Deficit, Budget, and War

Part of the reason that Afghanistan and Iraq are "Small Wars" to the United States is that they are relatively small in comparison to our military capacity. If Iran were to invade either of those two countries, that would be a major military operation for them, and one that likely would not bode well for either side in the conflict. For the past thirty or more years, the U.S. has substituted military technology for casualties, and it has worked relatively well. (Compare American casualties in Afghanistan with Russian ones.) This has all been made possible by a tremendous budget which currently outstrips the next ten countries combined.

However, the national debt, which for the better half of a century has not been trivial, now looks to take a turn for the gargantuan. If, as has been recently predicted the national defict increases by nearly a trillion dollars each year for the next ten years, it is likely that the U.S. will have to cut deep into defense spending in order to return to solvency. (This is disregarding all of the other significant problems created by spending more than you have).

Rather than having a conversation about national budget policy per se my point is to raise the question of how a smaller military budget would influence the US's ability to intervene in Small Wars around the globe. I see several possibilities. The first is that the U.S. starts substituting bodies for technology, which is practical, but not politically feasible for now. The second is that the U.S. relies more heavily on allies. While that sounds appealing, most of our allies are not militarily capable to pick up enough slack. That is not to say their hearts are not in the right place, but frankly, they have come to rely on the American military and have cut a very deep 'peace dividend' which they cannot easily recover.

The final possibility is the traditional American reaction of Isolationism. Even cutting our military involvements overseas, America can still probably be safe(ish). While I personally do not agree with this strategy there have always been groups that argue for is, and there are still many important scholars who make just such an arguement, and spme variant of this COA seems most probable.

In the end, if the US's military capacity collapses under the weight of its financial profligacy, how do you thing that will change the wars she fights? Do you believe there will be more wars or fewer (between all countries)? Can groups like the UN and NATO survive without the US? What about less powerful countries? I am interested to know what this forum thinks.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

...This has all been made possible by a tremendous budget which currently outstrips the next ten countries combined.

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Which in turn is caused by the fact that the next ten nations in line are unable (due total population) to spend that much and elect not to spend more than they do because we are able to spend that much.

We have spent a relatively small amount of GDP (not a good measure but one that is convenient) on Defense through out our history and not all that much more, as a percentage of GDP than most of those other ten nations.

The budget crunch you accurately cite is due to the increasing amount spent on social welfare by the Federal Government. I'd simply point out that such spending is not the Federal role, it is a State role and the Feds are doing it because our arcane tax system gives them about 60+ % of all government revenue while they expend less than 40% including some but not all of that social welfare and 95+% of the defense expenditure. The difference is transferred to the States and local authorities via grants and transfers -- a woefully inefficient system that wastes scads of money. Were the tax system revised to provide the right amounts at the right level of government and thus better transparency on what amount is spent for what purpose, we might make more sensible decisions. However, Congress will not like that, they prefer the opacity...

All that to point out that the money angle is not as simple as the size of the defense budget.

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Rather than having a conversation about national budget policy...

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Pretty hard not to -- as it is at the heart of your query. It and the various impacts budget and other, of our idiot Congress are really the crux of your post and the drivers of defense policy.

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That is not to say their hearts are not in the right place, but frankly, they have come to rely on the American military and have cut a very deep 'peace dividend' which they cannot easily recover...The final possibility is the traditional American reaction of Isolationism. Even cutting our military involvements overseas, America can still probably be safe(ish).

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True on the allies, true on isolationism which almost certainly will not occur in spite of some pressures but not true on more troops, less tech. I'd argue for significantly fewer -- but far better -- active troops plus a larger, well equipped and trained Strategic Reserve force...

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In the end, if the US's military capacity collapses under the weight of its financial profligacy, how do you thing that will change the wars she fights? Do you believe there will be more wars or fewer (between all countries)? Can groups like the UN and NATO survive without the US? What about less powerful countries? I am interested to know what this forum thinks.

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Not likely to occur; Decreased budget will probably make little real difference in methodology; No major change in the number of conflicts but a generally slowly declining number of State on State wars; Yes, they can survive but I doubt it'll come to that -- if it does, look for the UN (-the US) to declare war on the US. :eek: :wry: (If the EU doesn't beat them to it); Don't understand the "what about less powerful countries" issue?

Here's the FY2009 Outlays (in $ millions):

MILITARY PERSONNEL
ACTIVE FORCES 108,555
RESERVE FORCES 20,019
TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL 128,574

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 212,733
PROCUREMENT 112,897
RESEARCH, DEV, TEST & EVAL 76,352
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 14,113
FAMILY HOUSING 3,354
REVOLVING AND MGMT FUNDS 3,725
DEFENSE-WIDE CONTINGENCIES 200
DEDUCT FOR OFFSETTING RCPTS -1,561
TRUST FUNDS 296
ALLOWANCES 547
INTERFUND TRANSACTIONS -126
TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 551,105

The two heavy hitters are personnel and O&M, at 44%.
Procurement is 21%. (I assume that is systems, not beans and bullets).
RDT&E is 14%.
Those three account for 79% of the budget.

As the force grows, one of three things will happen:

1. Personnel cost increases will be covered by cuts to O&M
2. Personnel and O&M cost increases will be covered by increasing the budget
3. Personnel and O&M cost increases will be covered by (.9999 probability) shifting funds from one of the other two.

I expect a combination of 1 and 3.

Which leaves less than $189B available for budget reductions. Maybe, big maybe, 10% of that can be trimmed, for any reason, without crippling national capability to design, develop and produce major weapon systems.

The consequences I foresee are:

1. Training and readiness deteriorate.
2. The ability to develop and produce new systems deteriorates, including recapitalizing existing systems.
3. The level of military power available begins a steady decrease.
4. US ability to project power deteriorates.

Your big question is: "...if the US's military capacity collapses under the weight of its financial profligacy, how do you thing that will change the wars she fights?"

I think the answer is that we will lose the ability to effectively fight any. Think in terms of 18th and 19th century Spain.

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Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

I think the answer is that we will lose the ability to effectively fight any. Think in terms of 18th and 19th century Spain.

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That, I believe has distinct implications for things like small wars, especially. Using the 18th and 19th Century Spain example, we saw Spain go from fighting a series of small wars against people like Simon Bolivar, to fighting one final big war for its imperial life against the United States. Such a decline was primarily a function of Spain's inability to keep a budget as the revenue from gold in it colonies dried up.

