ISAF Campaign Plan Summary
ISAF Campaign Plan Summary - John Nagl, Small Wars Journal Blog
Quote:
I was struck during my recent visit to Afghanistan by an impressive understanding of counterinsurgency principles in the
International Security Assistance Force and at subordinate headquarters (See In
Afghanistan, 'New Spirit' To Confront The Taliban at
NPR).
At the request of the small group of think-tankers I was travelling with, General David McKiernan's headquarters has agreed to release an
unclassified version of the ISAF Campaign plan specifically for posting on
Small Wars Journal. Things I find particularly interesting in this plan include the upfront acknowledgement that this is a counterinsurgency (vice peacekeeping) campaign (obvious to us, but hugely important in the NATO context); the addition of "Shaping Operations" to the classic "Clear, Hold, Build" COIN methodology; an acknowledgment that in this still critically under-resourced theater, ISAF cannot be strong everywhere and must therefore prioritize areas to clear and hold (
a point Dave Kilcullen made well on Sunday with Fareed Zakaria); and the overt emphasis on buildling Afghan governance capability and capacity as the objective of all of our operations.
Could be way off, but that has never stopped me before!
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Can anyone explain to me what this actually means. Particularly why the word "Shape" is used.
Wilfo,
Shape in my mind is doing things like reforming the local police, and holding shuras to inform the populace of our intent before we go in searching houses and ticking people off. I submit that shaping (I would prefer "condition setting") up front pays dividends in the long run. Lining up the PRT, NGO's (a mission in and of itself) identifying issues through ASCOPE (particularly through SWEAT-MS), selecting short term projects that quickly make security gains or good will projects pays big during the clear, hold and build. I hate to sound like a jargon monkey but that is the quickest way I can explain what it means to me.Although you can clearly argue that reforming local officials, conducting projects can/should be done during hold/build. I think shaping the envirmoent through a competent police force or estasblishing good relations with the populace first is best. Use build for long term capacity type stuff. My only complaint with this current campaign plan is a lack of mechanisms to ensure we are synched with the ANSF. We have been here for a few minutes, I truly see nothing new in our approach to how we will synchronize efforts with the ANA/ANP.:(
Just for grins, I looked it up in the dictionary.
Tons of definitions as a noun and as a verb; since its use, militarily ( ? :rolleyes: ) is as a verb, here's the one I think most appropriate:
"To embody in a definite form: shaped a folk legend into a full-scale opera."
I particularly liked the example... :D
Agree with Hacksaw and Eden
Re: the one pager, there's no 'there' there. I always get worried after I read "the latest revelation" and know less than before reading it... :eek:
Europe doesn't care what we say and the strategy comes from the politicians and CentCom (but only to the extent the former allows the latter to dictate a bit :wry: ).
I'm totally unsure what purpose that Unclas document serves other than to mystify an already ignorant media. :confused:
for some reason I cannot edit my previous post
The line about the IO / Narrative campaign LLO should read 'Why isn't there one?'
I defer to the more learn'ed but in a word yes.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Many thanks.
So if I said "Preparatory activity to help achieve the campaign objectives" it would mean the same thing?
Yes, But other Council members are correct, I gave examples of shape as it will more than likely be used in the context of this campaign plan. But as you know we can use Fires, IO, Checkpoints, etc, to shape the battlefield of the terrain or populace…
Also as I have read the Campaign Plan, I do not disagree with Eden that most of these guys know their stuff (they are not on the staff at ISAF by accident)
I feel Mark's comment about platitudes is dead on. I realize that you dont hammer out details at the theater level inside of a campaign plan. However I dont see subordinate staff's in the regions as even having a jump off point for refinement, to make the dream come true.
Tony
At least we now have something to dissect!
I am not sure how much real insight anyone expected to get from a 5-line mission statement and 13 bullet points that summarizes a joint and combined operational level campaign plan. I for one was rather heartened by John’s post and the tiny insight it offered, so my hyper-tension is under control. I am not sure how many of have seen a summary of the OIF Joint Campaign Plan. It would not say a great deal more than we have been offereded in the ISAF summary: lines of operation (political (Main Effort), security, diplomatic, and economic) and the supporting activities (information, intelligence, engagement and logistics). Linda Robinson provides a really good open source summary in [I]Tell Me How This Ends[/I.
The interesting omission from the ISAF summary is any mention of diplomatic activity to support the plan. Aren’t the regional context and the role neighbours can play to support or undermine the plan pretty important considerations when it comes to developing a theater plan? While the summary mentions Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuaries in the border region, shaping the diplomatic environment in a wider sense than the effects strike operations have is a crucial, but as yet unstated task that has to be met.
Not much and that's the point...
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Originally Posted by
Alex Alderson
I am not sure how much real insight anyone expected to get from a 5-line mission statement and 13 bullet points that summarizes a joint and combined operational level campaign plan.
It doesn't pass the "so what" test. That's to say it serves no useful purpose, so why bother -- except as a platitude for the media and punditocracy / civilian strategist crowd.
Thank you so much Mr White
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
It doesn't pass the "so what" test. That's to say it serves no useful purpose, so why bother -- except as a platitude for the media and punditocracy / civilian strategist crowd.
For once again bursting the bubble for those of us who like to at least pretend someone actually might care what we have to say
We all have our talents. I'll thank you to know
that several Commanders who have said things like "You could rain on a Medal of Honor ceremony" were not correct. I'm good but I'm not that good...
(Your comment also applies to my deathless prose. ;) )
Wait 'til the GAO gets involved
While the sketchy ISAF campaign plan summary has created more itches than it scratched, it's interesting that at least a glimpse of what may be in store has been offered. And who knows, the authors might be avid readers of Small Wars Journal and might take account of some of the concerns raised. For me, the interesting thing is to compare this vorspeisen with the way the 280 page Petraeus/Crocker Joint Campaign Plan (and all its 14 annexes) was kept on a very tight hold for a long time. True, plenty of visitors to Baghdad were briefed on the plan and the method, but very little was said publicly. Indeed, a rather amusing game of cat and mouse developed between those in Baghdad and the GAO (see http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081021t.pdf) over the very issue of public statements of intent.
Ken justified to ask 'What's the point?' If it is to stimulate a bit of discussion among those who are interested and care, and to get a different take, beyond tell us more, John's post has worked.