Leading scouting/counter-scouting theorists
I already asked about leading infantry theorists and got some replies, now it's the turn for scouting/reconnaissance, and its counter.
Armour, infantry and air get a lot of attention, but scouting is hugely important as well.
I recall several armor journal articles of the 90's about how the (counter)reconnaissance decided most NTC battles.
There are other, more theoretical reasons for my interest as well.
Well, does anybody know modern (post-'92) theoretical work about ground scouts or cavalry?
An author's name would already suffice as a first hint.
Here's a link to 'Scouts Out.'
Big slow 272 page .pdf
LINK.
True, American Cavalry differed from European norms
in many ways. Almost every way, in fact. We never went the Curassiers, Hussars or Lancers route.They were effectively Mounted Infantry -- not Dragoons -- Mounted Infantry, not the same thing at all.
I recall reading that when Rudyard Kipling visited the US, he talked to a US Cavalry Trooper at Yellowstone, one who had been in the Household Cavalry in the British Army. The man said "Our horses aren't half trained and we almost never use the Saber or do Saber drill -- but we can shoot. I fire more ammunition here in one month than I fired in seven years with the Blues." That carried through to the present day and the Armored Cavalry Regiment that Fuchs fails to appreciate is the result. :D
As one US Cavalry Colonel was heard to remark when asked why we Americans weren't better at sneak and peek reconnaissance; "We don't have the patience for it. We just go out looking for trouble and find it -- if you're going to do that, you have to have Armor and Tanks." True statement, that.
The flip side is that we can and do perform sneak and peak reconnaissance -- we just do it in small batches and we don't talk about it.
Understanding the Terrain
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
The biggest issue I find with people taking about "Reconnaissance", is that it always seems that they mean something over and above "finding the enemy".
Now I don't really KNOW what "Reconnaissance" is. I just accept that I/someone has to find the enemy, to fulfil the "FIND" function. FINDING is vital. I'm not so sure about "Reconnaissance".
Wilf, I disagree with this comment. Before you can FIND the enemy, you must KNOW the terrain. That's where Reconnaissance comes in. In American Doctrine, we have different forms of how to figure out the terrain.
Several forms of Reconnaissance:
-Map
-Aerial
-Route
-Area
-Zone
There are differing views between our Infantry and Armor communities on how to execute reconnaissance missions. I've worked in both, and I prefer a combination of the guidance listed in the Scout Platoon and Infantry Platoon manuals.
v/r
Mike
My views on Reconnaissance
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
In the "Dicta Wilf" Formation I still have no good reason to allocate forces to something we call "Reconnaissance." - Surveillance and Observation, yes!
Wilf, traditionally, the terms surveillance and observation sufficed. I concur with your point. Current Army doctrine on reconnaissance can be very confusing. Back in 2005, when I was a lonely staff weenie trying to transition our infantry battalion into a RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition) unit, I sorted through all the current doctrine and summarized it as best as I could. Simply put, Mike's intepretation of our doctrine is:
1. Reconnaissance- Human Observation
2. Surveillance- Technological Observation (UAV's, sensors, etc)
This simplified our work so when I use the term reconnaissance, I am referring to a group of soldiers collecting intelligence on the terrain or populace to covertly/overtly infiltrate and conduct observation. Likewise, surveillance covers intelligence collected from all the technological toys that we have to play with today.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I think there is a blind spot when it comes to asking how much information do you want to feed the staff beast, and how much time and effort do you want to expend doing it, for no actual proof that it is actually making things better.
In my mind, recon efforts are not driven towards feeding the staff beast. Rather, these missions exist to empower the platoon leaders and staff sergeants conducting missions. Two quick points.
1. Aerial Reconnaissance. Perhaps one of my best learning points from my last deployment taught to me by some wise infantry dudes. Prior to entering a new area, I would take the company leadership for a helicopter ride after we conducted our map reconnaissnce and initial in-brief. These flights allowed my NCO's and O's to gain a better appreciation for the terrain prior to infiltration. We operated in river valleys, mountanious areas, cities, and desert environments so I wanted them to comprehend the differences. The helicopter flight was one such method for better understanding.
2. Route, Area, Zone Reconnaissance. I hate the term that "insurgents melt back into the populace." One's enemy does not possess supernatural powers. After a hasty ambush (IED or small arms attack), they egress using established trails, paths, or roads. Often, these avenues of approach cannot be found on a map. So we conducted patrols to collect better intelligence on every route that existed within our AO. Simultaneously, these patrols gave us the opportunity to talk with the locals. (In some extreme cases, we were the first americans that they had ever met). Later, the knowledge gained allowed us to better understand the enemy's course of action. We established our own ambush positions followed with a "Suprise" for the enemy.
v/r
Mike
Good thread, All three of you do good work.