This is important today, because the U.S. is the guarantor of much of international security. Unlike Spain, whose decline began well before the Napoleonic wars, and who finally abandoned her global empire quietly at the end of the 19th Century, the US is currently engaged in many small wars throughout the world. Those wars will not go away because of American bankruptcy, and indeed we might find ourselves in a situation where small wars become large ones, without changing scope. (e.g. Iraq/Iran breaks into full on warfare, because the U.S. is unable to guarantee their security.)

I agree that the U.S. will likely lose the capability to fight in wars in any way resembling what it does now, but it will not lose its incentives to manipulate outcomes to its best interest. It seems to me likely, that the U.S. will shift away from a policy of international engagement to one of more cautious isolation. Such a policy could mean that the U.S. only becomes involved when the situation is bad enough (the British are evacuating from Dunkirk again). However, I don't think that a diminished ability to fight wars on America's part will change the nature of wars. Even the wars in which the U.S. is involved in now could, if not successfully concluded and stabilized in some way, could easily turn into Large Wars absent a near-leviathan like the U.S. to underwrite them, which needless to say is very bad indeed.

In other words, it seems likely to me, that unless we control spending, we are likely to see future warfare, which will look a lot like Iraq and Afghanistan, but with way higher casualties, and much less desirable outcomes. While this may seem like I am 'securitizing' the budget debate, it seems to me that there is precious little discussion of an issue that clearly has long term national and international implications.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Don't understand the "what about less powerful countries" issue?

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In this case what I am talking about are places like Kuwait, East Timor, and Kosovo, which only by the grace of the United States are they independent. It is possible that they might use the tactics of insurgency to guarantee their existence, but in the words of Stalin, quantity has a quality all of its own.

The budget debate that I wanted to avoid, could be summed up thusly: Yes, the vast majority of the largesse previously and currently in the budget is social welfare. Indeed, even if we were to completely abandon all military spending, it would not decrease the projected shortfalls for the next ten years by anymore than half. Given a choice between decreasing spending on virtually any social program and national defense, I would cut everything before decreasing defense spending.

However, it seems to me that the precient

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"When the people find they can vote themselves money, that will herald the end of the republic."

~Benjamin Franklin

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has come to pass. Once programs are in place people view the money coming to them as entitlements, and defend them as such. Usually the only way to acheive any cuts is through a 'compromise' which will almost assuredly result in defense budget cuts.

Even without such cuts, outside forces could force them upon us. Economists have no idea how many dollars are outside the U.S. If demand for things like US Government Bonds, or Oil priced in dollars wanes, the devaluation of the dollar could be precipitous, resulting in a real decrease in spending even without a nominal one.

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In other words, it seems likely to me, that unless we control spending, we are likely to see future warfare, which will look a lot like Iraq and Afghanistan, but with way higher casualties, and much less desirable outcomes.

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Just a few considered implications (from a non-military political type):

1) Less willingness (for money reasons) for the United States to get involved in foreign 'adventures', regardless of cause. Now I'd bet that the extremes of both parties (isolationist types on the right, and anti-war types on the left) would both be very, very happy with those results, but the problem is likely to be "Never want something so badly, because you just might get it".

For example, if the US military is substantially constrained from it's current 'role' of "Chief Cop" in any number of different locations, you could see any number of regional conflicts brewing up, and the constraints that currently exist in modern day warfare on how the conflicts would unfold would be unlikely to continue (think reverting to Taliban style tactics, only being both considerably more brutal and widespread).

2) More conflicts would be likely to have either a primarily religious, ethnic, or economic survival overtones (Example: conflicts over water). And those types of conflicts tend to get very scary, because a strong part of the intent of the combatants on all sides is to dehumanize the opposition, so few, if any weapons and tactics available to either side would not be utilized. Think Republic of the Congo, only more brutal and with less restraint.

3) Regional conflicts. When it's the small players fighting by themselves, these types of conflicts can and will spread quickly as the neighbors are more likely to choose up sides - particularly if the big guy is going to be sitting it out. This is probably the one I'm the most concerned about - because if the US starts to take an attitude that they are going to sit out these regional conflicts, then we are almost turning over resolution of the conflict to the least stable leadership which is actively involved in the conflicts.

4) Tactics in such conflicts. These types of conflicts aren't going to be rewarding for precision warfare - instead it's likely to be "more terror, all the time". Targets which generate/inflict the most losses, fear, and loathing will be preferred, and also inflict the most pain. It's not going to be strikes against opposition military as instead against much softer civilian and economic targets. And I could see substantial use of CBW in such conflicts, because when each side goes out to dehumanize the opposition, there's a lot fewer restraints against such use of such weaponry.

Obviously, the above is worst case outcome. But warfare could easily slide back to being extremely brutal, with the Iran-Iraq war being typical in terms of losses.

:mad::(

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

... my point is to raise the question of how a smaller military budget would influence the US's ability to intervene in Small Wars around the globe. I see several possibilities. The first is that the U.S. starts substituting bodies for technology, which is practical, but not politically feasible for now...

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I would argue that it is neither politically feasible nor practical. The more bodies, the more difficult quality control becomes and the more difficult C2 becomes. Greater chance of more incidents that resemble Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and that douche who raped a girl and killed her family. A smaller number of better trained folks would be more practical, imo, if for no other reason that they will commit fewer follies.

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Originally Posted by Schmedlap

I would argue that it is neither politically feasible nor practical. The more bodies, the more difficult quality control becomes and the more difficult C2 becomes. Greater chance of more incidents that resemble Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and that douche who raped a girl and killed her family. A smaller number of better trained folks would be more practical, imo, if for no other reason that they will commit fewer follies.

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I agree, but part of the reason that we have the really well trained military we do now is money. If money gets cut it is at least as likely to come from training budgets as it is from R&D and Acquisitions. Indeed, because of the diffuse costs and specific benefits incentive structure, it is actually more likely to come from training than from either of those areas. For evidence of this, the training division of every single service is the least well funded in comparison to its mission. That is usually because there are only a couple of congressmen with training bases in their area, but there are a crap-load with factories that make things.

I do have to say, though, that I already believe that we are already at the minimum number of soldiers we can have and continue to carry off missions like Iraq or Afghanistan with any hope of success.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

I do have to say, though, that I already believe that we are already at the minimum number of soldiers we can have and continue to carry off missions like Iraq or Afghanistan with any hope of success.

