After re-reading through my former post
It seems prudent to add a little bit more
Accepting that the statements made are rather absolutist they still seem fairly correct.
It is probably important however to follow with this-
The reality of human variances in manner/thought/ and deed means just about no society ever exists in complete peace but it does seem at least from my studies that those which experience the least amount of violent conflict are those which focus on ensuring that to the greatest extent possible the majority of groups which make up their populous at least feel as though they can live as they believe without having to fight governmental processes to do so.
Any characterization of the situation in Afghanistan on a discussion board
is going to be inaccurate, out of date and will fail to do justice to the nuances.
Any characterization of people in groupings or categories is going to be inaccurate, able to be taken out of context and will fail to do justice to the nuances.
Combine those two thoughts. then go forth...
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Originally Posted by
Brandon Friedman
Ken, I might be misunderstanding you, because in your later comments, I tend to agree with you. But with all due respect, I think your categorizations above badly underestimate the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan and fail to reflect the reality on the ground.
I don't underestimate the situation in Afghanistan, the categorizations above may state grossly simplified categories to make a point in a semi light hearted vein they are incapable of underestimating or overestimating or even estimating anything. Aside from having a long ago but still educational peacetime tour in the area, recall I even went out of my way earlier to point out my son had two tours there, a Grandson in law also has two and I know folks there now as well as others who've been. I'm not pulling this stuff out of my back pocket. I have more respect for everyone on this board than that.
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Dealing with Afghans (or even Iraqis, for that matter), cannot be broken down into eight simple categories. Relationships in these places are more fluid than you're suggesting. So, assuming I haven’t just misread you (which I might be doing),
You didn't misread but you seemingly took a simplistic set of points for a scholarly dissertation on population centric operations. Aside from people in general being infinitely more complex than that -- you cannot categorize them other than in generalities. With a tour in the ME and pretty broad travel there, I'm aware of the nuances and the fact that nothing in the ME -- or South Asia -- is as it seems. The national sport in that area is haggling, they're masters at it and no westerner will ever match them -- foolish to try.
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I have some questions for you:
Do you kill civilians who actively assist the Taliban by offering shelter to their fighters? How do you know whether or not they were coerced into it? What about those who provide the Taliban with weapons? What about civilians who actively assist one Taliban group, but offer you information about another Taliban group? What about farmers who eagerly sell opium to warlords known for attacking Americans? How do you distinguish between those who support the warlords and those who are coerced into supporting the warlords?
Assuming 'you' is GPF acting on intel provided in all cases, in order: No; That's one reason why you don't; No (willingly provided, sold or were coerced or just taken? No way to ever be sure even with a brilliant 'Terp and half an MI Det along); Take the info with a grain of salt and check it out while compensating them in some way thus keeping a possible information source; No; You can't.
Once more, as I said way above: "IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary."
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What if U.S. forces offend the honor of a local tribe one day, and the next time U.S. forces come around, the locals fire at them? Leaving immediate self-defense aside, are they to be killed?
Did you punish or report the offending US elements and make sure the local tribe knew of the punishment? You must hav known about it if you know that's why they're shooting at you. If not you were wrong and are therefor responsible for your unit being fired upon and you have to make a judgment call. Enjoy.
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Are they considered the "enemy?"
First thing you need to do is purge the word enemy from your COIN lexicon, that's an MCO construct and is woefully un-population centric; in FID, there is no enemy, there are good guys and bad guys, a few of each. There are a great many in between who will go with the flow. The trick is to kill the bad guys, not kill the good guys and kill as few of the floaters as possible. Bad guys shoot at you; good guys and floaters do not, thus they're easy to tell apart.
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What if they start planting land mines on the approaches to their village to keep U.S. forces out?
Do not step on or drive over them. Tell the point Squad to start probing, the second and the guns to overwatch and the third to standby to go anywhere and do anything, if you have a 'Terp, tell him to ask them to come out and guide you in to save work, call it in -- wait a minute,why are you asking me this; you should know all that stuff...
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And what about the ever-present problem of receiving seemingly-good-but consistently-bad information from locals who are motivated by tribal rivalries and/or profit—and not by America’s desire to win the “Global War on Terror?”
Take it with a grain -- no, a truckload -- of salt, write it down, make sure your Company intel guru gets it (you do have one, right?) and logs it, report it, keep it in mind and don't act on it unless you get corroboration unless it poses immediate danger to US troops, then act -- but sensibly and with good judgment.
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There are an infinite number of categories that inhibit the process of knowing who to kill. I’ve never once fired my personal weapon or ordered anyone else to fire theirs without (at least) first being drawn upon by the enemy. That’s because we had no idea who to kill otherwise.
