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LINK. Money quote:As I've often said, we don't do this very well; Small Wars need to be kept small...Quote:
"We could, in other words, get out of the counterinsurgency and stabilization business. This is not an attractive option and entails many risks. But it does reflect reality. Ultimately, it may be better than a strategy based on a capability that exists only in our minds."
Nice. I'm glad that somebody smarter and more credible than me has finally said it. I was getting lonely beating this drum all by my lonesome here, here, here, here, and here (just off the top of my head).
Here is Admiral Mullen's assessment of our capability to leverage a whole of government approach to anything...
And the data backs him up.Quote:
“We need a whole-of-government approach.”
...
“The United States military is necessary, but it is not sufficient alone,” Mullen said. He pointed out that the American military is stretched and is doing missions that servicemembers have not been trained to do.
...
Other Cabinet-level departments – State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice – have the proper expertise for “soft-power” missions and need to have personnel able to deploy to address these problems, Mullen said. “But in my opinion,” he added, “we are a good decade away from creating a capability in our other departments.”
- via DefenseLink News
(emphasis added)
http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3446/...5090e710cc.jpg
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Ken & Schmedlap,
My view is that the requirement for expeditionary whole of government responses are not going away, (lots) more of anything is not necessarily a better answer, and that mass production in emergencies often does not have good outcomes. The 2010 budget for DOS makes for an interesting read (51.7 billion USD proposed). We will eventually find the appropriate balance and it will include a more robust whole of government COIN capability. That painful lesson has been purchased at a cost of too many lives and too much treasure to ignore.
Agreed. But until the capability actually exists, we should stop pretending that it does.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
An eye-popping piece of work!
At last, a military-related expert stating the obvious problem: The civilian surge just ain't happening.
My guess is that there were 30 to 40 (tops) of the civilian experts Steve is talking about that actually deployed in Iraq in late 2007/2008. The rest of the PRTs were, like in Afghanistan, packed with military assignees doing what they could, or "the regular suspects" of US Govt civilian agency assignees working, as the military was, outside their actual fields of expertise.
Of my gang of senior civilian engineers, planners and city managers (all temporary appointees), all but one is back home. One is Afghanistan scratching his head about the ill-defined and supported mission. And most, like me, never heard from the State Department again---no thank yous, no debriefings, no lessons learned, and no on-going relationships.
Fact is that, in most instances, the PRTs were not structured, managed or resources to really allow the senior experts to do what they came to do. Only a few of us were lucky enough to break out as either Eprts (under military) or, as I was, a "virtual" and unofficial Division/UN prt. Otherwise, many left with an unsatisfactory experience as to what they "could have" accomplished, vs. what they were able to. It was not like a CORDS process.
I have been monitoring the S/CRS statements and activities for a while, and have been greatly concerned that, by the time they come on line 3 to 5 years from now, the problem they were intended to solve---imminent nation-building challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan---will be in the public tail lights.
The time to solve the USAID/Reconstruction Aid problem was last year (and predicated on moving smartly), but that effort has, by all accounts, gotten bogged down in bureaucratic infighting, change of administration, budget problems, the catastrophic reports of Iraq's reconstruction fiasco, and competing (but unresolved) congressional bills.
Reality suggests that there are only two entities with any prospect of effecting rapid civilian results of any kind: US DoD and UN (both fraught with "issues" but, still, the only credible parties).
As Congressman Adam Smith and others have argued, the next best try will be to have NSC take a lead, with the money, to try a "Hail Mary" pass at inter-agency, and civilian reconstruction. Maybe?????
Otherwise, as Steve Metz suggests, either something significant must occur or it will soon be time to get out of the COIN/Nation-Building enterprise.
Steve
Yes we have to not count on "ghost men" but we have to do what we have to do. The best COA is to appropriately educate and train our Agile/Adaptive/Expeditionary Servicemembers to serve in governmental functions. I don't see it as the big stretch that most people do. I think if we stop pretending an expert is gonna magically answer your question from a cubicle in Virginia then you are closer to the truth. Recognize what is possible or not. Lets save the cash of sending one squared away State guy and have him teach/train 30-40 or 4000 guys that will do the job for less.:)
Of the troops:
The experts from a cubicle in Virginia. Sounds like the ones we would get in Iraq with these great reconstruction studies that looked great on paper, but forgot that the bridges were disconnected and the power wasn't reliable. Much to do before they could be implemented.
I agree with your point---uptrain the force to do the pieces they need to do. It is the only way that can make DoD's efforts fly in the time permitted.
Two problems: (1) To work most effectively, there needs to be a core element that sets the framework (ie, within the Afghan Development Program if a national program), provides support to provincial/local teams, and/or serves as a conduit for US and International Aid programs already under way; and (2) there is no program yet to start that training (that I am aware of).