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There are better ways to have handled each of those. The problem was not that the money to develop and train forces capable of strategic raids had not been available, it was that the political and military will to employ the tactic in pursuit of strategy was lacking. Thus we had to employ an Armor and Euro centric force in South Asia and the Middle East -- just as we had earlier committed similar forces (and operational methods) to North Asia and Southeast Asia. We appear to be on the way to rebuilding that same force...

Would have been and would in future be far cheaper and more effective to employ such raids rather than getting tied up in lengthy, expensive in all terms and essentially marginally productive COIN efforts that in the end offer little if any change to either the nations involved or the strategic balance...

If you have a lot of money, you buy a lot of tools, supplies and such -- often more than you need. If you don't have that much money, you tend to buy smarter and buy only what you need. That lack of excess also causes you to work smarter.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

There are better ways to have handled each of those. The problem was not that the money to develop and train forces capable of strategic raids had not been available, it was that the political and military will to employ the tactic in pursuit of strategy was lacking. Thus we had to employ an Armor and Euro centric force in South Asia and the Middle East -- just as we had earlier committed similar forces (and operational methods) to North Asia and Southeast Asia. We appear to be on the way to rebuilding that same force...

Would have been and would in future be far cheaper and more effective to employ such raids rather than getting tied up in lengthy, expensive in all terms and essentially marginally productive COIN efforts that in the end offer little if any change to either the nations involved or the strategic balance...

If you have a lot of money, you buy a lot of tools, supplies and such -- often more than you need. If you don't have that much money, you tend to buy smarter and buy only what you need. That lack of excess also causes you to work smarter.

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So what you are saying here is that the problem is a force structure and not a force size issue. I can agree with that, but at the same time I just don't see a way that a small elite force could pull off missions of the type of Afghanistan or Iraq.

If, rather than invading Iraq, we had just sent in 10,000 (arbitrarily chosen number) SF soldiers, and they had fomented rebellion amongst hoi polloi, then we certainly would have destabilized Iraq, but I am not sure that the same 10,000 would have been able to stabilize it again.

I am willing to be convinced, but breaking things is easy; building things is hard, and it is in the building that the world gets shaped.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

...at the same time I just don't see a way that a small elite force could pull off missions of the type of Afghanistan or Iraq.

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That's the point -- those were missions made necessary more by the existing and available force structure and the focus of military (mostly) and civilian (influenced by the military) leaders. Both Afghanistan and the Middle East needed military attention, that was IMO a strategic necessity. Neither mission as actually performed was IMO strategically desirable in virtually any respect.

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If, rather than invading Iraq, we had just sent in 10,000 (arbitrarily chosen number) SF soldiers, and they had fomented rebellion amongst hoi polloi, then we certainly would have destabilized Iraq, but I am not sure that the same 10,000 would have been able to stabilize it again.

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In the first place we didn't have 10K SF. In the second, why would you want to do that? Foment a rebellion and you have no idea how that might end.

We should have in Afghanistan have known the location of all AQ assets and simply have gone in an destroyed them and left. In the ME, the issue was not Saddam but to send a message to the ME that attacks on American interests were no longer going to be tolerated as they had been for the past 22 years with either no response or a tepid one; rather with a full bore slam. Iraq was as good a place as any as it was effectively a pariah state with a roundly disliked Dictator but there were other more directly related targets. Problem is that our Foreign Policy in the region (and elsewhere) for many years has been directed at a course which made the course taken almost inevitable -- and the fact that so few options were available is an indication of major errors in foreign policy as well as military policy.

The more salient fact that four Presidents over the period 1979-2001 failed to properly respond to a series of provocations and probes from the Middle East which almost certainly led us to 2001 and later should not be forgotten...

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I am willing to be convinced, but breaking things is easy; building things is hard, and it is in the building that the world gets shaped.

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I totally agree. Very much so. I'd also suggest that employing a sledgehammer in building is not a common thing for a good reason.

Here's what the Wiki says about sledgehammers: "Sledgehammers are often used in construction work, for breaking through drywall or masonry walls. Sledgehammers are also used when substantial force is necessary to dislodge a trapped object (often in farm or oil field work), or for fracturing stone or concrete." Not a good tool for building; better one of these; LINK.

The GPF is a sledgehammer. It should be used for its designed purpose -- to break things -- you can use it for other things to be sure but it will not be nearly as effective as the proper tool.

Building things take time and preparation, it helps to use the right tools -- and those are intelligence, diplomacy and properly applied foreign aid plus a little very low key police and / or military assistance -- with emphasis on the low key. Once you expand the military presence, you're creating targets (everyone loves to snipe at the 800 pound Gorilla); you're usually creating a need for further commitment and you are undertaking an effort that will almost certainly be time consuming, expensive in many terms and with an uncertain end state almost guaranteed.

So I again ask -- why would you do that mindlessly without even investigating other options?

The answer is, of course that our previous decisions both on diplomacy and force structure put us where we were in 2001. We now have an opportunity to be bit smarter and, I believe, an obligation to be a bit tougher. Domestically and overseas. We can and should nip a lot of this stuff in the bud and forestall any more Afghan or Iraq like commitments which are generally not worth the costs. Perhaps really never worth them. We certainly need to be prepared to do them but we equally certainly should do our level best to avoid them. Whether we will or not, I can't say. Your generation needs to work on that...

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Both Afghanistan and the Middle East needed military attention, that was IMO a strategic necessity. Neither mission as actually performed was IMO strategically desirable in virtually any respect.

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I agree. It seems like not only the US but most countries have a real problem assessing their ideal outcome and the best tools to accomplish that, beforehand. Hindsight is nice, but not useful.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

In the first place we didn't have 10K SF. In the second, why would you want to do that? Foment a rebellion and you have no idea how that might end.

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I understand, knew that. This example was chosen as one of many possible COA's if we did have 10k elites, which admittedly was not the ideal one either.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

We should have in Afghanistan have known the location of all AQ assets and simply have gone in an destroyed them and left.

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And there is the rub. If we at any point had that good of intelligence, I highly doubt there would have been a 9/11. Even if there were, we would surely have had no need to dislodge the Taliban, we could've just sent in the Rangers to gather up OBL. Even better we could've just parked an AC-130 over the area and fired up everything that moved. But the catch is not only did we never have intel like that about UBL and AQ, but we have never had it about anyone, anywhere, ever. I wouldn't even be surprised to learn that we don't even know where every single one of our own forces are.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

The more salient fact that four Presidents over the period 1979-2001 failed to properly respond to a series of provocations and probes from the Middle East which almost certainly led us to 2001 and later should not be forgotten...I totally agree. Very much so. I'd also suggest that employing a sledgehammer in building is not a common thing for a good reason.

