The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier
The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier, 1840-1945.
The British Political Officers (sometimes called Frontier Officers) were mostly (in the NWF) military officers serving, seconded or retired. Their role appears to have been to keep track on the tribes and provide detailed political direction and advice to commanders. I am trying to research some more on them as it occurs to me that the model used is possibly quite pertinent to today. With the exception of one book (on order, yet to arrive - The Making of a Frontier: Five Years' Experiences and Adventures in Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chitral, and the Eastern Hindu-Kush (by the man who gave us the Durand Line :eek:) I have not found any good material. Does anyone know of any good material, primary or secondary out there? It is mostly outside the scope of the Imperial War Museum in London, and I have yet to check the National Army Museum (London).
On a similar vein - anyone aware of good material on the role of District Officers?
In failed states where any capacity for governance has to be grown (ie Afghanistan and Somalia where there is no functioning police, civil service or education system as we would recognise it, nor the educated middle classes to establish one) and intervention is measured in years, probably decades it occurs to me that the District Officer model could well be a successful model to follow. At the moment however I do not know enough about it to venture much of an opinion! :rolleyes:
British Political Officers
Red Rat,
A good account, although oblique, can be found in Chevenix Trench's book, 'The Frontier Scouts'. Whilst primarily concerned with the development of the various Guides and Scouts regiments that have evolved into the modern, Pakistani, Frontier Corps, there are many references to the roles of the Political Officers.
Another source, although again oblique, are the recollections within the journals of the Indian Army Association (IAA). Now sadly defunct, a quick flick through the pages of that journal (and indeed others such as that of the Sikh Regiment Association) will produce a fund of stories. Some of them are quite wry. I've lost the detailed reference but one account of a major battle which lasted some 24 hours ends with a company commander clearing a ridgeline and just trying to work out how to winkle out the last remaining 'hostiles' from a cave, when along comes the political officer, who had been moving 'one bound' behind the lead troops and talks the opposition out of their bunker. He then led them off downhill without so much as a 'by-your-leave' to the company commander. The latter expressed himself as 'flabbergasted' but his problem had been solved as he reflected it would probably have cost him several men to clear the cave. It would be wonderful to know what the political officer did; I suspect remove them to a tribal shura where a decision would be made on whether they would be punished or more likely 'bound over' to keep the piece, until the next time..........
Lessons learnt? The need for an acceptable mechanism for what I suppose we would now call 'tactical reconciliation' - without the fuss. The need for authorised 'political officers', up close and dirty - perhaps partly met by the successful MSST concept, operating immediately in areas that have been 'cleared' in the SCHB construct. And finally, note the terminology: 'hostiles'. As David Kilcullen has shown, a percentage (the majority?) of those we are fighting are 'accidental guerillas', as Shakespeare puts it, 'Warriors for the Working Day'. In that case gracing them with terms such as Taliban, Anti Government Elements (AGE), Opposing Military Forces (OMF) or even 'insurgents' is to label them incorrectly. Our predecessors called them 'hostiles', because that is what they were at the time but they also knew that tomorrow they would have to deal with them politically. If you 'project' an inaccurate title onto them, then you will be failing in one of the first military principles, 'know your enemy'. May I commend a 'rebranding exercise' therefore - let them be 'hostiles' and thus judged by their behaviour and not by some 'a priori' labelling exercise. We may then learn also to be more discriminating in whom we are dealing with: those that are hardcore and irreconciliable can be dealt with accordingly; those who are willing to accept a political process, even if fighting now, can be approached differently.
Hope this might shed some light???????:wry:
The people of Swat in my experience were quite happy
During my two years in then West Pakistan, based on visits I made to Swat. then ruled by a carried over Raj era family principality, good progress was being made from the grass roots up: schools and colleges for boys and girls; light industry; good agriculture; tourism among the best in the world; great fishing and hunting; mountaineering.
What pulled Swat backward then and now was extremist religious practices and views. The benevolent, albiet non-democratic rulers were eventually pushed out, the necessity to keep a semblance of law and order came about, and coerced Sharia in it's most extreme forms reached it's apex today, and is now being resisted by the local tribes people who are being murdered at worship, Mulims murdering Muslims, while at mosque services, Sunnis attacking Shias.
Too, Christians, while a minority in Swat, had a peaceful coexistance until this era of the Taliban and al Qaida.
I have acquaintances today from Swat who are highly successful as professionals (MDs, recent Harvard Law graduate, etc.) who hate and want an end to the use of extremist religion/terrorism to try to take an unwilling people down to neolothic barbarism.
Terrorists and al Qaida hiding behind the good name of Islam are now being fought vigorously by the several tribes within Swat and this is most welcome. They are fed up and enough is enough bloodshed by the terrorists.
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By the way, Sanderman's 'hearts and minds' amongst the Baloch was created precisely to counter the 'butcher and bolt' policies that 'Henry Lawrence's Young Men' started with the Pashtun, particularly as practiced in Waziristan and Swat. Heard of those places lately? It seems neither tactics nor strategy have changed much in more than a century, so what have we learned?
