Fear, yes but also and perhaps even more to cause
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Originally Posted by
Uboat509
As for 9/11 and Madrid, what else were those for other than to sow fear?
major economic damage in both cases (in which they were quite successful...) and to elicit an excessive response.
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Reporting that has been made open source shows that they were surprised by our response to 9/11. And why shouldn't they have been? As Ken has pointed out numerous times, our response to attacks against us in the Middle East had been tepid at best. Look at our response to Beruit, Mogidishu, Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and so on. Why would they have expected us to act any differently after 9/11?
I think a lot of that surprise was at the effectiveness of OEF 1 and disbelief that OIF would occur, IOW, the type and location of both responses was not what they had expected due to our previous responses and that knocked them off balance for a bit. They did get an excessive response but it was not the one they had expected and somewhat prepared for.
Had we better prepared our response capability in the 90s as many wished, we could have surprised them even more...
Nor do I think we were at all sensible...
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
This I'm not so sure of. Our ability to remove governments and occupy land was more than adequate. I'm not sure that any response capability that was desired in the 90s would have given us the ability to manage the post-occupation challenges.
Depends on what capabilities and who desired them. There was a school of thought inside the Army that urged far more effort toward managing such problems, foreign internal defense and security force assistance. There was a smaller school that advocated avoiding doing that post conflict/FID/SFA thing at all costs. They advocated tailored response and urged acquisition of equipment to do that; cheap disposable vehicles, very stealthy air transport with very long range and such in addition to major war items. Unfortunately, they got subsumed in the far larger crowd (almost half the Army was in Europe, that's where you had to go to get promoted...) who were major war / avoid FID etc crowd. As both Presidents in the 90s had no interest in any military adventures other than launching missiles -- though the first one did launch two major operations even while he was cutting the budget for the so-called 'peace dividend' -- the result was predictable. No FID, no exotic dangerous toys that might get Politicians in trouble...
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"Float like a butterfly" meaning, above all, do not ever occupy territory.
I think we have to be prepared to do that while rigorously avoiding actually having to do it.
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When we're clearing, we have the initiative.
Bingo! You've got it and just proved that going to the War College doesn't adequately prepare the wrong people to fight the nation's wars. That's the only time we do have the initiative, long a tenet of US doctrine. In most other circumstances, the opponent has the initiative. I've seen varying figures for Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan on enemy initiated versus US initiated contacts. IIRC, in all cases they initiated over 60% of the contacts, in some cases as high as 90%.
That is just criminal. No reason for it to be that way -- it IS that way due to poor selection and training, poor personnel polices with concomitant almost forced lack of trust in subordinates and societally induced politically correct risk aversion. Not because it must be that way, poor ROE or the bad guys knowing their terrain better...
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I suppose it's restating the obvious, but I don't think we went about this in a very sensible way.
Nope, not at all. We've lost the bubble...
All the problems were foreseen by many in the Army -- problem was no one on high listened and the US has no consistent mechanism for giving civilian policy makers the requisite strategic and military knowledge to avoid make less than sensible decisions about the application of force.
Gentleman, you heard the policy, now make it so....
Said it before, but one of the things I just do not get about the US Army is their idea of "Strategy" - as being discussed here.
Policy changes as strategy is applied. It's not a set of rules of even a doctrine. It's a Crack Whores household budget - which shows Wienberger and Powell don't get it, but I'll leave that for now - The US Army cannot and should not attempt Strategy or any input into policy.
Military Power is a tool. It's not the policy, so basically, yes you can occupy any land you so wish, IF you are skilled enough to do at a cost that makes it sustainable within the policy. Lack the skill, and you fail the policy.
Some SWC folk seem intent on saying "OMG! We must not occupy" when the exam questions is "How can it be done well."
I know this is all very obvious, but it seems that it does need saying. - Apologies to anyone who feels it's TOO obvious.
You forgot the next question on the Exam:
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...The US Army cannot and should not attempt Strategy or any input into policy.
While I agree with you in theory, the practicality is that our system and our laws require certain military inputs to policy decisions. The reality is that input is solicited but sometimes ignored or altered to the detriment of the nation -- and that applies to advice given, not given, taken and not taken. However, most often, that advice is asked for by the policy folks and is generally accepted with only those modifications deemed required for domestic political consumption -- which factor always outweighs both international and / or purely military considerations.
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...Lack the skill, and you fail the policy.
Or more correctly, you are unable to implement the policy due to lack of skill -- or will -- or tools. Sometimes the skill is willing but the flesh is weak; other times the skill may be derelict... :wry:
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Some SWC folk seem intent on saying "OMG! We must not occupy" when the exam questions is "How can it be done well."
The following question I mentioned above is; "Can it be avoided. If so, what alternatives are available?"
The question after that is "Do a cost : benefit analysis of courses of action. Show your work."
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I know this is all very obvious...
Yes. I agree. ;)
While all that is obvious, the US Political-Military dynamic is quite different to that in almost all other nations. Tends to confuse many... :D
I think he's already answered that.
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Originally Posted by
JMA
IEDs?
LINK.
IEDs are his Artillery, they're just another weapon. They don't scare any more troops than would artillery. They do fascinate the media and the uniformed, though.....