Rules of Engagement for Conscience and Sense

From Democracy Project - Rules of Engagement for Conscience and Sense. H/t ZenPundit.

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There comes a time in combat when split second choices are made. Tactical rules of engagement training condition one to those choices, and may make sense to the situation or to the overall mission, or not. But, inescapable in the choice is whether to die for a rule that doesn’t apply to the immediate threat. That reality is ignored only if one feels that another’s life is more important than one’s own, that the primary mission of a soldier or Marine is to die for their country rather than make others die for theirs. Front line life and death are that clear and brutal.

In today’s asymmetrical wars, the home front faces the same choices, life or death as the threats can extend here, but do have more time to reflect. But, the moment of choice is still near instant. Rumination is the same, in effect, as not acting, and letting the foe act and exploit weakness and hesitation.

I’ve heard those conservatives or to-now Iraq war supporters express their misgivings about the “surge.” Those misgivings, that lack of confidence, have strong grounds in the too often vacillating and confused course of our engagement.

Still, not only is there no alternative that doesn’t promise even worse outcomes, but the misgivings ignore the unavoidable problems of any war.

No, the “surge” is not a magic bullet. Indeed, far more is needed, all up and down the line from military to diplomatic force. But, it is having some important results, even now when just starting. We should be demanding the far more that is needed...

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ROE perhaps will become more flexible with Pretereus in charge. I make reference to a Post by M. Yon in his blog recently about some apartment buildings that insurgents/terrorists are repeatedly using as a base of operations. I asked myself why they were still standing, much like a strong bunker on high ground with the only goal being to repeatedly chase the occupants out each time they return. Since our civilian population is really not feeling much fear of our enemies 'out there and over there' , it is impossible for them to make any kind of connections to the reality of fact that civilians are the insurgents prime assets for support and protection. In other words, in the minds of our civilians and their perceptions of engagement and tactical necessity, it is better to allow insurgents the use of a structure than to prevent some Iraqi family the use of it by destroying it, despite the fact said Iraqis may well be coereced into said arrangement with insurgent forces. Civilian perception and opinion polls should have no bearing on ROE but this is indeed happening. Can and will Pretereus break the mold? Mr. Pretereus, bring down those huts.

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

During one of our daily ROE changes, I actually looked at one of the cards. The fact that they ROE was changing, and it was done casually, and through an e-mail, led to the Troops proclaiming that the ROE was "all ####ed up." and they therefore felt justified in ignoring it.

A checklist-style ROE is not the answer, imho. We had a guy waste some kids stealing trash, and he was completely ROE-compliant. We also had a female E-5 who sat there and endured a mortar barrage from some insurgents that she could see and could've engaged, but was prevented from doing so by the "ROE of the day" as well as direction from the TOC.

I would prefer a Horatio Hornblower "Strategic Corporal" to an ROE, but lacking that, a leadership chain that puts some serious effort into communicated the "why" aspect of ROE.

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I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

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120's got a painful point ! Just how would we go about explaining to the E5 taking mortar rounds, that although you can see them and they're in you sights, you can't fire. What ?

Regards, Stan

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Originally Posted by Stan Reber

120's got a painful point ! Just how would we go about explaining to the E5 taking mortar rounds, that although you can see them and they're in you sights, you can't fire. What ?

Regards, Stan

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In some cases the adversary is shooting and scooting and all you will do is ensure collateral damage that creates 10 insurgents for any 1 you might get lucky and kill. Like I said, in some cases, everything is situational dependent - but to just make a blanket statement that anyone taking mortar rounds should return in kind - all the time - defeats much of what we have learned over the last several years - and forgot over the last several decades.

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In some cases the adversary is shooting and scooting and all you will do is ensure collateral damage that creates 10 insurgents for any 1 you might get lucky and kill. Like I said, in some cases, everything is situational dependent - but to just make a blanket statement that anyone taking mortar rounds should return in kind - all the time - defeats much of what we have learned over the last several years - and forgot over the last several decades.

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Thanks Colonel !
I spent some time reading your recent interview, and I agree collateral damage in the E5's case would have merely created another 10 insurgents, and maybe one dead.

I didn't mean, she should have gone full auto and sprayed the surrounding area, but then how would one write the ROE regarding the use of "semi-auto, carefully-placed rounds" while being showered in mortar fire ?

Point well taken !
Regards, Stan

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Originally Posted by Stan Reber

Thanks Colonel !
I spent some time reading your recent interview, and I agree collateral damage in the E5's case would have merely created another 10 insurgents, and maybe one dead.

I didn't mean, she should have gone full auto and sprayed the surrounding area, but then how would one write the ROE regarding the use of "semi-auto, carefully-placed rounds" while being showered in mortar fire ?

Point well taken !
Regards, Stan

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Stan - that was me - Dave, not John Nagl, but glad you agree:D

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Originally Posted by 120mm

I think, most importantly, ROE must "make sense" at the grunt level, and changes must be "sold" to the troops.

During one of our daily ROE changes, I actually looked at one of the cards. The fact that they ROE was changing, and it was done casually, and through an e-mail, led to the Troops proclaiming that the ROE was "all ####ed up." and they therefore felt justified in ignoring it.

A checklist-style ROE is not the answer, imho. We had a guy waste some kids stealing trash, and he was completely ROE-compliant. We also had a female E-5 who sat there and endured a mortar barrage from some insurgents that she could see and could've engaged, but was prevented from doing so by the "ROE of the day" as well as direction from the TOC.