The message I get from the UN/USAID, and all involved hands is that Afghanistan Reconstruction is just like Iraq, but with less cohesiveness, and no background infrastructure and less domestic people skills.
More troublesome is that, according to Al Jazeera, the troubles and instability are now heading North, with the convoy routes.
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2...025153877.html
Given the national election and consequent stability of government issues, and possible rising problems in the north, we may be running very fast just to stay in place (or worse).
for your consideration?Debatable -- certainly some wish to see that. The question I ask, in view of history, is there a better way? Can those 'expeditions' be avoided. I submit they can be. Why do we insist on playing to our opponents strengths? Repeatedly...Quote:
Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
I hope you're wrong and that we do not find that balance simply because the price paid thus far for the results obtained indicate that we really do not do this well.Quote:
We will eventually find the appropriate balance and it will include a more robust whole of government COIN capability. That painful lesson has been purchased at a cost of too many lives and too much treasure to ignore.
I also believe based on my experience and observation of recent efforts that we are getting worse instead of better...
He's not alone, many have been pointing that out for several years. Essentially, with respect to the 'civilian surge' he said the same thing you said. However, he draws a different conclusion from those facts:Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
I totally agree that the 'capability' exists only in our minds; more importantly, he's got it right in the first clause of that quote -- We need to quit the counterinsurgency and stabilization business as we now attempt to, yet fail to, perform those missions.Quote:
"We could, in other words, get out of the counterinsurgency and stabilization business. This is not an attractive option and entails many risks. But it does reflect reality. Ultimately, it may be better than a strategy based on a capability that exists only in our minds."
Steve Metz
You are right to point out the USG shortfalls; IMHO part of the problem in Iraq however is that we have not consistently figured out how to integrate more of the local Iraqi experts into problem solving. There are more Iraqi's than coalition forces, Iraqi's speak the language, Iraqi's know the culture, and Iraqi's understand which local solutions to local problems have a better chance of success.Quote:
Originally Posted by Schmedlap
The SOF concept is to raise local armies focused upon lines of operations such as security (SF), governance/economics (CA) and information (PSYOP). GEN Petraeus, BG McMasters, COL Newell, and others have consistently shown that GPF forces can train for and execute multiple lines of operations which are not just limited to the security one. Similar to a requirement for a annual, semi-annual, or quarterly ruck march or pt test, it would be wise to have an annual, semi-annual, or quarterly GPF visit to the local city government for training on city councils, police operations, electrical concerns, water treatment, and wastewater treatment...first responder level skills could be the proverbial ounce of prevention in future conflicts. It would not hurt to dedicate a few days exclusively to CMO operations at our CTC's either :wry:
Echoing your call for a realistic assessment of our capabilities, I would also add that a whole of government approach whose ends, ways, and means are consistently structured to include Iraqi (local) participation could increase our collective reach...the impending drawdown in Iraq will reveal the effectiveness of our efforts in this arena.
...looking before we leap is very important. Our current and future military is duty bound to provide solid advice to our leaders as to the anticipated costs of proposed actions.
I see fundamental changes in USG attitudes and many are searching for a better way.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
I don't have all the answers my friend but I know in my marrow that exclusively focusing upon a single variable to the exclusion of all others does not solve a multivariate equation. We could also consider the similarities between a Mixed Martial Arts match and Full Spectrum War; limiting oneself to only boxing skills ups the risk factor. IMHO DOD must consistently provide first responder capabilities in lines of action other than security, while remaining the subject matter experts on security, in order to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war. IMHO the rest of the USG too must have expeditionary elements to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war.
It is my personal observation that there are massive differences between a light security footprint and a heavy security footprint. As to quality more first hand observations of our current operations are needed in order to provide a current impression...:wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
We don't do that very well, either, quoth the Curmudgeon... :DQuote:
Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
As do I and hopefully we'll find it. There may be times when commitment to FID is not an option and we must be prepared for those. However, they can be few and far between and it is in our interest as a nation that be so.Quote:
I see fundamental changes in USG attitudes and many are searching for a better way.
I agree. My point is that, simply, we do not do that FID thing well and are never likely to do so; the national psyche and, more importantly, the national political milieu and the US Army personnel system do not lend themselves to that kind of effort -- as we repeatedly prove. So prepare, yes -- but avoid large force efforts if possible. The cost far exceeds the results. Always. :wry:Quote:
We could also consider the similarities between a Mixed Martial Arts match and Full Spectrum War; limiting oneself to only boxing skills ups the risk factor. IMHO DOD must consistently provide first responder capabilities in lines of action other than security, while remaining the subject matter experts on security, in order to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war. IMHO the rest of the USG too must have expeditionary elements to be able to contain and properly focus the destruction that accompanies war.
