Helping Joe Understand the Locals

Not too long ago, I read this post over at Bill and Bob's Excellent Afghan Adventure.

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As we moved into the Ghain, the TF Fury soldiers came into direct support of my sad peschak. Mind you, we had been given very little time with these cats to prepare them for this operation, concentrating our efforts on the most dangerous aspect; house clearing. The ANP moved exactly as I have described them; like a herd of cats. Their tactical movement bore scant resemblance to the tactical movement of the more highly trained ANA and no resemblance whatsoever to the movements of the elite kids from the 82nd. The airborne troops held my peschak-ha in absolute disdain. They couldn't get enough of amusing themselves derisively at the ANP's expense. While the ANP couldn't understand a word that was said, they understood every word that was said.

Disrespect requires no translation.

It took a lot of work to help my ANP through the Psyops that were laid on them by these "highly-trained, elite" soldiers of the Airborne Pride of the Army. I wanted to butt-stroke the muscle-headed airborne bastards.

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My question for the council is, how can a platoon or company commander develop more cultural awareness in his command? I've read Cavguy's posts regarding how there is literally not enough time to do all of the officially required training. In between the safety instructions, combat training, and the rest, how can junior officers give their men a better understanding of their mission and cultural context in which they are operating?

Or am I in my ignorance seeing a problem where there is none?

I would submit this is not a training problem in the 82d, but a leadership one.

From my earlier article "Sisyphus and COIN"

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10. Work through the host nation. This most basic of counterinsurgency tenets is often the most disregarded. Working with allies of varying levels of integrity and competence is sometimes a challenge. It is the host nation’s war, and only they can win it for themselves. Acting unilaterally on any line of effort undermines the overall goal of building host nation capacity and responsibility. We learned to work through transition teams to develop the host nation forces. We learned it was the conventional unit’s responsibility to mentor and train local forces, and build their confidence. One of the most transformative decisions I witnessed was when my commander, LTC John Tien, mandated that every combat patrol be executed jointly with local forces. The howls of protest were audible from the commanders, including myself.

We regarded the local forces as a hassle, inept, and security risks. Looking back, LTC Tien’s bold and unpopular action did more to secure the city than any other single decision. After months of working alongside our forces, local forces achieved some stunning successes which enabled the transition of security to the lead of the host nation. We learned in many respects the host nation is often more effective than our own forces in creating lasting security

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

... not a training problem... but a leadership one.

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Definitely agree with that. If the chain of command looks at indigenous forces as "Haji" then so will the men. If the chain conveys respect and empathy for the indig forces, then so will the men, so long as the chain is respected. (There will always be a couple knuckleheads who won't - but just as the ANP requires no knowledge of English to sense the disdain, they will likely require no knowledge of American culture to recognize that the one or two guys acting differently are the unit meatheads).

May be true, may not be. I don't think there's enough information to express a valid opinion. Always two sides to any peeing contest and the truth is generally in between. Not a good plan to rush to judgment on hearsay...

If it is true, it is indeed an unquestionable leadership fault on the part of the 82d folks, picking on the ANP shouldn't have been tolerated by anyone SGT and above. The TF Fury Bns were new at the time (last year) but that's no excuse.

I'd also really like to know what he did about it at the time...

However, I'm reminded by this that the 'Elite' bit is a two way slanging watch. There's a surprising amount of venom directed at those perceived rightly or wrongly to be higher in the pecking order by folks who presume they are looked down upon. Much of that is wrong and unnecessary IMO. In my experience, there is more hatred and discontent expressed upstream than there is derision, disdain or disrespect sent downstream.

Take it a step further, the active Army disparages the ArNG -- and the ArNG can be way beyond disparaging about the active Army -- generally among themselves, rarely to the active folks in person. SF and the conventional Army which get plenty of coverage here -- lot of mud slinging which does no one any favors. Been my observation that there's plenty of wrongdoing -- or wrong saying -- on both sides of most of those peeing contests.

On this particular topic in that theater, folks I know who deployed with the 82d to Afghanistan recount problems and conflicts with the ArNG folks on the training teams on a variety of issues and therefor a residual batch of hurt feelings on both sides.

My impression is that the Troops from the 82d have no problem and have generally good rapport with the ANA -- who themselves deride the ANP as lesser mortals and do not like to operate with them -- but do tend to treat the ANP like most everyone in Afghanistan seems to; poor relations.

That's not right and, if true needs to be fixed but it is, I believe at the Joe level understandable (and thus needs a little supervisory direction). Be nice if everyone was grown up and did a good job at everything all the time but that's unlikely.

