Two divergent legal views ...
so, you (used generically for "a person") can be both right and wrong - depending on whether the brief you carry is carried in one country or another.
On one hand, the Eminent Jurists Report has a viewpoint that gh_uk probably favors.
On the other hand, the US courts - and both the Bush II and Obama administrations - have a different viewpoint, which is gradually evolving based on principles of the Laws of War (as interpreted and applied in the US) and on the principles and interpretations of the US Constitution. That is still a work in process - with ramifications not only on the Laws of War, but also on future ROEs. So, this thread which looks at developments in both the US and the UK.
For a more in depth look at Astan, look at this thread -which presents the US constitutional view on some related issues.
The Bush II administration had some very odd ideas (promulgated mostly in the period 2001-2003 by John Yoo et al) about executive power, rendition, interrogations and a number of domestic situations. While those odd ideas have been largely scrapped, the more mainstream Bush II positions (as to detention, Iraq and Astan) have been continued with different rhetoric.
I have a lot of problems with Wilf's examples and definitions, which I expect is due to having completely different perceptions of the same facts. However, this is enough for now.
Wilf, I will get back on this later ...
without any spin. :D
Have to leave on a project (got lost on the time while composing a reply) - either later today or Sun.
Time to transform our terminology to......
BW's post intentionally, or unintentionally, supports my repeated argument throughout the SWJ council for a transformation in our thinking (which will require a new set of terminology) about our security problems, instead of the stale responses of narrowly trying to define the problem so we can define and apply the opposite as a solution: terrorism = counterterrorism, insurgency = counterinsurgency, etc. We ignore the complexity of context at our peril.
Below are some BW's quotes that are worth considerable thought and discussion. If the irregular warfare concepts that the SECDEF is trying to get the military to master is simply going to be a reintroduction of our stale doctrine on COIN, UW, CT, etc., then IMHO we are missing a golden opportunity to adjust they way we think about our security interests and how we develop and implement appropriate strategies. The military is great ship that can evolve rapidly, but revolutionary change is prohibited by our bureaucracy and ingrained perceptions. Doctrine is a double edged sword, and at this point in time it is harming us, more than helping us.
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One thing we should have learned is that in this globalized world, it is far easier (and getting more so daily) for a group of individuals to conduct an act of war against a state than it is for a state to wage war against a group of individuals.
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"Sir, you don't want to risk strategic defeat when the greatest possibe gain is merely a tactical one."
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So, in addition to getting the legal status straight, it is EXTREMELY important to take operational and strategic planning out of the war construct and instead place it within a holistic strategy-driven, policy-based construct that seeks to stabilze these fragile states through a program of engagement that includes tailored programs for each of these violent groups to remove the problems. Simply conducting a COIN or CT or any other war campaign won't cut it.
Exactly, thus the risk of trying to define the problem as simply terrorism, insurgency, instability, etc.
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Back in the day, the US military routinely conducted military operations in areas of conflict without demanding that the entire nation join them in a state of war. Somewhere we lost sight of that. We've come to believe that if our military is fighting then we must support them by ensuring that our entire nation is at war.
Bravo! How many commanders are more focused on public affairs than strategy and fighting? There is a difference between grass roots engagement to shape perceptions of the local audience and the constant striving for a Kodak moment so we can push a so called good news story to our homefront. We're conducting operations in many places very effectively that never see the light of day in our press, that should be the norm, not the exception.
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China thinks in terms of hundreds and thousands of years, and they have to watch in wonder as we flail away in the moment. I'd really like to wipe that smile off of their faces. We aren't down and out by a long shot, we just need to focus a little less on fighting small wars, and a little more on crafting and implementing big strategy. We can do this.
We can, but not without a "significant" change in our government institutions and thought processes.
This does not look good to me
From what I can see from the previous posts, there seems to be leg missing from the three legged stool.
Almost all assume Strategy to be the rational and logical exercising of state power. It is not. It never has been and never will be. Strategy is Politics. Politics has all the rationality and logic of the fashion industry. In fact fashion has to make money, so some skill is required. No so in Politics.
Politics is not informed by information. It is informed by opinion and belief. It seems to me that what is being talked about is the Political beliefs surrounding Terrorism and Insurgency.
Seems to me that anyone assuming otherwise is set to work against the chaos instead of within it. We may make progress if we stop using the word "Strategy" and start saying Politics/Policy.
I wish you every success...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
...Back in the day, the US military routinely conducted military operations in areas of conflict without demanding that the entire nation join them in a state of war. Somewhere we lost sight of that...
I missed that. Demanding the entire Nation join them in a state of war. I didn't see it at all in Korea or Viet Nam; There were in both wars a few folks who grumbled about the fact they were engaged and others were not but they were a quite small minority. I did see a glimmer of such thinking during Desert Storm and it is certainly, oddly IMO, quite prevalent today. I just figured it was due to better communication and the mass media effect.
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It gives our major opponents a good chuckle as they watch us flounder. China thinks in terms of hundreds and thousands of years, and they have to watch in wonder as we flail away in the moment. I'd really like to wipe that smile off of their faces. We aren't down and out by a long shot, we just need to focus a little less on fighting small wars, and a little more on crafting and implementing big strategy. We can do this.
That's what I wish you success in achieving. I believe you're asking for more than this nation can deliver -- not because we're evil or stupid but simply due to the governmental structure and functioning mode. We're too big, diverse and chaotic to settle on a coherent long term strategy, thus the effort IMO should go to influencing policy. That is achievable, a long term strategy, I'm afraid, is in the too hard box.
From your later post:
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In a nutshell our proposal is based on the premise that understanding and shaping the overall environment is more important than any individual immediate threat...
Couldn't agree more. US History, however, does not lead me to be very sanguine about your prospects. The Chinese do indeed think very long term -- we, OTOH, tend to think four years is an eternity. I'm not sure the "Now" generation we have created can focus long enough to do that. Still, I hope you're correct and I'm wrong.
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The President just announced his new way forward for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and while I have not seen any details, it sounds like a mix of SFA in Afg; and CT in Pak. I would only add that without a grand strategy to measure it against, it is hard to assess if this is the right way or not. I know I will look at it in terms of "how does this contribute to the greater Credible Influence of our nation."
I suspect the answer to your question will be 'not much.'
You and Bill are probably correct in what you wish for but I think Wilf has it right on the reality. We can influence policy...
The attachment below gives the reason I'm not terribly hopeful that your strategy concept will be adopted at the national level -- or that Afghanistan is going to work out too well. I would note that the Upper Time Line is far too short; five years is not a long time to most others. The Lower Time Line reverses that and is probably too long for the US general public -- or body politic... :(