{SNIP}

Building things take time and preparation, it helps to use the right tools -- and those are intelligence, diplomacy and properly applied foreign aid plus a little very low key police and / or military assistance -- with emphasis on the low key. Once you expand the military presence, you're creating targets (everyone loves to snipe at the 800 pound Gorilla); you're usually creating a need for further commitment and you are undertaking an effort that will almost certainly be time consuming, expensive in many terms and with an uncertain end state almost guaranteed.

So I again ask -- why would you do that mindlessly without even investigating other options?

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I agree as well, and perhaps poverty will suit us well. We seemed to make much better choices as a nation in our direst circumstances. And while the military is a sledgehammer, there is no better tool for establishing security. Security is, after all the first priority of work, and without it, as we have learned in Iraq, all efforts are fruitless.

I would like to steer away from IZ/AF for a moment, because I hope that if we are bankrupted, it happens well after our departure from both of those countries, and the instability, at least as it stands, was an avoidable mess of our own making. However, messes have a way of making themselves, and they too will require sledgehammers to clean up. Our only national security problems, and our only future small wars are by no means guaranteed to result from mistakes in our foreign policy.

Imagine a collapsed Mexico, or Venezuela, or Haiti, which shouldn't be too hard, and all would be too close to ignore. A small and elite force would not be able to do anything to stabilize those countries, no matter how good they are. Moreover, unless Brazil steps up, which I believe is quite unlikely, the only people who currently have a hope of responding in any meaningful way is the US. We could find ourselves stuck in a position where we cannot afford to do nothing, and we cannot afford to do anything.

Believe me, I am all for more elite forces, especially as a percentage of total troop structure. I just do not believe that we could effectively defend the nation from many potential and legitimate threats with fewer troops than we have now. To list just a few: a Chinese incursion into certain islands in the Pacific, a collapsed Latin American country, a militarily viable state in Central Asia (more of an indirect threat I suppose), a hostile state at critical Seaways (e.g. Panama Canal, Suez, Straights of Magellan, Straights of Malacca). All of these areas would require as many troops as we have or at least enough troops that we would be hard pressed to carry out other critical missions.

Again, I am willing to be convinced, but I would have to see hard evidence that an elite soldier can secure the same battle space as a greater number of not so elite soldiers.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

I agree. It seems like not only the US but most countries have a real problem assessing their ideal outcome and the best tools to accomplish that, beforehand. Hindsight is nice, but not useful.

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That wasn't hindsight on my part or that of others. I and others have been railing against this kind of stupidity for over 40 years. The problem is that it requires political testicular fortitude and military eschewal of parochialism -- both items in short supply in the US. Thus my comment that your generation could change it; mine got swamped by the Baby Boomers who knew everything...:rolleyes:

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...if we did have 10k elites...

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Don't need elites, just very competent forces -- easily attained by cutting force structure, moving most heavy stuff into the RC and increasing the training budget by some reprogramming.

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And there is the rub. If we at any point had that good of intelligence, I highly doubt there would have been a 9/11.

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I'm not at all sure we didn't have it -- I do know we did not act on what we did have due to lack of political will.

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I agree as well, and perhaps poverty will suit us well. We seemed to make much better choices as a nation in our direst circumstances. And while the military is a sledgehammer, there is no better tool for establishing security. Security is, after all the first priority of work, and without it, as we have learned in Iraq, all efforts are fruitless.

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That's why a bunch of us in the 70s and 80s got gray hair. The heirarchy wanted nothing more than to do business as usual -- as apparently do you. The object is to NOT have to establish security...:cool:

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Our only national security problems, and our only future small wars are by no means guaranteed to result from mistakes in our foreign policy.

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No, only 90% or so...:wry:

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Imagine a collapsed Mexico, or Venezuela, or Haiti, which shouldn't be too hard, and all would be too close to ignore. A small and elite force would not be able to do anything to stabilize those countries, no matter how good they are.

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No it would not. Nor can you show me a reason for us to stabilize them other than we've always done it that way. Our neglect of South America in spite of the Good Neighbor policy and half a dozen later clones has aided in the creation of all the problems you mention. Crass stupidity on our part. I understand what's done cannot be undone but I'm not all sure we would need to interfere. In fact, I'm sure that we should not. Why not just aid them in solving their problems without sticking our over sized nose into it and trying to tell them how WE thing they should run THEIR country...

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Moreover, unless Brazil steps up, which I believe is quite unlikely...

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Probably unlikely for Mexico but not so for Venezuala -- they don't want stupid on their northern flank.

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...the only people who currently have a hope of responding in any meaningful way is the US. We could find ourselves stuck in a position where we cannot afford to do nothing, and we cannot afford to do anything.

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Define response. I agree with the word but suspect we'd disagree on the merits and execution. Putting a slew of Gringos in Mexico would be the best way in the world to get them to stop squabbling, unite and turn en masse on Los Nortenos (not the Nuestra Familia kind, the Yanqui Blanco variant).

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Believe me, I am all for more elite forces, especially as a percentage of total troop structure. I just do not believe that we could effectively defend the nation from many potential and legitimate threats with fewer troops than we have now.

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You keep using the word elite. I have not. Better selected and trained forces than current structure with specific equipment that we have known we've needed since the mid 70s but have not developed to the point of public acknowledgment of existence purposely to preclude the use, certainly; elite? No. The Army was purposely dumbed down in doctrine, training and skills in the 70s and 80s in an attempt to influence national policy; it was fairly successful in some respects but as Afghanistan and Iraq show, not completely successful. Blowback is a beach... [quote]To list just a few: a Chinese incursion into certain islands in the Pacific...[quote]Surely you aren't suggesting fighting China (or India) on a man to man basis. That's not a ground force effort. Never has been and is unlikely to be one in your lifetime. Or certainly should be.

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a collapsed Latin American country, a militarily viable state in Central Asia (more of an indirect threat I suppose), a hostile state at critical Seaways (e.g. Panama Canal, Suez, Straights of Magellan, Straights of Malacca). All of these areas would require as many troops as we have or at least enough troops that we would be hard pressed to carry out other critical missions.

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Having been to through or near all those, I don't see the problems you see. I'd also suggest that introduction of US forces into most of those area would almost certainly create more problems than it solved...

Why not put as much effort into preempting problems in all those places as it would take to execute your proposed solution in any one?

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Again, I am willing to be convinced, but I would have to see hard evidence that an elite soldier can secure the same battle space as a greater number of not so elite soldiers.

