We really picked a winner with Karzai, he wants to join the Talaban and also uses drugs, might be a little crazy to. Link to interview on MSNBC.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540...92324#36192324
We really picked a winner with Karzai, he wants to join the Talaban and also uses drugs, might be a little crazy to. Link to interview on MSNBC.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540...92324#36192324
Apparently, al-Qaeda isn't very enthusiastic about this: LINK
Maybe the US is actually ready to leave (and some good men are to be sacrificed to make it look respectable)? and ISI certainly thinks it is going to get the contract when the US leaves. Since Karzai doesnt want to be swinging from a lamppost with cigarettes and dollar bills stuffed into his mouth, so his unhinged behavior has a reason....
SO what do the experts say: what is the US objective now that "victory and democracy" are off the table? A cynic would think the US should aim for a well balanced civil war that keeps Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran busy for decades, but with the US you never know. The administration may actually be aiming for something more idealistic.
What is the desired End state in Afghanistan?
Taliban removed from power. CHECK!
Stable Afghanistan government capable of handling current external and internal threats. CHECK!
Removal of all Taliban everywhere on God's green earth to 6 sigma certainty.
Not there yet.
I would argue that the first two are the only legitimate ones out there and we are done.
The ANSF is manned, equipped and trained to deal with anything the Taliban can throw at them. That they refuse to do so is a different issue.
If foreign soverign threats are a concern, thats why God invented treaties SoCATO (South Central Asia Treaty Organization) Rolls off the tongue, doesn't it.
War's over boys.
We won.
Despite the commotion, I was very pleased with the emerging solutions today.
Two weeks ago, Bing West gave a very clear and cogent report on the Marjah operation, ending with the routine warning that it all depends on the ability of the Afghans to step up for the later Hold, and Build phases.
In the succeeding weeks, President Obama stopped by to reportedly pressure President Karzai to get his act together. We all heard the responses, ranging from Karzai's claimed threat to join the Taliban, and Galbraith's belief that Karzai is literally smoking something.
Out of all that comes a more contextual recommendation from West in today's NYT: How to Save Afghanistan From Karzai. Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/op...ml?ref=opinion
Bottom Line, in my read of it, was the recommendation that Karzai be bypassed, especially by US dollars, and that the mission be right-sized to a realistic one of clear, hold, turn over. Turn over to who? The Afghan military? Turn over what? Responsibility for policing and governance?
What about the locals? Work with the ones that will work with us. Leave the ones that are puppets of Kabul.
He recognizes the risk of turning Afghanistan into a military dictatorship, but points to examples (Philipines, South Korea) where that worked out OK. Bottom line, though is that it is for Afghans (not the US) to make their governments work, and not for us to prop up bad ones.
A simple op-ed, but loaded with meaning and realities. Defining a workable military mission. Defining a credible and actionable answer to Amb. Eikenberry's framing of Karzai as an unreliable partner.
I assume that implicit in West's next steps is neither a "Yankee Go Home" mission ender, nor an end to substantial US civilian stabilization/reconstruction. (Although a lot of Joe Biden's camp will here this as familiar).
But the bottom-line is nuts-and-bolts practical, deeply connected to reality, and, refreshingly, an answer that does not raise more questions than it answers.
The ANA is absolutely the wrong vehicle.
It is Tajik dominated.
If you want to infuriate the Pashtoon majority (plurality), put the ANA in charge.
MOI with ANP would be more accepted.
The problem is, we shoved a crap constitution down their throat which gives the president disproportianate power, especially in light of the traditional decentralized nature of Afghan society.
The solution is we tell Karzai, "Resign or we (and our money) leave in 6 months." If he resigns, great. If he doesn't, great. Just be prepared to be back in 5 more years. At this point, Karzai is more harm than good. Especially with AWK screwing things up.
There are those here in the UK who state - quietly - that Karzai is the only option and a far larger group who'd prefer the question was not even asked. It is sometimes bewildering to see how the fundamental issues of our role in Afghanistan are pushed aside for the tactics.
I would expect the 'establishment' would swiftly change its "tune" if the USA announced, or quietly undermined him, that Karzai was an obstacle.
From my "armchair" Karzai is not the only option, especially when you realise the power of a nation-state based in Kabul is actually very limited.
IMHO we should not overlook the domestic impact of Karzai's recent apparent statements, his attitude will harden the majority here who oppose the UK involvement and could swing others.
Sylvan:
I don't doubt that there would be a lot of internal unhappiness to be resolved by Afghans under a "Make the Afghans solve their own problems" approach.
They have a Popalzai in Office in Kabul, and another as shadow governor in Kandahar. How is that working out for them?
I don't mean to be flippant, but there is a point at which either they own us, and we own their problems----or they own their own problems and rapidly engage in solving them.
There are no solutions to Afghanistan's internal political/civilian governance problems to which our military can be a deciding factor, and, as the scorecard shows, few remaining US critical problems left unresolved.
