Afghanistan and U.S. Interests: Kotkin vs Nagl
The first question one must always ask is "What are our National Interests?"
The Washington Post ran this quote from John Nagle on 31 August:
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JOHN NAGL
President of the Center for a New American Security
America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.
U.S. policymakers must, of course, weigh all actions against America's global interests and the possible opportunity costs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, low-cost strategies do not have an encouraging record of success. U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan on the cheap after 2001 led it to support local strongmen whose actions alienated the population and thereby enabled the Taliban to reestablish itself as an insurgent force. Drone attacks, although efficient eliminators of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, have not prevented extremist forces from spreading and threatening to undermine both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.
In a well-stated countering perspective, Major Jeremy Kotkin published the following piece here in the SWJ that argues in fact that we have no such National Interests at stake. Though Jeremy is a bit of a protégé' of mine, and a co-worker here in the Strategy Division at USSOCOM, these thoughts are his own. Jeremy makes a good case, and it is one grounded in sound history as well as the principles of Strategy and Insurgency. Frankly, Dr. Nagl's argument has no such foundation to rest upon.
For your consideration: U.S. National Interests and Afghanistan; and the young, untested Major Kotkin vs. the CNAS machine and Dr. Nagl
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...hanistan-in-t/
I think those folks at CNAS have lost the bubble...
Quoth Nagl:
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...The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. *
I wish he had expanded that and told the world how, without a multi-decade presence in Afghanistan, he proposes we might accomplish that...
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...al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win.
Clearly? I think not. If it were clear, then even I would see the logic and rationale. I do not. Some said we clearly had to win the 'Cold War.' I didn't see the logic there either -- and regardless of those who say we 'won' it, I suggest that the erstwhile opponent is still around and still causing minor problems. That's the key point -- minor. That, I suspect is the best we can hope for with Al Qaeda and it's clones, derivatives and Allies. We are not going to eliminate terrorism or Islamist fundamentalism. We can through many avenues reduce the problems they bring to an acceptably low level -- major military force is not one of those avenues at this point; it is, in fact, pretty close to counter productive.
As Major Kotkin says, Hezbollah is far more dangerous than is A.Q. and neither poses an existential threat. Both and their allies require a comprehensive diplomatic and low key SFA approach with enhanced strategic entry capabilities predicated on the probable force structure size limitations faced by the US. Executing a series 'COIN campaigns' is not only not the best answer, it is a quite poor answer that will almost certainly fail.
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The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.
Obviously, Doctor Nagl's math and mine differ.
The US and NATO plus any nascent Afghan forces do not and will not have the manpower to provide anything other than a light footprint. The objectives -- if they are cited above (*) -- are not attainable at an affordable cost and they need a more comprehensive re-look.
I do agree with him that a more comprehensive approach is needed -- simply comprehending that COIN efforts as a large force intervenor do not work would be a good start.
Gaining a sense of things...
Omarali50,
Interesting posts as always.
Speaking of cross posting, while trying to gain a sense of things in Afghanistan a couple of economic questions have popped up and I would be interested in your take on things.
My understanding is that estimates as to the annual per capita GDP range from less than $365 (less than the 'magic' $1/day mark, my source is a 2004 World Bank Hydraulics & Hydrology Study of Afghanistan, Working Paper # 36, Water resource development in Northern Afganistan and its implications for the Amu Darya Basin) to $800 and that some of the small time poppy farmers are in the $6,000 range (WSJ article). Would you agree?
He's still in training...I'll break him in yet.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
tell your sidekick MAJ Kotkin that I like his article, particularly his distinction between national interests and vital national interests:
Somewhat similar thinking is found in Kilcullen's Chap 5 (of TAG) - turning the elephant back into the mouse.
And, there is no doubt that ...
He did not use the phrase "good governance" once. :D
Jeremy came back from his War College training all "regimented" so to speak, and I've been working hard to corrupt him, but he holds his ground and thinks well for himself.
