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http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story...ink=MI_emailed
Can this part possibly be right?
And if it is, what sort of impact will this story have on domestic support for the war?Quote:
U.S. commanders, citing new rules to avoid civilian casualties, rejected repeated calls to unleash artillery rounds at attackers dug into the slopes and tree lines — despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village.
Even if the denial of fires occurred as the reporter claims, I wonder if he has his facts right as to the cause (new rules to avoid civilian casualties). Generally speaking, restrictions on the use of artillery are nothing new. Even in early deployments to Iraq, we needed BDE-commander approval for any fire mission of artillery into the city that we operated in, or the immediate vicinity (battalion commander approval for mortars). I generally cringe when weapons organic/OPCON to battalion are controlled by BDE, but in that case I think it made sense. Certain fires need restrictions.
Whatever the case, the quoted passage is a bit odd. I just read the full article (a very short article, considering the length of the firefight) and the reporter notes that the Captain requested artillery or attack aviation and the response was that no helicopters were available. Later, a specific request for artillery was a smoke mission, not HE. They did not get smoke, but they did get WP. Firing WP doesn't seem like something you do if you are worried about civilian casualties.
The report is very light on details.
(I'm thinking here of the question "what sort of impact will this story have on domestic support for the war?")
Detailed ROE are not in the public domain. We know a bit from the unclass (and publicly released) portion of General McChrystal's tactical directive, and we know a bit about this battle. From that, those who want to draw broad conclusions from scant knowledge will proceed without much caution.
So much for the obvious, here are my thoughts.
What percentage of the US public will do that? It will certainly be incorporated into the current level of noise, and some will consider it signal. I'd bet the number is close enough to zero not to matter - not because few are quick to judgment sans knowledge but because few are concerned with that degree of detail.
Now if some high-visibility public figure were to begin banging this particular drum, and if enough media attention was paid to that banging, then all bets are off. But in this case I don't know who that drummer would be.
I am very frustrated by this report. I can absolutely see this happening, although in the past units in Konar were not shy about using artillery to support troops in contact. What is especially disturbing to me here is that the Marines in contact are clearly ETT or PMT mentors -- and it is par for the course for the local battlespace commander to not provide adequate support for these troops, or to try to ignore them altogether.
I for one don't buy very much of this story, for a ton of reasons.
...is a few more Generals:
Weeks before his son's death, John Bernard said he had been raising red flags about the military's new rules of engagement policy, which stipulate when and how U.S. soldiers are and are not allowed to use force. The new rules, issued by U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new top commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, were aimed at reducing civilian casualties.
Now, a month after his son was killed, John Bernard, 55, says he is on a mission to spark a national discussion about the new rules, and the military's broader strategy in the Afghanistan war, which he believes led to Joshua's death and continues to endanger U.S. soldiers serving in the embattled country.
...Bernard's efforts are gaining traction among Maine's congressional delegation. Rep. Michael Michaud and Sen. Olympia Snowe have written letters directly to Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Sen. Susan Collins, who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee, has spoken with Gates.
For those who don't recognize the names, John Bernard is the father of Marine Lance Cpl Joshua Bernard, whose photo the AP published over his father's wishes.
Now...Had it not been for the policy of U.S. forces working closely with Afghanis and the new rules of engagement that restrict use of force in the name of preventing civilian casualties, Joshua Bernard might not have been killed that day, John Bernard said.
The drum is being banged.
+1Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
To those who doubt, I challenge you to listen to the 15 minute audio interview with the story's author, which includes pictures.
If I had watched men die for want of needed support in contact, I would be fuming mad too. Sh*t happens in war, I know that well, but this one apparently didn't have to.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/75300.html
(Sorry, can't embed the video from McClatchy's website)
On the ROE thread I mentioned why I supported GEN McCrystal's new rules, which I still do. I oppose those who can't understand when rules need to be interpreted or violated to do the right thing.
It goes back to my question as to why johnny (joe) can't think and what I posted in that thread as to what I would do if confronted with such a decision. I said:
The task force supporting obviously didn't feel they had that flexibility, or were unwilling to use it. Sad.Quote:
And then there is the Cavguy solution. If you're on the ground, and the right and obvious thing to do is staring you in the face, just do it, and take the consequences. That's actually what we did that day of the video. My army experiences tell me well considered violations of rules/guidance is generally underwritten by most commanders, especially if conditions warrant.
Niel
From the newly id'd blogsite: http://www.quattozone.com/ by a US PAO in Afghanistan on the ambush and ROE: http://www.quattozone.com/2009/09/ru...nragement.html
davidbfpoQuote:
commanders in Afghanistan owe their troops an explanation of why and under what conditions they should place themselves at greater risk. The rest of us need to resist the temptation of jumping on a bandwagon that equates looser ROE with supporting our troops.
