http://analysis.threatswatch.org/200...ctory-in-iraq/
From Threatswatch / Center for Threat Awareness, a site we at SWJ like.
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http://analysis.threatswatch.org/200...ctory-in-iraq/
From Threatswatch / Center for Threat Awareness, a site we at SWJ like.
I did a quick read and this report is what it is: a quick less than comprehensive substitute for the ISG report, which has its own problems.
The report assumes much in that it appears to me to largely ignore the effects of time, that is the time since the end of regime toppling operations.
A specific issue that I take issue with in this analysis (and this should surprise no one) is that the authors in addressing external factors operating in the Iraq operation, state the following:
This amounts to strategic cop out on an issue central to this region. If the authors see Iraq as central to GWOT--and they say they do--they cannot then sideline the Arab-Israeli issue by essentially ignoring the fact there are two sides in that dispute, one that affects the entire region.Quote:
The ISG recommends that the US make a significant effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means to achieving cooperation from Iraq's neighbors. While we actively support efforts to end the conflict, we see no value in the fanciful view that the US or any foreign power has the means to end that conflict. As such, this massive undertaking as recommended by the Iraq Study Group has no place among strategic recommendations regarding confrontation within Iraq.
We support the two-state solution in principle, with the caveat that the Palestinian state – should it become one – adopt in unquestionable terms statements and policies that recognize and validate the existence of the Israeli state. Middle Eastern nations seeking to resolve the conflict, rather
than exploiting the Palestinians to distract their own disaffected and repressed citizens, would do well to begin the process by establishing relations with Israel and permanently ending anyrelationships, formal or informal, with terrorist organizations in and around the Palestinian
territories. The abuse of the Palestinian and Lebanese people are not causes of violence in Iraq, and should be recognized as similar to the manipulation that Iraq's Shi'a and Sunni are experiencing at the hands of Iraq's neighbors.
Best
Tom
We do not have the power to resolve the Arab - Israeli conflict, but we have the power to resolve the Sunni-Shia-Kurd-multiple splinters of all above conflict? Hmmmm.
This single paragraph speaks volumes. I'm going to ask for PCS orders to Ramadi.Quote:
Withdrawal should be considered only upon the request of the legitimate Iraqi government and [emphasis mine] only after the completion of the minimal US objectives of eliminating al-Qaeda and aligned movements (AQAM) from Iraq. Half-measures of any sort or the pursuit of ideas based less on reality and more on false hope in Iraq's neighbors threaten to further destabilize the situation in both Iraq and the region at large and places the lives of Americans, coalition members and Iraqis at greater risk.
Sure. There's no powerful Kurdish lobby camped out front...;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Ironhorse
Poking at the perceived inconsistency across the theaters, I almost quoted Marc Knopfler with "two men say they're Jesus, one of them must be wrong." But I figured it was best to leave the whole Christian angle out.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve Blair
I think I speak for both myself and my co-authors when I say we appreciate everyone’s feedback.
Thanks for dropping in, Michael. I'm sure you'll find the report "cussed and discussed" (as we say in Montana) by the SWC membership. We can be flippant at times, but you'll also find positive discussion and suggestions here along with everything else. And that can be a rare thing some days on the message boards.:)
The feedback in the discussion here is greatly appreciated as Michael said previously.
I do feel compelled to respond to the assertion that, while we state that we (US) cannot solve the Arab-Palestinian crisis that (misinterpretted in here) we zare percieved as furthering a position that we (US) can solve the Sunni-Shi'a-Kurd blood feuds in Iraq. We absolutey do not assert nor believe this.
What we believe is quite simply this: The relationship of the Israeli-Palestinian issue to the Iraq conflict is ancillary. Solving it will not stop Shi'a attacks and Sunni reprisals or Visa Versa. Therefore, specifically WRT Iraq policy, this is energy and effort wasted with false expectations.
We also believe that, just as we (US) cannot solve or resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we have even less influence on the Shi'a-Sunni religeously-based conflict that predates the Israeli conflict by centuries.
But...what we can do is stem this conflict's existence from being used by outside forces (Iran, AQAM) to motivate and propel recruitment and increased attacks that are designed more to create chaos and weaken the Iraqi gov't than settle or resolve the religious conflict being used as the front.