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I don't think you are willing to be convinced, you want to do things the same way we've been doing it. I suppose you'll get your way because it is easier than doing the hard stuff -- until you actually have to do it, then it costs you, big time -- and is highly unlikely to produce the result you desire (see Afghanistan and Iraq as well as half dozen other places I could name). There's that elite thing again -- not my word; yours. You do not have to be 'elite' to be competent.

The object should be to preclude it being battle space but if it must be that, not to secure it but to control and dominate it.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

The heirarchy wanted nothing more than to do business as usual -- as apparently do you.

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:eek: Argh.... Dagger straight to my heart.

Actually, those daggers are useful, because they illustrate where our differences are. What you seem to be arguing is from a position of "limited engagement" or :gasp: "isolationism." (I know that often people use these word pejoratively, and I think that is crap. If it is so wrong don't argue aesthetically, argue the point, like I am about to do.) I could easily be persuaded to a position of "limited engagement" and like all good Americans I have a strong isolationist streak. However, what I am most concerned with is a precipitous decline in American strength, such that no other country is able to step into the gap, thereby creating an unstable international situation. As you said,

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The object is to NOT have to establish security...

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there is an old Roman saying

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Quis desiderat pacem, preparat bellum!

Let he who desires peace, prepare for war!

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I understand that there are other ways to fight war than big heavy forces charging in and destroying things, but politics and not tactics decide how, when and why we fight wars.

That said, I really don't see a point, including bankruptcy where the U.S. gives up its 'expeditionary' nature. Our first overseas expedition was in 1801 for crying out loud, and that proclivity hasn't ceased since. It isn't just a republican thing, either since Bill Clinton showed an amazing willingness to send troops into every situation a bleeding heart could love. (He was a sucker for anything that he could bite his lower lip over.)

My point being is, as much as we may like it or not, politically, there is no way that we are ever going to go from an Army which takes and holds territory the old fashioned way to one which relies on raids and brief incursions. Until the American political landscape changes, we are stuck with it and we can either grouse about it, or we can deal with it.

re: Mexico This should almost be another thread. I am not talking about telling anyone how to run their country, I am talking about protecting people within our own. I will say though that if the government collapsed completely, which is not out of the question, then we would either have to completely secure the border or face Pancho Villa type problems in our own country. There is no need to reenact the punitive expedition, but we cannot abandon our own people to capricious raids by well armed and organized thugs based outside the country.

re: S. America This should be another thread. So I will leave it alone until I can post that.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

I agree, but part of the reason that we have the really well trained military we do now is money. If money gets cut it is at least as likely to come from training budgets as it is from R&D and Acquisitions. Indeed, because of the diffuse costs and specific benefits incentive structure, it is actually more likely to come from training than from either of those areas. For evidence of this, the training division of every single service is the least well funded in comparison to its mission. That is usually because there are only a couple of congressmen with training bases in their area, but there are a crap-load with factories that make things.

I do have to say, though, that I already believe that we are already at the minimum number of soldiers we can have and continue to carry off missions like Iraq or Afghanistan with any hope of success.

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When I ponder budget cuts, my first concern is not training. It is manning and equipping. We have a larger force because of the mission set. We are also getting more money because of the missions set - and because the public demands lots of stuff for those troops. I can't see budgets being cut significantly unless the mission set changes and/or the force size is reduced. That would be the impetus, imo. I would also add that many of the positive changes made in our training over the past 10 years had very little to do with money, but lots to do with leaders' attitudes about risk and preparation for war. For example, the old practice of rodding people onto ranges and teaching them to fear their weapons is going away due to attitude adjustments, not budgets. I would also add that the most significant thing that has made us into a better trained force is our optempo. Training is nice, but experience is better.

at or alongside each other but obviously I'm failing to communicate...

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

Actually, those daggers are useful, because they illustrate where our differences are. What you seem to be arguing is from a position of "limited engagement" or :gasp: "isolationism." ...

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Far from it, that dog won't hunt at all in this age. Nor am I suggesting that we not do any 'expeditionary' operations -- I am suggesting that we need a capability to do strategic raids on both a covert and overt basis (and that DoD has deliberately eschewed that in an effort to influence policy -- that's backwards IMO) as well as expeditionary capability which is imperative as a capability -- not desirable; to be avoided but possibly necessary. Further, that the strategic raid is more in keeping with the American psyche and norms and properly done will normally be cheaper on all accounts than a lengthy COIN-like operation. Those latter should be avoided if at all possible for all the obvious reasons.

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However, what I am most concerned with is a precipitous decline in American strength, such that no other country is able to step into the gap, thereby creating an unstable international situation. As you said, [The object is to NOT have to establish security...

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I can cover a road block by fire from a click or two away; I don't have to sit on the crossroads and be a target...

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...but politics and not tactics decide how, when and why we fight wars.

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Of course they do; that's the point. If you provide the policy makers a sledge hammer and only a sledge hammer, that's what they'll have to use even if another tool would be a far better option.

We have the capability of providing a number of tools; we have foolishly elected to build sledgehammers.:mad:

If that's all the policy makers have; they, as you seem to wish to do, will use them because it's better than nothing and they don't know any better and are taking advice from overly cautious military types. Dumb.

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That said, I really don't see a point, including bankruptcy where the U.S. gives up its 'expeditionary' nature. Our first overseas expedition was in 1801 for crying out loud, and that proclivity hasn't ceased since.

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Thank you for making my point -- the vast majority of those were strategic raids. Only after the foolishness of the Philippines in 1898 did we get involved with the go and stay business -- and we have NEVER done it well...

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My point being is, as much as we may like it or not, politically, there is no way that we are ever going to go from an Army which takes and holds territory the old fashioned way to one which relies on raids and brief incursions. Until the American political landscape changes, we are stuck with it and we can either grouse about it, or we can deal with it.

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I don't think that's correct; I acknowledge there are many who believe that way but there are others who'd dispute that. Most of the Marine Corps would, probably...:D

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re: Mexico This should almost be another thread.

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True.

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we cannot abandon our own people to capricious raids by well armed and organized thugs based outside the country.

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Nor would I suggest we should.:cool:

Alright, I think I have figured out at least where our disconnect is, and it is that we are talking past each other.

Walking this back, I agree that a more agile, and all around better force is desirable, but I do not believe that we can decrease the number of ground troops that we have below the number we currently have for three reasons:

1. I think that the actual mission of national security, (e.g. actually guarding our borders) requires at least the ca. 500k soldiers that we have. I base this on defending both the Southern border and Pacific Islands, from diverse emergent threats.