West's proposal was that we work with the local folks who will work with us, and leave the rest to talk among themselves (but without US assistance or financial aid).
Personally, I witnessed to many foolish endeavors in Iraq with US taxpayer dollars literally flushed down a toilet by well-meaning but misguided efforts to intervene in Iraqi domestic problems.
Last week, Salah ad Din's Deputy Governor was interviewed about the Iraqi elections, and I remembered his very cogent explanation of why Iraq did not need US built schools (if they wanted them, they would have built them themselves, at much less cost and much better quality). Instead, what he really wanted was a civilian airport, the final construction contract for which was just let (to an American contractor): a completely Iraqi funded project.
Certainly, Afghanistan lacks the resources of Iraq, but that does not mean that we do them favors by bringing US projects to insulate them from the political/governance problems of their own country.
Reading these reports of soldiers being directed to wandering through Afghan villages like lonely Santa Clauses (Need any wells? How about a couple of schools?) under the Clear-Hold-Bribe strategy is just not going to produce significant results consistent with US timetables.
Between William Polk's very good article in The Nation on the futility of such efforts, and the London Conference report on essentially the same matters and conclusions, it seems like a good time to put down a different kind of gauntlet. Tough love or otherwise.
My opinion.
Bing's article was refreshing, and a good perspective on how Marjah may provide examples for a "bottom up" approach. I do feel it's worth taking a step back from the "ditch Karzai now" argument and try understand why he made his comments earlier in the week. Was it part of a hidden agenda for reconciliation? What was the context of those statements? Was he being intentionally inflammatory to evoke a western response? What was said to him prior to those statements? I believe it was in a closed door meeting, and he was quoted by the Nangahar provincial representative, which also may be laden with rhetoric. Despite Karzai's clear toleration for corruption (hello! his brother is a major narco/terrorist facilitator), he is no fool. He's survived because he's a politically motivated opportunist. He knows how to build alliances and utilize coercion. Is he worth our continued support? Probably not. Is he worth addressing and negotiating with? Sure.
The point in asking these questions is to try and understand Karzai's actions over the last week without making the typical over-reactive assertions. Karzai is playing a dangerous game, and the NATO nations should react accordingly, which is to say they should call his bluff. However, before acting, they should attempt to reach out and understand the logic behind his statements from his perspective before moving on and cutting him out of the picture entirely.
Green:
From what I read lately, Karzai's primary focus is to prepare for the time after the US backs off in 2011. Playing to his popular base, plus against the threats to his power base (anti-corruption).
We may be the strongest tribe at the moment, but we offer him no future.
The funny part was his comment about joining the Taliban. Immediately, the Taliban's well-oiled press machine responded that they could accept him, but only after judging him for bringing foreign troops into Afghanistan.
That sounds like Salem Witch Trials. Wrap him in rocks, drop him into a lake. If he is innocent, he will float upward.
His back is up against a lot of walls. What to do?
If I was him, maybe I would be taking drugs, too.
PS: As much as anything, West's flyer (coming after his trip to Marjah with all the big boys) might, in the end, prove to have been a trial balloon to get his undivided attention. It really is a big game.
PPS: As Saddam was swinging, Quadafi reminded his Arab brethren that this fate often awaits those leaders who dance with us. Was he right? Is that what Karzai is focusing on?
I agree, we could do better.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Link to Washington Post article (from SWJ Blog) by Peter Galbraith (worlds greatest living expert on Good Government and Brother of the worlds greatest living Economist James Galbraith:)) comments on what to do in A'stan since we don't have a legitimate ally with Karzai.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...d=opinionsbox1
He seems to gain political capital by biting into the hand which fed him, feeds him and which won't hang him from the spring board of a swimming pool.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
Said thought might well cross the minds of his potential "allies", the Taliban who would gladly give him a fair trial and hang him for crimes against Islam, the Afghan people and the cooperation with the infidels.
Firn
Concur with the jist.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
My ultimatum is simple. Karzai goes or we do. And I mean rapidly. Who ever wins the blood bath either deals with us or we break skulls again and start over.
ANSF can handle the taliban right now.
Militarily we have met all our objectives. Supporting an illigitimate dictatorship that we installed is not helping our long term objectives.
We backed the wrong horse, as State Department always does, and the military is paying the price. Karzai wasn't even popular in Kandahar. His base was Tarin Kowt, a non-entity in the larger picture.
Wish that 2000 pounder took him out in 2001. Would have been easier.
Sylvan:
One version I read of "would have been easier" was if the US had not pressured the Afghans to accept our constitution, and not simply re-appoint the old king. Alternative is a new Loya Jirga to address constitutional issues (do what they would have done back in 2002).
Having said that, Tough Love sounds like the remaining course. The Afghans still have many unresolved political/civil issues better left to themselves; every effort we make in that sphere forestalls their resolution.
PS: If the Taliban (under Omar/ISI, not Baradar) "judges" first, there won't be any "second thing" to address.
