Can a theater commander ever say that his war is not "winnable"?

I have been pondering the immense interest given to GEN McChrystal's recently issued (and closely held) assessment of the mission in AFG. I do not know the GEN personally, but he seems to be a smart, thoughtful guy and a person of integrity. And God bless him for adopting Rosemary's baby out of the orphanage in agreeing to command the AFG ISAF. My question is not specifically about GEN McChrystal and is not intended to cast any aspersion on his honesty.

With great diffidence, I ask this learned group:

Can a theater commander ever say publicly or to his CINC that his theater is not "winnable" (however that is defined)?

Is there historic precedent for making such an assessment?

Unfortunately, I think not. By the time the mission order comes down to the commander, be it theater, sub-component (as in the case of US Forces-Afghanistan), or tactical, it is *assumed* that the higher level strategy has been worked out and solidified. I would take that to mean that the civilian government and JCS have already developed overarching Ends, Ways, and Means, calulated the various risks, and found the strategy to be feasible, acceptible, and suitable. In other words, they do think it is 'winnable,' or else they would have not went forward. If a commander refused, he'd be removed and rightfully so (this, of course, gets into larger questions of integrity and the civil-military relationship: i.e. should GEN Shinseki have fallen on his sword when he initially briefed SECDEF and POTUS on the need for more troops in Iraq; the failure of the CJCS during Viet Nam, etc).

Realistically though and in the current situaition, the question is almost moot because no one can seem to define what 'winnable' is.....even Special Representative Holbrook (paraphrasing, 'we'll know it [success] when we see it').

I think he'd have to qualify it in terms of risk to the political objective, and as such it is really a menu of choices. This gets into negotiating the Ends/Ways/Means equation, or offering up options involving each and pointing to their associated risk(s).

This allows the political leader to make some judgments and assume their legal responsibilities and authorities as CINC.

That is not a cop out, it is the way we've designed our system. We (military folks) grow up learning to articulate the world in opportunities, advantages and risks. We may need to do a better job of articulating and communicating them to the political leadership, but that is what assessments and reviews are for, and it is incumbent upon that political leadership to ask tough questions and think.

Ultimately it is the political leadership that must summon or encourage the body politic to put forth the will, or must apply the argument for an increase in means, and ultimately its the political leadership that must stand for election/re-election. That said, the assessment or review put forward by the CDR is a good way to frame the costs of the political objective.

Best, Rob

I have a recollection that during WW2 military commanders, notably at Chief of Staff level, did object to some of Winston Churchill's ideas and decisions. The only one that comes to mind was General Wavell's objections to deploying resources to Greece - before the German invasion - instead of "finishing the job" in the North African desert campaign.

davidbfpo

I would think that the good commander would go back to his boss with a variety of COAs. His best take at how to do what he has been told to do, with a full candid and honest assessment of what he believes the outcome will be. Along with that, if he thinks that first COA is a loser, he must bring alternatives, with powerful rationale for why they are superior and will better accomplish the commander's true intent, or perhaps best serve the country's national interests.

He must do this with the moral courage going in to either then do as he is told or respectfully say he cannot and step down. At this level it must be about the nation, and not egos; though I realize history tells us that is oft not the case.

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Originally Posted by rborum

I have been pondering the immense interest given to GEN McChrystal's recently issued (and closely held) assessment of the mission in AFG. I do not know the GEN personally, but he seems to be a smart, thoughtful guy and a person of integrity. And God bless him for adopting Rosemary's baby out of the orphanage in agreeing to command the AFG ISAF. My question is not specifically about GEN McChrystal and is not intended to cast any aspersion on his honesty.

With great diffidence, I ask this learned group:

Can a theater commander ever say publicly or to his CINC that his theater is not "winnable" (however that is defined)?

Is there historic precedent for making such an assessment?

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Randy, although it was not over a specific conflict area, the last General I know of to resign instead of following the party line was Lt. General James M. Gavin, 1958 which is just part of what makes him one of the greatest Generals in US History.

Looks like we have another contender a Marine LTC. Here is a link to the article through zenpundit. B/T to zenpundit....B/T is Beret Tip.

http://zenpundit.com/

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Randy, although it was not over a specific conflict area, the last General I know of to resign instead of following the party line was Lt. General James M. Gavin, 1958 which is just part of what makes him one of the greatest Generals in US History.

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Thanks guys for your helpful insights and examples. My thoughts aren't very well-formed on this, so please forgive me as a stumble along.

Assuming that anyone who agrees (or simply complies) to "take charge" also has an implicit or explicit mandate that "failure is not an option," - I wonder how one can ever determine if an effort is futile.

