Why democracies don't lose insurgencies
Need to know if anyone can cite a post-1945 insurgency against a democracy that won, as defined by achieving all goals. (separation or overthrow) Political settlements are a different set.
I'm considering my grad thesis on Democracies and Insurgencies. Specifically, in the RAND insurgency dataset of 89 insurgencies 1945-2006, I found no examples of a democracy (defined by government enduring the insurgency, not the government of external supporters) losing an insurgency, as defined by the insurgents attaining all of their objectives (overthrow or secession). Of 20 democratic insurgencies in the database, 10 beat the insurgent, 5 are ongoing, and 5 reached some sort of political accord between sides.
I have some subjective coding questions, but the results hold true even when I "play" with the inclusion of certain cases not in the RAND set. (i.e. Russia 1999 (Chechnya II) is not considered a democracy, but in 1994 is)
Other casual observations include:
* last longer on average (AVG 17 yrs vs. 11)
* less likely to settle politically than the mean for all governments in the dataset
* results seem to hold true regardless of GDP, external support (either side), external sanctuary, political freedom, and even military competence
* Average insurgency size is less than half the mean of all insurgencies
* Nearly all post-cold war democratic insurgencies are separatist in nature, not aiming for regime change.
My overall research will involve why democracies are more resistant to insurgencies. Sort of a "Democratic Insurgency" theory.
Possible hypothesis include:
For reference, the 1945-2006 Democratic insurgencies, by outcome: (note, "Lose" means insurgent loss, included is start date of insurgency, and length of insurgency)
Philippines (MNLF) Lose 1971 25
Argentina Lose 1968 11
Peru Lose 1981 11
Philippines HUK Lose 1946 9
Uruguay Lose 1963 10
Lebanon Lose 1958 1
Uganda (ADF) Lose 1986 14
Northern Ireland Lose 1969 30
Philippines (MILF) Lose 1977 29
Turkey (PKK) Lose 1984 15
Philippines (NPA) Ongoing 1969 37
India Northeast Ongoing 1975 31
Nigeria (Niger Delta) Ongoing 1991 15
Sri Lanka Ongoing 1976 30
South Thailand Ongoing 2004 2
Senegal Political 1980 22
Chechnya I Political 1994 2
East Timor Political 1975 25
Georgia/Abkhazia Political 1992 2
Papua New Guinea Political 1988 10
Input appreciated about the viability of this topic or holes in the thesis before I go to far. Also any literature pertaining to this topic appreciated.
Also researching insurgencies
I found the below study.
Lyall, John, ’Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?’, 2007, Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/DemoWar.pdf
I would appreciate your opinion about it.
THX in advance.
Some things in this world don't ever change
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight..
Whenever approaching any study such as this definitions do tend to effect what you see, that however doesn't represent the truth of what they are.
Given that one approaches the subject in such a manner as to tracing the roots and from there following up the tree this could turn out to be very insightful;)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.
While perhaps true that nonetheless fails to prove that it wasn't voluntary.
Lots and lots of "some people" out there. Never gonna please em all:D
This is an example of the ill informed
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
...For that matter, changing the definition of "democracy" invalidates your thesis:
"...The country is alleged by many historians to have been nothing more than an American-backed puppet government, but many others claim that it was genuine democracy (or, at the least, a patriotic movement with genuine concern for the Vietnamese people). An individual's views on the matter generally correspond closely to their views on the Vietnam War in general - supporters of the war often believe that South Vietnam was a democracy, and thus worthy of defence, while opponents of the war often believe that South Vietnamese democracy was a sham.[/URL]
stupidity in the discourse on Viet Nam. It was emphatically a democracy but one in the Asian model; an oligarchy at the top, elected politicians below -- particularly at Province and local level. The leaders responded to the populace. Anyone who contends it was a puppet government in verging on idiocy. The Viet Namese ran their country, took little to no advice from the Americans (unless we offered a healthy bribe; even they'd demur frequently) and did what they wanted to -- frequently stymieing US goals.