With respect to Ian's question:

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"...how can junior officers give their men a better understanding of their mission and cultural context in which they are operating?"

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Some of you guys that are more current than I am can give him a better answer, but IMO, the answer is:

It is not the junior officers job to do that; it is a Command (read at least Bn) responsibility. At the junior officer level, what should occur is insuring that all the troops get to all the classes and in conjunction with the PSG, decide on a course of action to improve upon and reinforce the higher echelon stuff. That would include but not be limited to insuring all the NCOs have copies of the cultural handouts from the CoCom and theater, have a phrase book and practice the critical phrases among them selves -- it will filter down to the troops (most of them, anyway). The important thing for the junior officer is to learn what's right and what's wrong and to make sure that his NCOs enforce the rules and guidelines with common sense once you get in country.

None of that takes a great deal of time -- or effort -- and it can all be done while other things are happening and at scheduled training lulls when all are sitting around waiting for the next relay or event. The real effort is just making sure people do what they're supposed (and generally know that they are) to do

The author's focus (starting with the title) is on "culture" - specifically military culture.

As I understand his argument, the prevelence of elitism (pecking orders), in too many cases, leads to a trained indifference (and distain ?) to those who are not of "our" elite.

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(e.g., from article)
In the American Army, there is a hierarchy, as most are well aware. This hierarchy is based on the "Hooah Factor" or the degree of eliteness of one soldier as compared to another. In the Infantry, the Airborne is higher than the Leg, for instance. In any initial sizing-up, an American soldier is weighed by his or her rank, apparent physical prowess, qualifications, what unit they belong to, and what badges they wear; and their ability to project a stream of urine for any distance is immediately assessed. It is the unspoken pissing contest. It is bred into our beings as younglings while still sopping wet behind the ears and is actively encouraged and trained. It becomes second nature. In fact, it is in our natures even before we reach the reception stations. Soldiers want to be elite.

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But, he finds the Marines to be a different kind of "elite":

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Oddly enough, the Marines seem to be getting the "working with indidge" thing a lot better than the Army is, too. I did not witness the same tendency to look down their noses at Afghans among Marines that I noticed among soldiers. I think this odd because the Marines assume that they are elite, as opposed to the Army, where most of the Army finds itself resentful of the few "elite."

This quote is out of context, and yet it applies perfectly:

"Because cultural preferences tend to value certain roles and to devalue other roles, military culture can impede innovation in ways of warfare that lie outside that military’s preferred core roles. ~ LTC Robert Cassidy"

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The link to LTC Cassidy's 2008 article, Counterinsurgency and Military Culture, is here.

And, he also uses SF as an example of the non-elite elite.

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One thing that surprised me in action was the disconnect between the conventional forces and the Special Forces. Counterinsurgency has typically been the realm of the Special Forces, but this is too large for just the SF. The job that my team did, that Bouhammer did before us and Vampire 06 has done after us, is traditionally a Special Forces mission. Just to clarify for anyone who might care, I am not a Special Forces soldier. In fact, there's nothing for me to feel especially elite about; but I know what I know. What I know is that the thing that makes the Special Forces so special is their attitude, the same one that gave them their nickname; Quiet Professionals. The SF have found a way to be elite without having to act elite. Just as we have had to borrow lessons from them on how to train indigenous forces, we need to learn from them how to have the humility to work with others and to respect other cultures. We need to learn how to be elite without having to be better than anyone else.

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And, as a counterpoint to the Marines and SF, the author presents "SSG Smokey Jackalacker", whose photo says it all.

Having lived through 40 years in a profession that has more than a level dose of elitism :eek:, I found both of these articles interesting (and informative) from a cultural standpoint.

To whoever fixed the thread title:
Thank you so much.

To the rest:
Thanks for the responses. The story I linked to was intended as an example of the sorts of things Cavguy mentioned in his quote, not an insult to the men of the 82nd. There's obviously no way to verify the veracity of that particular anecdote, but I've heard of similar things happening elsewhere.

Ken White:
Your response was basically what I was looking for.

Jimm99:
I'm glad I was able to contribute something of interest.

Thanks again.

JMM99 was right. That particular article was about culture in the Army and how in the counterinsurgency fight the elitism that is bred in as a result of the Reagan Revolution in the Army (an overwhelming improvement over the post-Viet Nam problems of lack of discipline, drug abuse, and conditioning) has caused unintended consequences.

True, the TF Fury Soldiers expressed more willingness to work with the ANA and compared the ANP very unafavorably (rightly) to the ANA. The TF Fury Soldiers did not interact with the ANA Soldiers other than in operations and I'm not sure if the contrast between the two Afghan forces caused them to be more openly disdainful of the ANP and diverted their attention from any comments towards the ANA or not. The Soldiers did show a general lack of regard for Afghans in general.