Of course, to be fair, the article is about US National interests, and not the nature of insurgency, so he did well not to just sprinkle around buzz phrases that are totally irrelevant simply to impress his boss!
Success breeds challenges all of their own
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
As Ken says, maybe the CNAS guys have lost the bubble.
I think it's worth noting that the CNAS guys don't come on SWJ, anymore. Maybe rigour isn't welcome. Be nice to be proved wrong - for real.
CNAS has been very successful, puts out some good thoughts, and has tremendous influence currently.
They also are getting into a sticky area of conflicting interests. I suspect Ms Flournoy would like to compete for the SecDef job, and by all accounts she is qualified. John may have an eye on Mr. Vickers office as well....who knows. Like I said, success no matter how well earned creates conflcts of interest that can shape the positions one takes.
I suspect the President may well feel compelled to take a hard stance on Afghanistan for fear that he will be called out as totally soft on terrorism. These guys have to make hard choices, and there is no right answer. I wish the boss was getting better advice though. We don't need to get harder on terrorism, we need to get smarter, and that doesn't necessarily mean we have to become decisively engaged in a course of action in Afghanistan that may well fail the Suitable, Acceptable, Feasible test.
He needs someone to explain the concept of "Good Governance" vs. "Effective Governance" perhaps...:)
Being ambidextrous is good...
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Originally Posted by
kotkinjs1
I think the true lesson learned is that sometimes the US doesn't need to be the only surgeon operating, even if we have the sharpest of scalpels. ;o)
Ah, but do we have the sharpest of scalpels? Perhaps? Are they all in the right place, available to be be used? Do we have enough of them?
Can we deliver the covertly? Not totally because we purposely neglected development of that capability so that we could not deliver them; that way no one would get cut or contaminated with body fluids by accident. Do we have the political will to use those scalpels? That's the question that needs answering, that and delivery capability (which we've only known we needed since 1951; reinforced in 1980...).
Do we also have in addition to scalpels and the Sledgehammers, a few other intermediate tools (and the will to accept casualties and potential prisoners / hostages made of those all those tools and their wielders...)
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Beyond that, maybe the surgeon is mistakenly operating with the left hand if he is in fact right handed (mucking it up by using the DoD when the true solution lies with the other aspects of national power mainly wielded through the Interagency).
I very much agree -- so did many on this thread: LINK and it's cropped up several times in other threads here -- most agree with you. As I said, ambidextrousness is nice -- but even better is one who is highly skilled using the correct hand for the job.
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Ultimately, to run with that analogy, we enlisted a bunch of Physician's Assistants to help us out in the initial and ongoing triage (the CT effort using NATO in OEF), but maybe the time for triage is long past over...
Too early to tell, patient not yet stabilized.
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and what we really need are other doctors, not just PAs, who have vested and similar interests with the patient; doctors with names like Dr. Russia, Dr. China, Dr. Iran.
Mmmm. Perhaps, though it might be a very good idea to insure that our assisting surgeons do not have a whopping life insurance policy on the patients. :eek:
A missed sponge -- or more difficult to spot, a simple moldy pea -- sewed in can cause sepsis. Surgeons tend to use only people they know and trust on their teams for a good reason; some people just will not play fair and a good many people in this world love nothing better than to see the big guy lose one. Though they of course would never be so crass as to say that...
Being ambidextrous is highly beneficial. Having a variety of tools is highly beneficial. Or, how about avoiding any surgery with better preventive care and treatment; paying $2K a year for prescriptions beats paying than $50K for a surgery with a 60-70+ % historical loss rate; that would be even more beneficial.
Using understudies who resent being understudies and roundly object to even the thought is not so beneficial...
As I said earlier, be careful what you ask for, you may get it. :wry:
Serious question - broken dishes
What did we (US) "break" in Astan that we (US) have an obligation[*] to "fix" ? You can make that argument (rightly or wrongly) about Iraq. I don't see it in Astan. Enlightenment please.
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[*] By obligation, I mean a moral or ethical obligation. I don't know of any substantial legal obligations that could not be satisfied by a few billion here or there.
