops. “Intimidation was a huge factor in their decision to step away from the table,” said Capt. Matthew Albertus, Apache Company’s commander.
It soon became clear that if Albertus was to have any chance of reversing trends in Anah, he needed to position forces closer to the action. Freitag ordered the establishment of Combat Outpost Anah beside a major intersection just north of the city.
From there, Apache could monitor the main road to Rawah, a favorite insurgent location for roadside bombs. Albertus’ 2nd Platoon and a company-sized Iraqi army element moved in March 25. Albertus also re-established contact with the council, seeking out the members individually.
On April 10, in conjunction with the police training team from TF 4-14, a Stryker unit based in Rawah, Apache held a one-day recruiting drive for local police.Police are the first line of defense in any counterinsurgency campaign, and JTJ’s defeat of the previous attempt to establish a police presence had allowed the insurgents free reign in Anah.
http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f...25-2052517.php
The formula for determing % of kinetic versus non kinetic
AB x X(s + r) - 100 = desired percentage of kinetic operations.
There are no clear cut formulas for figuring out the correct percentages of effort, and if you look at it objectively kinetic operations are partly political.
In situations like El Salvador, Algeria, Greece, etc. where there were established governments that required assistance to defeat the insurgency, I concur that the primary effort is political, and that military operations are limited to setting conditions for political success. This is what most of our legacy COIN doctrine makes reference to, but that isn't the fight we're fighting today.
In a situation like Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) where the government is rejected by large portions of the population, and where the insurgents are targeting the Iraqi people and the economic infrastructure (which is our primary political line of operation to create legitmacy for the government), we're in a situation where focusing our efforts on the political and softer activities will not achieve the desired effect.
I'm not interested in your schools if I can't provide for my family, or even provide some degree of security for them. I'll start looking for non-state entities that promise something a little more. Hey, I can put in an IED for $200.00, and my family won't be targeted by insurgents. Not a bad deal.
In parts of Iraq we need to be more aggressive, not less. In other parts of Iraq we need to focus on nation building type tasks and to create a graviational pull of the population to the government. Security must come first, you can't open schools when kids can't go to school closely. You can't be legitimate if you can't protect the population. Aggressive doesn't mean burning down cities, but robust presence and security patrols 24/7 denying freedom of movement to the insurgents. Once an area is semi-secured you can attempt to interject government control.
Our officers need to stop looking for formula type answers in doctrine and start thinking on their feet, they need to open their eyes to their reality, because they are the only ones that will know what is happening in their sector. The situation in your AO is different than it was in mine, figure it out listening to your strategic corporals and the locals, then develop your strategy and adjust it as needed. Read Nagel and Galula for context and ideas, not a how to manual.