Steve Metz has published a valuable article.
LINK. Money quote:
Quote:
"We could, in other words, get out of the counterinsurgency and stabilization business. This is not an attractive option and entails many risks. But it does reflect reality. Ultimately, it may be better than a strategy based on a capability that exists only in our minds."
As I've often said, we don't do this very well; Small Wars need to be kept small...
Stop pretending but do it
Yes we have to not count on "ghost men" but we have to do what we have to do. The best COA is to appropriately educate and train our Agile/Adaptive/Expeditionary Servicemembers to serve in governmental functions. I don't see it as the big stretch that most people do. I think if we stop pretending an expert is gonna magically answer your question from a cubicle in Virginia then you are closer to the truth. Recognize what is possible or not. Lets save the cash of sending one squared away State guy and have him teach/train 30-40 or 4000 guys that will do the job for less.:)
Good post, Surferbeetle. May I, however, suggest two points
for your consideration?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
My view is that the requirement for expeditionary whole of government responses are not going away...
Debatable -- certainly some wish to see that. The question I ask, in view of history, is there a better way? Can those 'expeditions' be avoided. I submit they can be. Why do we insist on playing to our opponents strengths? Repeatedly...
Quote:
We will eventually find the appropriate balance and it will include a more robust whole of government COIN capability. That painful lesson has been purchased at a cost of too many lives and too much treasure to ignore.
I hope you're wrong and that we do not find that balance simply because the price paid thus far for the results obtained indicate that we really do not do this well.
I also believe based on my experience and observation of recent efforts that we are getting worse instead of better...
I think you missed his point.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
An eye-popping piece of work!
At last, a military-related expert stating the obvious problem: The civilian surge just ain't happening.
He's not alone, many have been pointing that out for several years. Essentially, with respect to the 'civilian surge' he said the same thing you said. However, he draws a different conclusion from those facts:
Quote:
"We could, in other words, get out of the counterinsurgency and stabilization business. This is not an attractive option and entails many risks. But it does reflect reality. Ultimately, it may be better than a strategy based on a capability that exists only in our minds."
Steve Metz
I totally agree that the 'capability' exists only in our minds; more importantly, he's got it right in the first clause of that quote -- We need to quit the counterinsurgency and stabilization business as we now attempt to, yet fail to, perform those missions.
Quality has a quantity all its own -- or something like that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
...Our current and future military is duty bound to provide solid advice to our leaders as to the anticipated costs of proposed actions.
We don't do that very well, either, quoth the Curmudgeon... :D
Quote:
I see fundamental changes in USG attitudes and many are searching for a better way.
As do I and hopefully we'll find it. There may be times when commitment to FID is not an option and we must be prepared for those. However, they can be few and far between and it is in our interest as a nation that be so.
Quote:
We could also consider the similarities between a Mixed Martial Arts match and Full Spectrum War; limiting oneself to only boxing skills ups the risk factor. IMHO DOD must consistently provide first responder capabilities in lines of action other than security, while remaining the subject matter experts on security, in order to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war. IMHO the rest of the USG too must have expeditionary elements to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war.
I agree. My point is that, simply, we do not do that FID thing well and are never likely to do so; the national psyche and, more importantly, the national political milieu and the US Army personnel system do not lend themselves to that kind of effort -- as we repeatedly prove. So prepare, yes -- but avoid large force efforts if possible. The cost far exceeds the results. Always. :wry:
Quote:
It is my personal observation that there are massive differences between a light security footprint and a heavy security footprint. As to quality more first hand observations of our current operations are needed in order to provide a current impression...:wry:
Mmmm. Perhaps -- I'm inclined to day that quality is far and away more important than quantity and currently serving folks I'm in contact with seem to corroborate that. I also think Nathan Bedford Forrest was on to something with "Get there firstest with the mostest" idea. Mostest being the right force, not the whole force... ;)
Been reading Machioavelli again, Wilf?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.
Couldn't have said it better myself, Wilf! This is actually explicit in some of the "New COIN" work but, and it is a big "but", it isn't politically salable to the folks back home.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.
Exactly. It also has some serious consequences when it comes to allies and neutrals as well; the concept of "national interest" doesn't apply only to the US, and US actions in that area are watched very closely.
Cheers,
Marc
A new strategic colonialism?
Hacksaw asked:
Quote:
Do we need a colonial-like approach in order to achieve our strategic goals?
As a general rule no and so places like Afghanistan today are excluded.
Are there places where it could apply? Yes, at places of vital interest and probably shared by local partners. I would suggest Oman is a classic case; a place a Whitehall speaker said 'The UK will never leave, it is too vital". Sadly there are cases where it has failed, e.g. Ivory Coast.