Serious dishes deserve broken answers...
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
What did we (US) "break" in Astan that we (US) have an obligation[*] to "fix" ? You can make that argument (rightly or wrongly) about Iraq. I don't see it in Astan. Enlightenment please...[*] By obligation, I mean a moral or ethical obligation. I don't know of any substantial legal obligations that could not be satisfied by a few billion here or there.
In my view - jaundiced as it may be -- we have no legal obligation that would call for dispensing a few billion though we certainly have done that. :rolleyes:
Recall I have long said we should've gone to Afghanistan, clobbered the Talibs and AQ to the max extent possible (which we could have done to a far greater extent than we actually did) and left. We did not do that. Instead, for reasons that are not clear, we decided to stay. :confused:
Bush (George W. President of the US, arbiter of US foreign affairs, etc.) said in early 2002 that we would stay and help (LINK). He reaffirmed that in 2004 (LINK) and again in 2008 (LINK). President Obama has also chimed in (LINK)Thus, IMO -- and I'll bet big money, in the eyes of over half the 250M Muslims in this world among others, we have a moral obligation to do what we can to improve the capability of Afghanistan to stand on its own. Aside from the military commitment, more billions may well be disbursed... :eek:
Whether we should have said we would stay or not, we did, thus even though I sure don't think that should've been said, it was -- and we're stuck...:(
We agree too much to disagree ....
as to the agree:
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from Ken
Recall I have long said we should've gone to Afghanistan, clobbered the Talibs and AQ to the max extent possible (which we could have done to a far greater extent than we actually did) and left. We did not do that. Instead, for reasons that are not clear, we decided to stay.
and thanks for updating the links re: presidential statements (which I am very aware of because you pointed them out to me some months ago).
Those statements express future hopes. We have reached the point where any rational person (IMO) would have to conclude that those hopes are delusional.
We supported Astan for about 10 years in the 80s, helping them expel the Soviets by assisting them in waging unconventional warfare. We then properly enough left them alone to establish their own governance. Their efforts did not turn out well - so, by 2001, there was no recognizable government in Astan (merely two warring groups).
We then engaged in another episode of unconventional warfare in support of the Northern Alliance. That actually went fairly well, considering that it was done in rapid planning mode, since no contingency plan for Astan was in place before 9/11.
The international community then set up a governance plan for Astan as reflected in the Bonn Agreement. We and many other states and organizations have been supporting that plan since Dec 2001. We are now into year 8, with progress on the governance front showing no substantial improvement over what existed in 2002. We cannot conduct the political stuggle for the Astans, or for anyone else - despite the soaring rhetoric of our presidents.
Where this thing is busted is at the political struggle (good governance) level. Militarily, we can stay there as long as we want - but, as Jim Gavin said long ago to Dave Petraeus, there is no such thing as a low-cost "limited war".
I think it would be healthy if the US would simply admit that the Bush-Obama rhetoric has been unsound and not practical of fulfillment. However, governments are loath to admit their mistakes. So, I agree with you that what we are probably looking at is 2-5 years of continued engagement in Astan, probably at higher force levels than we have now. That would be the "good case" scenario.
As to the 1 billion+ Muslims, our presence in large footprint size in a Muslim country is by orders of magnitude more a negative factor than walking away from delusional rhetoric.
My take.
PS: Camelot never lived; but it also has never died - what a wonderful country is Camelot; and what a hellish real world its rhetoric creates.
There is no silver bullet, but there is good enough...
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Originally Posted by
omarali50
IF its somehow important NOT to have the region go up in smoke, then the US either has to "win the war" OR, so skillfully manage a withdrawal that they do not leave chaos behind. Most of the withdrawal options being discussed do not seem to assure the second. Most of the people wanting to win do not seem to have a convincing plan for the first. There is no easy way out any more and no easy way to win. Whatever option is chosen, success will be hard. In the end, it comes down to whether the United States is capable of carrying off ANY option well or not?