"OUR" Constitution it wasn't.
It is a Western Europe constitution that our State Department was so enamored of and shoved down their throat.
As you can see in other threads, my admiration for the capabilities of our State Department is literally immeasurable.
We gave them a disfunctional frame work, and then installed a disfunctional ruler.
And we are now befuddled that Afghanistan is disfunctional.
GIROA can never be any anything but corrupt, with fixed elections under the current constitution. Bad systems lead to bad results.Quote:
Originally Posted by Sylvan
In the US we forget how blessed we are by our good systems.
As to Mr. Karzai, that is a matter between him and the people of Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to get out of the mindset of thinking that if we don't like a particular leader of another nation that we have some right to change that leader.
We need to make our focus the people of Afghanistan. The Afghan Army is never going to threaten the US; but if we take positions that are counter to the well being of the populace of Afghanistan the people certainly can.
Mr. Karzai is doing the US a favor by creating separation and working to create legitimacy for his presidency that if not borne of the popular will of Afghanistan, at least is not perceived as borne of the popular will of the US.
We need to step back and reassess where certain "lines" are. There are things that are within our "area of concern"; those that are within our "area of influence"; and those that are within our "area of control." We traveled down a slippery slope throughout the Cold war, and the subsequent War on Terrorism, to where we seem to think that every corner of the globe not within the sovereign borders of a nuclear state is within our area of control. I doubt that there are many others who agree with that assessment; and it is a position that is wearing thin with friends and foes alike.
Once we realize that not everything that concerns us can or should be influenced by us, and certainly even less should be controlled by us, we will begin to find the security from terrorist attacks that we seek, and a reemergence of the influence with others that has waned of late.
Perhaps Mr. Karzai will help us to figure that out.
Bob:
Well said, but wasn't that paraphrasing a prayer?
God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference.
Wisdom, humility and understanding all rolled together.
Steve
... and a tight shot group for when all else fails.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
Hi Bob, couple of points.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
1-As long as we are fighting,dying and paying for the Government I think we have a legitimate interest in having some control of that Government.
2-As for focusing on the people of A'stan correcting the corrupt leadership of the country is focusing on the people of A'stan, isn't it?
debbil's advocate, let me flip 'em for disccussin' purposes.An alternative question is: Is our interest in control of the government of 'X' legitimate enough for us to be fighting, dying and paying for that government? *Quote:
1-As long as we are fighting,dying and paying for the Government I think we have a legitimate interest in having some control of that Government.
If the people of A'stan do not look upon their methods of interchange and intercourse as 'corrupt,' do we have an obligation -- or even a right -- to decide for them that they are wrong?Quote:
2-As for focusing on the people of A'stan correcting the corrupt leadership of the country is focusing on the people of A'stan, isn't it?
More importantly, how much time and effort are we prepared to expend in the almost certainly very difficult if not doomed attempt to turn around several centuries of practice?
A practice that while technically illegal and frowned upon still exists and skews things in our own nation to an admittedly lesser but still pervasive extent? What does such an effort say to others about our being hypocritical and thus encourage them to ignore our preaching as we do indulge in the practice ourselves...
* I realize we are there and my question thus is marginal on the merits and 'what if' doesn't do it. I ask it not so much for Afghanistan which is on a course that is set and we will not, cannot, significantly affect but for consideration prior to embarking on future operations.
I like Ken's version.
Mr. Karzai is no longer considered by the people of Afghanistan as their legitimate ruler. He is seen as our installed dictator.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
The Afghans I dealt with (Ghilzai Pashtoon primarily) had no problem with the US because the vast majority realized we are a temporary problem that will go away. They had huge problems with both Karzai and the government's construct.
We have earned the right to have a huge say in Afghanistan because
1. We broke it, we bought it.
2. We installed Karzai (that is not only true, but believed by 90% of the Afghans out there)
3. We are defending (but not, tragically, defunding) the current corrupt, disliked and illigitimate government.
Mr Karzai is doing us no favors at all. When he parrots the worst lies of the Taliban (which he does regularly) he does nothing to distance himself, he just makes the US look like liars. When his regime falls, he will follow nasrallah's path quite quickly. And I will shed no tears.
Where our opinions converge is that we tried to create government in a model of western european society and with no regard or understanding of Afghan society.
So we have an omnipotent central government, controllling both the military and police(!) appointed governors and a toothless, but popularly elected parliment. The Afghans quickly understood how worthless voting is and that is reflected by the ridiculously low turn out in the last election, even in areas where security was established
Karzai has done us, and the people of Afghanistan, no favors. Everyday he remains in power he hurts the interests of the United States and destabilizes the IGoA
Afghan society is capable of decentralized governance and peace at a much lower cost to the US in both military and cash cost.
The sooner we come to realize our mis-steps and rectify them, as opposed to doubling down, the sooner we can leave Afghanistan with our short and long term objectives met.
Sylvan,
I think you should re-read what I wrote; and also consider if the ends-ways-means of what you propose match up.
