AP: General calls for more Afghanistan troops
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...ryId=103363131
Quote:
"The only thing I've said to my folks is, 'A, I want an unvarnished assessment, but, B, I don't want to put the resource question before the strategy question,'" Obama said. "Because there is a natural inclination to say, 'If I get more, then I can do more.'"
I think that's fair enough, but the 'If I get more, then I can do more' comment strikes me as a little Rumsfeldian. I have to imagine that the number of troops available would weigh heavily in deciding what strategy to pursue.
McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'
McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'
by SWJ Editors
Via The Washington Post:
The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict “will likely result in failure,” according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post. Bob Woodward reports; Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung provide analysis; and a declassified version of document is available on washingtonpost.com.
The Report: Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” … McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan’s prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.
Bob Woodward’s full story can be found here.
Analysis: McChrystal’s assessment, in the view of two senior administration officials, is just “one input” in the White House’s decision-making process. … When Obama announced his strategy in March, there were few specifics fleshing out his broad goals, and the military was left to interpret how to implement them. As they struggle over how to adjust to changing reality on the ground, some in the administration have begun to fault McChrystal for taking the policy beyond where Obama intended, with no easy exit. But Obama’s deliberative pace — he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal’s report so far — is a source of growing consternation within the military. “Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let’s have a discussion,” one Pentagon official said. “Will you read it and tell us what you think?” Within the military, this official said, “there is a frustration. A significant frustration. A serious frustration.”
The full piece by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung can be found here.
The Department of Defense on Sunday evening released a declassified version of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's assessment of the war in Afghanistan. The Post agreed to publish this version, which includes minor deletions of material that officials said could compromise future operations, rather than a copy of the document marked "confidential." The document can be viewed here.
Everybody does strategy and
few understand what it is. :eek: I go by the Army War College definition that strategy consists of an ends, ways, and means construct based on the nature of the threat. It does not, as most so-called strategists think, consist only of ends and ways. It always requires a realtionship between ends and means. So, unless our President is waiting for the Afghan (and US) political situation to shake out - as one article last week said - and is using his current phrasing to buy time, then he simply doesn't understand strategy as I do and as is taught in the war colleges and staff colleges.
Cheers
JohnT
COMISAF Initial Assessment (Redacted)
As posted by Exum here. PDF was too large to attach. I'm sorting through it now. One question that I think we must consider is:
What are maximalist objectives for Afghanistan?
In Iraq, we set out to develop a democratic, federal state that was friendly to the US. BG McMaster's states those objectives were maximalist and defied reality. Given that Afghanistan ranks at the bottom on almost any world metric of nation-states, what is the best we can hope for? No easy answers.
v/r
Mike
"Armchair" Grand Strategy
If this conflict / intervention was not taking place in Afghan culture and society - what would we seek to achieve and what would we do? This may seem abstract, but allows clearer thought IMHO.
Yes, a Grand Strategy without Afghans. Slot in your objectives such as stabilise Pakistan, deter AQ from return to the area and 'X'.
Then factor in Afghan history and the Afghans. Allow thinking on whether the aims and means are worthwhile, let alone practical, politically OK etc.
Make your decisions and issue directions.
Steve the Planner,
I think we know what the objectives are, just that few express them well. Let alone take into account the actions of the current Afghan power brokers and bandit "lords" who have done everything to reduce Western involvement.
davidbfpo
If so I'd say refer back to posts #3
John raises an important issue in #3 - that political leadership and military leaders may have different understandings about strategy and about each others role in it, and that those different understandings may lead to some difference in expectations.
I think there are also some cultural differences between military professionals and politicians. That is not a swipe at politicians (or military folks), its just the way their experiences shape them - however it may contribute to misunderstandings.
Best, Rob
Now we sound like the cabinet.
It started as a simple exercise in bring more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Now, we have shifted to an AQI focus that is transnational, and only secondary to Taliban in Afghanistan (to the extent they would provide a base for AQI).
Unfortunately, I am now hearing two potentially discrete objectives: (1) pursue AQI including in places that may be attractive refuges; (2) stabilize and improve self-governance in Afghanistan (via a new Army).
Last night, I caught CNN Andersen Cooper: Micheal Were and Peter Bergen argued for a major military increase to fight Taliban in Afghanistan; discussion included buying off warlords as an off-set to more troop deployments. Rory Stewart argued for a downscaled US/NATO mission to just AQI prevention, building a long-term development relationship to improve actual Afghan's lives, and, implicitly, an Afghanization of the internal/external conflicts.
Like Brezinzki's warning that sending more troops will incur more wrath and opposition to the "foreign occupier", and the debate over whether this is a COIN problem which can only be addressed by a COIN solution (based on the COIN staffing model, it all seems pretty complicated---but not in the military realm.
I agree with the opinion that the assessment says, if it is a military problem, here is what we need, but the crying out gap in that report is the political one.
What are we trying to achieve in Afghanistan?
