Is there a Dutch approach ?
The nature of intervention operations the Western world has primarily engaged in over the last decades, has changed. Destroying the opponent’s (military) capabilities is not sufficient anymore to achieve the primary political strategic goals. In fact, military capabilities are just a minor element of the operational environment. An environment in which adaption is needed to cope with society, politics, economy, culture and (non)governmental organisations.
An adapted way of acting, asks for an adapted organisation. We have to relate to organisations as a system of systems, visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors. An organisation which is able to operate in permissive, semi permissive and non permissive environment. In exercises like Uruzgan Integration, Royal Netherlands Army elements are joined together into modular units. These modular units give input in the ability to learn (training, practising, performing their job) from each other.
That is why the Ministry of defence of The Netherland developed the 3-D approach, Diplomacy, Development and Defence. It includes Security Sector Reform, Stabilization, Governance, Development and Reconstruction.
The Royal Netherland Army recognises that modular organised units relate to this 3D approach. They operate in a consistent mix of a permissive, semi-permissive and non-permissive environment. The effect is complementary.
The “Uruzgan Integration” exercise combines the 3D approach. In this exercise the modular units consists of elements like Psychological Support (to inform the Afghan population), Infantry (to provide security for the unit), Provincial Reconstruction (to provide development and Diplomacy in Afghanistan), Reconnaissance (to provide information), Intelligence (to provide the current situation in favour of the unit), Police Mentoring (to educate the Afghan Uniformed police), Military mentoring (to educate the Afghan National Army). All these elements are combined in one unit and are also trained to be aware of the fact that they all are key in influencing the behaviour.
The Army, Navy or Air force are not the key elements in the 3D approach, its main responsibility is to shape the conditions for Diplomacy and Development.
Trying to bring Diplomacy and Development into Afghanistan , The Royal Netherlands Army learned that the overall end state should be a lawful and tolerant Islamic Republic of Afghanistan based on mutual respect for each other where people can life their lives in a safe and secure environment.
The current illiteracy (around 80%) is the main aspect to be aware of. The afghan society is an oral society. The spoken word is the main source for news so the defence against the opponent, which is also the Taliban, is not only military but a multi-faceted, multi-area effort having a long term goal that every Afghan, men and women alike, has the right to be able to write and to read.
The synergy of effort within the 3D approach is in support of the mission for Taskforce Uruzgan objectives. This is based on a comprehensive and systemic understanding of the environment as a whole derived from all source intelligence, and the subsequent analysis of adversaries, potential adversaries and other parties, their objectives, Centres of Gravity (COGs), and end state. Modular organised units are able to provide detailed profiling, target audience and network analysis. This will ascertain the most appropriate and effective and balanced operation. A selection of activities, carefully tailored to the regional circumstances, will form the basis for achieving the objectives we like to reach with our 3D approach.
The object in war is to obtain a better peace...
From B.H. Liddell Hart's book Strategy:
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A long series of mutually exhausting and devastating wars, above all the Thirty Years War, had brought statesmen by the eighteenth century to realize the necessity, when engaged in war, or curbing both their ambitions and their passions in the interests of their purpose. On the one hand, this realization tended to produce a tacit limitation of warfare-an avoidance of excesses which might damage after-the-war prospects. On the other hand, it made them more ready to negotiate a peace if and when victory came to appear dubious of achievement. Their ambitions and passion frequently carried them too far, so that the return to peace found their countries weakened rather than strengthened, but they had learnt to stop short of national exhaustion. And the most satisfactory peace settlements, even for the stronger side, proved to be those which were made by negotiation rather than by decisive military issue.
Three points occur so far in this thread...
Two from the Liddell-Hart quote:
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"...Their ambitions and passion frequently carried them too far, so that the return to peace found their countries weakened rather than strengthened, but they had learnt to stop short of national exhaustion..."
True but problematical when the opponent is not another nation but a non-state entity with ill understood aspirations. That not only changes the rules, it significantly alters the playing field. Large bureaucracies and foreign affairs professionals do not adapt well to rule changes -- or to playing fields of irregular shapes.
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"...And the most satisfactory peace settlements, even for the stronger side, proved to be those which were made by negotiation rather than by decisive military issue."