I would imagine, this is particularly problematic in conflicts where the objectives are not well-defined or easily definable (which seems like it will be the case throughout the world for the foreseeable future).

It seems like it might be easy, in such circumstances, for strategy to take a back seat to persistence and accumulation of action - by that, I just mean "doing more."

Whenever a force is not clearly controlling the battlespace, even if a decision is made to "dramatically" change strategy, it almost invariably leads to calls for more . More people. More resources. More activity. If things do happen to turn around, it becomes nearly impossible to determine what was attributable to the strategy, the activity, or just the volume of effort. If things don't turn around, then, predictably, it will be said that it is because we need more.

It reminds me of the research on "escalating commitment to failed courses of action."

It seems to me nearly inconceivable - understandably so - that a Nation involved in a war or intervening in an armed could ever say bluntly: "You know what, this isn't going to work." or "This is much harder and more complicated than we thought, and it won't be worth it." or "We admit it, this was a bad idea."

But it is certainly conceivable that a Nation could find itself in exactly such a position, and of course, some CDR who has dutifully saluted and agreed to take charge is on the hook.

In what circumstances might it be possible or advisable when facing a stalled or failing COA to dramatically re-define the outcomes - what it means to achieve "success" or to "win" - and call it a day rather than doing more in pursuit of ambiguously cast, potentially unachievable goals?

Just one thought that I would add...

The division of powers into CinC and theater commander has not always been the norm. Don't hold me to this, but it may be a relatively new construct. I'm thinking Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Mao, etc. Was your question deliberately worded to address situations when the CinC and theater commander were two different people? I'm thinking that some leaders who wore both hats eventually came to the conclusion that things weren't working out and opted to cut their losses, though I can't think of specific instances, offhand.

Randy,If I remember I think General Patraus(cant spell) actually said that he did not know if the surge would work for sure but it was our best option. Similar to what Rob Thornton talked about. The military lays out the best COA available and the risk associated with it.
On a further note most of the questions you ask are taught in Colonel Warden's workshop SMART Wars, SMART Strategies. Most of the questions you ask would or should fall in the making the go to war decision. I think you can still order the workbook we used, you might find it pretty interesting but it is largely concerned with the national level decision followed by the military strategy to implement it. Not really at the theater commander level. But it gives a lot of insight into an alternative view of how these decisions could be made as opposed to how they are made. Not necessarily better mind you just different.

The following story may be apocryphal, but General Marshall supposedly, having lost patience with PM Winston Churchill's repeated attempts to divert Allied resources into the Balkans as a way of postponing D-Day, finally blew up when Churchill demanded an invasion of Crete and told Churchill to his face that "...no American boys are going to die on that goddamned island!".

Not quite the same as saying "Can't win, get out" of a war, though.

The Duke of Wellington told the cabinet during the War of 1812 that it would take Great Britain "fifty years" to reconquer the United States. They really didn't have "supreme commanders" back then but given the importance of the war against Napoleon at the time, Wellington was de facto calling the shots on strategic advice.

I think IF the General said "it's un-winnable" he should get sacked, and quick.
IF he said, he needed more resources, or that the Policy could not be set forth by the current strategy, then OK.
Of course some of this buys into the the limits of military power argument, but the same argument does not seem to worry the Taliban.

Name is Petraeus, I think?

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Randy,If I remember I think General Patraus(cant spell) actually said that he did not know if the surge would work for sure but it was our best option. Similar to what Rob Thornton talked about. The military lays out the best COA available and the risk associated with it.
On a further note most of the questions you ask are taught in Colonel Warden's workshop SMART Wars, SMART Strategies. Most of the questions you ask would or should fall in the making the go to war decision. I think you can still order the workbook we used, you might find it pretty interesting but it is largely concerned with the national level decision followed by the military strategy to implement it. Not really at the theater commander level. But it gives a lot of insight into an alternative view of how these decisions could be made as opposed to how they are made. Not necessarily better mind you just different.

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

I have a recollection that during WW2 military commanders, notably at Chief of Staff level, did object to some of Winston Churchill's ideas and decisions. The only one that comes to mind was General Wavell's objections to deploying resources to Greece - before the German invasion - instead of "finishing the job" in the North African desert campaign.

davidbfpo

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Oh very much so--Churchill's constant push for actions against the "soft underbelly" of Europe --Anzio being a classic--simultaneous efforts to delay the main attack into France.

The same applied for the RAF's refusal to deploy more fighters to France in the face of the collapse in 1940.

On the other hand winning his support proved invaluable to the US daylight bombing campaign after he bought the idea of round the clock bombing.