Eight years of less restrictive ROE have not prevented tragedies such as the ambush in Ganjgal. In fact, more permissive use of firepower may have contributed to the murderous rage of those responsible for the attack. Had the troops caught in the ambush been able to level the village - or if Lance Corporal Bernard had been able to summon the full military wrath of his country to his aid - we might be mourning fewer dead Americans today. Tomorrow, though, we would mourn those killed by a larger, stronger insurgency in the next village. The new ROE in Afghanistan rely on a hard but sound calculus: greater risk to our troops now means less risk and a greater chance of success for our troops later.
I think Niel makes some very good points, along with others on this thread, especially Schmedlap's caution about establishing facts before making sweeping conclusions.
But to Niel, it is very possible that what drove the actions and decisions in this whole affair was in fact the General's recent guidance to avoid civilian casualties. So on the one hand say you support it, but on the other and very understandable one you are viscerally upset that these men didnt get the fire support they needed.
At least for me this is a tough contradiction (to which your post does not resolve) to let stand.
thanks
gian
Frankly, IntelTrooper's point disturbs me more than any ROE questions... but on to the ROE question. I'm not writing what follows for the benefit of folks who know (aka regulars here), but threads like this one tend to draw the attention of folks who don't (aka visitors via Google, etc), so I think it worthwhile to add this.
From the publicly released portion of Gen McChrystal's tactical directive:
The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operational security).
(NOTE) This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is determined no other options (specific options deleted due to operational security) are available to effectively counter the threat.
I am not privy to those other specific options and conditions - so I'm speaking on generic terms. Here's the quote from the story that's generating the heat:U.S. commanders, citing new rules to avoid civilian casualties, rejected repeated calls to unleash artillery rounds at attackers dug into the slopes and tree lines — despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village.I'm left to wonder if the radio response from the TOC was "sorry, no can do - ROE says so" - or if not, how this explanation made its way into the story. If I can think of a dozen ways that could happen I'm sure others can, too.
Some of those "ways" include an accurate characterization of the decision process. Which - if that's what it is - reads to me like a misinterpretation of ROE. ("...despite being told repeatedly that they weren't near the village...") One would hope (and I think this approaches Niel's point) that errors on the side of caution would favor the guys on the ground. But obviously one could argue that (assuming the case is as described) errors in this case favored the bad guys.
None of that indicates the ROE themselves are "bad" - to make that determination we'd need to examine those specific options and conditions - something the guys who made the on-scene decision did, and something those who will officially review this incident will also do.
FWIW: in this case it appears the four Marines were killed in the opening moments of the attack prior to the request for fires, this is not to downplay the issue but to clarify that we are not talking about an incident where any US troops died as a result of whatever decision was made regarding IDF/CAS.
On the other hand, there are other troubling aspects to the (as-told) story of a unit walking to a village (where elders had "announced over the weekend that they were accepting the authority of the local government") at a pre-arranged time to meet, greet, and conduct searches of homes that we haven't delved deeply into.
Meanwhile
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said that it did take “some time” for air support to arrive, but the delay was due to distance, not the rules of engagement.
He said the deaths are under investigation, adding, “We will hopefully get to the bottom and figure out if everything operated according to protocol.”
Honestly, I'm glad the attention is being paid. Clarity is a good thing.
From the article:Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
I think there is a problem with causation in this argument. It's like the Army football team saying the only reason the have had losing seasons for the past decade is because they only had a running game so they were going to go to a strickly passing game and no longer run. This argument minimizes and overlooks many other factors most strikingly the long-standing history of Pashtun resistance to central government and propensity to engage in fighting.Quote:
Eight years of less restrictive ROE have not prevented tragedies such as the ambush in Ganjgal. In fact, more permissive use of firepower may have contributed to the murderous rage of those responsible for the attack
In Mike's world, there are a couple of things that I would consider common sense.
1. Bombs dropped from a UAV with no ground observation is mutually exclusive to troops in contact.
2. Dropping precision munitions to close with and destroy the enemy does not equal a scorched earth policy.
Did the US PAO ask the Taliban if they took this math class?Quote:
Had the troops caught in the ambush been able to level the village - or if Lance Corporal Bernard had been able to summon the full military wrath of his country to his aid - we might be mourning fewer dead Americans today. Tomorrow, though, we would mourn those killed by a larger, stronger insurgency in the next village. The new ROE in Afghanistan rely on a hard but sound calculus: greater risk to our troops now means less risk and a greater chance of success for our troops later
v/r
Mike
to make a sensible comment. It has been my experience that newspersons accompanying troops rarely get the story straight, are not generally filled in precisely on what constituted the radio traffic and that firefights are chaotic and stories on what happened vary among participants -- even those who were right next to each other. I've also noted that each passing hour changes most stories...
Though I am still curious about the alleged dichotomy that support was denied and yet WP was fired... :wry:
Here is a factoid from the McClatchy article cited by Niel:
IF (and this is an important word - see Ken's comment) this factoid is correct, it cuts both ways: fire coming from an inhabited place (hilltop hamlet) and women and children present; but men, women and children all engaged in combat or combat support.Quote:
The worst single loss of U.S. military trainers of the war brought out the deep bitterness with which many soldiers view the new rules. They feel unfairly handcuffed, especially in the case of Ganjgal, where women and children were seen running ammunition and weapons to gunmen firing from inside the hilltop hamlet.
