Blending into the mindset of the Human Terrain
Effects are not stove piped as they interact and are complementary to each other. The very short term can have a direct impact on the long term so they have to be balanced related to the IRoA end state (NOT the Democratic republic of Afghanistan but the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).
Through interaction more sub effects and indicators will be derived from the Lines of Operation. "Out of the box" thinking will have to be encouraged at the expense of stove pipes, "fenced domains", personalities and comfort zones.
Those desired effect are a result of an agreed end state. Agreed at and derived from the strategic level by the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the min of development and the min of Defence.
All activities are connected to the several effect-delivering parts of our organization as everybody has a unique role in influencing behavior.
This has to be trained well before (Modular) units are deployed.
I think it would be wise to initiate some brainstorm sessions about another and more complementary way to conduct training (train as you operate) in which every participant (soldier, NCO, officer, civilian) is aware about his role as “influencer of behavior in a certain environment”.
Furthermore the point of departure should be a consistent and consequent permissive, semi-permissive and non-permissive mindset for training. Also when there is an operation in the highest level of violence the approach should be under the umbrella of that 3BW environment, btw, non-permissive imo does not refer to an exlusive hostile environment.
Such way of thinking asks for process controlled organizations rather that a line-staff organization. We have to relate to our organization as a system of systems, a modular unit of which al (non)kinetic elements make part. This means something for all our training centres because a modular organized unit will interact differently at all levels. A modular unit is a consistent and constant (non)kinetic organized unit based at a barracks working and training together permanently. All levels will be trained, the mix of (non)kinetic will differ but everyone still is aware that they are complementary.
A system of sytems approach with Modular units answers the current and future conflicts more comprohensive. The public support for military interventions is highly influenced by the opinion of the media, politicians and population in "our" home country, the country we intervene in and the countries who are in what way whatso ever are related to "our' country or to the AO.
Imo the potential conflict arena for the coming ten years stretches between the republics bordering Russia via Eur Asia, the ME to Africa. In this and other parts of our world I think we will be confronted with "fighting" about economical aspects, energy resources and water management. The military element in this will not have such a prominant role, maybe in an initial entry or as "firemen" mainly contucting a shaping role for security, development and diplomacy.
How do I see this work?
As we operate in urbanized “human” terrain we have to train in such terrain. Let’s say an initial entry in a semi-permissive environment at an airfield nearby a town (not with huge warfighting, we know how to fight but do we also know Why, How and with Whom to interact)?
Military have to make contact with logistical elements at that airfield and in the town to facilitate FoF, or they act as FoF themselves, it depends on the scenario. All civilian participants in the training are informed and civilian role play is instructed.
PsyOps teams (Train as you Operate) have made an assessment of the town population (real town, real people, real assessment), make contact with local media to inform the population about the coming exercise, explain to them the Why and How, and ask them (in one of the town parts) to participate in let’s say a roadblock.
Recce elements can perform their obs/surv task assisted by colleagues of the Home guard (a recce element makes an obs post in a room of a Home guard member opposite a bar, the bar is frequented by some MVI’s or HVI’s role play, they have to create a pattern of life, information will go up the chain and a lift ops can be executed at some training area as we don’t like to show our MO).
Lift operations and the more violent ops can be trained at a training area IVO a town.
Maneuver elements will “social patrol” a part of the town, introducing themselves to the population asking them some questions. Bottom line, Go to the people, introduce yourself, start a conversation and gain desired information/intelligence.
You can imagine the participation of all other elements (PRT and so on) that make part of the Modular unit.
Per level of training and of the Modular unit size the desired effects we like to achieve with the exercise can be developed. Of course this all depends of an integral, coordinated and synchronized approach.
Role play can be performed by:
Civilians from a theatre company to train the Modular unit in a permissive environment
Home guard in civvies to train the Modular unit in a semi-permissive environment.
Home guard or other military in "uniform" to train the Modular unit in a non-permissive environment.
Ofcourse these elements are integrated, also when the non-permissive part is manifest, the othter two elements are stiil existent as the "human terrain" will always play an important, even decisive part in our operations.
Training with modular units needs an extensive preparation, is highly related to "the way we operate" and will learn each participant that they all are key to achieve a desired end state.
An additional value of such training is the PR/Marketing of our efforts to the population who are able to get acquainted with the how and why of our activities and approaches.
Comment on another thread please
COINED,
This thread is duplicated by your other thread, with the same text. Can anyone adding comments use this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7185
Thanks
davidbfpo
I'm unsure what you're trying to say.
I did not comment on your initial post in this thread because in my opinion it said nothing. Others have commented and, essentially, expressed the thought that you really said nothing new -- and your response to that is to provide short, snippy comments that essentially do not seem communicate your thoughts at all well. I suggest that if six people -- and I make seven -- have said that your point is not well understood, then perhaps you should look at what you are trying to accomplish and rephrase significantly some of your more pithy comments.
For example
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Coined
If it is all old news, why then do we still follow the "old school", because it is part of our comfortzone??
Because Armies, Nations and People (as a group) all change slowly. New ideas get adopted as they appear and if they seem to make sense. People frequently will learn new things and use them but succeeding generations discard those things as irrelevant -- then a new crisis appears and things get 'rediscovered' and eventually get embedded as standard practice.
The world has been operating in that fashion for thousands of years and that is unlikely to change. So, yes, the comfort zone aspect is part of it, National psyches and penchants are part of it, the dynamics of situations are part of it -- and human fallibility is involved in all those . Also involved are group dynamics
Only the young who have no use for history don't know all that -- or pretend as if they do not.
Quote:
By the way, the ball is in OUR court!!
What does this mean. Specifically:
Of what Ball are you speaking, that is what specifically do you think should be done?