Mmmm. Perhaps -- I'm inclined to day that quality is far and away more important than quantity and currently serving folks I'm in contact with seem to corroborate that. I also think Nathan Bedford Forrest was on to something with "Get there firstest with the mostest" idea. Mostest being the right force, not the whole force... ;)Quote:
It is my personal observation that there are massive differences between a light security footprint and a heavy security footprint. As to quality more first hand observations of our current operations are needed in order to provide a current impression...:wry:
Sorry, but this is all missing the point.
As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.
Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.
You cannot have a strategy that cannot be implemented by force, if required.
Couldn't have said it better myself, Wilf! This is actually explicit in some of the "New COIN" work but, and it is a big "but", it isn't politically salable to the folks back home.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Exactly. It also has some serious consequences when it comes to allies and neutrals as well; the concept of "national interest" doesn't apply only to the US, and US actions in that area are watched very closely.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Cheers,
Marc
Wow, that's great Wilf, I like it!Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I read Wilf's post and went yeah that's what we're talking about...
then I saw two affirmations before I could type...
Well said, too true, over-reach???
So the big question...
Do we need a colonial-like approach in order to achieve our strategic goals? (what ever they may be, but for the sake of argument... a place to sell our goods, relative freedom from domestic attack... do we need more??)
:confused:
The proposed CRC is, as far as I can tell, very similar to how FEMA responds to natural disasters in CONUS: a core coterie that FEMA pulls from the regional offices and a select group of folks on stand by to come do work for FEMA in the event of a disaster. I think folks might reflect on how well that worked after Katrina. Is that really the model to apply to nation building/rebuilding efforts, especially in places that make the Bayou State after a hurricane look like a tropical island paradise vacation spot. And that's over and above the issue already mentioned of replacing the workers that get sucked away from their primary jobs to be the expeditionary CRC. (FWIW, encountered this latter problem during national MOBEXs in the early 80s when planning to mobilize RC folks to fight WWIII from the Fed jobs they worked on military installation--sad to see leadership has lost the bubble on that 20+ year old lesson.)Quote:
Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
Perhaps a standby force would work, if the government chose to use all the Federal retirees out there as that standby force. As it is, military retired pay is really a retainer that allows the Feds to keep us on a string for recall as needed. Perhaps the Feds could include some post retirement "nation building" training for those of us that need it and then activate us as required to do the work, rather than using us to plug holes in the military force structure. I would propose that the list of available personnel be expanded to include all retired Federal government employees, not just military retirees. It could be the Feds' equivalent of SCORE (Service Corps of Retired Executives) who volunteer to help America's small businesses. The Brits' use of officers on half pay as resident magistrates in the good old days of the Empire might be another, similar model for emulation, suitably expanded to meet the circumstances.
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
So if we just do like the USMC Small Wars Manual says and kill/clear out the bad guys and establish a Military Government we want have to print anymore manuals for awhile. :wry:
Hacksaw asked:As a general rule no and so places like Afghanistan today are excluded.Quote:
Do we need a colonial-like approach in order to achieve our strategic goals?
Are there places where it could apply? Yes, at places of vital interest and probably shared by local partners. I would suggest Oman is a classic case; a place a Whitehall speaker said 'The UK will never leave, it is too vital". Sadly there are cases where it has failed, e.g. Ivory Coast.
Temporary applications? Maybe, altough I'd hesitate to use all UN missions as evidence; some UN missions have been valuable e.g. UNTAG in Namibia.
The recent Detterence thread travelled over some of this ground, especially over the threat from terrorism.
davidbfpo
Good job Steve Metz. Lots of common-sense packed into a quick read.
Naw, Wilf. The American Empire just practices a unique brand that I'll call politically-correct colonialism. We really shouldn't be in the Empire business. We're much better off when we don't meddle into others affairs.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Ken said:
I'll add some important notes to expound this comment.Quote:
As do I and hopefully we'll find it. There may be times when commitment to FID is not an option and we must be prepared for those. However, they can be few and far between and it is in our interest as a nation that be so. I agree. My point is that, simply, we do not do that FID thing well and are never likely to do so; the national psyche and, more importantly, the national political milieu and the US Army personnel system do not lend themselves to that kind of effort -- as we repeatedly prove. So prepare, yes -- but avoid large force efforts if possible. The cost far exceeds the results. Always.