One wonders if the "specific conditions" (which we rightly do not know as Greyhawk points out) cover this kind of situation.
...the PAO site is his personal, unofficial site, views expressed do not reflect the official policy, etc. (Full disclaimer on site.)
which IMO becomes suspect by introducing obtuse foolishness like this:Those comments would seem to questionably accurate at best, politically motivated (understandable given his background) and tangentially if at all related to the story. They discredit the rest of his reporting in my view.Quote:
The lack of timely air support...was a consequence of the manpower and equipment shortages bequeathed by the Bush administration's failure to secure Afghanistan against a resurgence of the Taliban, al Qaida and allied groups before turning to invade Iraq.
...
The denial of heavy artillery fire to those trapped in Ganjgal also has roots in the Bush administration's decision to divert resources to Iraq and the resulting stress on the U.S. military.
More sensible is this comment:Though I'd suggest that air power does not give a vital edge, it merely offsets the opponents vital edge in terrain knowledge, local support and agility to a slight extent. A very slight extent...Quote:
There are a limited number of U.S. helicopters in Kunar, a stretch of craggy mountains and serpentine valleys bordering Pakistan where airpower gives a vital edge to overstretched U.S. troops fighting guerrillas who know every nook and trail of the area. Unbeknownst to those trapped in the Ganjgal kill zone, however, the available aircraft were tied up in the Shiryak Valley to the north in a battle in which two pilots were wounded, U.S. commanders said.
I can give kudos to the guy for going out with the troops -- and still decry the politicization and the lack of rudimentary military knowledge by too many in the media.
And while I can comment on the reporting, I still don't know enough to comment on the incident.
Mike, you raise some good points, but...
I'm sure they didn't, but we're not the Taliban, so we have to.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
I was still on my first cup of coffee with that post. ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger
I think Niel and Ken are more on the mark.
v/r
Mike
My objection to the COIN Religion is that it DOES require lopsided math like that. We have to play fair, the other guys do not.
Moreover, in playing fair and "doing COIN right" with the GPF increased casualties are a given. Add those increased casualties to the impatience of the American public (and Armed Forces...) for tangible results quickly, generally an impossible task in COIN like operations and you have a recipe for a screw up. Those are historical facts.
Thus I contend that COIN situations that might require GPF commitment are to be rigorously avoided unless there is no other option. I can think of no US operation of any size since WW II where GPF commitment to COIN efforts could not have been avoided. Nor can I think of one that has seen the GPF committed that was truly successful as opposed to ending with only a marginally decent outcome at best. One that probably was not worth the cost. While our commitment to Afghanistan is not complete, I doubt it will change that assessment.
So called COIN operations teach bad habits -- the Army today still has a number of residual Viet Nam induced problems -- and are ferociously expensive in all terms for the benefit derived. People that go around looking for places to deploy and do this stuff need to replace Bob's World's Intel weenies on point. :wry:
The Army and Marines need to be prepared for them, no question. However the policy folks need to understand that it will not be easy, will not be pretty and will likely not solve the problem they should have addressed earlier through other means. The Army and Marines should avoid these things like the Plague -- not least because that's what they are. Like the plague, they're equal opportunity killers, no slack for either side, no benefit except lowering the overpopulation counter a tad...
Sir,Quote:
Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile
I see where my own conflicts may muddy what I was trying to express.
On one level, GEN McCrystal had to tamp down on the excessive use of indirect assets, that despite earlier guidance, was still being employed in ways that strengthened the insurgent's ability to mobilize the use of force.
My fear, articulated better by Ken, was that such guidance falls prey to the bureaucratic imperative and does not contain sufficent flexibility/guidance as to what situations are exceptions to the rule.
No set of rules can ever compensate for every forseeable situation, which is why draconian measures such as the CG's guidance provide opportunities for incidents like this one (if description is accurate) to happen. It is odd, but in effect many are more willing to let others suffer/die than endure a (potentially career ending) reprimand.
In the end, leaders are paid to make hard choices and take responsibility for them.
The greater question is why such draconian guidance was required in the first place - which indicates a greater flaw in our leader development system and lack of understanding of the dynamics present in the Afghanistan operating environment.
Hope this clarifies.
Niel
Niel,Quote:
Originally Posted by Cavguy
I think we all pretty much agree that the use of heavy ordnance can create bigger problems down the road than those it solves in the immediate here and now. The more pervasive and frequent the use, the greater the likelihood of those bigger problems emerging. Left unchecked, its use would likely increase since, in any situation, people tend to respond with a mix of "here's something from my standard tool kit" and "let's use this, since it's available." So here's a question for you and others with field experience as I try to understand the intention and implications of the new ROE. How much of a problem was the use of heavy ordnance that the new ROE addresses?
To all:
A few days ago I was in the shopette when I first read the McClatchy article in the Stars and Stripes. I purchased it on the spot. The article intrigued me and I had to buy the paper because this section of Konar was my platoons sole responsibility in Konar province. After we left, my platoon AO was expanded to a company AO--that is how large it is.