You say we should "realize our mis-steps and rectify them." I agree, we just differ as to what the mis-steps are and how to go about rectifying them.
The fastest way to get Karzai to either be legitimate or replaced is to encourage his pursuit of legitimate processes, such as the Peace Jirga that his current actions are building up to.
Your steps 1-3 essentially state that we have made Afghanistan our sovereign property/problem; so we can do what we want. I argure that we need to distance ourself from that position, and that if Karzai throws some hard words in our general direction in the process, to put some thickskin on and deal with it.
We need to change the course of both our politics and our military strategy here, just doing one or the other isn't enough. Personally I think that Mr K's current play supports what GEN McChrystal is doing very well.
Sylvan:
That's exactly right.
From what I can figure out, Afghanistan has always had a very complex form of decentralized concensus based governance which is consistently contrary to the desires and interests of external parties.
But none of those external parties has, to date, figured out how to centralize things, and those who have tried, even with internal Afghan "national" figures has not been successful.
The remainder issue for us is what basic formats need to be in place in order to assure our realistic objectives, given the reality of a decentralized Afghanistan.
I remain of the opinion that many Afghans do, in fact, want the international community to do many things for them. So, when and how can they build a concensus around trading between what the international community wants as a floor for doing what they want. That discussion, concensus needs to be addressed, with or without the Mayor's input---for them to decide.
Hard to imagine that a well-focused and realistic military mission can not be accomplished in the next year provided we don't get lost in chasing the windmills in Afghanistan.
A Loya Jirga that keeps the current Constitution in place is doomed to failure.
As long as Karzai is willing to fight to the last American, we get primary authority in that country. I have seen the ANA just sit in their FOBs all day while the ANP and ISAF do the brunt of the fighting. When the Afghans step up, they get more say.
Non-concur on Karzai supporting McChrystal, unless to give support to McChrystal's excusal of ANA non-performance on the battlefield due to "A poverty of resources."
While lip-service is given to fighting corruption, the money is still flowing into Karzai's coffers, AWK still is de-facto governor and chief drug runner in Kandahar, and the elections were so ridiculously rigged that our continued expression of Karzai being "the elected leader of Afghanistan" is a joke in Afghanistan and out.
If in fact he calls a Loya Jirga (which he really has to) the results of that Jirga will be the deciding factor. I believe he will buy off the attendees and maintain the Status quo. While hiding behind the fig leaf of using Afghan traditions.
We will see. I am not (obviously) optimistic.
Hi Ken, all I can say is agree with you 100%. The correct Political Questions have never been asked and answered. I do think that Brzezinski's viewpoint has a lot of merit. Link to interview below.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VXy8mz_UVEU
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...ctions_opinion
Snip
Some months ago, our envoy to Kabul, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, saw into the heart of the matter in a memo to his superiors. Mr. Eikenberry was without illusions about President Karzai. He dismissed him as a leader who continues to shunThe Eikenberry memorandum lays to rest once and for all the legend of Afghanistan as a "graveyard of empires." Rather than seeking an end to the foreign military presence, the Afghans and their leader seek to perpetuate it. It spares them the hard choice of building a nation-state, knitting together feuding ethnicities and provinces, and it brings them enormous foreign treasure.Quote:
responsibility for any sovereign burden, whether defense, governance or development. He and his circle don't want the U.S. to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further. They assume we covet their territory for a never-ending war on terror and for military bases to use against surrounding powers.
[QUOTE=Sylvan;96502]
...
So in short he thinks that he and his circle think that the necessities of a perceived Realpolitik of the West and especially of the US gives him enough hand to bite in and to gain political capital out of it. I really wonder if he does see it like that and very much so if his biting is in our interest.Quote:
"responsibility for any sovereign burden, whether defense, governance or development. He and his circle don't want the U.S. to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further. They assume we covet their territory for a never-ending war on terror and for military bases to use against surrounding powers."
Firn
[QUOTE=Firn;96509]Karzai believes he is in an inpenatrable position. I believe he is correct in his assessment.Quote:
Originally Posted by Sylvan
He is, "our man" We failed to rein him in in the last election and now he is free to do as he sees fit. He believes we won't leave and Obama doesn't give off the vibe of strength that Bush did.
thats why the "You leave or we do" ultimatim is our only viable course of action if we are serious about good governance in Afghanistan.
Yea, we are being played for suckers:(Quote:
Originally Posted by Sylvan
Wouldn't that set up a tripolar Afghanistan? The Taliban and their local officials, Karzai and his local officials, us and our local officials? Sounds a prescription for chaos and madness.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
It is interesting to note that Karzai and his cronies are finally being openly recognized as a large part of the problem... not that this is news to anyone who's been paying attention, but we're seeing a much more general acceptance of that particular elephant in the drawing room. It will be interesting to see if we pin the blame for dysfunction exclusively on Karzai and his crowd, or if we will accept that a large part of the problem is the system that bought Karzai to power, which was largely created by the intervening powers - which would put more of the responsibility on poor decisions on our side.