Discretion and discernment should be taking into deep,thoughtful consideration before we "invest" our treasure and resources into another country. Indeed, we should look at any foreign investment as a loan. Every loan comes with a payment schedule that must be met. It's not free money. In this case, we are loaning our military, money, time, and our resources to another government. Think about it, if I went to BOA and asked for a loan while I have a crappy credit score, the bank is not going to give me money based on the fact that I'm a good dude, my kids need eat, and they fear me rising up in armed rebellion. They're going to look at credit history, my earning potential, and determine my risks verses their return on investment. We should do the same. Below are some considerations.
1. Did the host nation ask for our help? If not, then we're on a slippery slope to begin with.
2. What is the skill level (competence) of the host nation's governance and military apparatuses? In other words, our they capable of doing COIN without us? Is it worth the investment?
3. What is the will of the host nation? Are they looking to us for a handout, or are they going to be actively involved in solving their problems?
4. In the case where the host nation is sorely incompetent and incapable of governing, but their actions interfere with our national security, then we have many diplomatic options to deter. If those fail, then we have counter-terrorism and unconventional warfare as a last resort. However, I will submit that we should think like a bank. If someone forecloses on a mortgage and the bank reposses the house, the bank feels no moral obligation to find another home for the defaulter. In the same sense, if we conduct regime change, we should feel no obligation to follow up with nation-building. The "you break it, you buy it" theory is incorrect.
We gotta take these things much more seriously and start acting as an arbitrator and creditor not as a marraige counselor or Oprah. We CAN make investments to help others that are worthy of a loan help themselves. We CANNOT solve their problems for them b/c we feel bad about their circumstances.
v/r
Mike
Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
Mike, I should have known you would have figured it out:) I thought Entropy or Schmedlap or Tom Odom was going to but what you just proposed is the heart of SBW. And I stole that from history, there was a guy named Hammehead Charles or Charles the Hammerhead or something like that???(maybe someone here knows who I mean) that just flat out whooped ass on the Muslims and made a bunch of money to boot. To me that is the key. A system should become STRONGER because of actions not weaker!
True.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
The real rule reads:
"You committed not to break anything by signing the UN Charter that btw gives you huge privileges, so don't break anything!"
Another rule reads:
"You may break things and not buy them. All shop owners are free to treat you accordingly."
There may be cases where the abscence of an authority (after we've disposed of an authority / predecessor) or governance may be tolerable, even preferable given the cost of replacing it- but in the same vein - we also may also live with the consequences of leaving a vacuum - sometimes, it may result in a bigger mess down the road.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
4. In the case where the host nation is sorely incompetent and incapable of governing, but their actions interfere with our national security, then we have many diplomatic options to deter. If those fail, then we have counter-terrorism and unconventional warfare as a last resort. However, I will submit that we should think like a bank. If someone forecloses on a mortgage and the bank reposses the house, the bank feels no moral obligation to find another home for the defaulter. In the same sense, if we conduct regime change, we should feel no obligation to follow up with nation-building. The "you break it, you buy it" theory is incorrect.
v/r
Mike
That said, I'm not sure logic and pragmatism are even listed as immediate family, let alone next of kin to politics.
Wilf's comment holds the key:
First, we are dancing around the issue of control: Are we there to sieze power and direct/redirect it to some purpose, and if so, how?Quote:
"As far as I can see the "New COIN" and the Stabilisation strategy in general backs you into a place where you want to act Colonial, but not actually be Colonial.
Let's be honest. This is all about forcing countries to adopt policies acceptable to the Government of the US. - I have no problem with that, if that is what you want to do, but it does require behaviour that means your civilians tell their civilians what to do, - and if they do not do it, then there are definite consequences.
What exactly is our civilian purpose, basis, theory beyond military dominance? Is it just "expeditionary" in nature? Is it intentionally suppressive? Is it just to provide post-conflict stabilization, and minimal reconstruction, or to tinker with or expressly and substantively change the society and it's structures, operations and organizational principles
Second, do we have the resources and capability to sieze civilian power and direct/redirect it? Based on our history and effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan (to date), there is no evidence that we do, or that, at best, once we get the ball, we flub it..
Third, what are we directing/redirecting it to? In both countries, our big thrust was to create a new constitution, push for elections, then deal with the aftermath of those elections. Note that the Iraqi election are, due to list questions and Kurdish issues, on path to be, perhaps as contentious as the 2005 elections. If Iraq's ability to organize and complete a democratic election is still a "work in progress," what to make of Afghanistan's abilities?
If our purpose, once in occupation, was to actually effect a colonial administration, or dominate the civilian sector, we needed to provide civilian administartive and operational resources of a totally different type than we have.
By definition, an "expeditionary" civilian force is temporary, short-term, and, if staffed only by loaners from US national agencies, could not be expected to have the KSA's adequate for Colonial administration of an actual country, let alone a district.