I know Ganjgal intimately and that is why this story infuriates me so. From my previous posts and blog it is clear where I stand on the COIN debate (hugely for population-centric COIN). I don't want to rehash that battle here, but elaborate on the points that from the synopsis I read I truly believe are mishandled. Overall, we can not condemn GEN McChrystal's guidance on COIN or new ROE based on a single firefight. I mention this because I have already seen blogs and some comments prepared to condemn strict ROE based on a single engagement of ANSF/CF.
First, as Greyhawk mentioned, the bulk of casualties in an ambush occur in the first few moments. Without close air support on station or heavy weapons support, it is unlikely that the casualties would have been avoided. The needed support was not artillery but UAV or, even better, an ITAS system on a TOW vehicle that could easily spot the dismounted ambush's heat signatures as the soldiers entered the village.
Second, I know the exact distance that artillery support is fired to support Ganjgal. While at some point, ROE might have been invoked on the radio, much more likely is the fact that artillery is not a precision system. I have seen rounds fly hundreds off yards off course. While insurgents might not have specifically been in the village, even if they are a hundred yards in the woodline the rounds very easily could impact into the village and create a humanitarian crisis, a gigantic IO victory of the AAF.
Third, because this was the first patrol into Ganjgal, expectations should be low. Ganjgal is the perfect example of how CF/ANSF are not conducting clear, hold and build. The patrol to Ganjgal was the first in a long time and would probably be the only patrol for months. Thus, we might clear, but we would not hold. That is a recipe for a Taliban ambush.
Fourth, the best method to extricate forces in this region is a well prepared quick reaction force. Ganjgal is accessible by dirt road. I believe the failure to coordinate with CF mounted platoons and ANA mounted platoons (both stationed at the nearest Camp, few minute drive from Ganjgal) was much more critical to the pinning down of US forces then the lack of immediate artillery support. Also, the patrol should have been planned with close air support which is both more accurate and responsive than artillery.
We can not condemn the new ROE because one attack went poorly. This ROE was not in effect when the battle of Wanat occurred in the same AO. The ROE was not in effect during the ambush of 9 November 2007. Casualties are an eventuality of war. If we refuse to lose any soldiers in pursuit of victory then we need to reevaluate the war, not the tactics. We can debate the merits of the ROE but we can use this one case to condemn GEN McChrystal's strategy; too many other factors contributed to this attack.
Finally, the belief, that has also circulated, that this new strategy disproportionally risks our US forces is logical fallacy. The article reports that nine Afghans died in addition to another nineteen being wounded. We truly are sharing the cost with Afghans and hopefully we can teach them the
To Wolfsberger: The addiction to fire power, specifically mortars, artillery and CAS is huge in Afghanistan. Because we lack the maneuver to patrol mountains, ridgelines and many capillary valleys, we rely on fire power to act as our maneuver. We combine this with UAVs to solve our problem. To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability.
Probably described it best. We taught him the ins and outs of call for fire. Now, he's on his second tour- this one in Afghan.
v/rQuote:
afghanistan f-ing blows. literally and in multiple ways. this place is no joke. i tried calling for fire.... theres so many false ridges and draws and #### that you cant see on maps or binos till the smoke covers em
Mike
perspective.
One minor point -- I agree with all your positions, however, I do have a couple of comments on your last sentence:The cultural awareness adequate for troop units has been available for most of that time but many units have not made an effort to pump that knowledge into the Companies, Troops and Platoons who have to do the work.Quote:
"To the folks who say we need to kill our way out of this fight, that has been our solution for the first eight years, using fire power to make up for our lack of cultural awareness and maneuver capability."
Both that and the lack of maneuver capability are functions of poor or inadequate education and training coupled with equipment not designed for mission accomplishment in a risk averse culture. Those are all flaws inflicted by the US Army upon itself. That they existed in 2001 was and is sad and unnecessary -- that they still exist after eight years of war is borderline criminal.
As an aside, I have heard that the use of H&I fires and ridge sweeps by mortars and artillery in Afghanistan has been halted. I thought we learned in Viet Nam how abysmally stupid and counterproductive are both techniques -- after we had learned it in Korea... :mad:
A great explanation from Michael C that makes me wonder if the fact that the Marines were CSTC-A ETTs not under ISAF may have inadvertently caused some problems with respect to mission planning and QRF coordination. I do not know how things are in RC-East but in RC-South I saw some coordination issues between OEF CSTC-A and ISAF coalition forces (exacerbated by the fact that coalition units did not have Blue Force Tracker).
...at least, not yet.
The Washington Post: "As U.S. Toll in Afghanistan Rises, Lawmakers And Families Are Questioning New Restrictions"
Our friend Quatto weighs in here - with several points that may seem familiar to those who've read this thread. Said points are well stated there.
What I find confounding about the situation is from one (imho false) narrative General McChrystal is playing fast and loose with the lives of his troops via the ROE set to appease his political leadership, from other more recent (imho equally false and stated so by the man himself) claims he is on the verge of resigning because his political leadership is playing fast and loose with the lives of his troops.