Wilf, you can have Saturday off; Mike, you can have Sunday off, Tom -- you deployed, no soup for you! :D
Seriously, very good stuff -- I agree and have suffered much that both Tom and Mike say. Goes with the job, I guess...
I can recall setting up more than one R&S line that did not entail any reconnaissance to speak of and which had extremely poor ability to surveill due to human limitations; thus Mike's definitions are I think a step forward.
I agree with Wilf and Tom that RSTA is a bad combination. As is ISR...
Mike also said this:
Quote:
In a perfect world, I'd send every new soldier and officer to the SLC (Scout Leaders course), RSLC (Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course), and Ranger school. The combination of those schools would provide a good understanding of both mounted and dismounted recon.
I agree but suggest that if we simply did IET (Officer and Enlisted) correctly, the critical aspects of all three plus current IET would be included -- and those three courses could be tuned to do a far better job than they now do because of having to train some basics and retrain others...
I went to the old I&R course at Benning a long time ago. It effectively was Ranger School minus idle harassment combined with RSLC running nine weeks and it started with the premise that most of us knew and could do more than we did and proceeded to rapidly move forward causing us to have to scramble to keep up. Best Army School I ever attended by far; the old Pathfinder school (when we still did DZs) was the next best -- operated the same way. Only schools I ever attended that did not cram eight hours instruction into three days and that dropped people for non-performance.
Reconnaissance is a necessary and vital function. It IS everyone's job as Wilf says -- it also requires a few, not many, specialists that can do it stealthily, quickly, thoroughly and tell you accurately what's out there without fighting for it. They need to be a bit better than the average bear.
I totally agree. That used to be the norm.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Van
Please define "close". Ideally, even battalion scouts should be able to operate out of logistical contact and possibly out of battalion and brigade fire support range for at least two to three times as long as an infantry platoon.
The question is how many Commanders in the US Army today are willing to allow that to happen?
Quote:
Re: "Wider Recce"
Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.
Probably so -- and perhaps doesn't bear too much open discussion anyway... :o
Several points on the topic...
Rifleman:
That Close and LRRP definition was one of many BAD results of Viet Nam where one of the more ridiculous SOPs became that no US troops could operate outside US Artillery support fans. Both Brigades I was in ignored the rule totally at the times I was there; most obeyed it. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war... :mad:
Prior to that foolishness, the rule of thumb was that close was indeed inside organic and DS fire support range but that was the province of the Companies. The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoons (recall they were mounted where Scouts are not) had no close or distance restrictions, it was simply a METT based decision and I've operated 60-70 km out for three to five days at a time on many occasions. We pulled two mounted missions in Viet Nam when I was the acting PL and there were no distance or support limits. The rest of the time, we used Helicopter insertions and those were frequently 50-100 km away from everything.
The Separate Brigades in VN had LRP Platoons and Cav Troops. What they did depended on th Bde Cdr. That was all general practice in training prior to VN. After VN, we got stupid.
Van:
Quote:
...how many U.S. COs would use scouts outside of logisitical support range for any length of time;
Probably 'not many'. But having the capability for those special occasions, and maintaining the standards would be worth the training and logistical investments.
True on both counts. The Commanders are constrained by yet another Viet Nam myth and our newly acquired risk aversion. That needs to go. The current TOEs are a 1990s production designed to save spaces and money; it is not a wartime TOE -- and that tradition of peacetime design has hurt the US Army on many occasions. :mad:
I'd note that the Scouts being dismounted are far more a result of the cost of a HMMWV being ten times the cost of the M151 it replaced than any logical doctrinal or tactical reason...
Quote:
...the principle is whether you choose to 'dumb down' your soldiers or provide them the training and tools to exceed your expectations.
EXACTLY! We continually do this. Criminal. :mad:
Fuchs
Quote:
...thinks he meant this to be about armoured recce
He may think that but that's not exactly what he said: LINK. No intent to hijack but recce is a broad topic. In US usage, Scouts generally do dismounted stuff, Cavalry does mounted stuff and Reconnaissance or recce is the act that both perform. All that said not to pick on you, but after three 'mad' icons above, I wanted to leave smiling. ;)