Always true, particularly true in irregular / COIN warfare. Quite problematic, though, when the opponent truly cannot negotiate because he is too disparate and amorphous to provide, much less enforce, a binding resolution...
Those are worrisome issues that merit some long term thinking.
This from Coined, however is a critical and important point that merits some action while the previous points are pondered and pontificated upon:
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"Then you can talk about a full scale war, also when that is the case the permissive and semi-permissiv still make part of your approach towards those we categorise as opponents. We have to adapt our organisation to that.
It is also one that large bureaucracies have great difficulty understanding, much less implementing.
The prognosis, as the saying goes, is not good...
I did not say anyone was desperate
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Originally Posted by
Coined
You say:
"Quite problematic, though, when the opponent truly cannot negotiate because he is too disparate and amorphous to provide, much less enforce, a binding resolution..."
Note the word is 'disparate'; that means "Fundamentally distinct or different in kind; entirely dissimilar: Containing or composed of dissimilar or opposing elements." -- there are too many factions. The so-called Taliban are but many (even the Talibs are not unified; far from it...) out of many more. All of those many and varied groups are also amorphous which means there's no form or crux to their effort. More succinctly and directly, that means no one is really in charge so we cannot really make a deal with them -- though we may well fake one before we withdraw in 2011, declaring victory as we pass the Pakistanis with smug grins on their faces.
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Well, I think that the opponent is not desperate.
Nope, not one bit. Time is on their side and they know it. No reason for them to be desperate or even slightly worried. However, they are disparate as we both seem to say...;)
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The word "oppoment" usually relates to a visible and organised element. In current conflicts an opponent can be a politician, a local policeman, a governmental rep, .... and so on.
Startling revelation -- can we then say that an opponent is not necessarily a visible and organized element but can be anyone or any number of anyones who oppose to some degree or another what one wishes to say, do or to occur? That should be an acceptable definition. It was to me. :confused:
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Referring to Afghanistan the Western population often think that the opponent is Taliban. Well, I think that Taliban is the high leadership and some midlevel leaders in the provinces and that 80% of what we refer to as Taliban are not more than people who try to earn a living for their family, people who fight out of hatred because of ten years of Russian violence and years of Taliban supression (although the population embraced the Taliban in the first year of their power) and others who to things for the Taliban because they are intimidated to do so. Taliban as a name is sometimes also used to cover up drugscrime .... not only people in Afghanistan earn a lot by trading drugs.
I think we can agree on all that though it has little bearing on anything I said. However, since that is apparently a new question, seems to me the answer was provided by Eden above: "I suspect most Afghans would prefer a weak central government that serves mostly as a foil for the ambitions of neighboring tribes, ethnic groups, or warlords." Only thing I'd add is that my bet is that's what they'll end up having. As it was in the beginning, is now... :cool:
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So, what do the Afghanis want for themselves and for their children?
Unless you're an Afghan, neither you or I can or should answer that question and, frankly, it would be foolish for us to try. It is up to the Afghans to sort out the answer to that in their own way and in their own time. For us to presume to do it for them is the height of deluded western egocentrism -- and folly. Welcome to Afghanistan.
Borrowing from Forrest Gump..
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Originally Posted by
Coined
That's correct.
The article is mine.
So, now it is time for some valuable indepth discussions about permanent modular organised units based upon the a 3Block warfare scenario. Imho there is a consistentcy in permissive, semi-permissive and non-permissive. You cannot seperate them as they are interconnected. Sometimes one of the three is manifest, for instance non-permissive. Then you can talk about a full scale war, also when that is the case the permissive and semi-permissiv still make part of your approach towards those we categorise as opponents.
We have to adapt our organisation to that.
I may not be a smart man but I know post modernist babble when I see it. :eek:
What is this saying?
And then, why?
Can anyone other than the author even begin to guess as what it has to do with COIN ?
If I was ever captured, forget the waterboarding , or even the powerdrill like the good old AQI funsters.. I would scream for mercy if people continually read what routinely passes as 'COIN' writing in many journals to me...
Gian, mate, where are you? ... don't fight against COIN initiatives, use those professorial skills to rage against poor expression and prose. We are drowning it , Orwell is spinning in his grave.