Basic freedoms involve the haves and the have nots, but social and religious issue of helping the have nots improve their lot is life is opposed by the terrorists, who fight progress to keep the people, the have nots, in economic subjigation in "the name of radical terrorism" which they try to "smoke screen" as religion.
The grass roots have to have basic freedoms and be allowed to practice moderate Islam, too.
Military Stabilisation Support Teams
Red Rat refers to:
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I am less convinced by the MSST (Military Stabilisation Support Teams) concept, partly because I know little about it. From the briefings I have had it comes across more as the deployable wing of the PRT designed to accomplish what the civilian component of the PRT (diplomats and development staff) cannot do because their rules and the local security situation will not allow them to deploy effectively; what they (the MSST) do not seem to possess is any political authority.
I know the advocate of the MSST, who had years of experience in the region and in Helmand. Quite simply the technical skills needed could only be found in the military - mainly from the reservist Territorial Army - who had suffiecent military skills to defend themselves and do the desired task.
The MSST was not envisaged as having any political role, although if deployed in the field - away from the PRT it could easily have that role.
More on Pakistan later.
davidbfpo
Waziristan and FATA resources, past and present
This site has good coverage of day-by-day actions and maps on South Waziristan campaign. http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009. They’ve also got profiles of Taliban leaders. Here’s Hakimullah Mehsud. http://www.irantracker.org/related-t...akes-power-ttp
Also, here are some resources on FATA and Waziristan. As with Afghanistan, it's humbling to consider history and the weight of our current actions.
“Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan,” by Hugh Beattie, published by Curzon Press in 2002 - a detailed, fascinating work, with extensive notes on sources.
“Waziristan 1936-1937: The Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and their Solutions,” by Lieut.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, published in 1938. He and his father before him spent years in/near Waziristan, Balochistan, etc. Available in a couple of formats. http://www.archive.org/details/wazir...93619031345mbp. Also available in PDF http://coin.security-review.net/bits...pdf?sequence=1
“The Shape of Frontier Rule: Governance and Transition, from the Raj to the Modern Pakistani Frontier” by Joshua T. White (published in Asian Security, vol. 4, no. 3, 2008) offers some thoughts on governance reform in FATA and transitioning into the future.
And “Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society,” a 2008 survey, provides an extensive range of public opinions on everything from political institutions to possession of firearms. http://www.understandingfata.org/home.html
Finally, ICG just put out a new report, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA” (21 October 2009) that gives a scorching indictment of the current system governance, including and especially political agents http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6356. There's a thoughtful editorial in Pakistan's Dawn newspaper http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...eforms--szh-01 that points out some important constraints to just solving the problem... There's certainly not agreement in FATA on what reforms should look like.
Brilliant book on the Political Agent - in history
It took a long time to get to read all of Christian Tripodi's book, Edge of Empire: the British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947' and it was brilliant.
The writing style is easy, fluid even; there are references a plenty - so many it deserves a second read to note them. His views are balanced and every factor is taken into consideration - finance in particular, not just the political agent -v- military aspects.
Earlier in this thread Sandeman's work in Baluchistan, which steadily became an imperial province with little conflict, as he followed a policy of 'heats & minds'. Yes, that is where the phrase originated.
There are a couple of contemporary references, rightly the author does not comment on whether the political agent was a "fix" over the Durand Line.
Political Officer commits suicide when ordered to bomb Mahsud homes
Thread re-opened after a day in the archives in London, my research came across a book on North Waziristan 1946-1947, which has first-hand reporting on Political Agents as they were called and a sad tale follows in a moment.
The book is 'Frontier Legion: With the Khassadars of North Waziristan' by Frank Leeson, a very young Ghurkha officer, which was published in 2003. He describes the area:
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When one speaks of them as hills, rolling downs on which tanks and cavalry can operate are not meant, but the worst mountain-warfare country imaginable – steep precipices, narrow winding valleys every vantage point commanded by another, and innumerable refuges and routes of escape.
Link to book, alas without reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Frontier-Legi.../dp/1904726070
For background see this 2008 BBC News item on him: http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7713000/7713192.stm
On June 21st 1946 John "Jos" Donald, the Political Agent for twelve consecutive years, was ambushed by Mahsud tribesmen and held for ten days until a ransom was paid. The Mahsuds refused to return the ransom and the political-military authorities examined their options - they agreed to use aerial bombing (to destroy buildings). "Jos" returned from recuperation leave, engaged in several meetings (Jirga) with the Mahsuds and wrote to the Provincial Governor that he was incapable of carrying out his duty. Soon after he took his own life. (From pg.234).
By mistake the bombing caused a few deaths and led to a political furore across India - at one stage Gandi, from the Congress Party, visited the area and other parts of North West Frontier Province - with a hostile verbal reception from the Pathan tribes at meetings.