I think that it is a leadership and a training issue; but I believe that the training issue is a deeper problem than just that. Counterinsurgency is a very distributed form of warfare; even more so than light infantry warfare in restrictive terrain. Yet we do not train counterinsurgency in the NCOES or at the Soldier level.

Sometimes what we train what we call COIN, but it's really just counter-guerrilla. Basically we produce conventionally-oriented young warriors and then when they are operating in the shooting war they are in a COIN environment. We build in the elitism, provide inadequate cultural training, do not address the working with indigenous forces issue in training (very difficult, but needs to be considered) and do not train the basics of COIN theory and practice. The young Soldiers hear, "COIN" all the time, but they don't really understand it.

These are just ground level observations from Afghanistan. Perhaps it is theater-specific as far as not having a Phoenix Academy or anything similar upon RSOI.

In COIN, every positive interaction is very important, and every negative action is amplified or even confirms the enemy's IO. We fail on the training, and there are quite often failures on the leadership side. This is also cultural. A recent article noted the difference between the stateside and the deployed Army. We are not fighting in our preferred venue of AirLand and it shows. There is a great reluctance to embrace COIN, and when it is claimed, it is often counter-guerrilla incorrectly labeled as COIN.

Between that and incredibly centralized command and control in many cases, the Army is not effectively applying a very distributed methodology. These are key causative issues whose proof is in the worsening situation in Afghanistan.

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"In COIN, every positive interaction is very important, and every negative action is amplified or even confirms the enemy's IO. We fail on the training, and there are quite often failures on the leadership side. This is also cultural. A recent article noted the difference between the stateside and the deployed Army. We are not fighting in our preferred venue of AirLand and it shows. There is a great reluctance to embrace COIN, and when it is claimed, it is often counter-guerrilla incorrectly labeled as COIN."

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Between that and incredibly centralized command and control in many cases, the Army is not effectively applying a very distributed methodology. These are key causative issues whose proof is in the worsening situation in Afghanistan."

As a retired purple suiter who happens to be Air Force, using shared knowledge from good friends now and recently in Afghanistan, here are a few observations:

1. We, the Allies, had to take and work with whatever military superstructure existed in Afghanistan since 9/11.

2. This meant we allied with and inherited the Northern Afghan Alliance made up of Afghan ethnic minorities vs. the majority Pukhtun population of Afghanistan (many of which Pukhtuns were born in refugee camps inside northern Pakistan).

3. The Afghan Army is/will be officered in future by ethnic quota driven filling of officer candidate school slots. Whoever naturally is brighest and best qualified has little or nothing to do with who gets a commission.

4. Many of the older top field grade and flag rank Afghan officers were USSR trained and indoctinated, which is a topic unto itself for another discussion.

5. The desired future education of the average Afghan soldier we are "trying" to bring up to a third grade level, using a US education system standard.

6. Afghan soldiers go to solve or deal with family problems when and as needed which does create what to us would be AWOL gaps in the ranks but no one wants to openly address this fact. This to a Westerner's eyes is sheer chaos.

7. Briefly summarized, tribal differences, focus on home and family, and in today's world in Afghanistan taking home your pay to support you family...in part due to lack of what we would in the US call the "money-wire system"...are akward at best. **This total lack of a transfer of local funds within your own country issue is again an entire topicunto itself.

Thus, I would not blame our Allied soldiers nor say that lack of cultural awareness is "the problem" but that the very low level of Afghan formal education, the left over USSR trained flag ranks, and cultural tribalism are factors largely over the heads of our rank and file soldiers today.

But, if I am so smart, what is the answer? There is no prior history, ever, of democracy in Afghanistan. No past tense military academy which objectively and openly goes after and promotes the very best qualified vs. ethnic quotas, etc.

And, to an atypical Afghan soldier whose main source of the lowest education level possible is memorization and virtually blind adherance to and of Islam, there is nothing more than self example of a sectarian set i values each soldier can offer, coupled with his or her personal witness of how they live life daily as a Christian or whatever US source faith system our troops practice individually.

Respect is not reciprocated from primite Islamics to "non-believers", this is only possible, even if phoney, at the highest levels of the ruling top folks in Afghanistan today.

This is the huge cultural and religious challenge for our young solders to address. You simply cannot separate "religion" from "culture" as these terms have one and the same meaning in Afghanistan, and always will have such meaning.