Temporary applications? Maybe, altough I'd hesitate to use all UN missions as evidence; some UN missions have been valuable e.g. UNTAG in Namibia.
The recent Detterence thread travelled over some of this ground, especially over the threat from terrorism.
davidbfpo
Few's theory of American Colonialism
Good job Steve Metz. Lots of common-sense packed into a quick read.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.
Naw, Wilf. The American Empire just practices a unique brand that I'll call politically-correct colonialism. We really shouldn't be in the Empire business. We're much better off when we don't meddle into others affairs.
Ken said:
Quote:
As do I and hopefully we'll find it. There may be times when commitment to FID is not an option and we must be prepared for those. However, they can be few and far between and it is in our interest as a nation that be so. I agree. My point is that, simply, we do not do that FID thing well and are never likely to do so; the national psyche and, more importantly, the national political milieu and the US Army personnel system do not lend themselves to that kind of effort -- as we repeatedly prove. So prepare, yes -- but avoid large force efforts if possible. The cost far exceeds the results. Always.
I'll add some important notes to expound this comment.
Discretion and discernment should be taking into deep,thoughtful consideration before we "invest" our treasure and resources into another country. Indeed, we should look at any foreign investment as a loan. Every loan comes with a payment schedule that must be met. It's not free money. In this case, we are loaning our military, money, time, and our resources to another government. Think about it, if I went to BOA and asked for a loan while I have a crappy credit score, the bank is not going to give me money based on the fact that I'm a good dude, my kids need eat, and they fear me rising up in armed rebellion. They're going to look at credit history, my earning potential, and determine my risks verses their return on investment. We should do the same. Below are some considerations.
1. Did the host nation ask for our help? If not, then we're on a slippery slope to begin with.
2. What is the skill level (competence) of the host nation's governance and military apparatuses? In other words, our they capable of doing COIN without us? Is it worth the investment?
3. What is the will of the host nation? Are they looking to us for a handout, or are they going to be actively involved in solving their problems?
4. In the case where the host nation is sorely incompetent and incapable of governing, but their actions interfere with our national security, then we have many diplomatic options to deter. If those fail, then we have counter-terrorism and unconventional warfare as a last resort. However, I will submit that we should think like a bank. If someone forecloses on a mortgage and the bank reposses the house, the bank feels no moral obligation to find another home for the defaulter. In the same sense, if we conduct regime change, we should feel no obligation to follow up with nation-building. The "you break it, you buy it" theory is incorrect.
We gotta take these things much more seriously and start acting as an arbitrator and creditor not as a marraige counselor or Oprah. We CAN make investments to help others that are worthy of a loan help themselves. We CANNOT solve their problems for them b/c we feel bad about their circumstances.
v/r
Mike
Steve, good food for thought
Quote:
... but implementation requires a completely different structure, staffing and resources ....
Kind of reminds me of that addage - "How bad do you want it?"
You don't have to break anything -- just put a slight dent
in the appropriate skulls if violence is the answer -- it does not have to be regime removal or anything requiring a rebuild.
Fuchs has a good point about the UN Charter. Unfortunately, that Charter did not envision non-state actors who could and would challenge States. Getting revisions to that Charter would be virtually impossible due to penis envy so the world would just have to accept that SBW is the way to go...
That's true -- to an extent...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
Agree with Steve - its got to stand up to the FAS (Feasible, Acceptable and Suitable) test...
That's desirable but gets overtaken by the item that is true:
Quote:
I'm more inclined to agree with Old Eagle that its important we retain the capability to do the range of things we will surely be asked/told to go do...
All very true. I'd add two things. We cannot now do all the things we might be told to do; we have deliberately avoided strategic raid capability and a few other options -- we need to be prepared to do more than we were able to do prior to 2001 and we need to be able to offer those options rather than the sole option we thought we had at that time.
The Politicians will ask us to strange things and we should be prepared to do most of them in some fashion. We have been our own worst enemy with our inherent inflexibility -- we became a one trick pony and are paying for it. We attempted to influence national policy with military policy (The Weinberger and Powell Doctrines) and that was never going to work. Accepting what you say, Rob, is imperative -- and being able to offer a number of options including 'do nothing' to the deciders is truly vital in the strict sense of the word.
Where will all those civilians come from?
there are not too many options.
a. reinstitue draft
b. pay them a higher or equivavalent of their civilan income
I don't see it happening anytime soon. Cuz' then the soldiers earnings has to be raised too.
MikeF
Naw, Wilf. The American Empire just practices a unique brand that I'll call politically-correct colonialism. We really shouldn't be in the Empire business. We're much better off when we don't meddle into others affairs.
Luckily/unfortunately -I can't decide- the days of good ol' isolationism are gone.