2. Even with a less "Take and Hold" based strategy abroad, situations will inevitably arise that the US will feel compelled to take and hold territory, even without planning to do so, and the military and the country does not want to get caught short in such a situation.

3. Even with a more "Raid" mentality, there is likely to be missions and times where a smaller force would be highly stressed. Specifically, I am imagining a situation where, even though the deployments are only 3 mos. the dwell time is also on 3 mos. or other similar configuration. Tying into this, if we are going to have a force that is going to be this well trained we are going to have to be able to commit a greater amount of time to training, so a larger percentage of our force will be in training at any time.

Does that sound at all like what we are talking about? I certainly got distracted with my own discussion, so I cannot blame anyone for being confused.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

..I agree that a more agile, and all around better force is desirable, but I do not believe that we can decrease the number of ground troops that we have below the number we currently have...

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Does the number required not depend on your doctrine and tactical principles? If it does, then the question becomes are those principles currently in place the best for the world as it is today? :wry:

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1. I think that the actual mission ... at least the ca. 500k soldiers that we have...

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Do we have 500K or more nearly a Million? I would opt for more troops, perhaps about 1.5 to 2 M -- but with only about 350-400K active; the rest would be in the Guard and Reserve. That 350-400K does not count the USMC which is not going away...:D

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2. Even with a less "Take and Hold" based strategy abroad, situations will inevitably arise that the US will feel compelled to take and hold territory, even without planning to do so, and the military and the country does not want to get caught short in such a situation.

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I don't agree with inevitable but it is certainly a possibility and therefor needs to acknowledged in plans. I again state that it is possible to control territory without occupying it provided one is trained and equipped to do so. An MRAP is not the vehicle of choice for that, nor is Bradley or an M1 -- neither is a helicopter. OTOH, if you want to physically occupy space, then the ground vehicles have a use -- the Helicopter is still not a good choice for the movement of people (okay for supplies). It's not even good for commanders who become physically and emotionally separated from their troops. Not good for the Troops because it physically and psychologically separates them from the ground on which they operate.

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3. Even with a more "Raid" mentality, there is likely to be missions and times where a smaller force would be highly stressed. Specifically, I am imagining a situation where, even though the deployments are only 3 mos. the dwell time is also on 3 mos. or other similar configuration...

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Raids aren't the only other option, just one I cited. If you do raids, you aren't looking at three month deployments, more like a week or two. In any event, you'd have to work on selling me on deployments (in the current usage of the term) of less than a year. I understand all the reasons for shorter deployment, I just disagree. Lengthy tours in unfriendly places go with the job; those not prepared for that should find other employment -- one reason why I say a smaller active force; fewer will join if the deployment rules change. :eek:

The loss of continuity, tactically and operationally is not worth the slight benefit gained (I realize most will not agree with this but we may see how that works with some folks in Afghanistan in the near future).

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Tying into this, if we are going to have a force that is going to be this well trained we are going to have to be able to commit a greater amount of time to training, so a larger percentage of our force will be in training at any time.

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Yes and no; longer enlistments / active duty requirements, better initial training and more unit training -- as opposed to units that piddle around in garrison a lot -- will mean less time in training because people would spend more time doing.

Not to worry; none of that will happen. Congress and the Mothers of America do not want truly competent and dangerous armed forces; just moderately competent. However, my point was and is that interventions in other nations should be avoided because we do not do them well, they do not suit the American psyche and impatient nature, are more expensive in all aspects than several alternatives and we -- as you originally said -- cannot afford the force we now have and some drastic reprogramming will be required in the future.

A smaller better trained force does certainly give up some capabilities (though I'd question how valuable Mass is today...) but it can provide other capabilities which may be more valuable. Not least a requirement to think situations and applications to remedy them through...

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Does the number required not depend on your doctrine and tactical principles? If it does, then the question becomes are those principles currently in place the best for the world as it is today? :wry: Do we have 500K or more nearly a Million?

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I agree, and I am basing the 500k on the roughly half a mil active Army, since I assume that AF and Navy missions wouldn't change all that much. I also presume that the Marines mission wouldn't change all that much either, since it sounds a lot like what you are describing.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

I would opt for more troops, perhaps about 1.5 to 2 M -- but with only about 350-400K active; the rest would be in the Guard and Reserve. That 350-400K does not count the USMC which is not going away...:D

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I think if I were absolute commander of the military I would be even more radical than you would. I would have no problem with the configuration that you propose, but I would say that we should also allow people to enter and leave the military periodically as they choose.

Basically, (and I realize this is an oversimplification, but not by a lot) the military views the world as either in or out. Anything you did on the outside does not matter, and once you are out it can be very hard to get back in. With a few important exceptions, if you come into the military you start at the bottom whether E-1 or O-1. If you get out, and I mean out-out and not into the reserves, anything that you do does not matter should you attempt to return. The net effect is that there is only one door into the military building, and lots of doors out.

I believe that we should be flexible in allowing people entrance and exit to the military, and not treat everything that happened outside the military as if it doesn't matter. Of course, there really is nothing like combat arms except in the military, but truthfully supply chains, intelligence, maintenance and a whole host of other issues are almost perfectly analogous within and without the military. Why should someone who has been doing intel for the past ten years as a GS-whatever have to start out as a 2LT and hope he gets intel. Moreover, why not allow people to take breaks from the military, learn new things, and return at a rank and pay grade appropriate to the level of their abilities.

This is how things used to be, and it is how things are in the rest of government and in the medical community. I think that a military more integrated in our society would benefit both society and the military and society. I confess that I have no idea how we would have to configure our military with such a structure, and it would probably take some trial and error to get it right. (And you thought I was an inside the box type).

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Originally Posted by Ken White

I don't agree with inevitable but it is certainly a possibility and therefor needs to acknowledged in plans.

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Inevitable is probably a strong word. It isn't inevitable in the same sense a perhaps an asteroid on a collision course with earth is inevitable. It is inevitable in the same sense that an idiot with money will end up broke. Theoretically the idiot could avoid calamity, but he is an idiot. Theoretically the bureaucracy could avoid those problems but...

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Originally Posted by Ken White

I again state that it is possible to control territory without occupying it provided one is trained and equipped to do so. An MRAP is not the vehicle of choice for that, nor is Bradley or an M1 -- neither is a helicopter. OTOH, if you want to physically occupy space, then the ground vehicles have a use -- the Helicopter is still not a good choice for the movement of people (okay for supplies). It's not even good for commanders who become physically and emotionally separated from their troops. Not good for the Troops because it physically and psychologically separates them from the ground on which they operate.