To echo Ron Humphrey on your later comments:
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OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight.
Doesn't almost everything depend on how one defines things? Acknowledging that 'one' is human and we are infinitely variable.
All inquiry starts with a postulation, not the postulation...
Quote:
To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.
Oh, I dunno, I carried a rifle for years, it was purely voluntary. Still do on occasion; still voluntary. As an aside, 'Assault Rifle' is a term invented by the mostly ignorant popular media and perpetuated by even more ignorant Congroids who banned all "Assault Rifles" except those they didn't ban. A rifle is a rifle, not really any such thing as an 'Assault Rifle' (other than in the eyes of the US Congress. I rest my case...). That also excuses people who carry just pistols or who carry SMGs, MG, RPGs and such, I guess... :D
If, OTOH, as opposed to what you said, what you meant was if someone carrying a weapon was strolling about, any changes in the local milieu brought about by the elements that person represents will not be viewed as voluntary by some observers in the population of the locale where said weapon carrying soul then I'd say you're correct. I'd also suggest that the number so viewing that issue in that light will depend on many things and that for the most part, there will always be some nervous, whiney types who will see danger in anything but that most people have enough sense to judge things based on reality instead of ideology.
For example, the Gendarmerie in France has been wandering about with Rifles, Pistols and SMGs for years and a few people in France see that as threatening -- most of the French nation and its visitors, however, do not.
"How of fighting" vs. "Who of fighting"
The conclusion of UM's link (p.24) is interesting:
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While better measures of democracy may lead to a reassessment, it appears that regime type has little analytical utility for explaining COIN war outcomes and duration. Instead, emphasizing battlefield dynamics (the “how” of fighting) may prove a better theoretical bet than focusing on regime-specific variables (the “who” of fighting). Indeed, the degree of a military’s mechanization, its status as an external occupier, and the level of material support for insurgents all proved more consequential for explaining outcomes and duration. In short, democracies do struggle to defeat insurgents — but not because they are democracies.
Wilf, is this your position - more or less ?
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Some more articles by the same author are here.
Political system matters not, or at least is not significant
De Gaulle and Liddell-Hart met deaf ears. Surprisingly, Guderian and Tuhachevski were only listened to in the world’s two most oppressive political systems.
Phase III Maoist insurgency is conventional force
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
No. More ignorance. The insurgents were severely tromped and almost totally ineffective before the last US troops left in 1973. The North Viet Namese Army won it in 1975 -- with a conventional invasion, not an insurgency..
Ken,
You've raised this point at least a couple of times that I am aware of, and while you are factually accurate, the grand design of Maoist Insurgency is to culminate in a conventional force that seals the deal. So to say that the insurgency did not win is not really fair, they simply followed the full program to its logical conclusion, moving up and down between phases I and II, attempting III prematurely and backing down to II again, and finally, as you state, in 1975 being able to pull off the phase III conclusion.
I am quite confident that if that attack had been defeated, things would have simmered down in phase II for a while until they felt the conditions were right to try a phase III operation again.
Which goes to the point of insurgency: So long as the underlying conditions that gave rise to the insurgency exist, you can suppress it, but you can not stomp it out. The government must ultimately answer to its populace; either at the end of a bayonet, or by simply doing their job and addressing the legitimate concerns and grievances (or getting out of the way and allowing a governance that will do so) before it comes to that.
Not sure whether you were talking to
Quote:
Originally Posted by
reed11b
Is this considered nessecary to be defined as an insurgency?
Bob's World whose position my response that you quoted was directed to; to me; or to Cav Guy whose thread this is?
In any event CavGuy answered and did it well IMO. As for the position Bob's World states, he didn't restrict it to economic or social matters so the religious difference or just an ideological difference as well as ethnic and other differences are covered by his conditional requirement.