Follow on questions:
Is anyone doing or trying to do what you think should be done? If yes, who and how successfully? If not, who and why not?
Is there a proverb that says "He who looks for a three block war will find one?"
If there is not there should be. Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain...
That said, Coined's suggestions are, as I meant to say in my first post on this thread, nothing new. As others here have pointed out, even the evil old US has adopted all those techniques. Re adopted, actually -- we used them all before and just let them fall away. Way of the world...
Been my observation that Cops do not fight fires well. Also noted that firefighters do not do police chores well. Soldiers can of course do both jobs and have done so for years -- they just don't do either very well. My bet is that will not change. Diplomacy, successfully applied has halted a need for troops many times -- that seems a better alternative than any kind of war. Or any commitment of military force that can be avoided -- such commitments have a way of escalating things.
Spend too much time training a person to be nice and you will succeed, spend too much training him to be destructive and you will succeed. It is possible to achieve a balance and we should strive for that but we should never forget that any compromise brings shortfalls in some areas. Military forces can, if necessary, do a marginal job in stability operations; they will never do a good job, it simply is not their field. Nor should it be.
I know their is a proverb about horses for courses... :wry:
Be glad to provide a contructive comment...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Coined
Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.
No one is disagreeing with that. What we're awaiting is your providing some fresh thinking. Thus far, as Van said; "This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.". To cap that, you even provide a link to the US army Combined Arms Center for backup of your position even though you offered several criticisms of US practices.
You did make this valid statement:
Quote:
"For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts."
I can't speak for others but I do not question that. My guess is that most here would agree. Thus my comment above; ""Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain...""
Quote:
And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on.
The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
I would be happy to comment on anything new that is the sum of any parts. Thus far, you have provided nothing new that I have seen and no sum.
Quote:
Ready for some constructive and additional coments. :)
I though I had supplied some constructive comment which apparently you missed. Let me sum up my comments:
You so far as I can tell offer nothing new or innovative, instead say we need to incorporate best practices identified by many over the years -- and which are already being applied. No one has disagreed with that, many merely pointed out that is being done.
You propose to retrain military forces for a stabilization role. My experience and observation over a good many years and involving troops from many nations tells me this is an acceptable plan if there is no alternative; if there is any way to preclude such a military commitment, it should be pursued because military forces NEVER do a good job at stability operations; there are better ways.
My view is that the problems cited in that last statement will not change regardless of training UNLESS you completely move the force away from combat operations; I doubt this is a good idea.
Stabilization of problematic nations will without be required. Identification and evaluation of such a problem should be followed by rapid and adequate application of civilian efforts to preclude the necessity of a military deployment.
Two comments to add to all that; rapid and timely civilian intervention has been precluded and deterred by several factors. It worked for Colonies; it works less well in a post-colonial world where sensitivities to 'help' are a major problem that does not change the fact that civil is better and a military effort can create as many problems as it solves. Secondly, Europeans live in smaller, more homogeneous nations with strong central governments and have a colonial history and thus are more adept at providing such aid than are Americans. We know that and we accept it. We cannot for several reasons adopt European practices in totality. Size and breadth of necessary view being but two.
That's my summation, If I'm wrong in my assessment of your proposals, please tell me precisely what is wrong and I'll adjust.
I've attempted to follow this thread ...
for the past two days. I have a question:
Are the OP and additions thereto intended to provide any guidance to civilians who are interested in the non-military aspects of stability operations (nation building) ?
If so, the OP etc. have failed to reach this member of that audience. I have no idea of exactly what is being proposed or why.
Since the proposals are unclear to me, I cannot assess whether they are aimed at force structures, training, intra-agency co-ordination, inter-agency co-ordination, or something else.
Where does the OP etc. fit into something like James Dobbins' construct in The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (p.27):
Quote:
Setting Priorities
The prime objective of any nation-building operation is to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic. Economic development and political reform are important instruments for effecting this transformation, but will not themselves ensure it. Rather, such efforts need to be pursued within a broader framework, the aim of which is to redirect the competition for wealth and power, which takes place within any society, from violent into peaceful channels.
The first-order priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian assistance. If the most basic human needs for safety, food, and shelter are not being met, any money spent on political or economic development is likely to be wasted. Accordingly, this guidebook is organized around a proposed hierarchy of nationbuilding tasks, which may be prioritized as follows:
Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform
Humanitarian relief: return of refugees and response to potential epidemics, hunger, and lack of shelter
Governance: resuming public services and restoring public administration
Economic stabilization: establishing a stable currency and providing a legal and regulatory framework in which local and international commerce can resume
Democratization: building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections
Development: fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements.
This is not to suggest that the above activities should necessarily be initiated sequentially. If adequate funding is available, they can and should proceed in tandem. But if higher-order priorities are not adequately resourced, investment in lower-order ones is likely to be wasted.
Feel free to treat me as a three-year old in response - consise and definite statements are helpful to us infants.
-----------------
PS: Ken, you mean for 34 years I've been saddled with the boxed set of Bob Asprey's Shadows, when I could've been using an abridged edition ? And referring to that work, is it true that you introduced the gladius to the Legions in one of your training sessions ? :D
While trying to avoid this thread's obligatory headache...
...it became painfully clear that all of us really are talking about the same thing with different words (as people much smarter than me have already pointed out). So, I'll offer this, in plain English:
1. Our terminology changes as our understanding of a problem becomes more refined. A great example is Jennifer Chandler's discussion of our military's fractured, incomplete definition and understanding of what culture is. This thesis was written in 2005. I think we can all point out several examples of the changing terminology (for the better and for the worse) since then. What's the problem with that? IMHO, evolution is a good thing. Change for change's sake is not.
2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it. So far we have not discussed the corrolary implicit in the points of every person that's replied so far (at least, the ones that weren't pickin on people): how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?