And the first argument continues even after the second was raised - apparently its legs were a bit stronger than I first hoped. I sympathize with those who must counter both in time of war - along with some likely third argument which will put all that together in some coherent (ala Frankenstein's monster) way. (That is, assuming we don't pack it in over the combined weight of the two mutually exclusive arguments first. Between them there's something for everyone to oppose.)
Can anyone show me ANY evidence that a theoretical psychological gain is more important than the life of a US service member? Has the use of indirect fires been abused by some? Sure. Does that mean we should restrict its use by everyone? Once again, military leadership has chosen the easiest, safest solution to a problem, and to hell with the consequences with that solution.
SFC W
I've been monitoring the daily ISAF OwnSitreps and other reports since late last year. I've seen little change in practice in the handling of TICs or artillery support since the new ROEs came out. That doesn't rule out that units in the field may have changed their behavior to make less requests for support but the official reporting indicates that these units are being supported.
A lesson from the 08 September ambush in Konar Province that many seem to be overlooking is that a division of forces between ISAF and OEF can lead to bad consequences in a combat environment. When the maneuver battalion/battle space owner and the ANSF trainers report through separate chains of command there will inevitably be unit rivalries and a lack of full coordination.
This ROE issue is a very sensitive one as it plays to the fears/stereotypes of clueless politicians and spineless generals callously sacrificing the lives of U.S. service members. I'll place my trust in the judgment of persons in higher pay grades that GEN McChrystal has the intelligence, integrity, and combat credentials to do the right thing. And I can personally attest to the fact that the same holds true about the Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand and Farah Provinces.
My understanding of ROE is that it is crafted to ensure that we put escalation of force procedures in place so that incidents requiring the use of deadly force are less frequent. Once your life is in danger - or you believe it is - then the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat is kosher, even if that means the "minimum force" is an artillery round because you're out of ammo or otherwise unable to use lesser weapons at your disposal. Our EoF procedures were always briefed to us with the ROE - the ROE was the principle and the EoF was how it was to be implemented. It was always emphasized to us that we did not need to go step-by-step up the EoF procedures, nor were we forbidden from using whatever means necessary to dispose of the idiots trying to kill us.
I get concerned when so much is made of a single reporter's writing. He can't possibly have seen, or understood, everything that was going on around him.
perhaps the fire support was denied because they couldn't pass an accurate observer position to the FDC? I'm waiting for the investigation.
the results of the investigation - assuming that we get one that is accurate. I would like to see the recommendation by the investigating panel covering this aspect of the firefight (link in previous post):
if that were the facts. We (US and ISAF partners) have to make up our minds about what the rules are regarding irregular combatants.Quote:
The worst single loss of U.S. military trainers of the war brought out the deep bitterness with which many soldiers view the new rules. They feel unfairly handcuffed, especially in the case of Ganjgal, where women and children were seen running ammunition and weapons to gunmen firing from inside the hilltop hamlet.
In the meantime, I (like Uboat509) will remain uncomfortable with the apparent concept that the life of one US service person is worth less than the intangible psychological (or political) benefits to the "big picture" of allowing that life to be taken.
I was going to say this, but it is much better said by someone who was there. Still, I think it bares repeating. The issue isn't ROE. It's insufficient resources to execute the strategy.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
Are you comfortable with 10,000 casualties to establish the Normandy beach head? If so, then isn't your issue not with the loss of life, but the apparent lack of a beachhead?Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
Hi Rank amateur and all,
Please carefully note my use of the adjective "intangible". The endstate in the ETO was the destruction of the Wehrmacht as a combatant force and the unconditional surrender of the German government. Those are tangible goals.
Did they justify 9 men left standing in one company of the 29ID after they had taken their objective at Normandy ? Did they justify 138 casualties in C-1/117-30ID to break through the Siegfried Line ? I believe they did, though I do wish that those actions had not been necessary. That wish is personal because of the tangible physical and psychological costs to my father and others.
So, yes, I am uncomfortable with loss of life (and the other personal costs of war) for such intangibles as "making the world safe for democracy" and the like.
This ROE thing continues to grow legs...
Quote:
Meanwhile, the consequences of McChrystal’s new rules of engagement aimed at limiting Afghan civilian casualties from American air and artillery strikes are becoming clearer.
Afghan civilian casualties have, indeed, fallen sharply in recent months. However, as McClatchy Newspapers’ Jonathan S. Landay reported from the battlefield this month, American troops are being killed and wounded when they can’t get the fire support they need. Parents of troops serving in Afghanistan and members of Congress have taken critical note of the cost of McChrystal’s new rules.
- Joe Galloway, Obama's Afghan Dilemma
Schmedlap, great spot. I still think it is unfortunate because the facts are not clear.
To JMM- Isn't a democratic government a tangible goal? A democratic government holds freely run democratic elections and leadership steps down from power. Plenty of think tanks rate governments on how democratic they are. To make the intangible goal tangible we simply find the metrics and say we want an Afghan government that passes so-and-so's criteria for a democratic government.