Tom

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Originally Posted by rborum

Can a theater commander ever say publicly or to his CINC that his theater is not "winnable" (however that is defined)?

Is there historic precedent for making such an assessment?

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Luddendorff told the German government that the war is lost and that peace talks need to be initiated (autumn 1918).

Rundstedt was asked by Keitel what could be done about the Normandy landing and he replied something along the lines of "Make peace, fools, what else?".

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

I would think that the good commander would go back to his boss with a variety of COAs. His best take at how to do what he has been told to do, with a full candid and honest assessment of what he believes the outcome will be. Along with that, if he thinks that first COA is a loser, he must bring alternatives, with powerful rationale for why they are superior and will better accomplish the commander's true intent, or perhaps best serve the country's national interests.

He must do this with the moral courage going in to either then do as he is told or respectfully say he cannot and step down. At this level it must be about the nation, and not egos; though I realize history tells us that is oft not the case.

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I think that is basically the perfect response.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Luddendorff told the German government that the war is lost and that peace talks need to be initiated (autumn 1918).

Rundstedt was asked by Keitel what could be done about the Normandy landing and he replied something along the lines of "Make peace, fools, what else?".

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Yep. The exchange is in the footnotes of the Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.

Rundstedt's dismissal may have come partly as the result of his blunt words to Keitel the night before. The latter had rung him up to inquire about the situation. An all-out German attack on the British lines by four S.S. panzer divisions had just floundered and Rundstedt was in a gloomy mood.
"What shall we do?" cried Keitel.
"Make peace, you fools," Rundstedt retorted. "What else can you do?"
It seems that Keitel, the "telltale toady," as most Army field commanders called him, went straight to Hitler with the remarks.....Kluge was immediately named to replace Rundstedt.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Luddendorff told the German government that the war is lost and that peace talks need to be initiated (autumn 1918).

Rundstedt was asked by Keitel what could be done about the Normandy landing and he replied something along the lines of "Make peace, fools, what else?".

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Very helpful examples. Thank you.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I think IF the General said "it's un-winnable" he should get sacked, and quick.
IF he said, he needed more resources, or that the Policy could not be set forth by the current strategy, then OK.

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I guess I'm wondering if "needing more resources" is not always - or nearly always - the default response when executing a plan that doesn't seem to be working.

I didn't mean to get glitched in the discussion of the "theatre commander"-level specifically, but I have found helpful the reminders a number of you have made here about how such dilemmas are embedded within the broader civil-military decision making process.

Randy,another modern example would be USMC General Van Riper and his refusal to keep playing a rigged War Game after he had already beaten the US forces. This was supposedly a War game of a possible invasion of Iran if I remember correctly (check this i could be wrong on the country).Others on this site may remember more details. General Van Riper is a really smart guy so this may be worth doing more research on to see some of the fine details of high level decision making when facts get in the way of a pre-determined decision.

You might also consider the Athenian General's request (I think it was Nicias??) who is reported to have thought that if he sent an outrageous request back to Athens for more men and ships they'd call the mission off. Instead they fulfilled the request (with some extra to boot), but no allowment was made for cavalry and it did not turn out so well.

This may have been a case where the CDR might have been better off just saying this is a bad idea - but I think the political body had already been sold on it, so they'd probably have just sacked him (or worse)

I think what you will probably find more historical examples of disagreements over operational approaches (e.g. "here first", or "in this manner vs. another") between military and political leaders - which is kind of the "once it is started, let me execute it - or atleast do my job" argument.

There is also the discussion of "means" required to enable an operational approach - of which I thought a good recent example of such discussion showed up on the SWJ blog wrt SWC Council member COL Gian Gentile's response to the article written by Anthony Cordesman where he ref. the opening years of the Civil War before Lincoln promoted Grant.

Best, Rob

hi Rob,

You are right. It was Nicias, who spoke against the expedition to Syracuse in the Assembly and was elected general on the reasoning that his skepticism ( and military experience) made him best qualified to execute the invasion. Athens also doubled down later when the invasion faltered.

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Randy,another modern example would be USMC General Van Riper and his refusal to keep playing a rigged War Game after he had already beaten the US forces. This was supposedly a War game of a possible invasion of Iran if I remember correctly (check this i could be wrong on the country).Others on this site may remember more details. General Van Riper is a really smart guy so this may be worth doing more research on to see some of the fine details of high level decision making when facts get in the way of a pre-determined decision.

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AFAIK it was called millenium excercise at invading IraQ and he won by sending his messages by couriers (yes real persons). He has repelled the planned landing at BASRA IIRC.

