I agree with Schmedlap. That's an NCO function pure and simple.
The problem is that our training got dumbed down in the 1970s and 80s and we stopped teaching NCOs how to talk to people. I saw dozens if not hundreds of on NCOsS doing what that guy was doing on presence patrols in three countries. Most, not all doing it pretty well.
His only problem is that no one bothered to give him a ten minute class in people skills and then let him practice them for a grade for forty minutes. That i8s the fault of the USMC (the Army is little better). That also is done better in good units even today. Problem is, by definition, half the units are less good, half are more gooder... :wry:
Also, his comment:
Quote:
I guess the argument is that pop-COIN requires a level of participation from all government agencies that we currently lack the ability to provide - and that we will continue to lack the ability to provide for the next decade. Not a real useful concept, imo.
and your observation both illustrate the major flaws in 'Population centric COIN.' Resources and timing. We cannot afford to keep the civilian structure and military training regimens required for population centric COIN so each occurrence will be a from scratch exercise that will take entirely too long to get rolling. The effort will flounder before it gets going, literally. It is a badly flawed concept much loved by people whose desire to fix the rest of the world overwhelms their common sense. Great theory, won't work. We keep proving that -- and forgetting that we proved it... :mad:
That said, we can and must better train our entering enlisted persons and officers and better educate our leaders so that some COIN like efforts and capabilities are built into the structure while remembering that the GPF will never do better than marginally well at the job. :cool:
Back to the here and now -- that NCO is exemplary of a minor system glitch, not a major uncorrectable flaw.
Good job for going out with the guys. Been my observation here and there that all embassies, like all units in the services, are not equal. Some are more active than others and more tolerant of weapons and patrols and getting jobs done versus bureaucratic safety (All FSOs aren't equal, either, as I'm sure you know ;) ). Though I admit to being away from the bureaucracy for about 15 years, doubt things have changed so much as to greatly modify that.
That's why COIN does not work...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
The way COIN is supposed to work is first you control the population, then the population tells you where the Taliban and are setting up the ambushes.
'Cause you cannot control populations without draconian measures and we are not going to use those...
My point was not to extol
either the Brits or the Guats nor to excoriate the US and GVN but simply to point out the similar methods can work or fail depending on how employed and the culture in question. Obviously, strat hamlets did not work in Vietnam because the culture would not accept it. What I am suggesting it that there are likely to be effective ways of controlling population even in Pashtun areas with an appropriate understanding of the culture. As a start, one might begin by asking how the Brits successfully coopted Pashtun elements even incorporating them in the Corps of Guides. The questions to ask are what worked in the past, might they work now, how would we need to adapt them.
Cheers
JohnT
Failure to institutionalize
Posted by Steve Blair,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Good lessons, Mike, and it's interesting to me (as a historian) how many of them should not be new. Quite a bit of it is classic Vietnam (circa about 1968-69, but was being done earlier in some places). Not knocking your lessons at all, which are hard-earned, but more observing that we could/should do a better job of preserving those lessons. And on a possibly related note, many of them could have been pulled directly from the old Small Wars Manual.
Posted by Ken White,
Quote:
The problem is that our training got dumbed down in the 1970s and 80s and we stopped teaching NCOs how to talk to people. I saw dozens if not hundreds of on NCOsS doing what that guy was doing on presence patrols in three countries. Most, not all doing it pretty well.
The above comments simply reinforce the SECDEF's assertion that we have failed to institutionalize the lessons learned from our previous experiences in irregular warfare. It is not the same as conventional war, thus the argument if you can win in a conventional conflict you'll be able to win in an irregular conflict is dangerously misleading. While many of us disagree with the definitions and some of the new fangled theories being pushed (with no historical evidence to support them), most of us hope the SECDEF is successful in institutionalzing the study and practice of irregular warfare throughout DoD.
At the risk of being a heretic
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
The above comments simply reinforce the SECDEF's assertion that we have failed to institutionalize the lessons learned from our previous experiences in irregular warfare.
Not on that; that's totally correct and a lick on us.
Quote:
It is not the same as conventional war, thus the argument if you can win in a conventional conflict you'll be able to win in an irregular conflict is dangerously misleading.