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Insert countless stories of misuse of equipment here.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Raids aren't the only other option, just one I cited.

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I used the nomenclature of "raids" because, although you did not specifically say it, your strategy seems to imply short duration and therefore a planned exit. An operation where the exit is planned used to be the definition of a raid. It doesn't have to be a "raid" in the classic sense of running up, raising hell, and leaving, but for lack of a better word, but anything from sabotage of a nuclear power plant to the 1979 Sino-Viet-namese war qualifies using my definition.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

If you do raids, you aren't looking at three month deployments, more like a week or two. In any event, you'd have to work on selling me on deployments (in the current usage of the term) of less than a year.

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I suppose when I said deployment I meant time away from home, and not necessarily away from homestation. Nevertheless, it is almost an axiom of organization that the more people who become involved, the longer things take. When the Marines ship out for some thing, no matter how large or small, it generally means 7 months away from family. I think that if we could keep it down to 3 we would be lucky. I could be wrong though.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

I understand all the reasons for shorter deployment, I just disagree. Lengthy tours in unfriendly places go with the job; those not prepared for that should find other employment -- one reason why I say a smaller active force; fewer will join if the deployment rules change. :eek:

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Unfortunately, smaller organizations usually result from a higher attrition rate, as well as a lower recruitment rate, which can lead to less institutional knowledge and therefore less experience. There is no way to know at the beginning who will last 20+ years, so it is not like you can recruit only those who will make it.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

The loss of continuity, tactically and operationally is not worth the slight benefit gained (I realize most will not agree with this but we may see how that works with some folks in Afghanistan in the near future).Yes and no; longer enlistments / active duty requirements, better initial training and more unit training -- as opposed to units that piddle around in garrison a lot -- will mean less time in training because people would spend more time doing.

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I think you are talking about the Victorian Era British model. I couldn't agree more. This is where my in and out model of the military would work. I bet we could get plenty of all kinds of people to sign up for long tours of understanding and controlling but not occupying area, if they knew that upfront. Stay a long time and get the job done; then return home and do it again or don't.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Congress and the Mothers of America do not want truly competent and dangerous armed forces; just moderately competent. However, my point was and is that interventions in other nations should be avoided because we do not do them well, they do not suit the American psyche and impatient nature, are more expensive in all aspects than several alternatives and we -- as you originally said -- cannot afford the force we now have and some drastic reprogramming will be required in the future.

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No argument here, except to say that we aren't alone in our incompetence. It seems to be a flaw of human nature that we are seized with the uncontrollable desire to meddle in the affairs of others, but are deprived of the ability to do so effectively.


All that said, and it seems like we actually do see eye to eye on some if not most of these issues, I think that such a change bodes ill for two groups in particular: International Organizations which rely on American soldiers for the heavy lifting, and small or less militarily capable nations that rely on the US for their defense. While not what the US military is designed for, their bodies do a lot of the work for groups like NATO or the UN, who would be hard pressed to even exist without them. And lets face it there are plenty of countries, including some whom we consider powerful, whose basic military strategy is "Hold out (or don't) and let the Americans rescue us." I do worry that a precipitous transition from our current status brought on by the many negative problems resulting from bankruptcy, could result in destabilizing the international arena, and make the world for us, and everyone else, less secure.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

I think if I were absolute commander of the military I would be even more radical ... I would say that we should also allow people to enter and leave the military periodically as they choose.

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Very much agree.

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I confess that I have no idea how we would have to configure our military with such a structure, and it would probably take some trial and error to get it right. (And you thought I was an inside the box type).

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Didn't think that, merely trying to highlight how easy it is to rely on the familiar and pick up the same tools out of habit... :wry:

Agree on the trial and error -- the Army, in addition to radically revising the Personnel System (to the extent of firing or moving everyone currently involved and starting all over) -- should be more willing to experiment.

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It doesn't have to be a "raid" in the classic sense of running up, raising hell, and leaving, but for lack of a better word, but anything from sabotage of a nuclear power plant to the 1979 Sino-Viet-namese war qualifies using my definition.

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Raids are good, strategic raids are a good alternative to many things, so I'm a believer. Better Intel and more aggressive diplomacy would be a big help. On one thing I'm firmly convinced -- committing the GPF to nation building should be a last resort and if it is done, a civilian should be in charge. :cool:

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...When the Marines ship out for some thing, no matter how large or small, it generally means 7 months away from family.

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In addition to fixing a bankrupt personnel system and significantly improving training, we also need to overhaul the pay structure -- which is essentially a 1917 construct. We could start by not rewarding a guy to be married -- I'd opt for paying a bonus to stay single but the Mothers of America and Religion Inc. would go berserk... :rolleyes:

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There is no way to know at the beginning who will last 20+ years, so it is not like you can recruit only those who will make it.

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On that I don't agree; we could better select new entrants, have higher standards, refine the pay and training and have a waiting list to get in -- and if your suggestion of a revolving door were also adopted...

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I bet we could get plenty of all kinds of people to sign up for long tours of understanding and controlling but not occupying area, if they knew that upfront. Stay a long time and get the job done; then return home and do it again or don't.

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True.

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International Organizations which rely on American soldiers for the heavy lifting, and small or less militarily capable nations that rely on the US for their defense. While not what the US military is designed for, their bodies do a lot of the work for groups like NATO or the UN, who would be hard pressed to even exist without them. And lets face it there are plenty of countries, including some whom we consider powerful, whose basic military strategy is "Hold out (or don't) and let the Americans rescue us." I do worry that a precipitous transition from our current status brought on by the many negative problems resulting from bankruptcy, could result in destabilizing the international arena, and make the world for us, and everyone else, less secure.

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That's all true and I think some of that could be turned around with better diplomacy and lowered US military visibility worldwide. We should avoid some commitments because we'll merely become targets and we have to stop trying to fight nicely; that never works. Hard and fast will do less damage and create less casualties of all kinds. The harder and more rapid the better... :cool:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

I'd opt for paying a bonus to stay single but the Mothers of America and Religion Inc. would go berserk... :rolleyes:

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I have mixed feelings on this myself. I served my time as a single soldier, and sometimes felt that I missed out on having a set support at home, but by the same token, the divorce rate is so high, that even marriage wasn't really a guarantee. And for some people it was a real distractor.