Foreign service officers are trained for specific tasks, and administration/operation of civilian governments is not one of them. Diplomacy's limits do not reach into public administration, infrastructure repair and management, or the operation of essential services. Nor, in my view, should/could they.
The civilian resources needed for that are completely different, and are not contained within any permanent military or civilian framework we have applied to date.
I wholeheartedly agree with Ofthetroops recommendation that if troops in the field are going to be tasked for civilian missions (as they are), they should be provided with a framework and training to do a decent job off it.
But, right now, we have the worst of all worlds, and the results are inevitable. Foreign service officers without expertise in civilian administration being pressed into the mission of civilian administration and serious reconstruction and essential service problems, but only on a year-to-year assignment basis (next year, they will be stamping passports in Paris). Soldiers left on the ground to develop ad hoc solutions for immediate and serious problems they see on the ground, but with no training or support framework.
No offense, but what Steve Metz wrote was:
The infrastructure development, financial and economic planning, education, etc... resources in Iraq's "civilian surge" were all temporary appointees on one-year assignments. They came, they went---and not to Afghanistan. And they were never properly integrated into the program to maximize their potential effectiveness.Quote:
The problem, though, is bigger than Afghanistan. Much bigger. The foundation of current American security policy is stabilizing countries where extremists can use insurgency and other forms of violence to create terrorist sanctuaries. To be effective, this requires extensive assistance and large numbers of advisers with expertise in infrastructure development, financial and economic planning, education, governance, the cultivation of civil society, and law enforcement. Yet, after five years of speeches, workshops, and reports, we are no closer to having what we need.
If the US was serious about the civilian side, it would abandon the "expeditionary" and temporary staffing models for these folks, and create a structure that was, first, built around the credible expertise, and second, able to engage the situation and resources (even if soldiers on the ground), to achieve short, medium and long-term goals based on some reasoned expectations of what could be achieved in the civilian world.
Military or foreign policy folks set the civilian objectives, but implementation requires a completely different structure, staffing and resources than exists today. That dream team is just a dream.
My two cents.
Steve
Kind of reminds me of that addage - "How bad do you want it?"Quote:
... but implementation requires a completely different structure, staffing and resources ....
Fourth (actually, First, but the forum knows no strike text):Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
IS IT WORTH IT?
Be prepared to see me hammering this into your heads in 2009-2010.
Resistance is futile. All strategic thought needs to keep the nation's welfare at top priority. Soldiers are merely paid servants to the nation (and usually at the same time citizens, of course).
Resources and capabilities are fine - it's not fine to release them just because you can.
@Steve; don't be offended, please. I know #4 may have been part of your #1 behind two or three corners. It just deserves to be in the spotlight imo.
Rob, we don't have to leave a vacum we could redraw the boundries and annex it to surrounding countries or what ever we want. Which is really the whole problem we keep trying to satisfy everybody else but America. We should flat out make a statement that to support any Terrorist action against our country will cost you your life and your money. They started it we didn't.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
Fuchs
Fourth (actually, First, but the forum knows to strike text):
IS IT WORTH IT?
EXACTLY!!!!!!!!!!
Steve
Slapout9:
A lot more to that than meets the eye.Quote:
Rob, we don't have to leave a vacum we could redraw the boundries and annex it to surrounding countries or what ever we want
If current trends of regional disparities and distinctions were carried into the future in Afghanistan (ie, expanding a Tajik/Uzbek national army to suppress Pashtun districts, north and west desires for natural resource exploitation & industrialization, election split), there may come a time when the "bounds" of Afghan interests are, of themselves, broken.
Steve
To me that is not a problem but a great opportunity. You should to, somebody would most likely hire you to come in and write them a plan:)Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
Agree with Steve - its got to stand up to the FAS (Feasible, Acceptable and Suitable) test - which gets to Steve's otehr point about implementation. What often looks like a easy win, is often more complicated. Even when there is an appetite to govern - its sometime more like the folks with alligator mouths and hummingbird rear ends.
Annexation in itself has a slew of problems, as do other options like just continuing to go back and pour gasoline on new fire ant colonies. I'm not ruling out any option - rather I'm saying it should be weighed, and considered not only in the short, but the long run.
I have no reason to beleive it will be. I'm more inclined to agree with Old Eagle that its important we retain the capability to do the range of things we will surely be asked/told to go do, because what is strategically wise is often at odds with getting and staying elected, or with pursuit of other ideal objectives (foreign and domestic). I have every ounce of faith that at some time in the future, as in the past, an elected leader will ask us to go do something to which we are ill suited. We (or they), may know we are ill suited, but we (or they) may not as well. It will not matter - we will get the mission. Its also likely that said mission will not be the one that was anticipated, and occurred as a result of mission creep brought on by a change in perspective influenced by politics.