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Originally Posted by Schmedlap

Just one thought that I would add...

The division of powers into CinC and theater commander has not always been the norm. Don't hold me to this, but it may be a relatively new construct. I'm thinking Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Mao, etc.

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Maybe this comes late, but it's an old construct.

Ever since monarchs stopped leading their own armies (typical since European 18th century conflict) we have usually seen theater/army commander and CinC (=head of state) separated.

The Germans also had the army group (Heeresgruppe) level in WW2 and a similar division of Western and Eastern Front in WWI.

Many Roman emperors sent generals to wage war in distant places; they certainly claimed to be what we would call CinC today.

Thanks Mark,
I now find myself trying to remember exactly when it was that Athens tapped into their reserve to pay for the war and melted down the gold cladding on Athena for talents. If we want a historical example to consider for how a "long war" influences the interaction of politics and war (and the impact of chance) there are few competitors that might prove more useful then that of the war (and times where there was less war or no war) between Sparta and Athens. Too many folks think it is only useful as an example of a struggle between a maritime and a land power, or a democracy and an oligarchy - both of which, as comparrisons have their own limitations.

Best, Rob

I always saw its primary utility in being an example for the society-shattering effects of prolonged warfare.

The Greek culture produced very little advances and notable personalities after that war.

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Randy,another modern example would be USMC General Van Riper and his refusal to keep playing a rigged War Game after he had already beaten the US forces. This was supposedly a War game of a possible invasion of Iran if I remember correctly (check this i could be wrong on the country).Others on this site may remember more details. General Van Riper is a really smart guy so this may be worth doing more research on to see some of the fine details of high level decision making when facts get in the way of a pre-determined decision.

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And here's some places worth starting with....
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...type=printable
http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,95496,00.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/wa...on/12navy.html
http://nationalsecurity.oversight.ho...ry.asp?ID=1618
http://nationalsecurity.oversight.ho...1114181303.pdf
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/1103-04.htm

As for the main topic of the thread, I agree with those who've said if you can't win it, you shouldn't be leading it. Now, when that's happened in the past, I note some (most notably after they retired) have said, "well, I didn't agree with the plan/resources/strategy/approach, but I didn't quit because I wanted to be sure the best possible effort was made, even a less-than-perfect situation." Was this true, or were pensions/reputations worried about more? I can't read minds/hearts, so I'll leave that to the individual consciences of those making such statements.

This isn't just a problem for CinC's but also all leaders, and even soldiers in the military. There comes a time, probably for everyone, where you don't agree with what is going on, and you only have two choices: exit or stay. Saying that "This is unwinnable" is functionally exit, because you have no reason to believe that you will be retained after that, if the powers that be have already committed to the idea. After all, (Nicias aside) if they have made a decision, why would they want someone who believes that the mission is doomed to failure in charge?

If you stay, later on people will believe that you stayed because really you tacitly agreed with the mission. If you leave, you may be abandoning those around/subordinate to you, who may not have the option to get out. In the end, this may be part of the reason that big time policy changes are so difficult in the military. People quitting is a great way to get the turnover necessary to make those changes a reality, but like lobsters in a bowl, loyalty keeps pulling people back in, even if most people don't agree with the policy.

find someone who will do ti. Generally better to say 'Yes' and then do it your way. If you get it done, they can say little, if you don't they'll can you any way...

Some things have to get a flat 'No, Sir. I cannot do that' but they're relatively rare in my observation and generally, if what you say makes sense, you' ll win the argument.

All of which gets away from the poor Theater Commander who pretty much has to say he can do this thing... :wry:

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"If we want a historical example to consider for how a "long war" influences the interaction of politics and war (and the impact of chance) there are few competitors that might prove more useful then that of the war (and times where there was less war or no war) between Sparta and Athens. Too many folks think it is only useful as an example of a struggle between a maritime and a land power, or a democracy and an oligarchy - both of which, as comparrisons have their own limitations."

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Wholehearted agreement.

I like two sources here, the Landmark Thucydides and Donald Kagan's Peloponnesian War:

http://www.amazon.com/Landmark-Thucy...1946508&sr=1-1

http://www.amazon.com/Peloponnesian-.../dp/0670032115

Alcibiades figures in heavily with the poor strategic choices of the Athenians here ( and not just of the Athenians, Alcibiades was a remarkably bad actor but evidently a persuasive one) which raises the question of the elite, among which both Nicias and Alcibiades were the dominant figures. An elite that sees and pursues a divergence of personal interest/ambition from "national" interest are more dangerous than a foreign enemy.