Aghh!
I'm not sure it's a question of linear thinking so much as it's
a question of nothing new.
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1. The environment we operate in;
2. the (troop contributing) Western countries;
3. all countries which are in a certain way connected to the country we are guest in or intervened in.
Also the above has to be synchronised and coordinated.
I suspect most here would agree with those considerations -- but most will also note that they are all well known and long standing questions to which there are many answers -- there is no possibility of a 'one size fits all' solution as we are dealing with people. The answers will change as events occur and there will also be variations in the questions themselves.
Thus the overarching question becomes "Yes. So?" What, precisely, are you postulating?
And I agree with Rex' comments.
I will also offer an additional Item:
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"...the coming battlefield in the potential arena of conflict (republics bordering Russia – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan – Middle East – Northern part of Africa)."
That seems to suggest that those regions will be a battlefield.
Why must that be so?
It seems to me that if the flexibility that you desire (and which many others have noted is needed) but do not offer suggestions to obtain were present, such conflicts could be averted. There seem little question that they should be ...
Datapoints on the Dutch Approach...
From a 2006 Speech by the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bot at the SID and NCDO Conference on Security and Development
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The key to success in conflict prevention and resolution is the overall political framework that gives logic and coherence to the political, military and developmental efforts we undertake. I call this the trinity of politics, security and development - in reference to the Clausewitzian trinity of army, people and government. (The business of Clausewitz was war; our business is to make peace.)
When the trinity of politics, security and development is broken, the work of soldiers, police officers, diplomats and development workers will lack direction, lack coherence and lack impact, and, at worst, will become counterproductive.
Maintaining cohesion between our political, security and development efforts is especially relevant in regions affected by conflict, or regions that serve as safe havens for extremists and terrorists. In places where we are trying to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, our military efforts should support and be seen to support this overall effort. Where we are trying to win over the population for a more peaceful and stable order, our developmental instruments should support and be seen to support the overall effort.
This brings me to the efforts made by the Netherlands to support peace and development.
When a country has emerged from armed conflict, its social fabric has often been torn apart. The humanitarian situation is poor, the economy has collapsed, public administration has been weakened, large numbers of people are unemployed, displaced and traumatised, and the profusion of small arms and high crime rate engender feelings of insecurity. Experience has shown that, in 30% of post-conflict countries, violence flares up again within ten years. In Africa, that rate is as high as 50%
The NRC Handelsblad has some interesting articles on this topic from time to time...
I think he says pretty much what Coined says.
And, as noted, all that has been said by many around the world. So that returns to the root of the Thread...
Is there a Dutch approach? In the sense that it is even slightly different than the approaches of others to like problems?
Coined has not, IMO, made the case this is so. Nor, I believe, does that 2006 speech -- but I'm certainly willing to be shown wrong.
More to the point, Coined also postulates "that the current way we organise our armies are residues of the past. We have to get rid of linear thinking, dogmatic and "stove piped" organisations." Who here would disagree with that.
As Rex said "make sure the jargon:insight ratio tilts heavily to the latter." Thus I'm awaiting some insights.
Stripped to its essentials ...
isn't the ideal here like such. A group that has:
1. Absolute and perfect horizontal and vertical lines of communications within the group.
2. Innovation and intuition at all levels are encouraged (and in fact crucial) within the limit that all good things must come to an end - decisions must be made within time frames.
3. Expertise in specialized areas comes into the group - preferably from in-house associated groups (since then #1 comes fully into play); but if required, from outside sources.
4. Absolute in-house confidentiality as to everything known in-house (both the lead group and all associated groups), except for designated output.
5. Communications with outside sources is limited to a need to know basis for confidentiality reasons.
6. The designated in-house lead group is in charge.
Nothing new in any of this - standard practice on "big case" and "big project" matters in the legal field (e,g., Sullivan & Cromwell and Donovan-Leisure in the 60s and probably for decades before); and I expect many organizations (business, government and military) as well.
The trick is to do this within a bureaucratic framework (large law firms are bureaucratic, but can't afford to be too bureaucratic) - which is easier said than done.
Should we call this the American Approach ? :D