...and we are wasting time searching for that magic silver bullet.
Omarali50,
The question in my mind is more along the lines of how the project be done, what are the project costs, what is the project schedule, and what should the realistic expectations be for the project deliverables.
In short, from this armchair, it appears to be gut check time...to be quickly followed by the issuance of appropriate marching orders.
Along those lines, there is a recent link to a Marine CAP Paper floating around on SWJ somewhere, which provides some interesting backgound on that particular concept (Dr. Holt helpfully provides references on the Marine CAP concept as well). My experiences lead me to believe that Dr. Holt's thought piece Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win has merit, and is worth considering...American patience and political cycles may not be compatible however...what are your thoughts?
Yup, Slap, the real Jim Gavin ...
in GEN Petraeus' 1987 dissertation - snip is on my home computer - somewhere in pp.50-100 in a footnote to Gavin's 1950's book introducing the concept of limited war. His later (in the 1980s) statement is the last sentence in the footnote.
3 Attachment(s)
Here is the Gavin footnote snip
from the 1987 Petraeus Dissertation, as well as two others stating the views of Gavin and MacArthur with respect to engaging in a ground war in a land-locked Asian country (in that case, Laos).
As a general note, please do not confuse those of the "Never Again, but School" (including JMM) with pacifists, isolationists and absolute non-interventionists.
I agree with much of that...
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
and thanks for updating the links re: presidential statements (which I am very aware of because you pointed them out to me some months ago).
I recalled that and since neither of us old dudes is totally addled, suspected you were up to some Lawyerly exercise (not chicanery, never that...) so I gave you one before and Obama after the two I had given earlier. Always issue a surfeit of rope. ;)
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Those statements express future hopes. We have reached the point where any rational person (IMO) would have to conclude that those hopes are delusional.
Umm, Obama maybe but I doubt even that; Bush? Not hope -- what suited his political purpose at the time. Either way, I'm pretty sure most opinion today is with you -- delusional -- but I don't think that's the case, it was almost certainly cold blooded political expediency. Took some heat off Iraq and, more importantly, to W., tied his successors hands and forced that successor (and probably his successor as well) to follow through on what Bush had done because he was concerned that his successor might not do what Bush did -- correctly, in my view (though it could've been more efficiently and effectively done...). :wry: (Syntax degarbler available on request).
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I think it would be healthy if the US would simply admit that the Bush-Obama rhetoric has been unsound and not practical of fulfillment.
I don't think that would be at all wise, not least for the reason you cite:
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However, governments are loath to admit their mistakes. So, I agree with you that what we are probably looking at is 2-5 years of continued engagement in Astan, probably at higher force levels than we have now. That would be the "good case" scenario.
I see no benefit in more troops, rather some downside. What should happen is the Administration publicly announcing their goals (hopefully realistic and not the CNAS / Kilcullen variant) as of this latest Commander's Assessment update and we should set about trying to get there as efficiently as possible. Note efficiency and not effectiveness... ;)
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As to the 1 billion+ Muslims, our presence in large footprint size in a Muslim country is by orders of magnitude more a negative factor than walking away from delusional rhetoric.
I didn't go for the whole Billion, only those in the areas affected (not including India who is only partly affected; they, the Indonesians and Malays, the Turks, most of the Maghreb and Muslim Africa don't really care other than as an item for rhetorical support and the odd Fighter here and there...). I don't think so. It is negative for many but it's an annoying negative and little more. Walking away from it, OTOH will just feed a new propaganda frenzy which in turn will draw more recruits -- the current crop of recruits are easily dissuaded because so many die; given 'peace', no working war, then recruiting people to do dumb things gains. Symbology, pride and such are more important to the Arab and the Afghan than they are to westerners. There is also a major double standard problem -- they don't have to do what they said and they can lie to you because you are not Muslim but you cannot return the favor because your code says you should not therefor if you do, you are doubly wrong and they'll scream it to the world. Proving yet again western perfidy to people who epitomize Huntington's quote:
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"The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do."