I for one believe our soldiers, regular and SF are all doing as good a job as is humanly possible. Let's not blame them for the "cultural" barriers and vacuums, of which there are very many, as they make do with foreign "standards" beyond anything we have encountered before, even in Iraq.

Afghanistan nationally is to me a collection of tribes and not much more. To think "centrally" especially regarding civilian governance is irrational in the face of the facts on the ground there. Each province in Afghanistan I believe will work best almost as if each is a separate nation, as this is how the locals minds and attitudes have run for hundreds of years.

My two cents. Good luck and thank you for the excellent job you boys are doing for us all over there.

The troops are doing the best they can. Given inadequate training but their basic adaptability, they're coping fairly well. They were put into an AO that was and is unbelievably poor, more so than any other the US has been to in the last 100 years or so and were essentially, given no mission -- not on a strategic or operational plane at any rate.

Said strategic vision or mission is still, eight years later, in flux (I'm feeling charitable today...). That flaw drives a lot of trains...

As for failure to properly apply COIN techniques. That is a bum rap.

Accurate, yes -- but that failure is due to, in order:

1. Inadequate full spectrum military training and education at all levels due to flawed policy decisions over many years. Not an excuse -- but it is a very important reason. You cannot leave important spectrums of conflict of the training regimen for years and expect rapid adaptation by those whose training and education lacked important elements.

2. Poor mission assessment and assignments by senior people. The COIN specialists, SF, are being badly misused and are too heavily engaged in DA efforts to an extent that precludes their employment in the COIN role other than peripherally (IMO, any DA is too much; not their job). Units are assigned in a piecemeal fashion, rarely if ever return to an area with which they are familiar. Units that trained up for DA missions were diverted to lesser roles. Units trained for one mission assigned to another. Even last minute theater swaps. Mission dictates rule, understandably -- but some basic common sense would not be remiss. Excessive control and reluctance to deploy small units in the Army has had an adverse impact.

3. Force design and structure predicated on the War the Army wanted to fight instead of the wars (note earlier singular capital and current lower case plural w...) the Army has known it might have to fight since the 1980s -- really longer than that. The wrong kinds of units got priority in funding which led to the wrong kinds of training. The political (not military) decision to form USSOCOM also had a pernicious effect in that it removed (purposely) the proponent for COIN and FID from the Army for all practical intents and purposes, thus further insuring that the Army, per se, would be clueless about and indifferent to those types of efforts --again, even though it was abvious that that kind of commitment was highly likely. Consider the fact that the Bush Administration walked in the door saying 'no nation building.' They rapidly discovered that wasn't solely their call...

Those things are changing in some cases, however the legacy effect is still with us. Kudos to those who are effecting the changes but there are some who resist and hold back the others.

Long way of saying, yeah, it isn't going great but it probably is gong better than we have a right to expect in view of the aforementioned flaws.

The key thing will be the determination by Washington of what to do now.

We can produce a functioning nation with an effective central government -- but I doubt we have the patience for the 50 or so year effort that would take. We should not leave the Afghans in the lurch by summarily leaving but we need a realistic assessment of what we can afford, undertake and sustain. there are a number of things that are possible. We'll probably try several that aren't before settling on one that is... :wry:

Oh, and on the elites and their disdain for lesser being? Well, yeah. People are like that. So what. Not going to change. Marines do a little better because they hold themselves to a higher standard than most Army units do. SF and the 'quiet professional' stuff is hype. SF folks are quiet because, mostly they're older and the older guys keep the younger ones quiet. They are indeed professional but I know that the 'get along with the locals' does not extend to thinking that the 82d, say is as good as they are , much less that the 9th Battalion (Mechanized) of the 9th Infantry is. They will not disparage other units in public -- but privately... ;)

IMO if most soldiers looked at dealing with the locals as they did with that pretty girl in the bar on Saturday night, they would do just fine. We try to make a good first impression, why? We want to at least get her number for future engagements, but ultimately we are trying to get her to get in "bed" with us (literally and figuatively). We pull out all the stops, put on our best display to win her over. Ultimately going into it we know we will win some and we will lose some, but do we stop trying? No. When one turns us down we continue onto the next. One must remember not to leave a bad impression on one as she will tell her friends and word will spread throughout the bar thus placing you in a semi-permissive if not hostile environment. Therefore you go home alone with no hopes of future engagements. May leave a lasting impression on people in that bar. No substitute pretty girl with anything you like and bar with town, city, unit, etc......

Does Joe need formal training? Not really he has been doing it for years, just doesn't realize it yet.

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Originally Posted by ODB

IMO if most soldiers looked at dealing with the locals as they did with that pretty girl in the bar on Saturday night, they would do just fine.