I have a hard time seeing how an effort to circumvent Karzai while leaving him in office is going to accomplish much. We coukd of course go back to the 70s, back a coup, and try to get a compliant general installed, but this hasn't produced entirely positive results in the past.
The idea of withdrawing, letting Karzai fall, and either dealing with whoever steps in (if it's not the Taliban) or going back in, removing the Taliban again, and starting over seems impossibly ass-backwards, but none of the alternatives sound much better. We do manage to work ourselves into some freakishly weird positions.
The invocation of the Philippine experience is of questionable relevance; the situations are hardly analogous and West's account is historically inaccurate. (A turf-driven digression, I admit.)Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
Dahayun:
I was looking forward to your comments (especially about the Phillipines).
Try to unscramble the muddle between Karzai and what increasingly is viewed by him as a block (Holbrooke/Galbraith/ISI/Taliban- ex Baradar), and it lloks like we could not be any more "in your face" to him than we are.
Iran sure looks like a close-by refuge in case things turn the way of Kyrgystan. Better off there than hanging around off a lamppost.
My guess is that the whole thing, like Iraq's election negotiations, is a game in progress, with no certain or predicatable outcomes.
On the other hand, pressing against Karzai may initially trigger his worries, but, on the other hand, trigger the worries of those who rely on, or would like to get, US and International assistance. The point of many of his powerful supporters, and opponents alike, was to get access to the trough we keep filling. If the US had the moxy to credibly threaten that trough, internal politics would have to come into play like never before.
How does anyone react if it were a credible potential that Karzai was no longer a path to the trough, and directly threatens future access for those not yet feeding?
BBC News goes everywhere, and the events in Kyrgystan, are all in the same neighborhood/sphere. All manner of things can occur when pressure builds.
The question is: If we stand like patsies while being openly dissed by him, there is no reason for anybody to do anything different. Status Quo is not a viable solution for us either.
In my mind, Galbraith and Holbrooke are abundantly signaling that a window is closing, and he isn't at it. To me. West's article was a "put" in the military game, as well as a further play to mobilize political support for US efforts.
If all that doesn't trigger a response, then another hand will be dealt. I doubt that any hand would ever include full-US withdrawal, but if Holbrooke and ISI are together and can limit/control the Taliban to meet minimum US objectives, it would not be the first time that we have substantially turned on our heel.
I just wonder whether all these folks are bluff (our side included), and the game will go on unchanged for a very long time. Something about having balls, or cutting the Gordian Knot that requires at least one party to actually do something significantly different. Haven't seen that yet.
On the other hand, if you start seeing serious experts like Dr. Cordesman come back from the current grand tour with serious change recommendations, US domestic politics could rapidly shift one way or another.
My three cents.
One absolute guaranteed way to get a rise out of me is to claim that Reagan's withdrawal of support was responsible for the fall of Marcos. A bit Pavlovian, yes, but I guess most of us have a hot button, or two or ten.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
I really wonder what that other hand is going to be. We had a window, with the obviously fraudulent election, but we seem to have passed it up, and windows don't stay open forever. If we set up a system, we accept the results of an election, and then we turn around and pull it all down because we don't like what came out of what we did... have to cringe at that, looks a bit of a debacle on the PR side.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
Maybe someone's got a creative idea... I hope so, and I hope (without much confidence) that we can pull it off. I'm not betting on significant reform from Karzai with any amount of pressure; I just don't think he has the capacity.
Sorry, I'm confused. Let me see if I understand.
The US put Karzai in place then ensured he got "elected?" - Roger so far?
The US is in Afghanistan with the permission of Karzai? - Correct?
.... so what is it about the strategy or the policy is it that has caused Karzai to threaten to join the Taliban?
- he hates being put on the spot about cleaning up corruption which is as Afghan as Nan (which is to say it migrated there out of Persia --as have so many things, including the Naan, or Nun as it is now...). It's an impossible dream.
- he hates being told, after only six years, to get his barely existent government moving to do things the US doesn't do well after 200+. Our impatience often comes across as hypocrisy. It always tends to bug other less driven cultures.
- he senses that the US wants out, badly, thus once again leaving Afghans in the lurch. We say we won't do that; history says we will and our opponents (to include some so-called Allies) point out Viet Nam, Panama, Somalia, as well as other times and places where we -- logically -- put our interests first * except they couch it as "You can't trust the Americans."
Enough to make anyone want to do or be something else... :D
* I have no problem with putting our interest first; I do have a problem with being smarmy and saying we'll do something we have no intention (or capability, not the same thing but has the same effect) of doing because it seems to perhaps, maybe, be something that might be in our interest in the near term...
Our electoral cycle poses numerous problems as well as even more benefits. The problem is not that cycle, it is the failure of planners to consider it.