On the other hand, we could ignore what time of government it is, be it democracy or autocracy or theocracy, and simply say we don't want it to be a failed state (the logic being failed states like Somalia or Afghanistan pre-October 2001 have a greater chance of harboring terrorists). To define a failed state we could also go to any of the NGOs or think tanks that define Failed States (Foreign Policy magazine does an issue every year). We could just say they need a per-capita GDP of X and a child mortality rate of Y and human rights ranking of Z. Thus the intangible benefits of democracy become very well defined.
Of course, you might mean that the creation of a democracy and/or the prevention of failed states are not something you care about in Afghanistan. But, it is hard to deny that there are tangible and concrete metrics we can use to measure our goals. (Whether or not our leadership clearly define those goals or not.)
Could be that you've just been doing it badly for 8 years. Cultural awareness has no relationship to Fires and Manoeuvre, that I am aware of.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
Additionally, Fires can only strike, and to some extent fix. They cannot FIND and they cannot EXPLOIT - thus if you choosing not to manoeuvre you are either incompetent, badly trained, or not being given the resources to make it possible.
ROE is only relevant to the policy being set forth. Thus ROE is always situation dependant. SO it might be that 4 dead Marines may have more negative political impact than 4 dead Afghans - just a thought.
First, the US Army and its NATO allies (the UK included), have been waging poor counter-insurgency for the last eight years. Not all bad in every area, but yes generally trending downward.
Cultural awareness does have a relationship to maneuver and fires and intelligence. They are all related: you must have intelligence to maneuver on the enemy, or to be effective at it, and fires can fix the enemy to allow you to maneuver. Now, not necessarily "cultural awareness", but whatever term describes all the tasks like psyops, reconstruction, political relationships, cultural attaches, language ability, information operations, civil action projects, training missions; all those soft skills fall in categories distinct from fire, maneuver and intelligence. Bad counter-insurgents cover up their lacking cultural awareness with an over reliance on firepower, like the US in Afghanistan and Vietnam previously. We have only in the last few years begun to remedy wholeheartedly our mistakes, but it cannot be done overnight.
Sorry I missed this by a week:
First, as far as I am concerned, this is a factor in the Political Struggle and should not be part of the Military Struggle. To the extent that the military needs to use "soft" means:Quote:
from MC
To JMM- Isn't a democratic government a tangible goal? A democratic government holds freely run democratic elections and leadership steps down from power. Plenty of think tanks rate governments on how democratic they are. To make the intangible goal tangible we simply find the metrics and say we want an Afghan government that passes so-and-so's criteria for a democratic government.
On the other hand, we could ignore what time of government it is, be it democracy or autocracy or theocracy, and simply say we don't want it to be a failed state (the logic being failed states like Somalia or Afghanistan pre-October 2001 have a greater chance of harboring terrorists). To define a failed state we could also go to any of the NGOs or think tanks that define Failed States (Foreign Policy magazine does an issue every year). We could just say they need a per-capita GDP of X and a child mortality rate of Y and human rights ranking of Z. Thus the intangible benefits of democracy become very well defined.
Of course, you might mean that the creation of a democracy and/or the prevention of failed states are not something you care about in Afghanistan. But, it is hard to deny that there are tangible and concrete metrics we can use to measure our goals. (Whether or not our leadership clearly define those goals or not.)
to advance its efforts, so be it. But, the military efforts must at least co-ordinate with the political efforts.Quote:
from MC
..; tasks like psyops, reconstruction, political relationships, cultural attaches, language ability, information operations, civil action projects, training missions...
Second, as to the political efforts, those must be of indigenous origins and acceptable to the indigenous people - not, as you say:
Of course, if you really want to impose US standards on Astan or any "failed state", and implement the opinions of our many so-smart think tanks, be straight-forward and occupy the country formally and install a military government - or simply annex the country as a colony and install a colonial civil administration.Quote:
... we simply find the metrics and say we want an Afghan government that passes so-and-so's criteria for a democratic government ...
....
We could just say they need a per-capita GDP of X and a child mortality rate of Y and human rights ranking of Z ....
Third, what is "democracy" and what is "failed" mean very different things to different peoples (and to different think tanks). Once upon a time, a Singapore businessman was asked what communism meant to him. He replied it was freedom to carry on international business. Going back to the intangible slogan that I used - "making the world safe for democracy" - that concept meant one thing to Wilson, another thing to his British and French allies, and still another thing to Cabot Lodge and the US Senate.
Fourth, on paper, Astan has a fine democracy and a great system of governance. As it should be, since the US and the Europeans negotiated it. What, it isn't working very well in the districts ? - we should be shocked, just shocked !! If you want metrics, go district by district; and find out what form of governance the people want. Or, you can just take the reports issued by or for the Karzai government and find out that everything is wonderful and improving.
Fifth, you are unto something about JMM in your third paragraph because I am not a big fan of "creation of a democracy" or "the prevention of failed states", unless the dominant lead comes from the people of that country. If you decide to go in that direction, then using Dave Kilcullen's 8 points is a decent outline (p.265 of the Accidental Guerrilla). But, you also should dwell on the bolded heading for that section: "Counterinsurgency: Possible, Not Recommended". Dr Kilcullen has joined the "Never Again, but" School (p.269); as to which and to him, I say "welcome".