They do not forget it, nor for a minute -- and they look for weaknesses in our application of violence to exploit. That includes the strategy(ies), operational techniques and TTP as well as political actions...
Creighton Abrams once said that "Generals should be noted for their silences." True. More importantly, so should Politicians. Because if the President says it in this celebrity rock star era, it becomes a commitment, not just a delusional (at worst) or political (at best? at worser?) statement which is all it really was. Not my idea, the media construct, I believe. Really stupid whoever's idea it is..:mad:
Surfing parallell waves...
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
Dr Holt's suggestion:
would be fine - if it were a 99% Astani effort and grew out of the villages themselves. The major problem in Astan is political, not military.
The Marine CAP program, and the majority of the CORDS programs, were good concepts - keeping in mind that CAP was a pilot program[*]. CORDS, as part of the larger South Vietnamese Pacification program (which included SVN CAP units as an integral part), has a greater number of "lessons learned".
If I were a political officer indigenous to a country plagued by an insurgency, I would adopt both as the central focus of my "COIN" effort - and find a military officer who agreed with me.
I suspect that events will gallop by before anything like Dr Holt's suggestions could be implemented. E.g, the SVN Pacification program (in various iterations) had a bit more than 15 years of historical development.
[*] We have to guard against the tendency to assume that, if a program works in 10 places (actually about 100 places in CAP's case), it will work in 10,000 places - must be at least that many villes and hamlets in Astan.
Regards
Mike
Mike,
Not too many differences in the grand scheme of things...however...
My qualifier would be that politics (in the western sense) may be too strong a word for the demographics that I believe we need to influence (and I have never visited or worked in Afghanistan). I think many (the bulk of the curve) would be more or less happy with three hots, a cot out of the weather, and some security. Studies that I have been plowing through seem to indicate that approximately ~85% are low tech farmers scrabbling to get by...long way of saying I don't believe the participatory Jeffersonian Democracy approach (as we know it) to be a viable one in the short term.
Your point on carefully considering the applicability of the CAP model to Afghanistan is wise.
As I understand CAP and with what I have done in the Army I think that I could not only survive but that I could also be an effective team member with a CAP/CORDS/CA/PRT/HTT lead element embedded in a SF/Advisor style matrix manned by a ISAF/ANA/ANP/Militia effort plus some heavy firepower to pound the stuffing out of anybody who gets stupid.
We would be located in some key places, with no Subway/Pizza Hut/Monster Chow Hall/FOB bull#### anywhere to be seen, and all would be focused on developing some sort of a functional economy & simultaneous security, some GoA capability, getting the neighbors involved in a constructive way, and getting the hell out when it all can move on its own... :wry:
I think that the President and Mr. Gates will not keep us in suspense much longer and I suspect they understand better than most what we need to do. I haven't retired yet and will ride it out a bit longer either way...let's just get it done.
Regards,
Steve
They existed in a time when thinking was not discouraged.
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
It is interesting that the "Never Again, but Schoolmates" (MacArthur, Ridgway, Shoup, Griffith, Norstad and Gavin) tended to out of the box thinking.
That was before McNamara and Earle Wheeler...
Actually I like intel people tremendously
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Originally Posted by
Entropy
BW,
Good comment!
I think that's a key insight. Sometimes it is possible to do more with less and a maximalist approach can make success less likely, not more. My biggest frustration with the Afghanistan debate is the competing strawman positions that our only two COA's are abandonment or a full-blown pop-centric COIN effort. There is a lot of middle ground between those two extremes - middle ground that should be fully explored.
Wow, you really don't like intel people. It's a shame you've apparrently had some bad ones along the way.
I just hate the pig-headed "threats R US" approach the community clings to, coupled with its complete disregard to the fact that they are completely clueless about the nature of this type of conflict; and absolutely no instituional motivation to learn or change. Dangerous. They send us pell mell in pursuit of tactical victories with absolute obliviouisness to the strategic risk they put as at.