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Great analogy. A peer company commander of mine got into trouble when he used that exact phrase and was quoted in Stars & Stripes ....

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

Great analogy. A peer company commander of mine got into trouble when he used that exact phrase and was quoted in Stars & Stripes ....

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Never read that one, if I did I would have quoted him, damn thought I was the first to think of it that way......time to go back to the drawing board, or is it great minds think alike?

I'm in agreement with ODB (and with the nameless scolded CO). I've witnessed countless good, bad, and ugly interactions between Soldiers and civilians. I can count on one hand the number that were the result of poor training or inadequate information. The rest were just the result of cocky 18-year-olds (redundant?) being jackasses. I almost never had to "re-train" anyone (nor direct an NCO to do so) because Soldiers already know how not to be belligerent. Most of it was simply discipline. My two nuggets of wisdom to my Soldiers (in highly sanitized formatting to keep it family friendly)...
1. Dealing with detainees: your job involves being shot at; their job involves shooting at you; if you don't like that, you chose the wrong line of work; if you're a little wuss who can't take getting shot at, fine, let us know and you can go to battalion; otherwise, don't be whiny little wuss and take out your frustrations/gynecological issues on detainees.
2. Dealing with locals: you think these people owe you gratitude or owe you cooperation? That's nice. Guess what? Nobody cares WTF you think. Now STFU and do your job, which includes being nice, gracious, polite, and making them think that becoming an American Soldier requires passing a congeniality test.

Total time required for this briefing: 30 seconds.

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Originally Posted by Schmedlap

...The rest were just the result of cocky 18-year-olds (redundant?) being jackasses...Total time required for this briefing: 30 seconds.

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Yep. At least some things don't seem to have changed all that much... :wry:

In regards to the observations of George Singleton, our own Army suffered from many of these issues in the early days. There are many "reasons" to get overwhelmed with the myriad of issues that "should" by nature hold Afghanistan in the dark ages. These "shoulds" and "reasons" become rationalizations for failure.

It has been pointed out before that Afghanistan does, in fact, have "democratic" traditions that have been part of tribal society. Jirgas and Shuras, for instance, are representative in nature. While the representatives are not chosen via election per se, those representatives represent their constituents via the consent of the represented. While there are dissimiliarities, the similarities indicate that Afghanistan does have a basic understanding of democratic principles.

My experience with Afghans bears little resemblance to Mr. Singleton's presentation.

Ken White makes some very good points on the causes for Big Army's slowness in grasping COIN. The longer the time that has passed since the beginning of COIN operations, the less it matters what the causative factors (or excuses) for not being excellent practitioners of the doctrine and the more it becomes a failure to really do what is necessary in a time of war.

A workable government that can defend its own territory and provide basic services will not require 50 years. It is a tough job, but not that tough. To bring Afghanistan up to speed with the western world; now that would take 50 years. The effort required to provide guidance and assistance will fade with time, but until the insurgency is defeated through good well-rounded COIN it is going to be intensive.

Old Blue, let me disagree.

The tribal and jiirga traditions are as feudal and unrelated to Western style democracy as an day is to night.

Since 9/11 almost daily dialogue with Afghans, together with good friends at pretty senior levels there, in the field, do not support you view.

Decentralized feudalism is the name of the game in Afghanistan, controlled by the most undemocratic factor of all...religion...Islam. Been there more than once, in person, even though years ago...compared to the ages of history, noting much has changed there from my era down to today.

However, you can use your new math ideology and allow me to depend on factual history and we are each entitled to construe different viewpoints respectfully and maybe even humorously for that matter.

Here is an excerpt from Afghan royal/tribal history to exemplify the undemocratic traditions there then and still found out in the tribal areas, outside the City of Kabul:

"In 1800 Zaman Shah began his invasion of India and while in India, His brother Mahmood Joined his forces with Fateh Khan and received further aid from the Persians and the British to defeat Zaman Shah and declare Mahmood Khan king of Afghanistan. With the support of disfranchised tribal chiefs, the gates of the kingdom was opened and Mahmood Was declared the king of Afghanistan. Upon hearing this news, Zaman Shah hurried back to Kabul to raise an army to fight Mahmood Khan but the Chindawoli force in Kabul had already made a pact with Mahmood Khan and defeated the forces of Zaman Shah. Being defenseless Zaman Shah fled to Jalalabad where he was captured by Fateh Khan and by the order of Mahmood Khan, Zaman Shah was blinded and imprisoned in the Bala Hisar prison in Kabul. Prince Mahmood was declared Shah Mahmood Khan Durrani in 1801."