Or if we agree. But my core argument, that you never quite dispute, is that democracy can be a tangible goal with clear metrics. You don't want to establish democracies around the globe, but you can't dispute that is a tangible goal.
You say, [I don't disagree. But, some states are clearly democracies and some are clearly failed. No intelligent person believes Somalia is either a democracy or a successful state. Same would go for Iraq around 2005-2006, not so much any more. No reasonable person disputes that America is both successful and a democracy. The difference is what think tanks debate. But, our civilian and military leadership should decide what goals they have when they are invading a country. If establishing a democracy is a goal, as Bush said about Iraq, then we should have metrics to back it up, and they exist.Quote:
what is "democracy" and what is "failed" mean very different things to different peoples (and to different think tanks)"
You then said,In Afghanistan, I don't dispute that different districts want different things. I know how broken the system is from Kabul to the districts, I have talked to district sub-governors and village elders. That doesn't change the fact that we can find metrics to measure democracy. It also doesn't change the fact that the people of Afghanistan would prefer a stable democracy to a return of Taliban rule. Especially at the rural, district level that is what they say.Quote:
If you want metrics, go district by district; and find out what form of governance the people want."
You finish by quoting Dr. Kilcullen. I thought the Accidental Guerilla was fantastic without a doubt. I agree with him that COIN should be waged as a last resort. Unfortunately, when I graduated college the Army was already waging to COIN operations. It seems, to me, that the best course now is getting by leaving stable countries in our wake, not failed ones. To do that we need metrics, and those metrics will be about stable democracies.
Final thought. Initially you said,Isn't that exactly what our forefathers were doing by fighting the Nazis on the beaches of Normandy? WWII was nothing if not a battle of democracies--UK, France and America--versus fascist dictatorships. Just saying.Quote:
So, yes, I am uncomfortable with loss of life (and the other personal costs of war) for such intangibles as "making the world safe for democracy" and the like."
to get into why we ended up fighting WWII - and how our strategic plans in PTO and ETO developed.
Take a tangible example, Astan. I know it's tangible because I was just looking at pictures and maps of it.
Tell me the metrics (not slogans) that you think will make Astan a democracy. That is Point B.
Tell me the same metrics that exist now. That is Point A.
Tell me how you get from Point A to Point B.
Regards
Mike
Point A- Either you mean 1. for me to tell you what metrics we currently measure or 2. tell you where Afghanistan stands with regards to my metrics in point B. Basically, for part 1, I don't think the US Army does measure any metrics worth measuring except maybe body count. It is one of my major criticisms with our leadership. As for point 2, as a lowly officer stationed in Arizona, it is next to impossible for me to know country-wide metrics on Afghanistan, don't you think? :D
As to Point B- A single post on a forum could never describe all the metrics we should measure in Afghanistan. As I have said, I think keeping a nation from falling into a failed state status is the best metric. So, I would refer you to Peace and Conflict 2010 and would copy the metrics they use. It is a think tank but I like their work. Of course, any other think tank measuring either stabiity or democracy would work.
As to "Tell me how you get from Point A to Point B.", I really wish I could but I have to say I cannot. In short, I would say GEN McChrystal's plan or population-centric COIN, but if I were smart enough to tell you the way out of Afghanistan in a forum post, then I would be general of the Army and not a simple Captain.
But we do have a tangible goal in Afghanistan, to keep it from failing and becoming again a safe haven for Al Qaeda or other Islamic extremists who use terrorism.
Can anyone speak to the accuracy of this? That is certainly an often cited criticism, but is it accurate? I would be very surprised if we were doing something so stupid and simplistic.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
Plato and Aristotle set the classifications of government into a six box matrix. The quantitative measures were: one, few, many. The qualitative measures were: good or bad. You can substitute other value judgments for good or bad; but the matrix box is what we still have. BTW, "democracy" was in their "many, bad" box.
There is no magic set of quantitative metrics that determines what democracy is or is not. It is an intangible. If you want to have some fun, attempt to classify the British parliamentary system from the time of Simon de Montfort to the present. And, if you want to talk about more modern concepts, are you talking about actual democracy, representative democracy, constitutional democracy, economic democracy, social democracy or popular democracy - or a combination of one or more of those (plus some others, I've probably forgotten).
As to your link, see p.8 pdf, as to democracies:
All this we know as a qualitative rule: the more a country looks like a nice, tidy "Western" democracy (whatever its "kind"), the less likely is a substantial segment of its population to revolt. On the other hand, a substantial segment of the population of a very effective (read that as an effective state security service) authoritarian regime is also less likely to revolt.Quote:
How important is democracy to post-conflict rebuilding and sustainable peace? About half of all post-conflict countries today have some form of democratic governance. But many are semi-democratic regimes in which, typically, electoral processes and legislatures are at the whim of autocratic executives. In 2008, a total of 86 countries had consistently democratic regimes, 28 were autocracies, and the remaining 45 were anocracies, a term we use for hybrid regimes (Pate, Chapter 4). The empirical evidence is compelling that factional, semi-democratic regimes are fragile and subject to failure, whether through armed challenges or institutional failure or both. In fact competitive elections in such regimes often precipitate armed violence and massacres, as happened in Kenya in 2008.