I believe that all those things you mention and more in the two Viet Nams in the early 60s were roughly in balance with slightly better industry and more efficient government with less corruption in the North but better economic, religious and ethnic / individual freedom conditions in the South. It was IMO better than a draw with a fair edge to the South, thus my response to him.
Some readings on a closely related topic
Cavguy,
One of the weeks of my graduate seminar in international security here at Duke deals with the performance of democracies in wars in general. This question is larger than your specific topic, but I'm thinking you might find it useful to look over some of these readings (unless you've done so already) to get an idea of how the literature on this issue evolved and where it is right now.
Håvard Hegre, et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” APSR 95/1 (March 2001): 33-48.
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, 2002).
David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” APSR 86/1 (March 1992): 24- 37.
Michael C. Desch, “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters,” IS 27/2 (Fall 2002): 5-47.
Responses to Desch by Choi, Lake, and Reiter and Stam; and Desch’s reply, IS 28/1 (Summer 2003): 142-94.
Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart (and Tough) Are Democracies Anyway? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” IS (forthcoming; Blackboard).
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (MIT, 2003).
Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, “Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94,” APSR 95/3 (September 2001): 633-47.
Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, 2003).
Recommended Critiques:
Michael C. Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism (Johns Hopkins, 2008).
Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, “Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look,” JCR 48/4 (August 2004): 525-46.
Risa Brooks, “Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay,” IS 28/2 (Fall 2003): 149-91.
I personally find your topic highly interesting. Do you have any particular case-studies in mind as well?
Warning Will Robinson Warning- Major over simplification incoming
Forgive me for the way this may sound but doesn't it seem like the actual justification's or reasons we find for unrest in general let alone insurgency, wars and the like are formed into some sort of massive jumble through our efforts to explain it rather than just see them for what they are?
Mankind is.
Mankind thinks- (sometimes):wry:
A family is the base unit of our communal existence, within it constructs we find order through determination to follow whatever path seems consistant with survival and perhaps even more importantly further development. Call it what you will; self-determination, self-actualization, self-development, Whats in it for me, etc.
Each individual seeks to find success(for lack of a better word) through their interactions with others in context with the environment within which they find themselves and what their experiences have shown them to be at least plausible. That said the structure for leadership doesn't really seem to vary so much as many seem to believe.
Parents fill the role of providing guidance and direction for the family, that is until such time as the children feel that their (needs, wants, desires, just deserts) are not being met to their satisfaction and they choose to strike off on their own. Societal norms generally seem to follow this same basic premise. So IMHO do many if not all major forms of governance.
Dictatorial - I follow you because I have no other choice, but at least I'm alive( Let the latter part come into question and I revolt regardless of my chances for success
Ideological- Generally Same as above except its not that I have too but that I choose to ascribe to said philosophy and as such follow you
Theocratic- I follow you because my faith teaches that I must follow the direction of those who have or are being directed to lead me
( This works until, as with the family unit I feel that my needs be they spiritual or otherwise are not being met with what I believe my faith requires of my leaders.
Democratic- The family chooses its leader through whatever form its comfortable with and follows them. Society chooses it leaders and as such chooses to follow with the addendum that should you not get them what they want they can choose somebody else. Let it get to where they feel like you might take that choice away and they'll revolt.
Long and short many in this life just want to be left alone but are still a part of whatever process takes place within their environments. If things become notably out of sorts they will and do come out of their corners.
Dictatorships have a really hard time dealing with that awakened giant due to the fact their survival was enabled through that groups silence
Theocracies have the choice of adjusting their overall presentation in order to facilitate a settling of tension's. They just have a tendency of refusing to do so due to "principles" or the fact that they really didn't believe so much as they used that belief to enhance their stature.
Democracies can and do more often than not get changes sufficient to calm the heaviest part of the uprisings and when they don't wars happen. Since most still want at least a semblance of democracy the more common action is to compromise and address the grievances one way or another.