To top it off we are often a bit schizo when it comes to ensuring we are prepared to do the undesired.
Best, Rob
in the appropriate skulls if violence is the answer -- it does not have to be regime removal or anything requiring a rebuild.
Fuchs has a good point about the UN Charter. Unfortunately, that Charter did not envision non-state actors who could and would challenge States. Getting revisions to that Charter would be virtually impossible due to penis envy so the world would just have to accept that SBW is the way to go...
Good to know that SBW is in fact using the perennial device of 'Divide and Rule'. Actually once borders were established in those wicked Imperial days they rarely changed; ironically Europe has seen more border changes of late than other places.
Plus as JMM has shown in maps of Afghan ethnicity there are large areas where it is a mixture.
Instead of contemplating a new 'Line' let us just leave well alone. The Afghans will have their own concept of boundaries and I'd speculate it will be like that in NWFP lowlanders -v- hill tribes.
Meantime good to see Fuchs has returned with his "hammering".
davidbfpo
That's desirable but gets overtaken by the item that is true:Quote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
All very true. I'd add two things. We cannot now do all the things we might be told to do; we have deliberately avoided strategic raid capability and a few other options -- we need to be prepared to do more than we were able to do prior to 2001 and we need to be able to offer those options rather than the sole option we thought we had at that time.Quote:
I'm more inclined to agree with Old Eagle that its important we retain the capability to do the range of things we will surely be asked/told to go do...
The Politicians will ask us to strange things and we should be prepared to do most of them in some fashion. We have been our own worst enemy with our inherent inflexibility -- we became a one trick pony and are paying for it. We attempted to influence national policy with military policy (The Weinberger and Powell Doctrines) and that was never going to work. Accepting what you say, Rob, is imperative -- and being able to offer a number of options including 'do nothing' to the deciders is truly vital in the strict sense of the word.
Rob, I think FAS should= Profitable! Also there is nothing easy about fighting but it is necessary. There is nothing so weak as a Police Officer that looks like he is prepared to fight but want...... or the worlds most powerful nation that it is AFRAID to use it's power to protect it's own citizens. it invites people to attack our hummingbird butt. When America understands that we will finally find respect in the world instead of trying to be friends with alligators.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
there are not too many options.
a. reinstitue draft
b. pay them a higher or equivavalent of their civilan income
I don't see it happening anytime soon. Cuz' then the soldiers earnings has to be raised too.
MikeF
Naw, Wilf. The American Empire just practices a unique brand that I'll call politically-correct colonialism. We really shouldn't be in the Empire business. We're much better off when we don't meddle into others affairs.
Luckily/unfortunately -I can't decide- the days of good ol' isolationism are gone.
Isn't that essentially the contracting work that goes on now?Quote:
b. pay them a higher or equivavalent of their civilan income
zenpundit tackled the problem Metz outlines in his article pretty well, from a US point of view.
UM- I didn't mean to imply isolationism. See the rest of my comments. I realize that we're engaged. I'm just trying to frame the role that we should play- negotiator, banker, dealer, arbitrator. Call it what you want just don't call it COIN:eek:.Quote:
Originally Posted by UrsaMaior
The foundations of our society in governance and economics premise on the notions of self-determination, self-reliance, and free-will. We shouldn't be suprised when others don't do what they're told b/c we try to force our will on them. However, things like FID and Greg Mortensen's venture work in small incriments as we help others help themselves.
Slap- when is SBW gonna be published??? Clausewitz stalled so long that his wife had to finish the book:D.
v/r
Mike
Self-determination, self-reliance and free will encompasses a lot of options.
One theory for low US election participation (especially at the local level) is "voting by feet." People in the US usually move to places that share their views, attitudes, and, for example, tax tolerance and school quality/commitment. Since most of that is resolved by their location, there is no need to actively vote/participate in government activities.
Besides, most of us (by lineage) fled some other dastardly place or condition (Ireland during the famines, Eastern Europe during the pogroms, etc...), so why is the blue thumb the only relevant metric?
The flows of refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan sure suggest that the time-honored tradition of voting with feet is alive and well there, as is the reality that most humans, as in Pakistan, rapidly flee before exposing their family to the hazards of conflict between, say, a government army and the Taliban.
Two options if the Taliban came to power in Kabul. One, all Afghans can succumb to them, or, two, they can chnge it by either driving them out, or fleeing as refugees.
Why is it not an option to leave Kabul to the Taliban, then (as before), back their opponents who will keep them in continual fighting just to hold minimal power?
Otherwise, if we protect "the people" from the Taliban, they have no reason, apparently, to make major commitments of life and treasure (what treasure they may have) to help us do it. No?
