Completely agree with both
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
that you were a radical Pythagorean, Ron :D!
I would argue that,in and of themselves, numbers mean nothing; their only meaning (as with all languages) comes from that assigned by humans. All mathematics (aka "numbers") is an attempt to map out a perceived territory in "reality". Sometimes, the math works quite nicely in that it produced an accurate, manipulable and predictive model for 99.999% of the interactions in that slice of reality; most engineering is an example of this. Other times, quite honestly, it is the mathematical equivalent of "here there be dragons :eek:!" and is pretty much useless (aka a lot of social sciences).
Agreed with the addition of what are they based on, how do they collect them, and is what is the correspondence between the symbol and the (supposed) object. Let me just give a really simple example of this. Back in 2003 in Iraq, any shots taken at Coalition troops were counted as "terrorist / insurgent attacks". In reality, a significant number of them stemmed from people who had been shamed and the only way to recapture their honour was to "attack" the "foreign infidels" who had taken it away. The number that represented "terrorist / insurgent attacks" was artificially high (a poor correspondence with the actual terrain being mapped), while the secondary number of terrorist / insurgent accuracy" or effectiveness (kill ratio) was artificially low. This second number led to the creation of a false assumption, backed by "numbers", of the efficacy of any insurgency. Or, in other words, the map didn't adequately represent the terrain.
Thus the inclusion of the Caveats
As to being Pythagorean
http://www.math.tamu.edu/~dallen/his...g/pyth_pic.gif
In the larger sense I would hope not. I'm fairly certain the categories of existance should be limited to basically human or God(thus no third or IOW men like Pythagoras,
The collaboration/sharing of information and equal parties aspects I could definately buy off on:wry:
Also after mulling this over
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
that you were a radical Pythagorean, Ron :D!
I would argue that,in and of themselves, numbers mean nothing; their only meaning (as with all languages) comes from that assigned by humans. All mathematics (aka "numbers") is an attempt to map out a perceived territory in "reality". Sometimes, the math works quite nicely in that it produced an accurate, manipulable and predictive model for 99.999% of the interactions in that slice of reality; most engineering is an example of this. Other times, quite honestly, it is the mathematical equivalent of "here there be dragons :eek:!" and is pretty much useless (aka a lot of social sciences)..
In this very context it might be seen as more clear why so many choose this format through which to attempt said mapping. Miscommunication, misinterpretation, etc are large parts of human interactions and consistently result in such chaotic ventures that it would seem unsurprising that so many choose to attempt to use an, at least less commonly misunderstood or mistranslated form of deliberation for how to "see" reality.
Also along these lines I would postulate that even when the "numbers" don't necessarily equate to perfect knowledge they might at least help to point one in the right direction.:confused:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
Agreed with the addition of what are they based on, how do they collect them, and is what is the correspondence between the symbol and the (supposed) object. Let me just give a really simple example of this. Back in 2003 in Iraq, any shots taken at Coalition troops were counted as "terrorist / insurgent attacks". In reality, a significant number of them stemmed from people who had been shamed and the only way to recapture their honour was to "attack" the "foreign infidels" who had taken it away. The number that represented "terrorist / insurgent attacks" was artificially high (a poor correspondence with the actual terrain being mapped), while the secondary number of terrorist / insurgent accuracy" or effectiveness (kill ratio) was artificially low. This second number led to the creation of a false assumption, backed by "numbers", of the efficacy of any insurgency. Or, in other words, the map didn't adequately represent the terrain.
Another good one might be something as simple as the number of battles lost throughout history due to leaders allowing numbers to cause them to underestimate their enemies.
Proving, perhaps, that half of
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
William, you should know that about half of European's population said the same even before it happened...
Europe didn't understand the real reasons for that invasion...
Quote:
The invasion would even have been a stupid idea IF Hussein had had chemical weapons. After all, he would have safely stored them without using the stuff for at least 12 years. The only sure way to make him use them would be an invasion...
Immaterial in reality -- but an admittedly bad choice for the stated rationale. It served only to really muddy the water...
PR Push for Iraq War Preceded Intelligence Findings
New material released on the push for war:
Quote:
PR Push for Iraq War Preceded Intelligence Findings
"White Paper" Drafted before NIE even Requested
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 254
Posted - August 22, 2008
For more information contact:
John Prados - (202) 994-7000
Washington D.C., August 22, 2008 - The U.S. intelligence community buckled sooner in 2002 than previously reported to Bush administration pressure for data justifying an invasion of Iraq, according to a documents posting on the Web today by National Security Archive senior fellow John Prados.
The documents suggest that the public relations push for war came before the intelligence analysis, which then conformed to public positions taken by Pentagon and White House officials. For example, a
July 2002 draft of the "White Paper" ultimately issued by the
CIA in October 2002 actually pre-dated the National Intelligence Estimate that the paper purportedly summarized, but which Congress did not insist on until September 2002.
A similar comparison between a
declassified draft and the
final version of the British government's "White Paper" on Iraq weapons of mass destruction adds to evidence that the two nations colluded in the effort to build public support for the invasion of Iraq. Dr. Prados concludes that the new evidence tends to support charges raised by former White House press secretary Scott McClellan and by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its long-delayed June 2008 "Phase II" report on politicization of intelligence.