Not that I would point any fingers at the elite governing class in America...cough....ahem....cough.....:D

I don't normally read Ralph Peter's column in the NYPost, but it caught my eye and in reading it found it applied to this discussion: http://www.nypost.com/seven/09032009...day-newsletter

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According to multiple (angry) sources, McChrystal -- our top soldier on the ground -- intended to ask for 28,000 more US troops. A presidential hatchet man directed the general not to make the request: Troop increases would be "addressed separately."

Worried about his poll numbers, our president's making a bad situation worse. He's given McChrystal the impossible mission of turning Afghan Flintstones into Jetsons, while starving him of means.

This violates a fundamental principle of the American way of war: Once the president assigns the mission, the commander must receive due consideration when he asks for the necessary resources.

Obama's message to McChrystal was "Just don't ask."

I don't believe the general's correct, but he has a right to be heard. Any decision about troop levels should be made based upon the facts on the ground, not politics. By playing along with White House censorship, McChrystal's allowing himself to be used as a political tool. That's not a proper role for any general.

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All manner of issues raised here, for a non-American I do wonder why a White House "hatchet man" could direct the general's report being written in such a manner. I could follow if DoD or JCS gave such a direction.

davidbfpo

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

I do wonder why a White House "hatchet man" could direct the general's report being written in such a manner. I could follow if DoD or JCS gave such a direction. davidbfpo

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"Sources" is a bit vaguely referenced, so I suppose we don't know with any degree of confidence whether (1) such a directive was ever given (2) such a directive was delivered by a "hatchet man" and (3) whether the hypothetical "hatchet man" was acting under the authority of or even with knowledge from the "White House." Nor is there any evidence that the White House was refusing to "hear" GEN McChrystal's request or rationale.

There are certainly plausible strategic reasons why the General -or perhaps the Civil authority - might wish to separate an assessment and a specific troop surge request.

I don't know if Peters' scoop on this is accurate or not, but it seems a bit specious to invoke accusations and moral outrage based on speculative inference... in my opinion.

I think that leaders should communicate clear and honest assessments of the situation and their prospects for achieving the desired end state with available resources. If a leader's honest assessment is that he cannot get the job done with the available resources, then it is up to the superior to decide how to proceed. Maybe someone else could deliver, maybe not. As has already been mentioned, what matters is that the job gets done, not who gets to do the job. Certainly the opportunity to command is important to the professional himself, but morally, that is not the important issue.

A related scenario is one in which the subordinate leader is convinced he can do something, and may be utterly wrong in his assessment. In this case, is the superior paying attention and how well does he know the nature of his subordinate?

I agree with others who have stated that the root question here is applicable to leadership at all levels throughout the Army (and in many other organizations, as well).

of seperate requests is that it might help keep the generals assessment from being percieved to dictate policy rather than inform it.

Now what the powers that be do in relation to real requirements is on them.
I'm sure the needs have been rather extensively expressed. Gen McChrystal seems like the type that would ensure that message is chrystal clear.

And can't see Gen Petreaus accepting anything less

Guess we'll see

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Originally Posted by rborum

Can a theater commander ever say publicly or to his CINC that his theater is not "winnable" (however that is defined)?

Is there historic precedent for making such an assessment?

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When the war is clearly not winnable. At that point, what has the commander to lose? For an American historical precedent, Robert E Lee did it at Appomattox, and history hasn't condemned him for the loss.

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Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

of seperate requests is that it might help keep the generals assessment from being percieved to dictate policy rather than inform it.

Now what the powers that be do in relation to real requirements is on them.
I'm sure the needs have been rather extensively expressed. Gen McChrystal seems like the type that would ensure that message is chrystal clear.

And can't see Gen Petreaus accepting anything less

Guess we'll see

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Chrystal clear. Very clever

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Originally Posted by Greyhawk

When the war is clearly not winnable. At that point, what has the commander to lose? For an American historical precedent, Robert E Lee did it at Appomattox, and history hasn't condemned him for the loss.

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True, but he was on the side that supported slavery, which is now universally condemned. However, if McClellan had said so after the Peninsular Campaign then I doubt history would have looked so kindly on him. (Not that he has a stellar reputation anyway.)

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"Can you imagine ever saying to the president of the United States, 'Sir, we just can't do it,'?" Martin asked.

"Yes I can," McChrystal said. "And if I felt that way, the day I feel that way, the day I'm sure I feel that way, I'll tell him that."

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- from 60 Minutes interview

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Originally Posted by Greyhawk

- from 60 Minutes interview

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Greyhawk: Your post is directly on point, sir.