That may be why I said try to kill anyone who shoots at you and try to avoid killing all the others. Are we not saying the same thing in a different way? The 'at least' BTW is a good touch, inaccurate harassing fire need not be answered -- should not be, really (showing disdain is good); probing fire at night must be answered cautiously if at all and absolutely not with an automatic weapon. As an aside on that count, re: the local who fired on you and may not have lacking an insult by us -- shoot back. In that part of the world to not do so is to appear weak and that's more dangerous than being weak. You should also never relax -- most irregular forces will avoid contact with an obviously tough and ready element and wait for easier pickings if they can.
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This is why the U.S. military is moving toward a population-centric approach. Sure, it’s not the way I was brought up in the infantry.
That's because all the things learned the hard way before you were born were purged from the system. Speak to several Chiefs of staff Army about that -- I sure tried to tell a bunch of their senior minions and two of them it was a dumb idea. The US Army was doing population centric operations all over the world for a good many years; some us got to be pretty good at it -- good enough to realize we learned something new every day and that no one had all the answers. :wry:
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But when you don’t have adequate intelligence or language skills within American units--and you haven't grown up in the "neighborhood"--being focused primarily on killing the right people is a recipe for disaster in places like Afghanistan--as Michael C rightly notes. We’re just not equipped. If you want to kill the right people, you must first secure the population, give them confidence, and then let the intelligence come to you. Only then should you start looking for fights.
We can disagree on that. You cannot provide security unless you look for fights in the right places and the intel is good enough to tell you that -- and I'll bet big buck few if any GPF units have set up ambushes on the known infiltration / exfiltration trails due to risk aversion. The population will have no confidence in you as long as they get night visitors and you are not the visitor.
Killing people who are trying to kill you is never wrong; killing anyone not actively trying to do that is almost never right. If you re-read my post, you'll note that's what I said. I also pointed out that was true in ANY war, population centric or not, something you also seem to have missed.
We have tons of intel, perhaps too much, the problem is in the distribution and utility; the bottom line is that at Bn level and below, you'll almost never have what you can consider adequate Intel. Fact of life. Nor will there ever be enough good interpreters -- that also is a fact of life. I hear your complaints, heard others voice them in 1950, 52, 61, 65, 66, 68, 70 in more than five countries all while doing the Grunt population centric shtick. I even picked up a first edition Galula from the SWC Bookstore in '64. not a great book IMO. Truly sorry to hear things haven't gotten better -- but sadly not at all surprised. Goes with the territory, I'm afraid.
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I have no doubt you’ll pick this apart--and maybe I'm misunderstanding you--
Found out the hard way on these boards it's better to read a comment and if it raises red flag, leave it and come back and read it again later. Then go answer it point by point to insure you didn't miss or elide an important item. All of us react to adverse stimuli and then tend to miss the thrust for a tree or two.
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but if there’s one thing on which we could probably agree, it’s the idea that these situations are best dealt with by avoiding them like the plague in the first place. We certainly agree this:
Yes, we can, we can probably agree on a number of other things as well. We're all products of our experiences and we're all better for sharing an learning. Closer to 80 than I'd like and I'm still learning new stuff every day...
Some thoughts about the business of soldiering in FID/SFA/COIN...
Most civilians want nothing to do with war and instead are focused upon raising a family and living life. Effective FID/SFA/COIN recognizes this simplified generalization by sheltering civilians from violence, enabling just governance & associated services, minimizing the generation of additional troublemakers, and hunting down existing troublemakers.
All of us who step onto a battlefield in a professional capacity have forfeited the ‘right’ to reasonably expect to be able to return home. Soldiering is not about trying to avoid spilling your coffee while at a quiet 9 to 5 desk job. For my nickel, Ken has clearly and succinctly shared a way of thinking, with his proposed eight categories, which is worthy of consideration by those who soldier. Much of it jives with my experience that soldiers must accurately anticipate the wide range of behaviors which people exhibit when under stress and have a viable plan of action to capitalize upon those behaviors.
There have been some comments about ‘drawing down’ on our own on other threads. Officers have the additional responsibility of imposing order upon the daily continuum, which ranges from apparently peaceful to very dangerous and during which all participants may be either ready, tired, mad, scared, sick, certain or uncertain or some mix of all of them. We all get paid for our ability to be extremely violent when required however ‘drawing down’ on our own is failure of leadership plain and simple. There are other solutions, you just have to be tough enough to follow through on them.
The question of how to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield is a daily question and it is my observation that effective leadership is central to resolving it. We do what we are trained to do in tough situations. Teaching our troops what we have learned upon the battlefield before we deploy is important because they will try and use what they have been taught (battle tested or not). Part of the answer is clearly articulated ROE that all have been trained upon. Part of it is learning everything that we can about our AO. Part of it is effective unit training and part of it is participating in CTC exercises. Once I am down range part of it may involve putting that wild-eyed kid in my vehicle, and taking him along with me when the situation allows so that I can keep an eye on him while modeling some good behavior. Part of it is asking myself ‘what would my family think of what I am currently doing?’ For me it means recognizing that anything is possible, relying upon my training and experience, recognizing that I don’t have all the answers, and doing what I must do as the situation unfolds.