As found @:

http://www.afghanland.com/history/zamanshah.html

The above describes the beginnings of the Durrani long serving dynasty of kings of Afghanistan. See my following footnote about a Durrani who is retired from the Pakistan Foreign Service, whose Grandfather was the two times back King Duranni (line) in and of Afghanistan.

FOOTNOTE: A former senior cabinet member under the late Pakistani Prime Minister S. A. Bhutto started e-mail dialogue with me, and I with him, shortly after 9/11. He saud at the outset after 9/11, and I then foolishly ignored him, that the West just did not understand the religious non-democratic mind set of tribalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This fellow, by he way, is the Grandson of the two times prior King of Afghanistan. As I am age 69 today, if he is still living [haven't heard from him for over a year now, he was retired in Rawalpindi area] he would be in his early 80s now.

Hi George,

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Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

The tribal and jiirga traditions are as feudal and unrelated to Western style democracy as an day is to night.

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First, I think you are making the categorical error of confusing "Western Style democracy" with the US Republican form - not all Western democracies are republics. Let me remind you that Britain and its tradition of parliamentary democracy evolved out of a feudal system and still have vestiges of it (that's 4 out of 5 of the core Anglo culture complex countries). And, even in the US Republican form, you maintain certain feudal vestiges (e.g. concepts such as eminent domain).

Second, I will also note that you (and others ;)) tend to use the terms "democracy" and "democratic" in rhetorical contexts that are quasi-religious. This idealization is as dangerous for the relationship assumed to be behind "democracy" by your founding fathers as is radical Safali Islam to the "democratic principles" in the more mainstream versions of Islam. On the dangers of treating "democracy" as a quasi-religion, I would suggest that you take a look at Aristophanes The Knights and Lysistrata.

Third, as far as using 200 year old examples of "undemocratic traditions", do you really want me to haul out the many that I could find in US history and/or current affairs (or Canadian,, or British, etc...)?

My point behind this is that you are confusing the name for the thing. Possibly worse, you are assuming, with a quasi-religious certainty that parallels AQ, that your vision is "TRUE".

You know, earlier when you said

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To think "centrally" especially regarding civilian governance is irrational in the face of the facts on the ground there

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you were spot on IFF by that you meant imposing a US style Republican form of governance. To attempt that in Afghanistan, and assume that people there will actually want it (!), is as insane as assuming that the US wants to live under Sharia Law. The Afghans have to settle on their own forms of governance, and that will be a lot easier once the Pashtun civil war is over and outsiders stop telling them what they should do.

...you were spot on IFF by that you meant imposing a US style Republican form of governance. To attempt that in Afghanistan, and assume that people there will actually want it (!), is as insane as assuming that the US wants to live under Sharia Law. The Afghans have to settle on their own forms of governance, and that will be a lot easier once the Pashtun civil war is over and outsiders stop telling them what they should do.[/QUOTE]

Thanks for your views Mark.

I actually do know the difference between Republican form of governance, democracy with it's various meanings, etc.

But, your amplifcations are helpful to all readers and I appredciate same.

Yes, Hitler was "democratically" elected; the UK has a Parliamentary form of democracy with no written Constitution; but our US legal system is based in part on two legal systems: "The Ten Commandments" which does in fact mix religion with politics thereby, and the British System of Common Law. In fact, the British legal system is, to me, more cost effective and timely, as in faster, in providing justice to the Brits. *Understand I strongly favor separation of church and state, so please don't confuse my religious/civic work with any implied views in the context of this discussion of Afghanistan. Their religion is their form of governance, the two are inseparable. And I doubt anyone can or will ever separate Islam from governance over there, loosely said.

Digressions you made to Greek history regarding democracy were a bit abstract in today's world as to where we now are where we now go, but valid historically in the evolution of "republics and democracies" for sure.

My focus as a young university student was on history and political science but only one course (I only took one elective course) in Greek history. My graduate work in political science at St. Mary's University in San Antonio before old USAFSS shipped me to Pakistan to the old US Embassy was contemporarily focused vs. political science evolution focused.

I agree that it would be insane for any of us to ever assume we can change things radically regarding Afghanistan's style and form of self governance, but efforts built on the old RAJ model as used there and in old India with the Civil Service provide a minor working model that has gathered dust in the closet [during the Communist and Taliba regimes]...this dating to and through the last Durrani Kingdon in the 1970s.

"Nation building" might be a good discussion for this group to again focus regarding Afghanistan, as the direction being attempted does momentarily parallel the earliest form of governance in the US which I will loosely refer to as the Articles of Confederation era when the US as a new nation came close to falling on our collective faces back then.