That is one of the arguments heard re: Afghan national corruption. Since we are only going to be there for a short time, after which the sky will fall (for some), they need to grab as much as they can as quickly as possible???!!!
Paradoxes, but like Rob argues: Ours is not to question why....
10-99
in my neck of the woods 10-99 means wanted or in some cases you handled the call another way (non routine procedure), is it the same on your end?Quote:
Originally Posted by Majormarginal
No book, but I am working on the article if Colonel Gurney dosen't file 13 it:eek:. I write with a legal pad. SWC is about the only computer stuff I do.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
I will say this in Warden's class on SMART Wars/ SMART Strategies you not only write a plan for what the enemy will look like when you are done but you also write a plan on what you want YOUR COUNTRY to look like when you are done (ie, your stronger position). Bet you donuts and coffe there ain't no such animal at the white house.
As a civilian on a personal surge, I can relate very well to my friend Steve Metz's comments regarding the socalled civilian surge. I would say the system of getting non-military to go to war is not only broke it is actually designed to discourage through red-tape and stupidity.
As a retired military guy who worked closely with civilians in two other war zones before this one, I can also state that the cultural underpinnings in the civilian agencies must be changed if we are ever to overcome the gap between desires and consumation.
This is a good article on what it targets: the current situation. The entire last paragraph should be read to get that thought across:
Maybe this is Plan B for Afghanistan and the fight against Al Qaeda. But just saying no to COIN and stability ops is not a strategy or even a policy. We may need to get out of COIN and stability ops in OEF. But as as a statement of larger policy, experience shows we don't always get to choose.Quote:
What, then, is Plan B? If we are unwilling to pay the price for a serious civilian capability--and admit that foisting the job of development and political assistance on the military is a bad idea--the only option is to alter our basic strategy. We could find a way to thwart Al Qaeda and other terrorists without trying to re-engineer weak states. We could, in other words, get out of the counterinsurgency and stabilization business. This is not an attractive option and entails many risks. But it does reflect reality. Ultimately, it may be better than a strategy based on a capability that exists only in our minds.
Tom
I think that this might be an instance of hating the players when we should be hating the game.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
I think the problem is that international law assumes things that aren't true and provides safeguards that shouldn't exist. Why do we recognize borders that governments are unable to control? Perhaps if we stopped doing that, then we could play to our strengths.
Wars used to be about redrawing borders. Now they're about trying to remold the situation to fit the existing borders - pounding a square peg into a round hole. On paper, I guess it sounds more humane. In practice, it's not.
Schmedlap's expanded version of the Border problems.
http://www.schmedlap.com/weblog/Latest.aspx
"Oct. 22, 2009 -- U.S. Joint Forces Command chief Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis has said his command would take the lead in ensuring a new approach to military operations planning -- built on commanders' creativity and cross-government participation -- becomes firmly anchored in Defense Department doctrine and education programs." Inside Defense.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
So, how will this work out?
From Tom Rick's Blog on FP: How to adjust in Afghanistan
Quote:
A veteran infantryman with much time in the Middle East, and other wars, writes in with the following suggestions.
And on the other side...Quote:
A Day of the Long Knives. We have a tremendous amount of leverage left in Afghanistan; there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the Karzai family will be to back running a chain of kabob joints in suburban Maryland without the support of the US government. What disappoints the Afghan people is that we have not used this leverage to insist on better governance. We can, and must, do better by them if we hope for a successful outcome against the Taliban and their criminal enablers.
We, not the Karzai government, should pick out the fifty most corrupt members of the Afghan government and insist on their replacement. The people who replace them should have a U.S. or NATO nation advisor assigned to spend the first three months with the new appointee cleaning up the mess. At least ten of the fifty should be members of the extended Karzai family in order to show that no-one is beyond the reach of the government clean up. The message behind this should be clear to the rest of the government; "you could be next!"
Where would we get the fifty advisors given the slow ability of the civilian arms of the U.S. government to provide the "civilian surge" long called for in Afghanistan? There are several options. We could use American civil affairs officers; there are plenty of them in Iraq and Afghanistan manning increasingly bloated staffs. Another source of manpower could come from cleaning out the attaché offices at the Embassy and sending them out to field until the civilian surge catches up in recruiting qualified civilians. A third source might be Iraq where there are Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are wrapping up their missions. The State Department could transfer them on a voluntary basis if it puts its mind to it. The bottom line is to send the message that we are prepared make heads roll in the Kabul government, and to do this on a three month rotating basis until we see results.
Until the kleptocrats in Kabul and the provinces have the fear of Allah put in them, there will be no reason for the Afghan people to assume that a reformed Taliban is not a viable alternative. That brings us to the provinces.