My guess, and it follows some of Rory Stewart's approach, is that if our goal is to assure a permanant, long-term relationship with an adequately powerful governance group capable of limiting AQI influence over time, we may be talking warlords, Talib accommodation, and many other Afghanizations yet to be discussed here in the apppropriate depth.
The above-referenced long-term relationship is precisely what we failed to achieve in Iraq, and why I'll keep my gorillas boxes in the garage for the next round.
How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?
There is no grand strategy in shooting bad guys until our hunting license is revoked. The ones who survive become the next crop of bad guys.
Steve
Interesting thread. I have Grenades to throw in the water...
The People of Afghanistan -- the nominal focal point of a COIN campaign -- are not our focal point, they are an ancillary issue. So this, as Slap says, is not really a COIN Campaign.
The US political process has never, does not now and is unlikely to ever support the truly coherent planning that Steve would like or the grand strategy that Marc would like. We tend to wallow about and generally end up doing more good than harm...
MikeF has some good thoughts on AQ strategy and I agree that's what I would do and think that's what they're angling for. He ends with the question "What is our strategy to defeat AQ?" My guess is we have now realized we cannot do that and we will continue to disrupt and deter.
The Marines version of strategy is realistic -- you have an end goal, you have means and from that you craft a way. The Army version is idealistic and incapable of execution at an international level in most cases because you will never have all the means at your disposal; you have to do with what you have. I suspect that the 'policy maker' -- the civilian politicians -- have a variant the reads:"Ends+Ways+MeansMade Avaliable+Escape route=Strategy." I'm unsure that the three versions can be decently merged but I'd opt for the Marine version as being best for everyone...
Marc suggests metrics. The word to me implies relatively provable factual data points to facilitate logical decision making. He suggests:
Quote:
1. What metrics are used to track correlations between continuance of the Afghan mission and radicalization in the US /NATO nations and countries that "we" are trying to influence by diplomatic means?
2. What metrics are in use to track the GS reputation of US / NATO military forces vise a vis changes in diplomatic "power" and "prestige"?
3. What metrics are in use to track changes in US / NATO civil rights and freedoms in relation to the stated goal of a "war" on AQ?
4. What metrics are being used to track the effects of various "strategies" vise a vis national political polarization?
Since we are not looking at logical decisions but rather at political decisions, I respectfully suggest that each of those collections of metrics are not amenable to realistic numeration or positive/negative assessments but require rather nuanced and probably quite lengthy summaries -- and all of which will be subject to interpretation and /or spin by various wheels in the policy establishments (plural) as it would appear best for them. The President may have been a community organizer but as Steve said, he thus should be aware of the capabilities and the limitations of political intercourse (word advisedly used...).
Which is where we are. We went to Afghanistan to rid the world of Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, the principal policy makers did not comprehend the fact that it is not going to be destroyed -- it's not even going to be defeated, best we can do is disrupt and deter. That's what we're doing reasonably well and we'll get better at that. After we got there, we blew several attempts to "get Bin Laden" (which we weren't, correctly, all that serious about anyway) and someone or something convinced G.W. Bush to say we would stay and 'fix' Afghanistan regardless.
Thus we're there as a result of a flawed strategy that the Armed Forces / DoD did not particularly want to implement because they knew the potential problems, knew the civilian establishment would accept little or no responsibility for what they had ordered and that establishment would constantly change the rules. They also suspected they would be tasked to do things that were not their job in the process -- all that has come to pass.
Steve cites Rory Stewart who I believe has better insights than most and should be listened to. Steve then asks:
Quote:
How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?
Haven't been in that area for almost forty years but I suspect the Afghans haven't changed all that much. My guess in answer to his question is that you cannot and it is foolish to try...
What many in the Armed Forces want out of this is a military win. Not going to happen; never was. Most know that but the system demands that they try so they at least get credit for a draw. They will stay and do their best with what they are given but would much rather be elsewhere...
What most Western politicians want is a political win, a semi-viable Afghan state that they can chalk up a at least a tilted draw and which will not be significant problems until they're long out of office -- after that, they don't care. Not an ounce. For now, they'd just rather be elsewhere...
So it is now realized that we are not going to beat AQ, at least not in Afghanistan and thus we merely want to be sort of sure they won't resettle there until our disrupt and deter works better -- and it will. That leaves us with a need to 'fix' Afghanistan to some extent for several valid reasons.
The problem is that sounds nice but if properly done will be a multi-generational effort and neither the US or NATO are going to do that. We just want an acceptable outcome and the people of Afghanistan are not a major consideration. They never were. We will do as well by them as we can in order to achieve for The US and NATO and Pakistan and Afghanistan (in that order) an acceptable outcome. How do we get an acceptable outcome? What is an acceptable outcome?
We haven't figured that out as far as can be publicly ascertained at this time. Add to that there is NO 'right answer' but instead many alternatives of varying complexity and cost with even more potential variance in results. That's why no one can say what we are going to do...