Hey, Bob, Jeremy -- you guys see that??? :D
cross posting: I had convinced myself that the US actually wants to leave a reasonable stable non-taliban Afghanistan after they successfully suppress the taliiban, but I am increasingly fearful that not only will the US be UNABLE to do so, it does not even WANT to do so. I cannot make out what they DO want, but it sure doesnt look good. ISI is back on top in Pakistan and crowing about "strategic victory". Everyone in Afghanistan (including Karzai) is busy trying to look beyond a US defeat. This may reach the point of no return sooner rather than later. The fact is, I can even understand why that may make sense from an American point of view. America will probably do fine without playing world cop all over the place. Unfortunately, the mess that now exists in that region will get much worse before it gets better if America leaves. But, I was wrong about US intentions, I hope I am wrong about that too....maybe things will actually get better with less American interference. But then again, expecting China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia to behave sensibly and stay on even keel and manage to pay/manage the Pak army without encouraging millenial jihadi dreams, that seems like a tall order.....
I see a Taliban senior leadership breaking ties with their Pakistani masters, so much so that Pakistan is lashing out and rounding up large numbers to remind them that they have no intention of letting them quit this partnership for controlling Afghanistan.Quote:
Originally Posted by omarali50
I see an Afghan President finally recognizing that he can never defeat an insurgency in his own country until he is willing to create the perception that it actually is his own country and that he is actually the one in charge of it; and not some cabal of foreigners.
I see Afghans relying less of foreign constructs provided for them by that same foreign cabal and reaching out to the informal and formal leaders across Afghanistan in a series of Jirgas to discuss the concerns and desires of the people in a style viewed as legitimate here.
I see great discomfort, and also great understanding within the cabal of what is going on. Personally I agree with those who see promise in this, and find myself in good company, small though it may be. Those who are most uncomfortable are those who are least able to step back from their own paradigms.
Is Mr. Karzai crossing lines of polite politics? Certainly, but this is no time for polite politics, this is a time for action, and he understands that. One way or another the foreigners who lifted him to power are going to leave sooner than later, and he must decide what kind of solution he wants to have left behind: A Coalition Solution; a Pakistani Solution; or an Afghan Solution. I for one, will not find fault in the man for seeking the Afghan Solution.
I also think it is important to understand that military action only shapes conditions in insurgency, but that success and failure lay at the Governmental level. Populaction Centric approaches are a wise way to approach a populace that is all going to have to work together to be a part of the stable state that emerges from conflict; but it is Government Centric approaches (i.e., a recognition that one must address the true fundamental failings of government that give rise to such conflicts, which I believe are in the neighborhood of Legitimacy; Respect; Justice and trusted processess for the populace to address the same).
So I see things moving in the right direction; and I hope Mr. Karzai succeeds in his efforts; because no amount of foreign military or humanitarian action can solve a problem of this nature if he does not. I also recognize that if Mr. Karzai succeeds it may lead to him ultimately being replaced by some character not approved of by many supporting his government now; I think he recognizes that as well. But then, the only result that can be truly legitimate is one that is not also preordained or controlled.
This BBC report 'Italians held over Afghanistan 'assassination plot' alleging Italian NGO staff involvement in a plot to kill the Helmand governor is not good news and rather fits in with the Karzai narrative:Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mid...st/8613801.stmQuote:
Three Italian medical workers are among nine men arrested in Afghanistan in connection with an alleged plot to kill a provincial governor, officials say. The detentions came after suicide bomb vests and weapons were discovered at a hospital run by a Milan-based charity in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand.
Peter Galbraith was interviewed on Farid Zakari this morning. It is not on You tube yet so I can't post it, but it was a most interesting interview. It will replay again later in the day on MSNBC watch it if you get a chance. Ooops!!! it is CNN not MSNBC!!!!
Slap:
I'll keep looking for it.
Zakaria's April 9 interview is on the CNN site.
In his opinion, the US is going the wrong way with Karzai.
In his opinon, Karzai is the only way forward, and, therefore, we must continue to support and praise him.
To me, that is just so much Washington Talking Head foolishness about national pols preening with other national pols (until the next national pol comes in- The King is Dead, Long Live the King).
If, as he argues, the US has become so desperately strapped to Karzai (as is, and with full and glowing US support), we might as well abandon the mission today.It would be pointless if Afghanistan cannot change.
Instead, he overlooks so many fundamental alternatives and strategies, the core of which are the Afghan people themselves. What if they want to do something different, either at the local, regional or national level, or apart from Karzai's way?
One point he makes is that Afghanistan's leader must be Pashtun, and therefore, must be Karzai. Implicit in that statement is, I assume, that force of arms must be used to impose Karzai/Pashtun solutions on the non-Pashtuns.
Taken to reasonable conclusions, there will come a point when the concept of Afghanistan as anation will inevitably be abandoned by non-Pashtuns simply to escape Karzai, and the likelihood of further Pashtun oppression and ineffectiveness. Many parts of Afghanistan are very different, and moving forward on separate trajectories.