Good week to one and all.

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Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

I actually do know the difference between Republican form of governance, democracy with it's various meanings, etc.

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I know you do ;). I just find it useful to point them out every now and again during discussions like this since it is so easy - especially in a 'net based forum - to slip into assumptions.

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Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

Digressions you made to Greek history regarding democracy was a bit abstract in today's world as to where we now are where we now go, but valid historically in the evolution of "republics and democracies" for sure.

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True. Part of the problem is that we have to have a fairly long historical depth to get enough examples of how democracies of various forms fail. Athens towards the end of the Peloponnesian Wars is one, the disintegration of the Roman Republic from, say 110 bce - 27 bce is another, but the dynamics of disintegration are quite different.

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Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

My focus as a young university studenet was on history and political science but only one course (I only took one elective course) in Greek history.

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I think I only took two in the area, but I read (and re-read) a lot of the histories as the basis for modern social theory later on. Then again, I started reading ancient history when I was about 6 or so so that I could argue politics and philosophy with my parents :D.

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Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

I agree that it would be insane for any of us to ever assume we can change things radically regarding Afghanistan's style and form of self governance, but efforts built on the old RAJ model as used there and in old India with the Civil Service provide a minor working model that has gathered dust in the closet...this dating to and through the last Durrani Kingdon in the 1970s.

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Mainly, I suspect, because the old Raj style of Imperialism just doesn't sell well in the international PR market any more :wry:. I fully expect a serious attempt at a Durrani "Restoration" sometime in the next 10-15 years.

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Originally Posted by George L. Singleton

I think the Internet citation I gave reached back 300+ years and mentions back to the time of the Greeks and Romans, but this is rusty memory as I dash out the door to work today.

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Yup, it does - I was just referring to the one in your post; sorry, I should have been clearer on that.

Cheers,

Marc

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You don't have to reject your (Catholic) upbringing and language in order to assimilate here (Northern PA), but you need to be less dependent (on it).

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Yep, way too over simplified, but it works for me to this day.

Case in point: Those successful immigrants in CONUS speak (English) and know our culture to exactly what level? Do they need to speak English or even understand American Society to succeed?

OK, it's not war or social and political upheaval. Or is it?

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Originally Posted by Stan

Case in point: Those successful immigrants in CONUS speak (English) and know our culture to exactly what level? Do they need to speak English or even understand American Society to succeed?

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One word only - "Lawyer". :cool:

I'm not sure about the states, but in Canada, the answer is Yes - you do need a certain amount of the language and more of the culture to succeed.

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Originally Posted by Stan

OK, it's not war or social and political upheaval. Or is it?

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Heh, welcome to the other part of my world :D.

George L. Singleton says:

The tribal and jiirga traditions are as feudal and unrelated to Western style democracy as an day is to night.

That's funny, because I've attended local Shuras, and there seemed to be some recognizable form of debate and collective decision-making based on representative agreement. I've attended a village level Shura in order to review local projects and the selection of new projects. I've spoken to villagers about the elder representation system. It was conveyed to me that the elders are not elected but can lose acceptance as representatives based on poor leadership, ideas, or influence. When you discuss shifting historical alliances as if they were the representative local politics that I observed, you would certainly come up with a different conclusion.

Since 9/11 almost daily dialogue with Afghans, together with good friends at pretty senior levels there, in the field, do not support you view.

I see. The pretty senior level people I saw spent very little time at the village level. They showed up, they met with a Wuliswahl or attended a district Shura, or they attended a Provincial Security Council meeting and they left. O-6 level visits were extremely rare and O-7 and above a white elephant. The higher the "pretty senior level," the farther from the ground reality.

However, you can use your new math ideology and allow me to depend on factual history and we are each entitled to construe different viewpoints respectfully and maybe even humorously for that matter.

Condescension will get you nearly as far as flattery with me, Sir, and does not appear to be respectful. My "new math ideology" is based on my experience on the ground in Afghanistan, which I will take over all of your course work and long distance conversations with Durrani leftovers any day of the week. I would submit, Sir, that I am in possession of more "facts" than you are in this case. Your attempt to snow me over with your historical credentials and "good friends at pretty senior levels" leaves me singularly unimpressed, and your attempt to brush me off with the equivalent of "you don't know what you are talking about, Sonny," leaves a faintly fecal scent, Sir. You are welcome to view that as humor.