By blocking/disuading Iran effectively (rather than pretend it isn't happening) and agressively rooting out the AQAM in Ramadi and elsewhere with the effectiveness of Fallujah, the Sunni-Shia conflict subsides (not gets solved) to a point where the Iraqi gov't has at least a fighting chance at approaching reconciliation rather than fragmentation, migration and clensing...which is in no one's interest.
Forgive the brevity of this response. I simply reject the misinterpretation that we, the authors, believe that the US can solve the Sunni-Shi'a historical religious conflict. Not so. But we can stop its useage as a weapon by rooting out the groups that see fit to do so.
We’re always keen on constructive criticism. I’d rather be savaged by practitioners (current and former) than picked at by your average no-risk-taking talking head.
You have put much thought and sweat into your product, which I will undoubtedly appreciate more when I have read it! :)
Please do not misinterpet my flippant remark, based only on my view through the soda straw at the short quote in post #2 of this thread, as an assertion. I know enough to know that one sound bite does not represent your entire analysis, on which I must defer comment until I am more informed. But I do think the sound bite (repeated below)Quote:
Originally Posted by SDSchippert
has a bit of a <insert favorite ethnic strife here> flavor to it which applies equally well to a couple of places.Quote:
The ISG recommends that the US make a significant effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means to achieving cooperation from Iraq's neighbors. While we actively support efforts to end the conflict, we see no value in the fanciful view that the US or any foreign power has the means to end that conflict.
And I find it increasingly hard to think of the legitimate, effective Iraqi government as distinct from the unsolvable Sunni-Shia conflict, which unfortunately still seems to be the miracle that needs to happen for it all to work out.
I look forward to a good weekend of reading!
First, my own apologies for sounding like I came out swinging...the trouble with the written word in comments. Using the words "I reject" made my response appear more combatively defensive than they really were. Figured it'd come back to bite me. Anyway...
On the first regarding near universal fit elsewhere, quite fully agreed there, sir. But if the shoe fits, well, it fits, regardless of how many wear the Air Jordan's... In just about any <insert your favorite ethnic strife here> conflict, we may be able to force down the level of violence in the short term, but the solution is never ours to impose, but one that the two (or more) sides must agree upon, amicably or not. Just as I have said speaking or writing on the subject, the absence of violence is not victory (nor solution), but it is precisely what the ISG report and its supporters popularly tout as 'Success' in Iraq. I say, "Poppycock."Quote:
Originally Posted by Ironhorse
Helluva point you make, by the way, next of pointing out the intertwined nature of the sectarian split and the Iraqi gov't itself (or rather, its various members from each competing faith or school of thought). Not an observation that escaped us, but it may have escaped overt illustration in this document.
However, one thing we do state overtly (perhaps not within this direct context) is that the US needs to understand what it can control and influence (and what it cannot) and set out to address that which it can. To that end, we cannot affect the sectarian nature of the membership of the elected Iraqi government. Only the Iraqis and those they elect can do that.... However, what we can do is smash (inside, AQAM) or block (outside [mostly], Iran and Syria - in its relatively limited supporting role) those who are intentionally exacerbating this divide to the point where the Iraqis can - again - at least have a chance at political reconciliation. I don't see how we have any logical choice. We can't settle it, but we sure as hell can improve the environment.
And this is to say absolutely nothing of the greater reason for smashing AQAM - primarily beginning with the proven Fallujification of Ramadi....followed not by relaxation of tempo, but an aggressive pursuit through momentum.
The alternative is unpalatable.
I would say two cents, but that's more like a quarter...
Definitely appreciate those in here who read and critique what we have put together. Yes, we put considerable time and effort, but nothing worth having is ever free or easy, and by the same token, nothing is ever perfect or bulletproof. The criticism and/or praise from within the collective experience and insight here at SWJ is valuable and meaningful.
SDS,
Now that we've got you here, I'm curious about a couple of things. First is a question of where you got your "surge forces" numbers from? Not implying that they are wrong, but just wondering what they are based on. Two 15,000 man divisions plus supporting formations?
Secondly, and because I'm not quite clear what your stance is, do you propose that we force the Mahdi and Badr groups to demobilize and stand down? Tied to that, were there points about handling Al-Sadr that you didn't include in you final product, but have the time to expand on here in the SWC?