That said, I don't think that we could successfully pay people to not get married. After all, the way that so many soldiers get engaged (e.g. to a local stripper) and married (e.g. after two weeks of knowing someone) divorce is almost a guarantee, and that is like fining yourself half of your pay for the rest of your life.:o That said, some of that is because of the incentives to get married in the military, and the short sighted nature of "Joe". In fact, we should start a new thread for all of the stupid "Joe got married and..." stories.

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On that I don't agree; we could better select new entrants, have higher standards, refine the pay and training and have a waiting list to get in -- and if your suggestion of a revolving door were also adopted...True.

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I don't think that we disagree as much as the initial nature of the comment sounds. I think we can shape the system and improve the incentive structure so that better outcomes are more likely. I don't think, nor do I think you believe, that we can guarantee outcome. Bottom line, with all the tests and waiting lists and everything, there will still be people who only last for so long, and we need to account for that in planning.

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We should avoid some commitments because we'll merely become targets and we have to stop trying to fight nicely; that never works. Hard and fast will do less damage and create less casualties of all kinds. The harder and more rapid the better... :cool:

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This actually gets us back to the political discussion that we were veering onto earlier in the thread. I personally would like to see less military adventurism, as long as that did correspond to denigrating military service, or a lack of willingness to use force when absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, historically there has been a correlation between the two. At the same time, the entire world is better off if we plan our devolution of power, rather than have it forced upon us by our own short sighted prodigality. I guess I look at the Indian sub-continent when Britain departed, and how the consequences of the precipitate nature thereof are with us today.

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

That said, I don't think that we could successfully pay people to not get married. After all, the way that so many soldiers get engaged (e.g. to a local stripper) and married (e.g. after two weeks of knowing someone) divorce is almost a guarantee, and that is like fining yourself half of your pay for the rest of your life.:o That said, some of that is because of the incentives to get married in the military, and the short sighted nature of "Joe". In fact, we should start a new thread for all of the stupid "Joe got married and..." stories.

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Three factors. The local stripper knows that Joe will get X dollars (she can probably read an LES better than he can). So does SPC Veronica at Bde. Both also know how much more he will get if they marry and thus they rope Joe for the coins. Joe goes along with this to get what he wants which has nothing to do with money. To a 19 year old, sex is an emergency...

The second factor is that the educational system in the US has not kept up with the times. They went from being a part time custodian of reasonably well disciplined kids to whom they were expected to impart a sound knowledge of the basics and teach to be orderly to a an institution that has more custody time for kids than do the parents -- and yet adamantly refuses to teach those kids any life skill or to discipline them. Thus Joe grows to the ripe old age of 18 plus and joins up with mostly little clue of what life may hold.

Then he hits a unit. If they care about him, he gets some education and mentoring. If, as occurs too often, they do not really care about him, he's left alone to do what he wants when he isn't being jerked around and treated as a not too bright stepchild. Then we wonder why he makes poor decisions. We could and should treat the kid better and demand more from him at the same time. We also need to train him to avoid that stripper and SPC Veronica and their wiles -- at least on a permanent / semi-permanent basis...

Used to have a Squad Leader who'd go to town and drink with his troops when he got a new one in who claimed a 'girl friend.' He'd go, leave with the girl -- and thus teach the kid a brutal but very effective lesson; old guys who are ugly and have no social skills have more money than young studs and girls know this. Not too many care enough to do that nowadays. Too busy with their own wives and kids...

We're trying to run a modern professional Army like it was a between the World Wars unit. Doesn't work too well. If we're not going to be in loco Parentis to Joe -- and the new Barracks say that is the case -- then we need to train Joe to take care of himself and treat him like an adult. That is a massive mind shift for the Army, one that'll take a generation or so to embed.

We could, in the interim, at least stop giving Joe a pay increase to get married...:mad:

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Bottom line, with all the tests and waiting lists and everything, there will still be people who only last for so long, and we need to account for that in planning.

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True and thus the revolving door -- which should include ready access to the Guard and Reserve and vice versa as well as to other services and the civilian agencies of government. Yeah, I know... :eek:

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I personally would like to see less military adventurism, as long as that did correspond to denigrating military service, or a lack of willingness to use force when absolutely necessary.

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Agreed. We could be a bit smarter than we have been.

Now, Take Congress...

Pleeezz :rolleyes:

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Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman

In fact, we should start a new thread for all of the stupid "Joe got married and..." stories.

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A mere thread? More like a multi-volume treatise.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

To a 19 year old, sex is an emergency...

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That should be an SWC quote of the year winner:D

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Originally Posted by Ken White

If we're not going to be in loco Parentis to Joe -- and the new Barracks say that is the case -- then we need to train Joe to take care of himself and treat him like an adult. That is a massive mind shift for the Army, one that'll take a generation or so to embed.

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Agreed, and when you are half stepping between "Being Daddy" and "You're an adult, bucko!" it will be increasingly infuriating for our soldiers.

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We could, in the interim, at least stop giving Joe a pay increase to get married...:mad:

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I just gotta share this story.

When I was a DLI, affectionately know as the Desperate Loving Institute, a sizable number of students got married to other students. This was in no small part due to the non-monetary incentives. First, if you were married, you got to live, basically unsupervised (i.e. like other people of your age) in quite nice housing on Ft. Ord. If you were single, no matter your age or rank (up to SFC!) you lived in a postage stamp barracks on the Presidio, where you were subjected to constant "Hey you!" details, mass punishment, and bi-monthly inspections that would take up every other Saturday, no matter how clean your barracks room was kept. Secondly, if you married someone who spoke a language radically different than yours, (e.g. Farsi and Chinese) you greatly increased the odds of being assigned to Ft. Mead, which everyone knew was a great place to ETS into a high paying job, instead of Ft. Gordon, or a line unit, where you were likely to deploy.

Funny thing happens on the way to the forum, though. Once you are out in the force, and have your orders, those incentives go away. Most people get promoted to E-5 where you can live off base, and off course, orders are orders. Therefore, the divorce rate sky rockets. Anecdotally, fewer than half of DLI marriages made it to the first duty station.

Bottom line is, I whole heartedly agree that the screwed up incentive structure is a bad idea. Indeed, given the time and the money I could probably convince the "Mothers of America" of it as well. I am sure that a fair number of the high divorce rates amongst soldiers come from people who married purely with the intent to make money off of it.

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Originally Posted by slapout9

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Originally Posted by Ken White

To a 19 year old, sex is an emergency...

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That should be an SWC quote of the year winner:D

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I second that. :D