Rant complete
OH well Good luck with the paper Niel :D
"North Vietnam" was not an outside power
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
And by that time well over 90 plus percent of the original insurgents were dead. I'm aware of Mao's Phases -- even more aware of Giap's (who was about twice as smart as Mao) plan.Probably true.Not really true with respect to Viet Nam -- most of the populace just wanted to be left alone. Some insurgencies are started and run by very dedicated folks who take the semblance of a problem, elevate it to a casus belli and go for broke.
I usually object to comparisons of Malaya and Viet Nam because the efforts were so very different -- but they do have one thing in common; in both cases an outside power (China in the first case, North Viet Nam in the second) took some social ills and raised them to start insurrections. Both were effectively stopped by a combination of good COIN tactics (very belatedly in VN) and political fixes. The big difference was that China was in no position to elevate to Phase III.
So yeah, it was a three phase effort -- but the insurgents didn't win they were mostly Southerners who did not necessarily want to hew to Ho. Another nation's fighters did win -- and the North had manipulated the VC almost as badly as they did the US.
The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.
Ok Ken, now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency. This is whole idea of a "North" and "South" Vietnam is just another aspect of the Western Colonial influence imposed on one populace. Vietnam had enjoyed some 900 years of independence from China prior to being subjected to about 100 years of French occupation and colonization. Upon successfully defeating that occupation the country was artificially divided into North and South states for purely Western political purposes. Did China and Russia support the Vietnamese movement to liberate themselves from this Western influence? Absolutely. Was North Vietnam somehow an "outside power" because a group of white men thousands of miles away drew a line on a map? Hardly.
This goes to a key aspect of my Populace-Centric theory. (Not controlling the populace, as in Kilcullen's population-centric tactics applied in Iraq; but in focusing on the needs, desires, perspectives and will of the populace as one engages through their government. To seek to meet our own interests in ways that are not counter to the interests of the populace; and to be, where necessary, an enabler of better relations between a populace and its governance and not a wedge to the same.)
We ignored the will of the Vietnamese populace writ-large by first reinstating the French occupation, and then by enforcing the artificial border through the heart of their homeland as part of our Cold War hedge against the Soviets.
I'd hate to see us make the same (similar) mistake in Afghanistan / Pakistan where a historic populace is also in revolt and we are preparing to commit tremendous energy once again to enforce a border created by white men thousands of miles away that cuts through the heart of the Pashtu homeland to reinforce states that reflect Western interests more than the interests of the Populaces they encompass.
When we learn from history, it is important that we take away the right lessons. Just me, but to me the main lesson is that the west can no longer simply expect eastern populaces to accept what we lay out for them, but that we can still achieve our vital interests in these areas by changing our approach to one of reinforcing the will of the populaces of these regions as prioritized over any vestiges of western governmental constructs imposed over the years, or ideas of how we currently want them to behave.
Surely we can be smart enough to find a way to support divided historic populaces around the world without having to destroy the states they reside within. Surely we can be smart enough to support troubled states without having to destroy the historic populaces that are divided by their borders.
My vote is for fighting smarter, not harder. We need a surge of strategic thinking, not a surge of hard young riflemen like my son. As long as we think we are there to "defeat" some threat as opposed to enable a stronger relationship between a populace and its governance we will fail. As long as people seriously think that a Clausewitzian model of warfare based on study of the Napoleonic wars between states applies directly to this type of conflict we will fail.
This is people business. Understand people first; second understand what actions over the years have manifested in the conditions of conflict that exist. Next, sit down and figure out new ways to meet your national interests in that region that are designed not to reinforce the failed system, but to enable a new system that has a chance to work.
(Ok, this is way longer, and went down a path I did not fully intend when I started typing 20 minutes ago, but sometimes you just have to go with the flow. Ken, clearly this is not all aimed at you. I just think you mischaracterize the true Vietnamese populace, but I also understand you have valid reasons for your positions. You earned them, and I have the highest respect for that.)