Heretical comment -- I'm not that sure we would've done all that well in a conventional war against a near peer competitor. I'd rephrase that statement of yours a bit; "If you're well enough trained to win a conventional war, you're probably well enough trained to do okay in irregular conflict." Mostly because I do not think we were at all well trained for conventional war; we were and are too rigid, too reluctant to take risk and we do not trust our subordinates adequately.
Well trained troops can handle both and the Army and Marines both worked at being able to do that in the early 60s with some success, noting that there were a some units that specialized in MCO, a few that emphasized IW and an even smaller few who trained for full spectrum.
I'd also suggest that in most IW, the possibility of 'winning' is not good for anyone if the fight even somewhat approaches a mid level conflict -- as in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Quote:
While many of us disagree with the definitions and some of the new fangled theories being pushed (with no historical evidence to support them), most of us hope the SECDEF is successful in institutionalzing the study and practice of irregular warfare throughout DoD.
Yep. Needs to happen. Training required to win against a near peer in MCO needs only slight modification and additions to adapt to irregular war -- with the caveat that the GPF will never do more than an adequate job at IW or COIN. Not their thing...
I don't watch TV so I can't comment on the series.
Cav Guys link, though, resonates with me -- I saw the same sorts of errors all too frequently in other places at other times. We just flat do not do this stuff well...
I also went to the provided LINKand saw this Note appended to the Cav Guy quote:
Quote:
Note: this comment is not a criticism of the American soldiers and Marines. It is a criticism of those who prepared them, or rather failed to prepare them. Watching US helicopters sweep across the broad expanses of Helmand Province, the words from officials in Kabul about progress, protecting people, development and governance seemed otherworldly.
At the risk of repetition, the US Army and probably all the NATO armies are not large enough to protect the villages, were they entirely deployed in Afghanistan. That is a key NightWatch takeaway from the Frontline special.
The first paragraph properly ascribes blame to poor strategy, poor operational deployment and poor tactics -- the latter two exacerbated by poor military training and education.
The strategic error is neatly summed up by the last quoted paragraph.
Nah, just the garratroopers...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
...Every sergeant major would either immediately retire or be stricken with a heart attack if there were more of me running around. :eek:
Of which there are too many -- what happens when you have a promotion system that rewards time in service and no disciplinary actions above all else.
AR 600-200 says all those SSG and above Boards select and the individual will be promoted unless his Commander writes a letter to pull for cause. Backwards. When you get to be Chief of staff, change it to say the individual will be promoted only when the Commander writes a letter concurring. Commanders will not take time to write letters for marginal people, so currently system, too many marginal folks get promoted -- change it and they won't...
Then you can go for broke with no fear of causing cardiac arrest...:D
The beginning of the movie ...
depicts the Death of Groupement Mobile No. 100 at the Battle of Mang Yang Pass (June 1954) and its aftermath. That unit (~ an RCT) was the elite of the French Far Eastern Expeditionary Forces; but most of them had just arrived from Korea - and didn't have a real clue about warfare in the Central Highlands. A lot of Marines had to exchange "colonialements" in another world. A real tragedy for the TdM (link to their article on DBP and this battle at the bottom of the Wiki).
Ken would have a competent opinion on the quality of Hal Moore's Bn. Based on reading the book, his guys didn't seem to be misfits. Of course, since Hal Moore was from That Place on the Hudson, anything is possible. :D
The relief Bn (second part of book) got clobbered, but not as bad as GM 100. Our KIAs (23 Oct - 26 Nov 1965) were 305 (234 in 4 days). One wonders what the MSM reaction today would be.
A somber topic.
Mike
Typical unit of the time, IMO.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
Ken would have a competent opinion on the quality of Hal Moore's Bn. Based on reading the book, his guys didn't seem to be misfits. Of course, since Hal Moore was from That Place on the Hudson, anything is possible. :D
No more misfits than most others. Marginally trained but there was a lot of that going around. Moore was a blowhard -- lot of that going around as well...
Missed the Ia Drang but worked with them in the aftermath of the battle at Trung Luong in June of 66 and for a few weeks afterward. Marshall discussed that fight in The Fields of Bamboo.