Which, IMO, is to be expected and is better than trying to do something that simply cannot be done within the human, political and financial constraints extant. IOW, the means in the fullest sense are constrained, they always were and failure to consider those factors placed us in an unenviable position.
A source close to McChrystal
Writes
Quote:
This story is not about an argument between two powerful men. It is about an argument between two or more sets of strategic assumptions concerning the mission and desired end state in Afghanistan.
Read the whole thing - I think that quote is key but there's much there of interest.
Only reel answers provided...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
...To date, little analysis has been conducted on AQ's ideology and strategy.
I think there may be more analysis than you suspect. The problem is that it's inconclusive but it is still being worked.
Quote:
...as many others throughout time have espoused, know your enemy as you know yourself.
Yeah, I've heard that, unfortunately or fortunately viewpoint dependent, I've discovered that one can't even know their friends as well as they know themselves, much less their enemies -- and, know what, that shortfall only complicates things a small amount. Quite small.
I think only in books and movies is that dictum workable; on the ground, it's extremely difficult and rarely provides any insights that significantly change the course of war.
A thorough historical review will show that most battles in the modern era were or are meeting engagements -- that's pretty much true at all levels from minor tactical to the strategic. So all you have to do is be better at correct (note NOT rapid; the OODA loops foolishness is fast draw stuff) response and you're ahead. If you've got a good sense of your opponent OR you've got good scouts, you can get a bit further ahead. Perhaps if you really knew him you could win easily -- but then if you really knew him, there might not be any cause for hostilities... :wry:
Yet hostilities are a constant, maybe mostly because we don't understand each other nearly as well as the Sociologists would prefer. Fortunately, it's also been my observation through the last 60 plus years that we have never known our enemy very well but happily, they always seem to be a little more discombobulated than we are. :D
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Throughout the last two years, I've searched for anyone trying to answer these questions.
Good questions but I certainly have no answers. I had a long discussion not too long ago with Wilf and 120mm with them taking the position that there were no cultural differences that preclude understanding others. They're entitled to their opinions but I disagreed. That disagreement was more than a bit based on the fact that I've fought people from at least four other cultures and neither I nor my superiors up to the national level really understood the opponents.
Quote:
but neither solution will solve our AQ problem.
Totally true. I suspect only time will really solve that...:wry:
Not a prob, we can disagree -- I've been known to be wrong.
Rarely.:D
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
Actually, I've posed the question to members of the NSC through JSOC. They were often left confounded and asking me for answers b/c they had not read enough, and yes, I had a high enough clearance to engage.
that doesn't surprise me in the least -- though I would suggest you're asking questions at the policy level where they cannot be bothered to know any details. I know of an analyst at DIA who's pretty knowledgeable and there are others around at lower levels.
The problem is not that "we" do not know, the problem is that the power structure is too egocentric to be concerned. Truth is also that they are not a significant issue. Same thing has occurred in all our wars since WW II. :eek:
Quote:
Honestly, it's not being worked. Everyone is hamstrung by the immediate threats in A'stan and Iraq.
At the execution level, that's the way of the world. Think of your Troop at Bragg and your foci there -- then consider your focus in Iraq.
Quote:
Bottom line-No one is focusing on AQ despite the rhetoric. The overwhelming problem remains that we have not defined the problem set.
We rarely if ever do define the problem set to any real degree of specificity.
Recall my comment above about not even really knowing ones friends. With that in mind, check the Op-Ed at the LINK. I would be willing to bet large sums that someone in State sent up a red flag on the issue and the Date. The NSC crowd could care less. I also believe effort is being expended on AQ, JI, Hezbollah and a slew of others. NSC crowd isn't cioncerned about them either. They are concerned about the multiple threats we face.
Quoth Slap :
Quote:
...AQ has a Strategy .....we don't! UBL has consistently said he is going to bleed us and bankrupt us. He hasn't deviated one bit from that and he is winning!
I have heard that also, only difference between Slap and I is that I don't think he's winning. Not even close. AQ is not the enemy, they are only one small, not terribly effective crowd in a much larger crowd of folks who dislike the US and do not wish us well. They are not nearly as dangerous and not nearly as bothersome as Hezbollah to name just one other. Nor are they as close to us as still others or as wealthy as still others.
Slap is right that they are focused and dedicated, they have a motive and a plan -- but they do not have the means to do what they say. They are only one aspect of twenty or so of concern to us strategically at this time. Slap also points out they target well. So-so, it seems -- yet if they overreach, a likely occurrence, all they'll do is hack off a whole lot of Americans. That's never a good plan; we tend to get stupid...
A single enemy makes it easy to focus ones effort, ala the Cold War or even WW II and most of the wars after that which were all Cold War influenced. Today, the enemy is multi faceted and multi polar; there are a bunch of them.
Spend too much effort focused on one and you'll miss what the others are up to. I believe the NSC is aware of that. I know others are...