I do not wish to waive the "Been There, Done That" T-shirt too boldly, but I have spent a considerable amount of time in Afghan villages at the local level speaking with local inhabitants who experience local politics on a daily basis. I subscribe to the school of "all politics is local." You may quote history as you like, but I've still got Afghan dust in some of my gear, Sir. This is not the rotor-washed dust of Bagram but the dust of Tag Ab, Chapahar, Kalagush, and Alingar.

I was not a ghost-chasing counter-guerrilla, Sir. I was an embedded advisor. I sometimes lived for weeks at a time "outside the wire."

Again, the concept of locally elected/selected representatives to decision-making assemblies is not a foreign idea to Afghans. The idea of an elected central government is a very new idea to them, but is not completely incomprehensible to Afghans. They struggle with the concept of a national identity, but the ANA is a very good example of the fact that Afghans can get past tribalism and work together. Local loyalty often transcends tribal loyalty, and village politics has some vaguely democratic elements. Different from Western democracy? Yes. "Night and day?" No, Sir.

There are a group of people who tend too far into social anthropology and get lost in the weeds. You would be surprised at the awareness that a lot of these backwoods villagers have of the basic concepts. It is in fact an issue in the districts that the district and provincial councils have only an advisory role and that the district and provincial governors are appointed and serve at the leisure of the president. These villagers would like to see these local executives become elected and therefore accountable to the local population. This would actually tie the traditional lines of power at the local level to the GIRoA.

This is an Afghan solution.

Over-analyzing the social anthropology of Afghanistan makes assumptions that are frequently in error visa vis the reality on the ground and is a distraction from the real point of this discussion, which is that our Soldiers are failed by training and leadership in their ability to be the "strategic Corporals" of COIN. Declaring the task too difficult, or even irrelevant, with pronouncements that Afghans are clueless as to any practices resembling democratic principles is diversionary. Further, it is incongruous with my personal observations at the local level.

Those are my "new math ideology" personal observations, Sir.

First, Old Blue, thank you for your service to our nation.

Secondly, much of the current tense feedback I get weekly is from people at the level as you describe yourself, both family friends serving there, as well as relatives who are young cousins.

Some of these young men are Marines, others are Army, and yes, some are SEALS, Navy types.

You have to work with whatever is there. Understood. But, a zebra is not a fox. The system of local governance is feudal and no where akin to what we here, where you come from, know as "democracy", there is no democratcy or republican experience in the history of Afghanistan.

Your experience with local customs and gatherings is obviously getting the job you have to do done, which is the bottom line, and thank God, you are safe and have gotten through all this in one piece.

One very dear young friend is a law student now at George Washington Law School in DC, having sustained a major disability which limits his mobility for the rest of his life. He was a young Lieutenant, a West Pointer, and a good friend of our children. His parents, as well as he, are my good friends, too. He is now on life long disability from his wounds. His wife recently had their first baby so they are doing well these days.

The fact that I originally in recent days addressed in a macro overview sense your criticism of my recemt remarks is because that was the level of the conversation when I joined it on this site, at the strategic or macro level. But, I am glad to have your pinpointed tactical/micro working experience, as of course that is where the job is actually done. But it takes folks at all levels to do the complete total puzzle job, you are part of a total team from top to bottom and teams pull together which you have done I'm sure.

Your work and risk of life and limb are appreciated by this old trooper who will shortly be age 70.

I was first an NCO before being commissioned eons ago. Wounded January 30, 1965 in the Rann of Kutch during the first dust up of what became the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Yes, I was a sort of spook and was the only American on the scene when wounded among a party of Pakistanis in their Land Rover which was hit by an Indian tank shell, indirectly, as the Air Force later chose to interpret the matter. Lifelong lower spinal damage with eventual major surgery resulted. I switched over from regular to reserve commission and thereafter, from 1965 forward the flight surgeon(s) kindly gave me waivers the rest of my 31 years active (6 years) and reserve (25 years) career.

I turned down a disability pension voluntarily to stay in the reserve, while others under the old rules and law drew both disability and reserve pay. One has to have one's own values, and I am not I assure you a wealthy man at all.

Of course, I don't care for your choice of words nor your tone, but that is where you were when you wrote these remarks. Remember, you critiqued me and I replied, but that is water under the bridge today.

I would openly request the administrators of this site not to rebuke you for your language nor your tone as you felt those feelings toward an unknown to you writer and you are entitled to a one time pass. But think before you leap in choice of wording in the future. You can get your meaning across just as well.

Again, we had and have both friends and family serving there, so my comments are not vague nor dated, but only now have I made this clear to you.

I also have still living today friends who are native to over there who are my age who live part of the year over there and part of each year here in our home town, where his grandchildren and children are now naturalized US citizens.

Good luck in your career and again, stay safe.