The reality is that, to the extent Afghanistan does function, it is by complex systems of competition and consensus at many different levels, and by many different groups, leaders and individuals. This is no different than many other places in the world that combine/recombine, aggregate/disaggregate, affiliate/unaffiliate
If, as Zakaria suggests, it is Karzai or the highway, he negates the possibility of those actual successful processes developing (or muddling through) to an alternative future. This is substantially inconsistent with Afghanistan's political history.
He greatly misunderstands the natural course of history and events.
Sometimes, his comments are insightful. Sometimes, they are just bizarre.
An update:Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-governor.htmlQuote:
Emergency, the Milan-based charity, said on Sunday that the arrest of its workers on Saturday was an attempt by the Afghan government and Nato forces to silence a "troublesome witness" of the suffering of civilians in the country. "They want to get rid of a troublesome witness. Someone has organised this set-up because they want Emergency to leave Afghanistan," Gino Strada, the head of the charity, told reporters.
Hat tip to Leah Farrell for capturing this Indian article on Karzai:http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/i...ow/5781643.cms
Ends with:Not a viewpoint I would endorse, but as others have noted before 'The Great Game' continues.Quote:
Standing by the elected Karzai — no matter how cozy he becomes with Pakistan and the Kandahari Taliban — is the only way for India to affirm its status as a secure and truly powerful regional hegemon. Moreover, it is the only course of action that is consistent with the Indian democratic narrative. Standing in Karzai's way because Indian hawks are worried about Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would immeasurably short-sighted, because Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan is inevitable and organic. Besides, Karzai's ventality, corruption and incompetence should not be so strange for South Asians. Our South Asian politics is like this only. Karzai was, is, and will remain, one of our own.
Isn't it funny?
In a dysfunctional system,if there is no positive solution or alternative, negative ones emerge.
Are they do-gooders frustrated by the circumstance, marks set up because they wouldn't pay someone, or are these just bullets being dug out of the wounds?
Sounds like this story will take a few weeks before anyone can actually know what it is about.
According to an LA Times report, President Karzai is (again) our close ally. Handshakes and press conferences all around.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...,1939741.story
So all that other stuff? (Never mind)
Here is a little over a minute of the Peter Galbraith interview which is all I can find at this time, but there is a lot more to this interview somewhere in cyberspace.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-jhxOHov7g
Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Frankly we know so far very little about this story, but let me put it into the (Italian) context:
a) Emergency, headed by Gino Strada is NGO providing humanitarian assistance, in this case it runs the hospital in Laskhar Gah or in the least provides medical and technical support for it. It is left-leaning and seems to be proud to denounce the "military occupation" and crimes against humanity caused by the same military forces or of the "sort of government".
b) They claim that they were picked on by the minions of the governor for this very reason.Quote:
È la solita storia: Emergency in Afghanistan, e soprattutto in quella regione, è un testimone scomodo di quanto fanno le forze di occupazione e una specie di governo ai danni della popolazione» denuncia Gino Strada, fondatore dell'associazione. Non c'è un motivo concreto, se non il ruolo critico dell'attività umanitaria della ong e delle denunce quotidiane a difesa delle vittime, secondo Strada, all'origine delle accuse agli operatori arrestati.
c) The immediate reaction of the right-winged Italian was surprisingly tame, which could be explained by the political climate and/or some truth behind the accusations. The reaction of undersecretary Alfredo Mantica seems to be almost gleeful - "(the arrests) should make Gino Strada and his organisation reflect that as a humanitarian he makes a little too much politics". He hopes that the truth supports Strada, but he is a bit "perplexed".
d) The spokesman of the governor seems to paddle back concerning the accusations against the Italians and speaks of some misunderstanding.Quote:
Il governo italiano sembra tuttavia restio a sposare la tesi di Emergency. «Prego veramente da italiano che non ci sia nessun italiano che abbia direttamente o indirettamente compiuto atti di questo genere - ha detto il ministro degli Esteri, Franco Frattini, a Sky Tg24 -. Lo prego davvero di tutto cuore, perchè sarebbe una vergogna per Italia». E già prima il suo sottosegretario Alfredo Mantica non aveva avuto parole incoraggianti: gli arresti devono «far riflettere Gino Strada e la sua organizzazione, che forse da umanitario fa un po' troppa politica», ha affermato. «Il governo italiano deve accertare la verità - ha aggiunto - e mi auguro che la verità dia ragione a Strada, ma ho delle perplessità». Mantica ha sottolineato che «è la seconda volta che Emergency finisce nel mirino delle autorità afghane», dopo il rapimento del giornalista di Repubblica, Daniele Mastrogiacomo.
e) The Italian government still does not openly support the arrested Italians. The minister of defense la Russa says that Strada should "avoid accusing the Afghan government, suspecting a NATO plot and drawing in the Italian government". He considers (Taliban) infiltrators a possibility which can not be ruled out.Quote:
Times di Londra mi ha citato in modo sbagliato, soprattutto per il riferimento di un legame fra gli italiani e Al Qaeda e oggi ha chiesto scusa - ha precisato il portavoce del governo di Helmand, Daud Ahmadi -. Tutto quello che ho da dire è quello che ho dichiarato il primo giorno e non aggiungo altro perché le indagini sono ancora in corso».