David Rothkopf at FP with: The Missing General and the Phantom Army
Quote:
Central to our ability to achieve these goals are the people in the U.S. government who are specifically organized to handle post-crisis intervention and reconstruction functions. Unfortunately, despite our regular need for such capabilities, we don't actually have a department or agency that is specifically built and sufficiently supported to achieve these goals. This despite the fact that such interventions have been among the most regular and crucial functions of the U.S. government for decades. Hopefully, Secretary Clinton's QDDR process will produce some recommendations to remedy this.
In the meantime, the next best thing we have is the U.S. Agency for International Development, a worthy but inefficient and often lumbering entity. Nonetheless, it is going to play a critical role in what we do in Afghanistan ... or it can and should play such a role. It also has related and vital roles to play in Pakistan, Iraq and other regions where state failure or state weakening create security as well as humanitarian risks.
These are the things it has. What it doesn't have is a leader. It is now almost November and the new administration has failed to arrive at a candidate for the job everyone can agree on and who can pass the muster of the absurd vetting processes that now dog would-be senior officials and impede this government's ability to function. We came close a while back but the candidate withdrew his name. There is behind the scenes scuffling over this one, partially because there is a sense the agency needs to change and there is a division of opinion as to whether it should be more independent or more closely integrated into the State Department. (The correct answer is "b." The work of A.I.D. is a critical component of American statecraft and the levers of its function need to be controlled by America's chief diplomat.)
Whenever this missing general is brought on board however -- and one can only hope that it is very, very soon -- he or she is going to have to cope with another reality that is not fully understood by most Americans and which is vital to the function of the U.S. government and to our success or failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. And that is how we get to the phantom army I mentioned earlier.
That army represents the majority of people currently on the ground in those two countries on behalf of the U.S. government and is therefore the largest single force on the ground in our Middle Eastern theaters. It is the army of contractors that have become the Hamburger Helper of American military and diplomatic initiatives in our two current wars.
Beetle:
All good thought pieces, but problems abound.
The underpinnings of effective governance lie in the ends, ways and means of delivering it.
Assuming the night of long knives occurred, what then?
A handful of MSI contractors might engage the Afghan ministries to show them what they know? How to optimize profit performance under a US AID contract mechanism? How to capture a greater share of CERP?
At its core, our civilian effort (both by DoS and DoD) is an "expeditionary" one. Short-term people with quick objectives facing a country with long-term development needs that, in part, are not helped by pushing billions of US dollars into the current civilian reconstruction bureaucracy.
We have a hammer. but is Afghan civil governance a problem for which a hammer can achieve desired results?
Maybe we need a different tool, or a different problem definition?
Steve
The quote from Rick's Blog sounds like equal parts frustration and tried & true tactical solution...a relief for cause if you will, but of incompetent Afghan civilian technocrats.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
Not having been to Afghanistan I subscribe to a different view in that I believe that if we commit to this mission we must work with what we have. My observation of the interactions between type-A infantry bubba's and local technocrats in Iraq and Latin America reveals consistent misunderstandings as to what is possible, what is wise, what is sustainable, and what will actually be accomplished inspite all of the strum und drang...
Appropriate coaching combined with realistic expectations management is what is called for and will, as you also note, require more than a 12 month time-frame for sustainable results.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
Leaving the strategic question aside (Is Afghanistan worth the effort?), my operational/tactical suggestion is to increase the numbers of the CA/CMO mission folks outside the wire (no FOB's, no commuting to work) by using reserve CA force's (USAR/ARNG, Marine, and re purposed Navy & AF - with vetted/certified required civilian skill sets - direct commissioning as required), DoS, USAID, USACE, USDA, DOJ, contractors, and ISAF CA/CMO types. All would answer to a modern day GEN Lucius Clay for unity of command. Our hypothetical GEN Clay could be required to answer to a higher ranking DoS Czar depending upon who has the lead DOD or DoS. A dedicated three or four-star with no-#### hire/fire power over mil, civ, and contractor would be focused upon ends, ways, and means and would have the horsepower needed to ride herd upon the cats while integrating all efforts into the ongoing security mission.
Long term, the necessity for a five year plan, ten year plan, or twenty year plan is beyond the capabilities of the crystal ball here on my desk...
Jim Gant: One Tribe at a Time
Quote:
When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower
must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not
grow more than one inch above the ground. During
the second year, after more watering and fertilizing,
the tree does not grow anymore than it did during year
one. The bamboo tree is still no more than one inch
high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by
any outsider.
But, on the fifth year the tree can grow more than
eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was
growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots
that enable the tree to create an explosion of growth in
year five.