Consistently democratic regimes are unlikely to be challenged by civil wars in the first place. If fully democratic institutions can be established after wars, economic redevelopment is more rapid, the risks of conflict recurrence are less, and transitional justice is more effective (Hegre and Felde, Chapter 8; Meernik et al., Chapter 10). Democracies also have a relatively good track record of reducing political discrimination against minorities, thereby reducing the salience of one major source of grievance around which anti-regime movements coalesce (Pate, Chapter 4). And democratic regimes have a better record of incorporating women into the political process (Caprioli et al., Chapter 9). Yet women seldom are recognized participants in peacemaking or societal reconstruction. So opportunities are lost that might give women more leverage to minimize the risks of war recurrence.
Yes, there are quantitative measures (I do read this stuff) for classifying "failed states". That is what your link (and a lot of other ones) is all about. The moral and ethical question that the individual making the decison has to face is whether intervention in a "failed state" has a decent probability of preventing more deaths than the intervention will cost. The question a nation has to face is where does the intervention fit into its priorities and into its capabilities. And, whether regional military groups (or non-kinetic groups, for that matter) could handle the matter - perhaps, not as well as we "exalted" Westerners; but handle it.
When I get home, I'll add the monograph to my folder on Peace Enforcement; and read the articles - and also check out the webpage. Thanks for the link.
PS: I don't buy the "lowly CPT" line - if you want to address GEN's topics, then you have to be able to present a GEN's arguments, even if you aren't one.
Can anyone speak to the accuracy of this? That is certainly an often cited criticism, but is it accurate? I would be very surprised if we were doing something so stupid and simplistic.
All I know, is that as a PL on the ground I was never told what the metrics for ISAF were. Also, I know that my BDE didn't have any relevant metrics, or at least PLs and COs on the ground didn't know them.
I also know that in the Accidental Guerilla, Dr. Kilcullen made a point that when the surge operations began and he was brought in, one of the big changes was a clear refining of metrics and tracking them much better down the chain of command. Could the same mistake be made twice? Easily.
So, if the high command of a country has metrics, but the American people, the Afghans of the country and the soldiers on the ground don't know them, do they really exist?
I think you just answered my question...
The amount of stuff that PLs and COs do not have visibility on dwarfs what they do have visibility on.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
I would say that, just as easily, they could learn from that in less than 2 years. Lo and behold they did, in Iraq. I don't know why the assumption that they haven't in Afghanistan, especially given that much of the same brain trust that revamped our approach in Iraq is now trying to apply Iraq v2.0 in Afghanistan.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
I don't understand the question. Why would the American people or the Afghans need to know them? And as I ponder the metrics that we had in Iraq, I don't even understand why the troops on the ground (as opposed to the troops in the TOC) needed to know them. I doubt that they did, which reinforces my skepticism as to why this would matter. Metrics do not drive operations; they measure the effectiveness of operations.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
I found a link on Foreign Policy that pretty much answered most of my assertions and questions. The Obama administration has set clear metrics for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the documents words,
Background: During his March 27, 2009 speech announcing our new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said "going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable."
The reason PLs and COs, along with Afghans and Americans, should know the metrics we are using in a counter-insurgency is because they are the ones executing the policies. When everyone is on the same page, we get better results plain and simple. Also, the PLs and COs will be the ones reporting progress, so why wouldn't know what they are being evaluated on?
for Afghanistan given the situation as you know it and our publicly stated goals?
It's the same reason that you shouldn't gear the teaching in a classroom towards the standardized test. The test becomes nothing more than a measure of how well the teacher was able to prepare the kids for the multiple choice questions, rather than a test of how well the kids are educated.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
Metrics aren't necessarily part of "being on the same page." They're just a measure of performance and effectiveness. I remember when our metrics in Bosnia dealt with number of patrols and number of safety violations. Operations were then geared towards number of patrols and safety. The definition of "patrol" became not a trip out the gate, but rather a 2-hour period outside of the gate. So, if you were out on a 3.5 hour mission, your commander would tell you to ride around for an extra half hour so that it would count as two patrols - I'm not making that up (how could I?).
That said, the metrics should have a lot in common with the commander's intent - which everyone should know.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
Well. Wow. You have the metrics. As a CO/PL your guys are doing the measuring. You might not be making the suit but you and others like you are gathering the raw data. It is usually not hard to follow. where does my report go? What is the working group of the on-high taking out of my reports. What is the way ahead? If you are not reporting on your observation in the community regularly to higher well yeah you are wasting your peoples time and effort. DOnt do that. Is it good to have x is why we do y well sure it is preferred but the answers are around if you know the questions to ask. And it may not be your job it may belong to someone else.