Defending himself against accusation that the government fails to protect the Italians he asks how many "exponents of the left have we rescued in the conflicts?"
Quote:
Gino Strada a essere più prudente e «evitare di accusare il governo afghano, di gridare al complotto della Nato e di tirare dentro il governo italiano».
Sarebbe più saggio se «prendesse le distanze dai suoi collaboratori, perché può sempre succedere di avere accanto, inconsapevolmente, degli infiltrati» afferma il ministro in un'intervista a La Stampa, nella quale paragona il caso che ha scosso Emergency a quello di altri «infiltrati», come le Br con il Pci o i Nar con l'Msi. Per il ministro, in ogni caso, «la storia del complotto non sta in piedi». «Se le autorità afghane - afferma - avessero fatto un imbroglio contro Emergency ci saremmo arrabbiati anche se il loro orientamento politico è noto a tutti. Quanti esponenti di sinistra abbiamo salvato negli scenari di guerra?». Se venisse accertata la colpevolezza degli operatori italiani, per La Russa, «il danno per l'Italia militarmente impegnata in Afghanistan sarebbe gravissimo».
Opinion:
I won't rule out that this hospital was chosen by the Taliban to blow up the governor, as it could be a good setting to do so. Infiltrators and smugglers might have been used to bring the needed material into the hospital before it gets watched and closed off by the bodyguards. Strada does not rule out this possibility, put he puts the guns down to foul play by the Afghan government. Anyway it was clear that there is not love lost between Emergency and the Afghan government and the Italian one.
There are IMHO two realistic possibilities:Quote:
«Se qualcuno di noi volesse introdurre una pistola in un qualsiasi ospedale italiano lo potrebbe fare in dieci minuti. C'è sempre la possibilità di corrompere qualcuno e che qualcuno la depositi al momento della perquisizione». Ma, ha aggiunto, in ogni ospedale di Emergency ci sono cartelli con scritto «Niente armi».
a) The security forces acted on the legitimate concern and used this opportunity to lash out at Emergency,
b) The Afghan political forces made it up.
An active involvement of this Italians would be very surprising and very grave, but it seems to be the least likely explanation.
Firn
His logic is flawed.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
In order to win in Afghanistan, we must win the Pashtoon population. This is a fact.
To win the pashtoon population, you don't need (IMHO) a Pashtoon president. You need a government that respects and protects Pashtoon culture and local leaders. A Dostum doesn't work, but a Massoud might. Karzai certainly doesn't do it. His gubenatorial (sp?) appointments have been heavy handed and counter productive. Regardless, Karzai is not a popular leader among the majority of Pashtoons and is especially disliked in Kandahar City. That we focus so much on Helmand and ignore Kandahar (we will see if we are serious about fixing that situation soon) is one of our many blunders.
As noted earlier, we missed our opportunity to start fresh after the elections. Although I believe installing Abdullah ^2 would have worked against us in the South.
However, the bottom line the longer Karzai remains in power the worse the situation is going to become in the South unless he quickly changes course in many areas.
Foremost is reigning in his little brother.
Allowing Governors to be if not popularly elected, at least popular vetted at a Shura or Jirga.
Release control of Provincial Police to Provincial Governors. Maintain control of ANCOP only at MOI level.
Replace Tajik dominated leadership in the ANA in 205 corps to Pashtoon leadership.
Eating a bullet (OK, wishful thinking)
Sorry, I forgot to provide the links. The quotes come all from the Corriere della Sera
Not surprisingly exponents of the left say they are behind Emergency. Il monde é paese, the world is a village, as the Italian saying goes.
Firn
So, the Lords of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar may be Pashtun, but, by their actions, do not engender support of the Pashtun people under their watch (thumb).
Thus, inside their sphere is oligarchy and fealty, and outside their immediate sphere are their opponents.
We are somewhere in the middle of that mess, fueling the oligarchy while denouncing it, and opposing the opponents without addressing the cause of their opposition.
A bit of a sticky wicket?
I was reading a recent interview with Dr. Abdullah who indicated that he could have, by saying yes to a few phone calls, have brought down Karzai, but, in doing so would have (1) caused huge danger/destabilization, and (2) worked outside the parliamentary process that, in his belief, is the thing that Afghans take pride in having restored---he would not become what he opposed.
That kind of hard-learned humility (maybe much from recent losses) demonstrates that he (and many others) could fairly lead all the people (no loss of face for Pashtuns). Question is how does a transition/trainsformation occur?
Behind that interview, also, was Abdullah's concern about Karzai's continual efforts to dismantle civilian structure (Election Commission, etc.). So the question of timeliness is in play---Can a change take place before even further damage is done?