I would prefer a Horatio Hornblower "Strategic Corporal" to an ROE, but lacking that, a leadership chain that puts some serious effort into communicated the "why" aspect of ROE.

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120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

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Originally Posted by SWJED

Stan - that was me - Dave, not John Nagl, but glad you agree:D

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Sorry Dave !
I am not trying to take sides RE - ROE. I know how to place single shots from a model 1911 (the same Colt Commanders model I carried when I was Tom's NCO in Africa) and I also know who is the most important in a mortar team, should I need to take one or two out without wasting ammo.

I am having a relatively hard time thinking as an NCO, how I would now explain 120's situation to that very same E5.

Yes, I was also an E5 once (thank God).

Regards, Stan

Unless something has changed the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) are still in effect worldwide, which means a U.S. soldier, marine, etc. can take the appropriate self defense measures, so if the mortar fire was effective, the E-5 had legal authority to engage the mortar team. Judgment must be pushed to the soldier in the fight, not the TOC where staff officers can only speculate on what is actually happening on the ground.

If you want avoid the kill one insurgent, then create 10 effect, then you need to train your soldiers before you deploy them on the nuances of this type of fight. You have no right to try to control it from the TOC. This is why we have SROE to begin with, to keep chicken little from getting American fighting mena and women killed.

Thanks Bill !!!
I had a hard time with this. I can only imagine what the E5 was going through, hiding and waiting for an "ROE-approved" way out. Preposturous comes to mind :(

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Originally Posted by jcustis

120mm, I have to ask what will probably a painful question. These ROE changes, did they occur in Iraq? On the Marine side of things, the ROE never changed, although there were "clarifications" that arose during Fallujah v.2.0. In fact, I think that besides a shift in verbage that there were no forces declared hostile (e.g. military or paramilitary), I remember the ROE to be the same in 2004 as what we used to cross the border in 2003.

Your absolutely right, that's total nonsense to let guidance that should be as clearly cut as possible, degrade to set of something at the level of confusing special orders.

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The E-5 in question was a COSCOM soldier attached to V Corps Rear Headquarters. The ROE changed daily for us, mostly little changes, which I am sure never percolated down "to the troops" due to incessant and finicky nature of the changes.

Both of those incidents happened in the space of a week, and were partially the result of a well-publicized video of some "farmers" fired up by some 4ID Apaches, as well as complaints by the local sheik that we were killing too many farmers, who happened to be working at night.

A significant number of those farmers were carrying AKs and RPGs, as well as mortar rounds, verified by BDA photos, but for some reason we couldn't engage anyone from the towers anymore, without direct permission from the Corps Rear TOC.

The net result was tower soldiers not reporting engagements, several of which were actually against unarmed farmers. Training and trusting soldiers to execute the ROE is also an issue, here.

Roger...I thought it would be those little things.

I think the most important thing to bring out of this is for commanders to train and trust their soldiers. The current checklist system of ROE is a crutch; we should be able to produce a soldier that will know when and how to engage an enemy so as to not assist the insurgency.

Walking over the ground, later, it was obvious that not only would the E-5 been justified in engaging the mortar crew, she would've damaged the insurgency in doing so. On the other side, the E-4 who killed the kids was absolutely in the wrong, though it was determined he was in compliance with the ROE. (They were penetrating the perimeter to steal trash)

Unfortunately, in a top-down "directed" system, you get Yugos. It is a "hard sell" in the current environment to get commanders to accept risk in order accomplish "soft" missions and to actually trust the enlisted man/woman. If our soldiers have to spend 8 hours a year training on "grill safety", how can we expect them to function in a COIN environment?

As an aside, to really p.o. the reading audience, the E-5 who took the mortaring was reprimanded for being "sharp" with the O-4 "Battle Major" who denied her requests to engage the mortar team.

Thanks 120 ! I had a feeling this was coming.

I now, more than ever, thank whomever for having refined officers such as LTC Odom (with his wit and wisdom) at my side when things got difficult and arduous decision making was the last thing I needed to hear.

Tom, like most of my professional officers used his common sense in such scenarios and took an ass chewing later. He would still laugh and I often had to wonder if this was doing his career any favors. I already had 20 plus in, so there were no longer academics involved, just saving the skin on my behind.

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Unfortunately, in a top-down "directed" system, you get Yugos. It is a "hard sell" in the current environment to get commanders to accept risk in order accomplish "soft" missions and to actually trust the enlisted man/woman. If our soldiers have to spend 8 hours a year training on "grill safety", how can we expect them to function in a COIN environment?

As an aside, to really p.o. the reading audience, the E-5 who took the mortaring was reprimanded for being "sharp" with the O-4 "Battle Major" who denied her requests to engage the mortar team.
8 Hours Ago 02:40 PM

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http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20070...680r_page2.htm


BMT

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Originally Posted by BMT

http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20070...680r_page2.htm


BMT

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TELL THAT TO THE MARINES!!!

I got pretty heated after a read of that article. I wonder what LtGen Mattis' thoughts would be, as I never felt any doubt under his command that I knew when deadly force was appropriate. I certainly felt more confident about the right to self-defense.

I think the major's (LtCol now?) admonition, that the troops should receive better threat recognition training, is pretty hollow because he doesn't provide any examples to illustrate that point.

There's more work co-authored by him that I've browsed through, and may throw some of it up here tomorrow night.